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ABSTRACT 
 
The main problem investigated in this study is why a homogeneous nation with a 
high literacy rate such as Lesotho has had so many breakdowns of democracy since 
independence in 1966. Lesotho is completely surrounded and economically 
dependent on South Africa and depends mostly on the external sources of income 
(migrant remittances, customs revenues and foreign aid). Why has this democracy 
not consolidated?   
For the assessment of the consolidation of Lesotho’s democracy, this study adopted 
the multivariate model of Bratton and Van de Walle. This model uses institutional as 
well as socio-economic variables. In the application of this model various other 
authors were used as well. Schedler dealt with the concept of breakdowns, whereas 
Linz and Stepan emphasised institutions and Przeworski et. al and Leftwich also 
utilised multivariate models, including socio-economic factors. 
Upon the attainment of independence, the King became a constitutional monarch 
within a parliamentary system. The monarchy was from the beginning of 
independence uncomfortable with this status that granted him limited powers. The 
democratic regime inaugurated with the 1965 elections lasted only till 1970, when 
the ruling party under Chief Leabua Jonathan which did not support the monarchy, 
declared the election results invalid and suspended the constitution after his ruling 
party lost to the opposition. But Chief Leabua Jonathan was toppled from state 
power in 1986 by the military. The military ruled for eight years. It was clear that the 
monarchy (eager for executive powers) and the military became factors in the 
survival of democracy in Lesotho.  
Democratic rule was relaunched in 1993. The 1993 and 1998 elections were 
followed by violent power struggles. This time the constituency-based electoral 
system served as catalyst for the political crises and was blamed. This is because 
seats did not reflect electoral support as opposition parties were not adequately 
represented in parliament. Constitutional reforms followed and in 2002 democratic 
rule was reintroduced. The 2002 and 2007 elections were conducted under the 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, which is a hybrid between constituency-
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based and proportional representation. Despite the electoral reforms, uncertainties 
still remained as the result of escalating socio-economic problems. 
This study addresses the ways in which the monarchy, the military, the electoral 
system and the socio-economic factors contributed to the breakdown of democracy 
in Lesotho. The original aspect of this study lies in the novel set of questions that 
have not been asked before. It fills the gap in the literature on the 2007 elections and 
the workings of the new electoral system by comparing the 2002 and the 2007 
elections.  
Despite the constitutional reforms in 2002, the 2007 elections resulted in the new set 
of problems. The problem of the Lesotho MMP system is how it has to be 
operationalised and the lack of understanding among the politicians and electorates 
on how it works. This situation is exacerbated by the absence of legal and clear 
guidelines on how the translation of votes into seats– especially for candidates under 
proportional representation (PR) – has to be undertaken in cases where there are 
coalitions between parties. This institutional reform of the electoral system has not 
added any value for the development of democracy as losing parties have refused to 
adhere to the rules.  
Apart from the electoral system, some of the other core problems are older and 
institutional. The monarchy has over the years been at the root of some of the 
country’s democratic breakdowns. It also had influence in the military. The military 
instituted a period of authoritarianism and managed the transition to democratic rule 
in the early 1990s.The monarchy and the military continued to destabilise the post-
1993 democratic governments until 1998, after which the electoral system was 
reformed. 
But the problems are not only institutional. Lesotho is a democracy with low per 
capita income. It also has high levels of inequalities as well as high unemployment. 
Lesotho also has one of the highest HIV/Aids rates in Southern Africa. The country 
performs poorly when measured against aspects of the United Nations Human 
Development Index (HDI) such as life expectancy, mortality rates and standard of 
living. It is the poorest country, with the lowest HDI of Southern Africa’s “free 
nations”, according to Freedom House. These socio-economic problems have 
impacted negatively on the prospects of democratic consolidation.  
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One positive aspect is the high literacy rate of over 80%. But this has not benefited 
Lesotho’s democracy in any meaningful way as most of its educated people are 
working in South Africa. The country does not have a sizeable middle class, while 
civil society, except for churches, is also weak. While the monarchy and military have 
been successfully depoliticised, Lesotho’s democracy remains unconsolidated 
because of weaknesses in the electoral system (lack of understanding of its 
operationalisation) and continuing problems of socio-economic development. Its 
ethnic homogeneity is not an asset either as other divisions have recurred all the 
time. The overall conclusion is therefore that although most institutional factors 
responsible for democratic breakdowns in the past have been overcome, the socio-
economic variables such as poverty, weak civil society, small middle class and 
socio-economic inequality will hinder consolidation for a long time to come.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die hoofprobleem wat in hierdie studie ondersoek word, is hoekom ’n homogene 
nasie met ’n hoë geletterdheidsyfer soos Lesotho, soveel onderbrekings 
(“breakdowns”) van die demokrasie sedert onafhanklikwording beleef het. 
Vir die beoordeling van konsolidasie van Lesotho se demokrasie is van ’n model van 
multivariëteit gebruik gemaak. Dit is gebaseer op die denke van Bratton en 
Van de Walle wat van sowel institusionele as sosio-ekonomiese veranderlikes 
gebruik maak. 
Die konsep van afbreuk (“breakdown”) is van Schedler afkomstig. Linz en Stepan 
maak uitsluitlik van institusionele veranderlikes gebruik, terwyl Przeworski et. al en 
Leftwich ook van multi-veranderlikes gebruik maak. Hulle denke het die teoretiese 
raamwerk van hierdie studie gevorm. 
Heeltemal omring deur, en afhanklik van Suid-Afrika, word die Koninkryk van 
Lesotho geteister deur politieke onstabiliteit. Die koning het ’n grondwetlike monargie 
binne ’n parlementêre stelsel geword. Die monargie was egter sedert die begin van 
onafhank-likheid ongemaklik hiermee. Die demokratiese regime het in 1965 met 
verkiesings tot stand gekom. Maar dit het slegs tot 1970 geduur toe die regerende 
party van Hoofman Leabua Jonathan die verkiesing verloor het, en die grondwet 
opgeskort het. Hyself is in 1986 in ’n staatsgreep deur die weermag omvergewerp. 
Dit was toe reeds duidelik dat die monargie en die militêre faktore in die oorlewing 
van demokrasie in Lesotho geword het. 
Demokratiese regering is in 1993 heringestel. Die 1993 en 1998 verkiesings het 
egter weer geweld opgelewer. Nou was die kiesafdeling-gebaseerde kiesstelsel 
geblameer omdat setels nie met steun vir partye gekorreleer het nie. Grondwetlike 
hervormings is ingestel waarna demokrasie weer in 2002 heringestel is. Die 
verkiesings van 2002 en 2007 het onder reëls van ’n hibriede stelsel van 
proposionele verteenwoordiging sowel as kiesafdelings plaasgevind. Daar was 
stabiliteit, maar onsekerhede was as gevolg van ingewikkeldhede van die stelsel wat 
nie opgelos is nie. 
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Die studie ontleed die rol van die monargie, die weermag, die kiesstelsel en vlak van 
sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling in die opeenvolgende demokratiese ineenstortings in 
Lesotho. Die oorspronklikheid van hierdie studie is dat vrae gestel word wat nog nie 
voorheen met betrekking tot Lesotho gedoen is nie. Dit vul dus ’n gaping in die 
literatuur, ook wat die onlangse verkiesings van 2007 betref. 
Ten spyte van die grondwetlike hervormings van 2002, het die 2007 verkiesings 
nuwe probleme opgelewer. Die probleem is dat sowel die kiesers as die politici nie 
altyd verstaan hoe die formules van die hibriede stelsel werk nie. Daar is ook ’n 
afwesigheid van riglyne oor hoe om stemme in setels om te sit waar kaolisies 
deelgeneem het. 
Afgesien van die verkiesingstelsel, is van die ander probleme ouer, maar ook 
institusioneel van aard. Die monargie soos hierbo gestel, is deel van hierdie 
probleme. Dit het soos aangedui ook ’n invloed op die militêre gehad. Beide het die 
demokrasie gedestabiliseer tot ná 1993 en 1998, waarna die nuwe verkiesingstelsel 
nuwe probleme opgelewer het. 
Die probleme in Lesotho is egter nie net van ’n institusionele aard nie. Lesotho is ’n 
arm demokrasie met lae per capita inkome, hoë ongelykhede en werkloosheid, 
asook van die hoogste HIV/Vigs syfers in Suider Afrika. Lesotho vaar ook swak op 
die Verenigde Nasies se Menslike Ontwikkelingsindeks. Dit is ook die armste van 
Freedom House se nasies wat as “vry” geklassifiseer word. 
’n Positiewe aspek is die hoë geletterdheidsyfer van 80%. Maar dit het Lesotho 
oënskynlik nie gehelp om die demokrasie volhoubaar te maak nie. Die land het 
byvoorbeeld nie ’n beduidende middelklas nie, terwyl die burgerlike samelewing met 
uitsondering van die kerke, ook swak is. Terwyl die monargie en die militêre deesdae 
gedepolitiseer is, is die demokrasie nog nie gekonsolideer nie. Die redes hiervoor is 
die probleme met die kiesstelsel en voortgesette lae ekonomiese ontwikkeling. 
Etniese homogeniteit is ook skynbaar nie ’n bate nie, want ander verdelings ontstaan 
deurentyd. Die hoofkonklusie van hierdie studie is dus dat alhoewel Lesotho die 
institusionele faktore wat vir demokratiese afbreuk in die verlede verantwoordelik 
was oorkom het, die sosio-ekonomiese veranderlikes soos armoede, swak 
burgerlike samelewing, klein middelklas en ongelykheid steeds konsolidasie nog vir 
’n lang tyd sal belemmer. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
 
This chapter begins with a brief historical overview, followed by the problem statement, 
research questions, the conceptual framework and the research methodology. The 
kingdom of Lesotho is a landlocked country of 30,355 square kilometres, which is 
completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa (Khaketla, 1971:1). The country 
is very mountainous with a harsh climate, especially in the north-east and along the 
eastern border, where the elevations exceed 3,350 metres above sea-level. Less than 
13% of the soil is arable and is found mostly in the western strip. The extremely skewed 
distribution of arable land explains the excessive population concentration in the 
western cultivable areas (Poverty Reduction Strategy of Lesotho, 2004/5:12). 
 
The scarcity of jobs and land shortages has forced many Basotho people to move to 
South Africa as migrant labourers. It was estimated that in 1995 over 25% of the adult 
male labour force was employed in the South African mining industry. For decades the 
country’s economy depended mainly on the remittances from its population working in 
the South African mines. While there was a decline in the 1980s in the numbers of 
migrant workers employed in South Africa as a result of retrenchments, there has been 
a renewed migration of skilled workers since the 1990s as a result of political changes 
in South Africa (Poverty Reduction Strategy of Lesotho, 2004/5). This dependence 
makes Lesotho very vulnerable to the politics of a powerful neighbour.   
 
Since the attainment of independence 40 years ago, the country’s democracy has 
experienced a number of breakdowns. The political atmosphere has been unstable and 
turbulent, with sporadic political violence. There have been three military coups de tat. A 
process of redemocratisation was attempted in 1993. But violence marred the elections 
of 1998. Electoral reforms were then introduced in 2002. In 1998 the country was 
engulfed in the worst political violence of its history, which almost precipitated the 
country into the state of civil war as opposition parties refused to accept the outcome of 
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the elections. This political crisis led to the destruction of much of the economic sector 
of Maseru and other towns through looting and burning down of major commercial 
centres. According to estimates, the damage was over M300 million (R300 million) 
(Bureau of Statistics: Report on National Annual Accounts, 2000:1). 
 
1.2  Historical overview  
 
The kingdom of Lesotho is based on the pre-colonial state of Basutoland, which was 
established by Moshoeshoe in 1822. Moshoeshoe was a remarkable leader who forged 
a new nation from smaller groups and refugees from the difaqane period in Southern 
Africa. He made skilful use of the placing system, which entailed placing a trusted 
loyalist – usually a member of the Koena group and a “Son of Moshoeshoe” – in charge 
of smaller groups. Overall 22 principal chiefs and ward chiefs came into being.  
The monarchy remained functional from 1822 to the present day, but lost executive 
power at the time of independence. Placing strengthened the power relations with his 
‘core’ district of Matsieng at Thaba-Bosiu (Kimble, 1999:9). The most significant political 
institutions were the pitso (public gathering) and lekhotla (court). These institutions were 
characterised by high levels of popular participation and a considerable freedom of 
speech, which is a hallmark of democracy (Machobane, 1990:23). Machobane 
(1990:25) states that pitsos “ensured that people participated in the government and 
governance, [and] Moshoeshoe achieved an important traditional institution of public 
democracy”. 
The lekhotla (court) is where major decisions relating to a whole range of affairs is 
made, from war to diplomacy, from major political placements to ‘cultural revolutions’ 
(such as the temporary abolition of lebollo – circumcision). These decisions were made 
in this “corridor of power” (Kimble, 1999). What must be noted is that, though the 
Kingdom consolidated during the difaqane period, there are still remnants of the Tlokwa, 
Baphuthi and Nguni-speaking people who remained outside of these institutions, though 
they are incorporated into the Sotho way of life. Their identity still prevails to a large 
extent in areas of Quthing and Butha-Buthe. Despite this, a remarkably homogenous, 
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single-language nation-state emerged, with Sesotho spoken as first language by at 
least 80% of the population (the other languages are Xhosa and English).  
During the years of British rule (1868-1966) the colonial administration sought to 
maintain the basic political conditions for domination over Moshoeshoe’s successors. 
The British ruled the Basotho through the monarchies of Letsie I (1870-1891) and 
Lerotholi (1891-1903). This involved the suppression of the anti-colonial threat posed by 
Letsie’s uncle Masopha Moshoeshoe and the “establishment of the basic legal, 
administrative and fiscal institutions of the colonial state” (Kimble, 1999:4).  
Moshoeshoe’s successors were made part of the National Council in 1903. Kimble 
(1999:4) argues that this was “an attempt to create a mode of intervention into... [the 
country’s]... internal workings”. This was particularly directed towards control over land 
disputes, court hierarchies and the administration of taxes. In the later stages they were 
made part of the Basutoland Council until 1959. By then schools, missionaries, migrant 
labour and civil administration had all changed the fabric of the traditional society.  
There was systematic erosion of monarchical power, particularly in the exercise of 
executive functions after the country became a British protectorate in 1868. The Morena 
e Moholo (King) became the “paramount chief” under British rule. When the country 
attained independence, the nation was still intact but with a weaker monarchy as a 
result of British rule, the forces of modernisation and the imposition of parliamentary 
rule, which made the office of the King a ceremonial one (Weisfelder, 1999:24). The 
erosion of the powers of the King affected him as well as his followers, even to this day, 
as will be explained later. 
Soon there was a power struggle between the royalists, who wanted an executive 
monarch as in Swaziland, and many other traditionalists and commoners, who wanted a 
titular monarchy and real power in the hands of the Prime Minister, according to the 
Westminster-type parliamentary democracy that would come to Lesotho at 
independence in 1966. Royalists formed the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) in 1962 
as opposed to other traditionalists (mainly chiefs), who formed the Basotho National 
Party (BNP) as early as 1958. Commoners tended to support the Basutoland Congress 
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Party (BCP) and later the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the All Basotho 
Convention (ABC). 
The people of Lesotho formed typical civil society associations from the 1920s onwards, 
e.g. the Progressive Association, the Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB), the Traders and the 
Teachers Associations. Christianity was widespread, with the Roman Catholic Church 
(RCC) being the largest, followed by the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC) since the 
late 1870s. Christianity and literacy were on the increase. There were high expectations 
that democracy would work well in a homogenous, literate and civil society-orientated 
country upon the assumption of independence. 
 
The Kingdom of Lesotho became independent as a parliamentary democracy in 1966.  
The first democratic government was inaugurated with the 1965 elections; it lasted until 
1970, when the ruling party (BNP) under Chief Leabua Jonathan lost the election, as it 
won 23 seats against the 36 seats of the BCP, or only 42% of the vote (Matlosa, 
1999:172). However, his party remained in power as the constitution was suspended. 
But this was only the first of the breakdowns and others occurred in 1986, 1994 and 
1998. As the BCP was supported by many commoners and the BNP by the 
traditionalists, this was a power struggle in which the conservatives prevailed through 
undemocratic means, i.e. deviating from the constitution.   
Chief Leabua Jonathan declared the election results of 1970 invalid, suspended the 
constitution and declared a state of emergency. This might have suited interests of the 
apartheid government in South Africa. He argued that the government was remaining in 
power to save the country from the onslaught of communism as propagated by the 
BCP, then led by Ntsu Mokhehle. King Moshoeshoe II was forced into exile to the 
Netherlands in April 1970 for eight months by the BNP government. This was on the 
presumption that he “would give the government a breathing space within which it will 
be able to restore calm and stability in the country” (Mphanya, 2004:70).  
During this period the BNP government exercised strict control over recruitment into the 
armed forces and it consolidated its own power, not only against external threats but, 
most critically, against the internal opposition (Mphanya, 2004:71). In fact, Mothibe 
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(1999:47) argues that “the action set in motion an authoritarian agenda characterised by 
brute force, naked oppression and de facto one party rule”. Mothibe (1999) further 
argues that the military became highly politicised and acted as essential supporters of 
this civilian dictatorship in power. The army thus sided with the undemocratic forces at 
that time. The traditionalists also lined up against the royalists by sending the King into 
exile.  
As a result of internal and external pressure to return the country to democracy, the 
BNP government made token moves to settle the legitimacy crisis that dogged it. It 
called for general elections in 1985, but these turned out to be illegitimate as all the 
BNP candidates were elected unopposed because the opposition boycotted the 
elections. The electoral outcome paved the way for the reform-minded military coup with 
the South African influence which deposed Chief Leabua Jonathan in 1986 (Mahao, 
1997:2). It has been suggested (Anonymous, 1986:66) that “from its inception, the coup 
was to facilitate the return to democratic rule, [it was]…a vital moment …for creating a 
purely transitional government”.  
King Moshoeshoe II gave the military the highest praise for the coup. His passionate 
speech in praise of the coup is worth quoting as he stated that: 
a second miracle since the founding of the nation happened on the 
20 January 1986. This nation was redeemed the second time and 
given a new lease of life. The Armed forces ushered a new era into 
Lesotho in an extraordinary fashion, one so different from what 
usually happens in similar circumstances, that many people are 
asking themselves whether the change is real and lasting (King 
Moshoeshoe II Address, 12 March 1986). 
The King granted the military administration with the title of Knight Commander of the 
Most Dignified Order of Moshoeshoe. This was the highest award ever to be given in 
the country (The Times, 22 January 1986). Machobane (2001:66) states that “it was a 
pronounced recognition of the well conceived plan of the men in arms”. With this 
setback to civilian authority, the question was whether the army had now begun to 
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oppose authoritarianism in government or were they acting on behalf of the weakened 
monarchy? 
The military argued that it had launched a coup in order to return the country to 
democratic rule through a process of national reconciliation (Gill, 1993:289). In its early 
stages the military government attempted to procure a kind of legitimacy by involving 
the King Moshoeshoe II. The military viewed the monarchy as the institution to lead the 
country in the process of national reconciliation. The arrangement was that the King 
would exercise legislative and executive power on the advice of the Military Council 
(Gill, 1993). Had the King’s power base now been militarised, or had the military sided 
with the monarchy in this ongoing power struggle? 
Faction fighting developed within the military as a result of power struggles between the 
King and Chairman of the Council (Major General Metsing Lekhanya) (Machobane, 
2001:57). The outcome of this power struggle led to another change in government in 
February 1990. This saw the dismissal and prosecution of the King’s confidant Colonel 
Sekhobe Letsie (Machobane, 2001; Mahao, 1997:2). In February 1990 divisions in the 
regime culminated in the passing of Order No. 2 of 1990.1  
The monarchy lost executive and legislative powers and, most importantly, the military 
removed King Moshoeshoe II from the throne, forcing him into exile in Britain 
(Machobane, 2001). This was the second time that the King was exiled, but this time by 
the military and not the traditionalists led by Chief Leabua Jonathan. The military 
administration also replaced the deposed King with his son, Prince Mohato Bereng 
Seeiso, who became King Letsie III in November 1990.2 
                                                            
1 Order No. 2 of 1990 was passed by the military government and it banned all political activities 
and political movements in Lesotho. 
 
2 Prince Mohato Seeiso and the College of Chiefs resisted the attempts of the military 
government for his installation as the replacement for his father King Moshoeshoe II, but after 
the lengthy discussions with the British High Commissioner and the increasing fears that the 
military government might abolish the institution, the Prince ultimately agreed to take over from 
his deposed father. 
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However, the military administration was not reform-minded as they violated the rule of 
law, abused basic human rights and retarded the process of democratisation (Gumbi, 
1995:3). In an effort to appease the potential opposition in the country, the chairman of 
the Military Council and Head of Government established a Constituent Assembly, 
which was to pave a way for the return of multiparty democracy (Gumbi, 1995; Mahao, 
1997). Did the military now begin to help with the redemocratisation of Lesotho?   
The junior officers staged an internal coup that dislodged Major General Metsing 
Lekhanya on 30 April 1991. The chairmanship of the Council was taken over by Colonel 
Phisoana Ramaema (who became Major General upon the assumption of his duties) 
(Mirror, 27 May 1991). Major General Phisoana Ramaema’s ascendancy to power saw 
the lifting of the Suspension of Political Activities Order No. 4 of 1986,3 which paved the 
way for the new (second) democratic regime in 1993.  
The 1993 election was a significant development in the re-establishment of 
constitutionalism in Lesotho (Mahao, 1997:4). The long-awaited democratic election 
took place on 27 March 1993 after a lengthy period in “constitutional limbo” (Mahao, 
1997:1). There was a high voter turn-out in the election. The prime factor behind this, 
according Matlosa (1997:147) was,  
the annulment of the democratic elections and abolition of 
democracy in 1970, suggesting the importance of these elections to 
the voters was that they were a means of righting the past wrongs.  
The election was won overwhelmingly by the BCP in all 65 constituencies in this typical 
First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) result, which represented 74% of the vote (Matlosa, 
1999:97). The BNP took 23% of the vote but did not get a constituency. This result 
indicated that the electoral system might have had serious flaws.  
The BNP refused to accept the election outcome, alleging that the election was rigged. 
However, it failed to prove allegations of ballot rigging in the courts and resorted to 
destabilising the government. The BNP leader Retselitsoe Sekhonyana denounced the 
                                                            
3Political Activities Order No .4 of 1986 banned political activities until a time that national 
reconciliation would be achieved (Mothibe, 1999). 
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BCP government and was later charged with “high treason and sedition”, though he 
received only a suspended jail sentence (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Events Leading to the Political Disturbances which occurred in Lesotho during the 
period between 1st July to 30 November 1998, 2001:16). 
The military was divided into two factions on the issue of who should replace the BCP 
government after it institutes another coup. The other issue at stake was a 100% pay 
increase demanded from the government (Sejanamane, 1996:38; Matlosa, 1999:174). 
The situation reached a climax when the then Royal Lesotho Mounted Police (RLMP) 
(now Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) went on strike, demanding a 60% pay 
increase. They were offered a 42% pay increase.  
On 14 April 1994 a group of soldiers assassinated Selometsi Baholo, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance. In an effort to diffuse the crisis, the government tried to 
placate the soldiers with an offer of an overall pay increase of 66% and improved their 
allowances (Mothibe, 1999:55). 
Tensions between the executive and the monarchy increased and resulted in the palace 
coup in August 1994. Was this the last throw of the dice for the monarchy?  The BCP 
government was deposed from state power by King Letsie III, who argued that he was 
acting in the interests of peace and stability. He formed an interim six-person 
Provisional Government for eight to ten months, while in the meantime the King noted 
that an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) would be formed to prepare for new 
elections under proportional representation (PR) (Matlosa, 1995:133).  
The pro-democratic forces (including the BCP members and civil society organisations) 
organised protests and stay-aways against King Letsie’s interim government. Their 
stay-away brought the capital, Maseru, and other urban centres to a standstill. All 
commercial sectors were closed down and most people joined the protests against King 
Letsie III. The King Letsie III’s interim government lacked legitimacy, but the pro-
democratic elements were unable to depose the government (Matlosa, 1995; Mothibe, 
1999; Sekatle, 1997).  
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The military gave tacit support to the palace coup. Matlosa (1995) argues that what the 
royalist supporters failed to acknowledge was the undoing of democracy in Lesotho in 
the wake of the successful democratic elections in South Africa in 1994. This would 
have disastrous consequences. The newly elected President of South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela, warned that if democratic rule was not restored in Lesotho, South Africa might 
be compelled to send a peace-keeping force. 
South Africa began to mobilise its troops along the Maseru-Ladybrand border (Matlosa, 
1995:136). Mothibe (1999:21) argues that this was in preparation for the military 
intervention in Lesotho. The United States of America (USA) and Sweden suspended 
their aid to Lesotho and other donors threatened to do likewise (Mopheme, 26.8.94).   
As the result of the external mediation by Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as well 
as the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union AU), King Letsie 
III finally agreed to restore the democratically elected BCP government of Ntsu 
Mokhehle to power on 14 September 1994. A memorandum was signed between Ntsu 
Mokhehle and the King Letsie III to restore the deposed King Letsie’s father, King 
Moshoeshoe II, to the throne. This action was greeted with popular celebrations across 
the country as the ceremonial King as well as democratic rule was restored (Southall 
and Petlane, 1995).  
After redemocratisation in 1993 and the formation of the LCD in 1997, the 1998 election 
was won overwhelmingly by the LCD. The LCD won 79 out of 80 seats with 60% of the 
vote (Kadima, 1999:14). This was the turning point for the electoral system of FPTP as 
BNP won 24, 5% of the vote but only one seat. The BCP got 10, 5% and the MFP got 1, 
3% of the vote but they did not get any seats either. This led to dissatisfaction and 
bitterness among opposition parties (BCP, BNP and MFP) as they felt excluded from 
the political system. They refused to accept the election outcome. They also alleged 
ballot rigging and then organised violent protests against the LCD government (Makoa, 
1999:83). The South African led military intervention managed to restore law and order 
and this paved the way for the electoral reforms.  
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It is against this background that the elections of 2002 took place. A mixed electoral 
system that incorporated FPTP and PR known as the mixed member proportional 
(MMP) system was adopted for the 2002 elections. It provided that parties would submit 
lists for the 80 constituency-based seats and political party lists for the 40 proportional 
seats (Government of Lesotho, Interim Political Act, 1998). However, the 2002 
parliamentary elections were characterised by a split in every one of the main political 
parties as a result of infighting.  
The LCD was split between two groups: Shakhane Mokhehle, the then Minister of 
Justice, Human Rights and Prisons and brother of the former Prime Minister and 
founder of the LCD, led a dissident group against the Prime Minister and party leader 
Pakalitha Mosisili. The two personalities had been in open conflict on the direction the 
LCD should take. Shakhane Mokhehle publicly disapproved of the election of the new 
National Executive Committee (NEC) in January 2001. 
Eventually Prime Minister Mosisili sacked three cabinet ministers, including Mokhehle, 
and demoted the Deputy Prime Minister and deputy party leader, Kelebone Maope, to a 
relatively junior position in cabinet (Lesotho National Assembly Report, 2002:9). This 
development led to a breakaway from the LCD and the formation of the Lesotho 
People’s Congress (LPC) led by Kelebone Maope.  
Power struggles continued in the BCP over the leadership of the party between Molapo 
Qhobela and Tseliso Makhakhe, which culminated in a protracted court case. The 
Lesotho High Court finally ruled in favour of the Tseliso Makhakhe faction. The Molapo 
Qhobela faction broke away and formed the Basutoland African Congress (BAC).This 
was the old BCP name that was used in the 1950s.  
The 2002 elections were eventually won by the LCD with 77 of the 80 constituency 
seats. The LPC won one constituency seat. Two constituencies did not elect their 
constituency representatives as a result of the death of two opposition candidates and 
the election was rescheduled in these constituencies. The LCD did not get the PR seats 
because Lesotho’s MMP system states that any party which wins over 70 constituency 
seats will not get the PR seats (Elkit, 2002:2). 
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Of the 40 PR seats, BNP got 21 seats, the LPC got four seats, BCP got three seats, 
BAC got three seats, the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) got one seat, MFP got 
one seat and the National Independent Party (NIP) got five seats. The Lesotho Workers 
Party (LWP) and the National Progressive Party (NIP) each got one seat (Elkit, 2002).  
The elections were accepted by the opposition parties except the BNP. The BNP made 
allegations of ballot rigging and instituted legal proceedings against the LCD. The BNP 
lost in all the cases on ballot rigging. However, stability prevailed after the 2002 
elections, with no violent protests against the outcome.   
Prior to the 2007 elections significant developments occurred in the country’s political 
landscape. The BNP was embroiled in the power struggle over the direction the party 
should take. The BNP’s MPs formed a faction known as the Struggle for Democratic 
Change, which demanded constitutional amendments and the removal of Major General 
Metsing Lekhanya from the leadership of the party. They accused him of being 
undemocratic and authoritarian (MoAfrika, 18 November 2006). 
The assassination of the former deputy leader and senior member of the BNP, Bereng 
Sekhonyana, MP, deepened the BNP crisis. The Struggle for Democratic Change, 
facing allegations that was it was backed by the LCD government, accused Major 
General Metsing Lekhanya’s faction of being responsible for the assassination of 
Bereng Sekhonyana, MP (MoAfrika FM, Radio Broadcast, 26 November 2006).  
The Struggle for Democratic Change held their conference and elected the new 
leadership of the party. Thabang Nyeoe was elected as the party president. Major 
General Metsing Lekhanya’s faction opposed the election of the executive on 
constitutional grounds and they eventually won their case in the High Court. Thabang 
Nyeoe broke away and formed the Basotho National Democratic Party (BNDP) 
(MoAfrika, 18 November 2006).  
In October 2006 Thomas Thabane (a senior cabinet Minister of Communications, 
Science and Technology) broke away from the LCD and formed the All Basotho 
Convention (ABC). Thabane cited rampant corruption, the lack of service delivery and 
the lack of implementation of policies in the LCD government as the key factors for his 
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breakaway. He crossed the floor and joined the opposition with 17 MPs. This move 
reduced the LCD dominance in parliament, as it remained with 61 seats over against 
the combined opposition, which had 58 seats. 
Amid unconfirmed reports that the ABC was mobilising MPs from the ruling party to 
cross the floor and push for the vote of no confidence in the LCD government, the Prime 
Minister Pakalitha Mosisili called for the closure of parliament as well as for early 
elections (Moeletsi oa Basotho,  4 December 2006).     
Though Thomas Thabane cited lack of service delivery and poor implementation of 
policies, the deputy leader of the ABC Sello Machakela indicated that the break with the 
LCD was a result of the unpopular amendment of the LCD constitution (Moeletsi oa 
Basotho, 4 December 2006). This amendment stated that “the National Executive 
Committee (NEC) shall have a final say in who should contest for the party in the 
constituencies and… shall have the right to neither accept nor refuse the name of the 
proposed candidate” (Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) - Lekhotla la Puso ea 
Sechaba ka Sechaba Constitution, 2005:16). 
Eager to get PR seats, the LCD formed a coalition with the NIP. The leader of the NIP, 
Anthony Manyeli, publicly denounced the LCD/NIP coalition after he was left out in the 
PR list. Anthony Manyeli successfully got an interdict from the High Court which 
declared the LCD/NIP coalition null and void, but this was later overturned by the Court 
of Appeal. This resulted in the emergence of two camps in the NIP, one under Anthony 
Manyeli, which refused to recognise the coalition, and the other under his deputy 
Motseki Motikoe in support of the coalition (Moeletsi oa Basotho, 4 December 2006).   
The ABC formed a coalition with the LWP. Neither the NIP nor the LWP fielded 
candidates in the constituencies, but their supporters were to vote for the LCD and ABC 
candidates respectively. In return, the LCD and ABC supporters were to vote for NIP 
and LWP under PR. The LPC, BAC and the BCP faction led by Ntsukunyane Mphanya 
known Mahatamoho a Poelano le Kopano (Congress of Reconciliation and Union) 
contested the election as the Alliance of Congress Parties (ACP). The retrenched and 
disgruntled migrant workers from the South African mines, who were unhappy about 
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their retirement benefits, formed the Basotho Batho Democratic Party (BBDP) under the 
leadership of Jeremiah Ramathebane.  
The 2007 elections (for 80 FPTP seats) were won by the LCD with 61 constituency 
seats, the ABC won 17 constituency seats and the ACP won one constituency seat. 
Elections were rescheduled in one constituency following the death of the ACP 
candidate. For the 40 PR seats, the NIP got 21 seats and the LWP got 10 seats. The 
BNP got three seats, the Alliance of Congress Parties (ACP), Basotho Batho 
Democratic Party (BBDP), Basotho National Democratic Party (BNDP), Popular Front 
for Democracy (PFD), BCP and the MFP all got one seat each (Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC), Election Report on Lesotho 2007 General Elections, 25 February 
2007). The LCD won almost all the rural constituencies. The ABC won the urban and 
semi-urban areas in Maseru, Berea, Teyateyaneng, Peka, Maputsoe, Hlotse and Butha-
Buthe. 
Opposition parties refused to accept the electoral outcome with allegations of ballot 
rigging. The King had publicly accepted the outcome of the elections. He stated that his 
powers were defined in the constitution and appealed to the opposition parties to 
challenge the LCD/NIP coalition in a peaceful manner.  
The ABC candidate for the Matlakeng constituency, Tsotang Mphethe, was expelled 
from the National Assembly five days after taking an oath as an MP. The circumstances 
under which he was sworn in remain unclear, because he was defeated by the LCD 
candidate, Mothobi Nkhakhle, in the constituency. He was also not on the PR list of the 
ABC/LWP coalition (Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 22 March 2007). There is no official 
report from the IEC except an acknowledgement from the speaker of the National 
Assembly that this was an administrative mistake (Public Eye, 30 March 2007). 
Significantly, the military declared its support for the constitution and its loyalty to the 
government of the day. The military crushed the sit-in protest of the opposition MPs in 
the National Assembly a couple of days after they had been sworn in; they were 
protesting against the election outcome and the allocation of the PR seats. At the time 
of writing, members of the (heavily armed) military were patrolling the streets of Maseru 
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on a daily basis. This was no longer a case of political meddling, but of upholding the 
rule of law.   
 
The situation remained tense but calm as opposition supporters in Maseru continued to 
jeer the LCD cabinet ministers and MPs. The electoral system of MMP (combination of 
FPTP and PR) has therefore led to an increased representation of over 10 parties in 
parliament. Thabane (leader of the ABC) has, however lashed out the electoral system 
because it has led to “the LCD hegemony in parliament, that is not truly representative 
through its controversial coalition with the NIP” (All Basotho Convention (ABC) Rally, 
Ha- Abia, 25 March 2007).   
 
1.3  Problem statement and research questions  
 
The aim of this study is to examine the process of democratisation in the Kingdom of 
Lesotho, with a specific focus on breakdowns and the absence of factors for 
consolidation and endurance. The question is: why have there been so many 
democratic breakdowns in a country with many positive features? Lesotho is one of the 
few sub-Saharan countries with a largely ethnically and linguistically homogenous 
population, high literacy rates and highly respected monarchs in the past. But there 
were democratic breakdowns. The causes of these democratic breakdowns are 
seemingly complex as they are not traceable to a single factor. The study aims to 
consider the role of a number of factors in the breakdown of democratic regimes 
experienced thus far, and to assess to what extent institutions and socio-economic 
features have succeeded in containing these factors.   
The study examines the movement between authoritarian and democratic regimes in 
Lesotho (democratisation and transition) and further pays particular attention to 
consolidation and endurance. The current (2009) democratic regime represents the 
third attempt (after 1993 and 2002) to consolidate a democratic regime, with all the 
previous attempts having broken down followed by a reversion to authoritarian civilian 
or military regimes. The question then is: to what extent is the current regime an 
advance over previous democratic regimes in proceeding towards the consolidation and 
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endurance of democracy? This study assesses institutional as well as socio-economic 
variables that feature prominently in the historical overview and in the academic 
literature.  It is therefore a multivariate model (see hereunder) which is also a novel 
approach to the studies of this nature in Southern Africa (see pg.22-23 later). 
 
Although the institutional prospects for multiparty democracy at the time of 
independence were good, the country suffered numerous instabilities and breakdowns 
of democratic rule almost from the outset. For example, all the elections from 1965 to 
1998 were controversial, leading to democratic breakdowns through civilian 
authoritarianism, as well as the military and monarchical interventions in 1986 and 
1994. In the post redemocratisation period in 1993, both the military and the monarchy 
competed for political power with the democratically elected civilian governments. The 
1998 elections ignited the worst violence ever.What went wrong: protests by royalists, 
the military, political opposition or other grievances? 
 
The only peaceful elections were those in 2002 and 2007. As mentioned before, the 
causes of these breakdowns are complex as they cannot be traced to a single factor. 
However, the evident variables that will form part of an explanation of democratic 
breakdowns are the monarchy, the military as well as the FPTP electoral system and 
adverse socio-economic conditions that keep Lesotho perpetually poor.   
 
One key question is whether the military and the monarchy, as well as the ousted BNP, 
now accept the full implications of constitutionalism and the new hybrid electoral model 
of parliamentary rule? Are elections therefore not sufficient to institutionalise 
democracy? Or are there other unfavourable conditions in Lesotho, socially and 
economically, that hinder the consolidation of democracy? Did the high literacy rates 
add any value for democratic consolidation? Is the elusive quest for democracy in 
Lesotho now potentially settled? Or will poverty remain an obstacle that will conspire to 
erode another promising democratic future for this mountain kingdom? 
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A case can be made that after independence the monarchy was a mechanism that 
obstructed the deepening of parliamentary democracy in Lesotho as it shifted power 
from this traditional institution to party-based majority rule. For example, there is a 
royalist party (MFP) which advocates executive powers for the King. Mahao (1997:2) 
states that in 1986 “the monarchy, a subject of intense controversy… was drawn to the 
arena of politics to provide legitimacy for the military seizure of power” and King Letsie 
III himself attempted to seize power in 1994.  
 
Machobane (2001) and Weisfelder (1997) suggest that the restoration of an unelected 
monarchy is one explanation for democratic breakdown. Over the years the monarchy 
has tried to assert its influence with little success. As for the 1998 crisis, the monarchy 
played a primary role as opposition parties camped at the palace grounds. There were 
also unconfirmed allegations that King Letsie III assisted opposition parties in various 
ways.  
 
The most comprehensive assessment of the redemocratisation of the 1990s comes 
from the book edited by Southall and Petlane (1995), Democratisation and 
Demilitarisation in Lesotho: The general elections of 1993 and its aftermath. It tries to 
understand why the military coups of 1986 and 1991 succeeded. Why was Lesotho 
susceptible to military rule? Were the military coups intended to restore the monarchy, 
change the electoral system or promote any of the claims mentioned below?  
Huntington argues in his 1998 book Political Order in Changing Societies, like Finer in 
Men on Horseback (1975), argues that coups occur in states lacking institutionalised 
political cultures and that suffer economic hardships. In contrast, Janowitz argues in 
Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (1977) that soldiers intervene 
out of patriotism, discipline, professionalism and cohesion. In Lesotho’s case, this was 
unlikely.  
 
Liebenow states in An African Politics: Crises and Challenges (1986) that soldiers often 
claim legitimacy, efficiency, stability, unity and development. These things may well be 
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true elsewhere, but in Lesotho it was also about the preservation of power for 
institutions that had to make way for popular power. In other words, did the military in 
Lesotho intervene in politics to drive forward the process of democratisation or hold it 
back?     
   
Though the crises of 1993 and 1998 suggest that the FPTP electoral system may be 
another institutional variable in the democratic breakdowns, Sekatle (1997) disagrees 
that the FPTP electoral system was a possible factor for these two breakdowns. She 
denies that the model favours the exclusion of significant minorities and that it denied 
the losing parties participation in the country’s political landscape. Sekatle (1997:7) 
states that 
I do not agree that the electoral system deliberately excludes certain 
sections of the population; it did not do so in 1965 and 1970. In 1965, 
opposition parties were well represented in parliament. The 1970 
elections would have also given a fair representation to opposition 
parties. The anomaly of a one party parliament that resulted from the 
1993 and 1998 elections is a legacy of the long history of BNP 
dictatorship. A political party is judged at the polls by its 
performance. The verdict passed by the electorate on the BNP in 
1993 and 1998 testifies to this. You cannot rule against people’s will 
for more than two decades and expect to be forgiven inside two 
years. 
 
Has Lesotho’s mixed parliamentary membership (MMP), instituted in 2002 changed 
democratic politics in terms of increasing popular participation and control? Was it 
sufficient to eradicate the legacy of the BNP dictatorship as alleged by Sekatle? 
Problems remain, as evidenced by the different interpretations of how MMP system has 
to be operationalised and the ruling party’s (LCD) view that PR parliamentary seats are 
not legitimate.  
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Electoral and parliamentary reforms do not seem to have enhanced the prospects for 
inter-party collaboration and cooperation to generate genuine debates and exchanges 
in parliament (Public Eye, 11 April 2007). Inter-party relations remain adversarial, with 
the ruling party using its majority to win parliamentary debates rather than creating the 
basis for cooperation and consensual decisions. Is this likely to enhance the prospects 
of democratic consolidation in Lesotho? Lesotho’s parliament is apparently alienated 
from the population, weakly linked with civil society and made up of people who can 
hardly appreciate their role and functions.  
 
Ajulu’s (1995:9) hypothesis on democratic breakdowns in the country highlights 
economic aspects. He argues that  
 
the post-colonial state in Lesotho was and remains relatively weak in 
comparison with other post-colonial states in Africa. It inherited 
neither a manufacturing, commercial or secure agricultural base. It 
was therefore a dependent state par excellence. This dependent 
nature placed restrictions on what the state was capable of 
achieving, irrespective of whichever class or alliance of classes 
secured control of state power.  
 
Ajulu (1995), and Fox and Southall (2003) all allude to problems of a weak economy, 
poverty and a fragile civil society. Notwithstanding this, a few hypotheses can be put 
forward on the basis of early discussions of the institutional dimensions which combine 
them with socio-economic factors. These arguments could be drawn mainly from the 
works of Kimble (1981) and Strom (1978).  
 
Kimble (1981:155) argues that the social stratification in Lesotho during the period 
1890-1930 in terms of Moshoeshoe’s I placing policies resulted in the relations of 
dependence and dominance between the chiefs and the commoners, which made a 
foundation for what she described as “royal aristocracy”. Kimble (1981:156) argues that 
by the time of Moshoeshoe’s I death, he had moulded, with the assistance of the British, 
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a koena ruling lineage into a dominant class. Its totem is the “crocodile”; hence 
Breytenbach’s 1975 book is entitled Crocodiles and Commoners. 
 
Strom (1978:82) argues that the political cleavage in post-colonial Lesotho is a mirror-
image and legacy of colonialism. She states that in post-colonial Lesotho there are two 
distinct social groups, namely the lower strata consisting of the migrant workers and 
their dependants, while in the upper strata there are chiefs and the petit bourgeoisie. 
According to Strom, this social structure has been responsible for the lengthy political 
battles between the key political actors. 
   
Machobane (1961) argues that the administrative reforms of the chieftainship and the 
court reforms in 1938, as well as the developments which followed, are crucial causes 
of the democratic breakdowns in Lesotho. Machobane (1961) argued that class 
consciousness and political assertiveness increased. There was also the emergence of 
educated elite within civil society movements such as the Basutoland Progressive 
Association (BPA), who were eager to participate in the governance of their country. 
 
Machobane (1961) notes that the rise in the price of grain in the last quarter of the 19th 
century opened up Basotho subsistence farming to capitalist penetration, which in turn 
weakened the communal bonds that kept the Basotho nation together. Also, the 
commoditisation of agricultural products placed land at the centre of political debates as 
the chiefs started to move the commoners from the best agricultural land.  
 
Neocosmos (2002:1) argues that the country’s political landscape in the post-colonial 
period is attributable to the outcome of struggles between the colonial state, traditional 
structures (chiefs), the poor economy and the emerging petit bourgeoisie. Relevant data 
show that in 1997 close 90,000 Basotho migrant workers employed in the South African 
mining industry were retrenched and this has aggravated the unemployment levels 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 3rd Quarter 1996;  Economist Intelligence Unit , 2nd Quarter 
1997) ever since. 
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In 1989 the country followed the structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the 
World Bank, which had detrimental effects on the levels of employment and social 
conditions. Government subsides were withdrawn and wages depressed. 
Consequently, poverty escalated as a result of the withdrawal of subsidies by the 
government.  
 
One of the abandoned schemes was the Food for Work  projects in  the 1980s and 
early 1990s, where female labour were paid a small sum for working in constructing 
infrastructure such as roads, dams and bridges (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd  
Quarter 1997). Is the ongoing crisis of poverty, where the majority of the citizens live 
under conditions of low surplus creation, a possible explanation for Lesotho’s 
democratic breakdowns?   
 
Lesotho’s economy is weak and dependent on South Africa. Unemployment is high and 
per capita income were less than US$1000 in 2005, which is much lower than those of 
most multiparty systems of Southern Africa, notably those of Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa. The country has high incidences of poverty and is dependent on the 
external sources of income (migrant remittances, customs revenues from the South 
African Customs Union (SACU) and foregin aid). Lesotho also has high HIV/Aids 
infection rates. Though the country made a positive progression during the colonial 
period towards democracy led by the literate civil society movements, the country had 
breakdowns. This suggests that socio-economic conditions might have contributed to 
this. 
 
Weisfelder (1992) argues that Lesotho’s democratic breakdowns even during those 
early days of independence were the consequence of poverty and underdevelopment. 
He (1992:23) argued that  
 
a highly politicized population exists in an environment of abject 
poverty and negligible potential for satisfying popular aspirations… 
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fully mobilized with nowhere to go, the Basotho employ their 
energies in political battles.  
 
Lesotho’s democratic breakdowns therefore seem to be rooted in the socio-economic 
conditions as well as the weak institutions of the state. Institutional and socio-economic 
conditions are significant for democratic consolidation, as will be argued in this study.    
 
The originality of the study lies in its posing a novel set of questions- based on the 
“multivariate model” of Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), which have not been asked 
together before. This fills a gap in the literature. Another new dimension of this study is 
that it deals with the 2007 elections and the working of the new electoral system by 
comparing the 2002 and the 2007 elections. Likoti (2005), Matlosa (2002), (2003), 
Makoa (1996), (2002) and Southall (2003) have written extensively on the prospects 
and challenges facing democratic consolidation in Lesotho before these later events. 
They concluded that the consolidation of democracy in Lesotho was unlikely as long as 
political parties do not adhere to democratic principles. Much of their attention was also 
focused on the institutional reforms (reforms of the electoral systems, and the 
restructuring of the military, the police and the bureaucracy).  
 
The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) undertook studies in 2003 and 2004 
respectively on the theme Consolidating Democratic Governance in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Region. These studies investigated the state 
of political parties in the democratisation process in the SADC region. They further 
assessed the role and effectiveness of political parties in the institutionalisation of 
democratic governance in the SADC region (EISA, 2004). But their study was more on 
the institutional reforms in Lesotho. It also covers issues such as representation and 
accountability, local government and citizens participation, though it acknowledges the 
significance of socio-economic factors such as economic and corporate governance in 
democratic consolidation.  
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Mahao (1997), Makoa (1996), Mothibe (1999) and Matlosa (1995) provided detailed 
insights into Lesotho’s military, its lack of cooperation with the democratically elected 
civilian administration, and the poor civil-military relations after the 1993 elections. But 
they did not cover the depoliticisation of the military after the 1998 election and its role 
after the 2007 election in safeguarding democracy. My approach seeks to assess the 
impacts of the restructuring of the military in the post-1998 electoral crisis and the 
military’s role in the promotion of democracy in Lesotho. 
   
Machobane (2001), Makoa (1996), Sekatle (1999) and Weisfelder (1999) have written 
extensively on the role of the monarchy in Lesotho’s politics. They argued that since 
independence the monarchy has over the years striven to attain executive powers. But 
the limitation of these studies is their lack of attention to the political developments that 
occurred after the 1998 electoral crisis, which is the depoliticisation of the monarchy, the 
gradual erosion of its influence and its role in the promotion of democracy after the 2007 
election. 
 
Sechaba Consultants (1995), (2000), Matlosa (2003) and Southall (2003) allude to the 
significance of socio-economic conditions. They argue that poverty and the increasing 
retrenchments of migrant workers were likely to hamper the prospects for democratic 
consolidation in Lesotho. They concluded that Lesotho’s economy does not have an 
internal growth dynamic and depends mostly on external sources. But they did not 
make a comparative assessment of the role of both institutional and socio-economic 
factors. They also did not divide the link between the role of socio-economic conditions 
(poverty) and electoral politics (jobs for representatives) in Lesotho’s democratic 
breakdowns and democratic consolidation. This study therefore, addresses the 
following questions: 
 
 In what way did the monarchy affect the breakdown of democracy in 1970 and 
1998? 
 In what way did the military affect the breakdown of democracy in 1970 and 
1998? 
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 How did the electoral system of FPTP affect the breakdown of these democratic 
regimes? 
 What has been the impact thus far of the new Mixed Member Proportional 
System (MMP) instituted in 2002? 
 What role did socio-economic factors (including poverty and dependence on 
external sources of income) play in the breakdown of democracy from 1970 to 
1998? 
 What are the prospects for consolidation given institutional reforms amidst 
continued weak socio-economic conditions? How would the factors impact on the 
endurance of democracy? 
 
1.4 Conceptual framework  
 
The key concepts relevant to the research problem are: authoritarian regimes, 
democratic regimes, democratisation and democratic survival, and democratic 
consolidation and breakdown. The multivariate framework is based on institutional, 
social and economic variables and is set out below. 
In authoritarian regimes rulers exercise power regardless of the consent of those over 
whom they rule. Absolutist monarchies and military rule are typical examples (Heywood, 
2002:38). In democracies rulers govern with the consent of the ruled. In liberal 
democracies consent is acquired through competitive elections that are fair and 
inclusive, and the rulers are limited in the exercise of power by upholding specific civil 
and political rights (Dahl, 1971) and policy restraint (Leftwich, 2000). Electoral 
democracies typically hold regular elections that are to some extent inclusive, but fall 
short of upholding all liberal rights. Democratisation is the process by which regime 
rules are re-written to move closer to those of the ideal of liberal democracy (Heywood, 
2002:422).   
The breakdown of democracies occurs with “dramatic, sudden and visible relapses to 
authoritarian rule” (Schedler, 1998:97). For the major actors in new democratic regimes, 
“consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of its breakdown to the point 
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where they can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near (and 
not-so-near) future” (Schedler, 1998:98).   
A key indicator of the consolidation of democracy is that major players resist the 
temptation to act outside of the constitutional rules of the democratic regime, but freely 
choose to act competitively within these rules of political contestation (Linz and Stepan, 
1996: 16).4 In the case of Lesotho, the major actors who have departed from democratic 
rules have been the monarchy, the military and the political party (BNP) led by Chief 
Leabua Jonathan immediately after independence. And in all instances the moment of 
default occurred when election results were announced. The role of these actors, as 
well as of the electoral rules as mechanisms of conflict resolution, is therefore critical in 
both the breakdown and the consolidation of democracy in Lesotho. 
In moving away from a single-factor account of democratic consolidation and 
breakdown, this study follows the methodology of Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), 
Leftwich (2000), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (1996), Linz and Stepan 
(1996) as well as others who applied a new theoretical approach to understanding 
democratic consolidation in Africa. Bratton and Van de Walle proposed a “multivariate 
model” (1997: 149-158, 186-193, 221-232), i.e. taking into account both institutional as 
well as socio-economic factors.  
They emphasise, however, that their approach is minimalist in that it deals with a 
minimum number of independent variables, which they isolate as “the mechanism” for 
regime change, i.e. what triggered breakdown, or what was favourable for the 
endurance of democracy? Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Leftwich (2000) and 
Przeworski et al. (1996) note that institutional and socio-economic issues were essential 
in understanding democratic consolidation. Leftwich (2000) further proposed additional 
                                                            
4 According to Linz and Stepan (1996:16), this indicator can be measured in three dimensions: 
behaviourally, when no powerful actor attempts to achieve its objectives by creating new non-
democratic regimes; attitudinally, when the majority of the public hold the opinion that 
democratic rules and procedures are the most appropriate way to govern public life; and 
constitutionally, when all political actors freely accept, and become “habituated to”, the 
democratic process as the appropriate set of rules for conflict resolution. 
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conditions for democratic consolidation, namely, legitimacy, adherence to the 
constitutional rules of the game, and policy restraint by winning parties. He also lists 
poverty and ethnic divisions as constraints. Moore (1996) also mentions middle class as 
crucial for democratic consolidation. The application of Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) 
“multivariate model” and Leftwich (2000) arguments gives the study a unique analysis of 
the problems facing democratic consolidation in Lesotho.    
As mentioned, the study identifies the following factors as independent variables: the 
monarchy, the military,5 and the electoral system within which they compete with one 
another. Independent variables such as Christianity will not be dealt with.  In addition to 
these four factors mentioned above, the literature on democratisation also points to 
certain socio-economic conditions that favour the consolidation of democracy. Restated 
in terms of the above definitions, these are conditions that contribute to, or facilitate, the 
establishment of the behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional attributes of a 
consolidated democracy. 
1.5 Research methodology  
The study is not based on questionnaires and opinion surveys.  It is a desktop research 
making use of generally available literature. I feel particularly equipped to write more on 
the political developments having closely observed events as they unfolded in the 
country since the redemocratisation period in 1993. I also had informal and unstructured 
interviews with some leaders of the main political parties. This is a descriptive and 
analytical study using concepts derived from the theories of transitions away from 
authoritarian rule and supportive of democratisation in Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
Bratton and Van de Walle’s seminal work on democratic experiments in Africa (1997) in 
which regime transitions were studied in a comparative perspective is used as point of 
                                                            
5 The importance of the military has also been emphasised in other studies.  In his seminal work 
on military interventions in Africa, Liebenow in African Politics: Crises and Challenges (1986) 
proposes that once any military has carried out successful takeovers (repeatedly in Ghana, 
Nigeria and Benin), that option will remain. Soldiers “learn” how to stage coups. These 
conditions were applicable to Lesotho, and the question is to what extent these conditions 
persist. See also works by Huntington (1998), Finer (1975) and Janowitz (1977).   
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departure, along with the conceptual frameworks of Leftwich (2000), Schedler (1998), 
Przeworski et al. (1996) and Linz and Stepan (1996).   
The study is broadly located within the body of work that is found in the field of political 
science that deals with democratisation. The 2007 national elections will be included in 
this study as it represents the second set of elections under the MMP system, hence 
allowing for valuable additional material to assess the electoral system and its impact on 
democracy.   
The study will depend on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources to be 
used from the political parties will include the election manifestos and the parties’ 
economic, strategic and policy documents. Government documents of primary value will 
include the Lesotho Vision 2020 strategic paper, financial budgets (1993-2006), the 
Langa Commission of Inquiry into the 1998 Elections in Lesotho, Lesotho Defence 
Force (LDF) Act of 1996 and policy documents.  
 
Other primary sources are the archival material on Lesotho at the Morija Museum, 
Lesotho National Library and archival section of the National University of Lesotho 
(NUL). There is a substantial data on Basutoland colonial records, Sechaba Consultants 
records, statistical evidence of the trends in employment, the growth of the middle class, 
economic indicators, poverty trends, migrant labour and population growth rates. 
 
Lastly, the study draws on the monarchical documents of King Moshoeshoe I, Melao ea 
Lerotholi (Laws of Lerotholi) and the Chieftainship Act. Other useful primary sources 
include the IEC electoral pamphlets, the Interim Political Act of 1998, results of the 
elections up to and including the 2007 election as well as information on the delimitation 
of constituencies. Secondary sources to be used include newspaper articles, academic 
and scholarly books, journal articles and media briefings. 
   
Finally, an important resource for the study is newspapers that are written in Sesotho.  
Although English is an official language in Lesotho, most of the party electoral 
manifestos, archival material and some government briefs are written not only in 
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English, but in Sesotho as well. I did not have any difficulty in understanding the issues 
covered in these sources.  
 
As the result of the endless breakaways of the main political parties, for instance, the 
breakaway of the ABC from the LCD, the BNDP from the BNP and the formation of the 
coalitions between the LPC, BAC and the Mahatamoho a Poelano le Kopano (Congress 
of Reconciliation and Union), its been difficult to access the party’s official documents. 
The emergence of these coalitions and breakaways has resulted in substantial changes 
to the original parties’ election manifestos, policy documents and strategic papers, 
which have been difficult to assess them in order to make balanced conclusions. How 
seats are apportioned in MMP systems between coalition parties after an election is a 
special problem not only in Lesotho but elsewhere as well. 
 
There has been a significant change to the original version of the Lesotho Defence 
Force Act of 1996 as part of the ongoing process of the transformation of the LDF after 
the 1998 electoral crisis. Statistical evidence on employment trends, poverty trends, 
migrant labour and economic indicators was slightly tampered with in the population 
census in 2006. Some substantial parts of the Basutoland records were burnt and 
destroyed during the 1998 political crisis. The study is also subject to a time limitation, 
as the 2007 election serves as a cut-off point for the study.  
 
The significance of the study lies in the foundation it can provide for the collective and 
critical (institutional, social and economic) understanding of the challenges facing 
Lesotho as well as of the route that the country has to follow in order to consolidate its 
democracy. The study will also indicate approaches on how to deepen democracy in 
Lesotho through an in-depth examination of the significance of institutional and socio-
economic conditions and factors (Leftwich, 2000) pertaining to consolidation and 
endurance.   
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CHAPTER 2:  DEFINING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIO- ECONOMIC 
FACTORS IN DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL AND CONSOLIDATION 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a framework within which the four variables 
inductively identified in Chapter One can be systematically analysed. These are the 
monarchy and the military, the electoral system and socio-economic factors. The 
chapter begins with an emphasis on democratic institutions. Attention is drawn to the 
definition of democratic consolidation, followed by the relevant conditions and factors for 
its consolidation.  
 
An assessment is made about the levels of democraticness and breakdowns. The 
objective is not to create a new theoretical framework for this purpose from the various 
works currently available. Instead, the aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of 
various theoretical frameworks available with which to analyse the dynamics of 
breakdowns/consolidation and then to select one multivariate framework which is to be 
used in this study.  
 
The global wave of democratisation after 1974 (the “third wave”) and especially in the 
1990s saw Southern African countries undergoing profound political changes including 
the embracement of political liberalisation. There was a shift from the previous 
authoritarian regimes to multiparty democracies. Lesotho, too, was not immune from the 
effects of democratisation on the global scale (Matlosa, 1997, 2000). What should be 
noted is that the emergence of these democratic systems still remains in its early stages 
and it is not necessarily irreversible (Matlosa, 1997), as breakdowns in Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe have demonstrated.   
 
Breakdowns can occur. The Commonwealth Heads of States (1997) noted that “unless 
appropriate structures and institutions are developed and sustained, democratisation 
may destabilise society rather than help resolve social and political conflicts”. Nor is 
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political change or transitions away from authoritarian rule tantamount to fully fledged 
democratisation, let alone consolidation (Matlosa, 2000). Bratton and Van de Walle 
(1997:29) accurately capture this situation:  
 
… cracks in the edifice of autocracy should not be mistaken for fully 
fledged transitions to democracy … political liberalisation and 
democratisation are simultaneous, complementary, but ultimately 
autonomous processes: the former refers to the disassembly of 
authoritarian regimes, whereas the latter requires the deliberate 
construction of democratic institutions. It is entirely possible that 
liberalisation can occur without democratisation, and in some parts of 
Africa the disintegration of authoritarian rule may be followed by 
anarchy or intensified corruption, rather than by stable and 
accountable governments.  
 
Many countries that experienced re-democratisation after 1974 and in the 1990s have 
had their second or third elections. The challenge confronting them is how to 
consolidate their democracies.  
 
Consolidation as later explained occurs when the democratic regime is free from 
challenges of legitimacy and when all political actors support the rules of the game 
(Leftwitch) established by the new democratic institutions (Diamond, 1996). Factors are 
parliamentary institutions (Przeworski et.al (1996) and Leftwitch, 2000)) political parties, 
rule of law (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Leftwitch, 2000), policy restraint by the winners 
(Leftwitch, 2000) and socio-economic factors such as affluence, economic growth and 
inequality reduction (Przeworski. et al (1996) and Leftwitch (2000)) must exist. There 
must also be a vibrant civil society (Linz and Stepan, 1996) and middle class (Moore, 
1996) for the regime to be regarded as consolidated. High literacy rates are also 
positive (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:237-241).  
   
Some authors argue that the choice of institutions is critical for democratic 
consolidation. Cardoso (2001:17) states that the revitalisation of institutions of political 
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expression and representation constitutes one of the main challenges confronting the 
contemporary world.  
 
Heywood (2002:87) indicates that state is a political association that establishes 
sovereign jurisdiction within a defined territorial borders and excercises authority 
through a set of permanent institutions that are public and responsible for enforcing 
collective decisions. This means that the state must have the capacity to mediate, 
manage and perform redistrutive functions. This underlines the significance of the state 
as an autonomous entity for democratic consolidation. The salient question is: does 
Lesotho’s state have appropriate institutions to manage its internal affairs given its 
chronic economic dependency on South Africa?   
 
2.2  Democratic institutions   
 
The study has adopted Robert Dahl’s (1971:1) contention that democracy is a system of 
government that is characterised by its continuing responsiveness to the preferences of 
the citizens, considered as political equals. Dahl’s assumptions are that for a 
government to be continuously responsive to the needs of its citizens, it is required to 
formulate preferences, to signify preferences and to include preferences weighed 
equally in the conduct of the government without any form of discrimination regardless 
of the content or the source of the preference (Dahl, 1971:2).  
 
He describes democracy as polyarchy (1971, 1986a and 1989) and further stressed the 
significance of participation and contestation. However, these are ideals; Elklit (1994:89) 
argues that whenever these democratic ideals are made applicable in the real world, it 
is evident “that no countries satisfy the requirements perfectly, and … that countries 
differ in the degree to which they fulfil them”. See the discussions on the levels of 
democraticness below.  
 
In Democracy and Its Critics (1989:221), Dahl defines polyarchy as “a political order 
distinguished by the presence of seven institutions, all of which must exist for a 
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government to be classified as a polyarchy”. Dahl (2005) re-emphasised the 
significance of institutions in his article “What political institutions does large-scale 
democracy require”. These include: 
- elected officials;  
- free, fair and frequent elections; 
- inclusive suffrage; 
- the right to run for public office; 
- freedom of expression;  
- alternative sources of information; and  
- associational autonomy (freedom to form and join organisations). 
 
Elklit (1994:5) points out that these seven democratic institutions put forward by Dahl 
(1989) for a government to be classified as a polyarchy can be seen as constituting two  
dimensions of democratisation, which are liberalisation (public contestation) and 
inclusiveness (participation). Hence, democratisation is explained as development on 
both dimensions (Dahl, 1971:4-8). 
 
These rights, institutions and processes are operationalised through specific indicators, 
as advocated by Elklit (1994:93). Elected officials are members of legislatures or 
executives. Moreover, elected officials are constitutionally elected by the citizens and 
have influence and control over government decisions on policy. Dahl indicates that 
attaining this democratic requirement is sometimes problematic, but the feasible 
solution is that citizens should be in a position to elect their top officials and “hold them 
more or less accountable through elections by dismissing them … in subsequent 
elections” (2005:193). The question of electoral turnover is therefore relevant 
(Huntington, 1991). Huntington postulates that two turnovers are minimal requirements 
for consolidation. In this way, the citizens might be in a situation to have effective 
participation and be in a position to choose another government agenda through elected 
representatives (Dahl, 2005). 
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Writing on political representation and participation, Heywood (2002:316) argues that 
legislatures for elected officials should “provide a link between government and the 
people … [and are] channel[s] of communication that can both support government and 
help to uphold the regime, and force government to respond to public demands”. 
Heywood (2000:317) states that the key functions of legislatures are not only to 
represent, but also to enact, legislation; hence, they are vested with “legislative power in 
the hope that the laws thus made will be seen to be authoritative and binding”. 
 
Heywood (2002) argues that an “assembly is a forum in which proposed laws can be 
openly discussed and debated ... [and] are constituted so as to suggest that the people 
(or, in pre-democratic days, the major interests in society) make laws themselves”. 
Secondly, in terms of increasing representation, assemblies are essential for they 
provide a link between the government and the people. This is where the choice of an 
electoral model becomes crucial.  
 
On the issue of free, fair and frequent elections, Dahl (2005:195) notes that in terms of 
increasing political equality, all citizens should enjoy an “equal and effective opportunity 
to vote and all votes must be counted as equal”. Dahl states that if voting equality is to 
be implemented, this means that elections have to be free and fair. This also means 
that the citizens can freely go to the polls without the “fear of reprisal and…. all votes 
must be counted as equal”. 
 
But free and fair elections are not sufficient. Dahl (2005:195) argues that “if citizens are 
to retain final control over the agenda, then elections must also be frequent”. Dahl 
argues that absence of regular elections denies citizens a considerable measure of 
control over their elected officials. Equality in voting enables the citizens to have control 
of the government agenda through their regular and elected officials (Dahl, 2005).The 
weight of the votes should be equal and the electoral system should not be manipulated 
to the benefit of any political movement or candidate, whilst electoral fraud and vote 
rigging should be avoided (Elklit, 1994:93). 
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Heywood (2002:229) notes that some scholars initially regarded elections as the core of 
the democratic process. He acknowledges Joseph Schumpeter, who argues in 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942:23) that democracy is to be viewed as an 
“institutional arrangement, as a means of filling public office by a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote. As he put it, democracy means only that the people have the 
opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them”.  
 
The core of Schumpeter’s argument is the interpretation of democracy as a contest 
between elites through elections and, significantly, with competitive elections. Heywood 
(2002:229) states that most scholars adopted the argument put forward by Schumpeter 
of relating democracy to competitive elections. They define a “democratic government in 
terms of the rules and mechanisms that guide the conduct of elections”.  
 
Heywood, however, notes that the issue of electoral fairness cannot be determined 
alone by the issue of how people vote. This is because it is affected by the accessibility 
of the voters to reliable and balanced information, the variety of choices they are 
exposed to and the circumstances under which the campaigning was undertaken. 
Heywood (2002:230) emphasises that elections are mechanisms through which 
politicians are “called into account and forced to introduce policies that somehow reflect 
public opinion”.  
 
On freedom of expression, Dahl (2005:196) states that “freedom of expression is 
required in order for citizens to participate effectively in political life”. Citizens should 
have the right to make their views known to the elected representatives without any 
form of hindrance and on any issue concerning the conduct of the government. 
Heywood (2002:202) warns against the ability of the media to influence and shape 
political attitudes which can influence political and electoral choice through shaping 
public perceptions on “the nature and importance of issues and problems”. 
 
Dahl (2005:196) notes that “free expression means not just that you have a right to be 
heard. It means that you have a right to hear what others have to say”. To attain an 
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“enlightened understanding” on government actions and policies requires freedom of 
expression. Dahl (2005:196) further notes that in order to attain civic competence, 
 
citizens need opportunities  to express  their own  views, learn  from 
one  another, engage in discussion and deliberation, read, hear  and 
question experts, political candidates and persons whose 
judgements they trust and learn in other ways that depend on 
freedom of expression. 
 
Dahl states that in the absence of freedom of expression, citizens would gradually lose 
their capacity to influence the “agenda of government decisions”. Dahl (2005:197) 
concludes this argument with the proposition that “silent citizens may be perfect 
subjects for an authoritarian ruler; they would be a disaster for a democracy”. 
  
On the issue of the availability of alternative and independent sources of information, 
citizens must be in a position to attain alternative sources of information that are not 
under the government’s control or dominated by a certain section of the population or 
interest groups. There have to be alternative sources of information to widen the scope 
of effective participation as well as increasing influence over the public agenda (Dahl, 
2005). 
  
On associational autonomy, independent associations are essential for they enable 
citizens to unite into interest groups, pressure groups and political parties. They further 
enable citizens to be aligned to any independent association with which they share 
similar grievances and through which they can influence policies through the legislative 
representatives from their ranks. There should be no discrimination based on ethnic, 
racial and religious differences. Dahl states that independent associations are essential 
as the source of “civic education and enlightenment”. They are essential not only for the 
provision of information to citizens, but to serve as platforms for discussion, deliberation 
and the attainment of political skills (Dahl, 2005:197).  
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Inclusive citizenship entails that everybody who resides in a country is subject to its 
laws and cannot be discriminated against or denied the rights enjoyed by all members 
of the society. These include the right to vote in the election of public representatives, 
the right to contest for public office, the right to freedom of expression as well as the 
right to form and participate in independent political organisations (Dahl, 1986a). The 
right to access independent sources of information and rights to other liberties should 
not be inhibited.  
 
Dahl and Heywood state that the rule of law is essential for democracy. Heywood 
(2002:301) argues that the rule of law requires a judiciary, an independent organ to 
ensure that the rights and freedoms of citizens are respected and protected within legal 
confines. The distinctive feature of the judiciary is that “judges are independent and 
non-political actors. Judges are presumably seen as being ‘above’ politics and the 
judiciary is classified as a crucial determinant for the separation of powers between law 
and politics. Heywood (2002:304) states that  
 
this is particularly important in states with codified constitutions, 
where it extends to the interpretation of the constitution itself, and so 
allows judges to arbitrate in disputes between the major institutions 
of government or in ones between the state and the individual. 
 
Constitutions are significant in upholding the rule of law, for they empower states to 
establish the unifying values and goals, and the provide stability for governments. 
Heywood (2002:299) indicates that they operate as “organisational charts” as well as 
“definitional guides”. They assist in the regulation of relationships between political 
bodies and ensure that there are structures established for resolving conflicts and 
differences. In the protection of freedoms, constitutions lay down the relationship 
between the government and the citizens, hence “marking out the respective spheres of 
government authority and personal freedom” (Heywood, 2002:299). 
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Significantly, constitutions attain this through the clear guides that define civil rights and 
liberties, and this is often done through bills of rights. In fact, this is intended to promote 
features such as freedom of expression, freedom of religious worship, and freedom of 
assembly and movement, which are seen as fundamental because they are 
constitutionally guaranteed. Lastly, on the provision of legitimacy for regimes, 
constitutions ensure that states are internationally recognised as they lay down rules 
and regulations that govern them. 
 
According to institutionalist theories, the creation of institutions of democratic order 
forms a critical starting point for democracy. Huntington’s (1991) conception of 
democracy falls within the Schumpeterian thesis that the key procedure of democracy is 
the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern. 
Huntington’s perspective on democracy is similar to other institutionalist theories on 
democracy, although not exclusively; he additionally identifies the role of civil and 
political freedoms as being critical to democracy. 
 
Huntington (1991:7) points out that   
 
following in the Schumpeterian tradition … a twentieth-century 
political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful 
collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and 
periodic elections in which virtually all the adult population is eligible 
to vote. So defined, democracy involves the two-dimensions 
contestation and participation that Robert Dahl saw as critical to his 
realistic democracy or polyarchy. It also implies the existence of 
those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and 
organise that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of 
electoral campaigns. 
 
This is not a case of one size fits all. A key institutional ingredient in any democracy is 
the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems as frameworks within 
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which voters can exercise their choice of who is to represent them (Notably, Przeworski 
et al. (1996) and Leftwich (2000), in line with Linz (1990), identified a parliamentary 
system as preferable for democratic consolidation than a presidential system.)  
 
Linz (1990:84-91) writes on The Perils of Presidentialism and makes a comparison 
between parliamentary and presidential systems. Linz (1990) states that in presidential 
systems, given the enormous powers that the president has, there is a likelihood of the 
development of presidential partisan interests becoming the national interest, and this 
consequently undermines the legitimacy afforded to the opposition. Under these 
conditions political struggles become a zero-sum game characterised by solid 
polarisation.  
 
Linz (1990:86) further warns that presidential democracies are likely to create legislative 
paralysis. This is because in presidential systems the executive, with its fixed term of 
office, can survive alongside hostile legislatures, thus resulting in “stalemates between 
the executive and the legislative branch”. 
 
Linz (1990) also argues that in presidential systems there are high stakes because 
there is only one winner. Linz notes that the defeated presidential candidate does not 
have an official role in politics and may most likely not “even be a member of the 
legislature”. Przeworski et al. (1996:45) conclude that under presidential systems the 
key “political conflicts” occur between the president and the legislature, rather than 
among the political parties. Importantly, the two-dimensional function of the president as 
the head of state and the chief executive, “combined with the popular mandate, may 
imbue the holder with an assumption of a supreme political standing, leading him or her 
to refuse to acknowledge the constitutional limits of the office” (Hadenius, 1994:75). 
 
On the other hand, Heywood (2002:315) notes that presidential systems, with the 
doctrine of separation of powers, “create internal tensions that help to protect individual 
rights and liberties”. Heywood further points that this can assist in the reduction of the 
domination of the executive as the result of the powers that are vested in the legislature.  
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Linz (1990) notes that parliamentary systems enhance responsibility in government and 
he asserts that in a parliamentary system the defeated candidate can assume the status 
of an opposition leader, thus enabling the opposition’s participation in the democratic 
process. But this depends on the electoral systems used. Heywood (2002:314) notes 
that the main feature of the parliamentary system is the “fusion of legislative and 
executive power: government is parliamentary... [and] is drawn from and accountable to 
the assembly or parliament”. 
  
According to Heywood (2002:314), the strength of parliamentary system is that “it 
supposedly delivers effective [and] responsible government”. Governments therefore 
become effective because their existence depends on support from the legislature, 
which further participates in the formation of the programmes to enhance government’s 
accountability to the electorate.  
 
Linz (1990) and Heywood (2002) both acknowledge that a parliamentary system 
enhances the responsibility of the government. In parliamentary systems, coalition 
governments and other forms of power sharing are common. This helps to create a 
cordial working relationship between the political parties. Hadenius (1994:74) agrees 
and states that “coalition governments and other sorts of power-sharing are ... common, 
breeding an atmosphere of cooperation and unity among the parties”.  
 
Heywood (2002) argues that presidential systems with the doctrine of separation of 
powers can be beneficial for the protection of individual rights and liberties. On the one 
hand, there is Heywood’s argument that human rights and liberties can be protected. 
But on the other, Przeworksi et al. (1996) differ from Heywood that political differences 
in a presidential system are more between the president and the legislature than 
between political parties. This often overshadows the protection of human rights and 
liberties that Heywood mentions. 
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Przeworski et al. (1996) and Linz (1990) conclude that a parliamentary system lasts 
longer than a presidential system. This is also because parliamentary systems are 
much more participative as they involve legislatures in policy formulation, evaluation 
and implementation.  
 
Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy; hence I intend to focus on how constitutional 
monarchies operate. Heywood (2002:342) states that in constitutional monarchies, the 
monarchy assumes a ceremonial function as in modern-day in Europe. Heywood notes 
that a constitutional monarchy offers a neutral, “non-partisan” head of state who is 
above politics. It acts as an embodiment of traditional authority and thus serves as 
symbol of “patriotic loyalty and national unity”. The monarch also “constitutes a 
repository of experience and wisdom”, particularly with regard to constitutional issues 
that are available to democratically elected governments (Heywood, 2002). 
 
Heywood (2002:342) warns that the existence of a constitutional monarch may 
contribute towards the violation of democratic principles as the head of state is not 
“based on popular consent and is in no way publicly accountable”. The monarchy then 
often symbolises and supports conservative values “such as hierarchy, deference and 
respect for inherited wealth and social position”. The monarchy can thus become an 
impediment to progress because it “binds” the population to previous “outmoded ways 
and symbols of the past” (Heywood, 2002:343).  
 
Electoral systems are significant frameworks within which to exercise choice, for they 
are “a set of rules that governs the conduct of the elections” (Heywood, 2002:232). 
Lijphart (1994) argues that electoral systems are essential in the establishment of the 
rules of the electoral process, the core of what democracy is all about. A significant 
number of studies on electoral systems have raised questions about the relative 
performance of PR and FPTP or the single-member plurality system with respect to 
criteria such as participation and stability (Powell, 1982:18).  
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Reynolds and Reilly (1997:27) indicate that in FPTP systems the bigger and established 
parties usually win with a higher proportion of seats than the proportion of votes they 
gain in the election. The winning candidate in FPTP systems is the candidate who gets 
the most votes in a particular geographical constituency, or electoral district. 
 
Reynolds and Reilly (1997:28) argue that FPTP is renowned for its simplicity and “its 
tendency to produce representatives beholden to defined geographic area”. The 
advantages of a FPTP system are that it establishes a clear link between the 
representatives and constituents. It gives rise to a parliament made up of geographical 
representatives of clearly demarcated constituencies. The MPs are directly elected 
representatives from various cities and towns rather than just party labels. Reynolds 
and Reilly (1997:28) argue that this enhances accountability as the voters have an 
opportunity to know their representatives, whom they can re-elect or vote out in the next 
election.   
 
It ensures that the constituency duties are undertaken and gives the electorate a certain 
choice of potential parties of government. It often leads to single-party governments. It 
also enables governments to be formed with an obvious mandate from the electorate. It 
further creates a coherent parliamentary opposition (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997).  
 
Reynolds and Reilly (1997:28) argue that “in theory, the flip side of a strong single-party 
government is that the opposition is also given enough seats to perform a critical role 
and present itself as a realistic alternative to the government of the day”. In ethnically 
and regionally divided societies, it is renowned for encouraging political parties to be 
“broad churches”, to encompass various elements across the society, particularly when 
there are only two main political parties and various societal groups (Reynolds and 
Reilly, 1997:29).  
 
Heywood (2002:233) argues that it prevents extremist parties from gaining 
parliamentary representation. Reynolds and Reilly (1997:28) note that  
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unless an extremist minority party’s electoral support is 
geographically concentrated, it is unlikely to win any seats under 
FPTP. This contrasts with the situation under straight PR systems, 
where a fraction of one per cent of the national vote can ensure 
parliamentary representation.       
 
FPTP systems enable the voters to choose between people rather than just between 
parties. The voters have an opportunity to assess the individual performance of various 
candidates rather than just having to accept the list of candidates presented by the party 
as may be the case under some PR list systems. FPTP systems give independent 
popular candidates a chance to be elected in their constituencies (Reynolds and Reilly, 
1997).   
 
The disadvantages of FPTP systems are that many votes are wasted because those 
cast for the losing candidates are ignored. It is seen as exclusive and denies the 
minority parties fair representation in parliament. It leads to the under-representation of 
the smaller parties and those with geographically evenly distributed support. It 
encourages the development of political parties based on race or regions (Reynolds and 
Reilly, 1997:29).  
 
Reynolds and Reilly (1997:30) argue that “FPTP can encourage parties to base their 
campaigns and policy platforms on hostile conceptions of clan … race or regionalism”. 
FPTP systems further affect the ability of women to be elected to parliament because 
they are less likely to be selected as candidates given the dominance of men in party 
structures.  
 
Reynold and Reilly (1997:31) argue that “FPTP systems can be open to the 
manipulation of electoral boundaries. Any system which uses single-member districts is 
susceptible to boundary manipulation, for example, unfair gerrymandering or 
malapportionment of district boundaries”. It further discourages the selection of a 
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socially broad spread of candidates in favour of those who are attractive to a large body 
of voters.  
 
Alternatively, Reynolds and Reilly (1997:60-61) argue that in a pure PR system, if a 
party gains 45 per cent of the votes, it gets exactly 45 per cent of the seats. This 
promotes unity (in a heterogeneous state) for it encourages voters to identify with their 
region or minorities rather than a focus on a particular constituency.  
 
Reynolds and Reilly (1997:61) state that in most countries that use the List PR system, 
each party presents a list of candidates to the electorate. The voters vote for a party, 
whilst the parties receive the seats in proportion to their total share of the national vote. 
The winning candidates are taken from the top of the lists in order of their ranking in the 
lists.   
 
Reynolds and Reilly (1997:62) point out that in most new democracies, especially those 
with deep societal divisions, the inclusion of all significant groups in the parliament can 
“be a near-essential condition for democratic consolidation”. It may therefore be seen as 
an instrument that overcomes the divisiveness of heterogeneity.     
 
The advantages of PR are that it accurately translates the votes cast into the seats won. 
It enhances the representation of bigger and smaller parties, which in turn ensures that 
there is an emphasis upon negotiation, bargaining and consensus. It therefore boosts 
fuller participation. Only few votes are wasted (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997). Reynolds 
and Reilly (1997:62) note that “when thresholds are low, almost all votes cast within PR 
elections go towards electing a candidate of choice”. It encourages parties to present 
inclusive and socially diverse lists of candidates. Reynold and Reilly (1997:62) hence 
state that  
 
the incentive under List PR systems is to maximise your national 
vote, regardless of where those votes might come from. Every vote, 
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even from an area where you are electorally weak, goes towards 
filling another quota and thus gaining another seat.  
 
PR enables the minority groups in the society to be elected into parliament. This might 
be good for nation building. When voting behaviour proceeds along cultural and social 
divisions, PR systems can therefore assist in ensuring that parliament includes both 
majority and minority groups. Parties can thus be encouraged by the system to create a 
balanced list of candidates in order to appeal to an entire spectrum of voters’ interests 
(Reynolds and Reilly, 1997). 
  
A PR system makes it much more likely for women to be elected into parliament. 
Parties have an advantage of using the lists to promote the advancement of women 
politicians. Reynolds and Reilly (1997:63) acknowledge that much of the evidence that 
provides a link between PR and women’s representation comes from Western 
democracies, but there is preliminary evidence that the similar trend was followed in 
democracies such as South Africa, Mozambique and significantly in Lesotho as the 
LCD/ NIP PR list for the 2007 election in Lesotho was dominated by women.  
 
Reynolds and Reilly (1997:63) argue that in most Western European democracies 
experience shows that parliamentary PR systems perform better in comparison to FPTP 
parliamentary systems in terms of “governmental longevity, voter participation and 
economic performance”. This is different from the regular changes in government that 
can occur between two ideologically polarised parties in FPTP systems, which makes 
long-term economic planning more difficult. PR systems make power-sharing between 
parties and interest groups more visible (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997:65).  
   
The disadvantages of PR systems are that its tendency to form coalition governments 
can result in the legislative “gridlock” and the subsequent inability to implement coherent 
policies at crucial times. Urgent and coherent decision-making can be impeded by 
coalition cabinets and governments of national unity that are split by factions (Reynolds 
and Reilly, 1997). 
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PR systems may also lead to the destabilisation of the party system. Minority parties 
can hold the larger parties to ransom in coalition governments and they also create 
platforms for extremist parties. Reynolds and Reilly (1997:65) point out that such 
systems result in  
 
governing coalitions which have insufficient common ground – in 
terms of either their policies or their supporter base. These 
“coalitions of convenience” are sometimes contrasted with stronger 
“coalitions of commitment” produced by other systems … in which 
parties tend to be reciprocally dependent on the votes of supporters 
of other parties for their election.  
 
PR systems create a weak link between the MPs and their “constituencies” because 
there are actually no constituencies. The voters do not have the ability to determine the 
identity of the people who will represent them and they do not have the ability to easily 
remove representatives – only party leadership can do this, because it is they who rank 
the PR lists. Unpopular candidates who are highly placed on a party list cannot be 
removed from the list by voting (Matlosa, 2003:100).   
 
PR systems are often criticised for vesting too much power and decision making in the 
party leadership. A candidate’s position on the party list depends mainly on “currying 
favour” with party bosses, whose relationship with the electorates is of secondary 
significance (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005:420).  
 
PR systems presume some kind of a recognised party structure, since the voters are 
expected to vote for parties rather than individuals. This makes the PR systems more 
difficult to implement in areas that do not have parties, or have embryonic and loose 
party structures. PR systems are still unfamiliar in most countries with English or French 
colonial legacies and are difficult to operationalise for the electoral administrations to 
implement (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997:65).     
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Gallagher and Mitchell (2005:591) point out that some electoral systems combine both 
FPTP and PR and are known as mixed systems. Mixed systems refer to “electoral 
systems under which deputies are elected from single- member constituencies’ while 
other are elected from lists”. In most mixed systems the voter casts two votes. 
Gallagher and Mitchell (2005:591) argue that “characteristically, the voter is faced with 
two ballot papers … one which they can cast their vote to indicate their choice of a 
candidate to represent the single-member constituency and another on which they cast 
a vote for a party list”. They not forced to choose the same party in both votes and they 
can split their votes, if they have genuine preferences.  
 
Mixed systems can either be compensatory or parallel (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). 
The workings of these two types of mixed systems will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
However, the choice of electoral systems is crucial for they are mechanisms through 
which votes are translated into seats.  
 
2.3  A definition of democratic consolidation  
 
According to Munck (2001:2), democratic consolidation has become “one of the most 
frequently used concepts in comparative politics”. Democratic consolidation was firstly 
introduced as a concept for addressing the challenges of regime stabilisation and for 
providing an answer to the critical question: when are democracies reasonably secure 
from breakdown? Guiseppe Di Palma’s (1990:141) interesting formulation is: “At what 
point ... can democracies relax?” The concept initially developed to cover a whole array 
of political problems confronting “third wave” and “fourth wave” democracies (Munck, 
2001; Olaleye, 2004:2).   
 
Most definitions of democratic consolidation involve stabilisation, institutionalisation and 
legitimation. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) “multivariate model”, which incorporates 
vital aspects of the work of Leftwich (2000), Przeworski et al. (1996) and Linz and 
Stepan (1996) applied in this study covers both institutional and socio-economic factors 
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essential for consolidation. Przeworski et al. (1996) argues that democracy is 
consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of 
institutions becomes acceptable. Diamond (1996) argues that consolidation occurs 
when a new regime becomes institutionalised, its framewok open and competitive 
political expression becomes internalised.  
 
O’ Donnell (1996a) argues that a democratic regime is consolidated when it is “likely to 
endure” and when it may be expected “to last well into the future” (Valenzuela, 
1992:70). Diamond 1996 (cited in Gouws and Gibson, 2000:2) defines democratic 
consolidation as the process by which democracies become broadly legitimate 
(accepted) among the population. It takes time to mature, i.e. only a democracy can 
become a consolidated democracy. 
 
Linz and Stepan (1996) say consolidation occurs when democracy is “the only game in 
town”, which is when it is behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally internalised by 
the political elites and the majority of the population. It becomes behaviourally accepted, 
with democratic principles used to attain objectives, and attitudinally internalised when 
all democratic principles are widely accepted as the most credible means of conducting 
politics. Lastly, it becomes constitutionally internalised when all rules and laws written 
down are adhered to. 
 
Du Toit and Kotzé (2006:249) indicate that democratic consolidation requires that there 
ought to be “congruence” between the following set of norms; 
 
the norms set by the regime – written into the constitution, especially 
those that pertain to formal citizenship, ... norms set by the 
government of the day, enacted in public policy statements and 
policy measures, laws, speeches, public agenda setting, … norms 
enacted by and embodied in the institutions of civil society … [and] 
norms contained in the networks of social capital, which exist and 
are built up within the civilian population.  
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Schedler (1998:92) also argues that democratic consolidation seeks to describe the 
challenge of making new democracies endure, extending their life expectancy beyond 
the short term and making them immune to the threat of authoritarian regression, of 
building dams against eventual “reverse waves”. Thus democratic consolidation may 
engage the “positive” mission of ‘deepening’ a fully liberal democracy or completing a 
semi-democracy (Schedler, 2001:1). 
 
In defining democratic consolidation, some scholars have adopted a procedural, 
minimalist definition. Huntington (1991:267) defines a democratic regime as 
consolidated after two electoral turnovers. This refers to the situation where different 
sets of elections occur and in which different political parties win. According to this 
Huntingtonian thesis, democratic consolidation occurs if the party wins the initial 
elections at the time of the transitions and loses the second or subsequent elections 
and peacefully hands over state power to the winners, whilst the winners will peacefully 
hand over power to the winners of the later elections.  
 
The underlying presumption of this proposition is that winning the election is not what 
initially matters but losing it, and acceptance of the result is vital. This shows that 
political parties and their supporters are willing to allow for the democratic game to take 
its course (Huntington, 1991). The limitations of this approach are glaring, as Beetham 
(1994:160) argues that “it is possible to have an electoral system that meets certain 
minimum democratic standards, but where such a transfer of power does not take place 
simply because the electorates goes on voting for the same party” or it becomes 
impossible for ruling parties to lose elections because of the unfairness of the electoral 
process.  
 
Beetham points to the classic example of Botswana, where there has been no turnover 
yet. He poses a critical question as to whether such democracies are consolidated 
because there has been no transfer of power. Bratton (1998:51) argues that elections 
are significant for democratic consolidation. However, they are not sufficient. Bratton 
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and Van de Walle (1997:234) state that despite multiparty elections, their freeness and 
fairness can sometimes be problematic. Zimbabwe is a case in point.  
 
Some scholars even argue about the “fallacy of electoralism” (Diamond, 1996:30). 
Diamond (1996) believes that elections do not safeguard the consolidation of 
democratic values and practises despite the fact that multi-party institutions may exist 
over prolonged periods. According to Leftwich (2000) winning parties must exercise 
policy restraint. Diamond argues that it is a grave mistake to overemphasise elections 
and concludes his argument that there is a possibility that multi-party elections can 
sometimes prove to be an obstacle for consolidation. This occurs, according to 
Carothers (2002:1), when ruling parties “cannot loose”. 
 
Bratton (1998) therefore argues that elections do not constitute a consolidated 
democracy though they are critical determinants for the survival of democracies. Bratton 
(1998) makes the interesting point that, whilst one can have elections without 
democracy, one cannot have democracy without elections. If elections are therefore 
necessary but not sufficient, the questions are what conditions make for democratic 
endurance, i.e. for survival and consolidation. 
 
2.4  Conditions for democratic consolidation  
 
Leftwich (2000:134-135) makes an important distinction between democratisation and 
consolidation. He proposed the following conditions for democratic consolidation: 
legitimacy, adherence to the constitutional rules of the game, policy restraint by the 
winners, success in reducing poverty, and the ability to deal with ethnic, cultural, racial 
or religious divisions within the society. But there is a different set of factors that make 
for democratic endurance, including affluence, economic growth, reduction of inequality 
(these are exactly the same as Przeworski’s arguments made in 1996), the absence of 
breakdowns, preferably parliamentary systems and a strong civil society according to 
Linz and Stepan (1996).  
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2.4.1. Legitimacy  
 
Leftwich (2000:136) states that a democratic system can survive if it enjoys legitimacy, 
which means “acceptability”. Leftwich (2000:136) states that legitimacy can easily be 
“understood and operationalised” if it is broken into geographical, constitutional and 
political legitimacy. Leftwich does not mention performance in his list of items that 
comprise legitimacy. This has been added to the definition of legitimacy to highlight the 
significance of the performance of the state in the delivery of services, which is likely to 
create greater acceptability amongst the population.   
 
Geographical legitimacy occurs when no regional secessionist movement lays claim to 
any place of the geographical state as the home of a separate nation. It means that 
“those who live within the state accept its territorial definition and the appropriateness of 
their place within it” (Leftwich, 2000:136). Constitutional legitimacy involves the 
“acceptance of the rules within which the contestation of political power is contested, in 
terms of which policies of re-distribution and redress are shaped” (Leftwich, 2000:137). 
  
Political legitimacy thus occurs when legitimate constitutional rules are effectively 
applied and the winners in the contest for power can be deemed worthy of their position. 
Leftwich (2000:138) points out that this occurs when “the electorate (or more 
realistically, organised parties in it, or other institutions like the army) regard the 
government in power as being entitled, procedurally, to be there”. 
 
Performance legitimacy is attained when the government of the day exercises its 
incumbency to deliver goods and services to citizens previously deprived thereof.  
Despite their generally poor human rights records, many developmental states, even 
non-democratic ones, have had widespread support from among the ranks of their 
citizens. (The elites generally would be well looked after in any case, being the 
managers of developmental policies, and where these succeed in producing new 
wealth, the immediate beneficiaries as well).  
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Notwithstanding at times resorting to outright repression against organised opposition, 
these states have been able to disburse the benefits of sustained strong growth lasting 
over decades into the civilian population in a tangible way. This is undertaken by 
widening service delivery on a broad basis – in schools, homes and health care, and by 
providing bore holes and veterinary services. In this way “development has rarely 
exacerbated societal inequalities and has contributed to increased life expectancy and 
higher ratings on the Human Development Index” (Leftwich, 2000:166-167). 
 
Socio-economic conditions, particularly the eradication of poverty, are relevant to 
performance legitimacy. The delivery of services to the vulnerable, the poor and 
previously disadvantaged should be widened by performance legitimacy. This restores 
confidence in the system of governance and ensures that government policies are 
people centred. Central to performance legitimacy is capacity building for the poor to 
ensure that there is a reduction of social exclusions and inequalities.  
 
2.4.2 Adherence to the constitutional rules of the game 
 
Under this condition both winners and losers should abide by the rules of the electoral 
process. Losers ought to accept their defeat and accept that they have to wait until the 
next electoral contest arrives. Winners should accept that winning the elections does 
not mean attainment of power on a permanent basis. Hence, “it is limited power and 
conditional power and the most significant limitation is to leave intact the constitutional 
rules of contestation that brought them to power in the first place” (Leftwich, 2000:138). 
 
Another crucial set of constitutional rules are those that determine how the spoils of 
victory are be distributed. However, there is substantial evidence that organs of the 
state, such as militaries, have often failed to adhere to the rules of the game in 
democracies such as Nigeria and Latin America.   
 
On militaries, analysts have argued that lasting transitions from military rule are hard to 
secure because the military retains the capacity to step back into politics long after 
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returning to the barracks (Huntington, 1991:120). Huntington (1998) in Political Order in 
Changing Societies and Finer (1975) in Men on Horseback similarly note, as indicated 
in the previous chapter, that coups occur in states that suffer economic hardships. 
Liebenow (1986) mentions in African Politics: Crises and Challenges that militaries 
claim legitimacy, efficiency, unity and development. 
 
Decalo (1976) in Coups and Army Rule in Africa and Biemen (1978) in Armies and 
Parties in Africa similarly argue that the intervention of the military in politics could be 
linked to corporate interests and the fragmentation of party politics. Gill (1993:289) 
argues that as militaries claim to promote stability, they are often used as political 
instruments by the victorious parties to suppress opposition, or sometimes they 
sympathise with the losing parties as they refuse to accept the election outcome. 
  
I concur with these arguments that militaries intervene in politics driven by economic 
desires, claiming to promote development and unity. But this situation often turns violent 
as military governments “are ... by their very nature authoritarian. Their rule is founded 
principally on the bullet and ballot-based rule is a figment of the imagination in the 
military’s political scheme of things” (Matlosa, 1997: ii).  
 
The relevance of these arguments on the military to Leftwich (2000) is that the military is 
one of the key organs of the state which is vested with the powers of upholding the 
constitution and maintaining law and order. Militaries ought to be committed to 
democratic practises, which entails adherence to the rules of the game. Leftwich 
(2000:140) states that “crudely, the troops which held the old regime in power must 
return to the barracks – and stay there”.  
 
Electoral systems are also a particular set of the rules of the game that have to be 
followed. Hence, Leftwich (2000:138-139) states that “there needs to be agreement or 
acquiescence about the rules of the political game [i.e. electoral systems] and loyalty to 
those rules”. Therefore, I concur with Heywood (2002) and Reynolds and Reilly (1997) 
that FPTP enhances public accountability. But it should be noted that it creates 
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uncertainty among the losing and small parties, who often feel excluded from 
participation in the electoral process. 
 
Arguably, PR has assisted some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to manage their 
protracted election-related conflicts by broadening representation, enhancing 
participation and entrenching democratic governance. This was evident in political 
transitions in Namibia (1990), Mozambique (1994) and South Africa (1994) (Kadima, 
2003:43). 
 
Leftwich also agrees with Przeworski et al. (1996) that parliamentary democratic 
governments last longer than presidential ones and this enhances the chances for 
consolidation. This is because presidential systems often leads to a deadlock between 
an executive presidency and the legislature, whist parliamentary systems have an 
executive that reflects the dominant party or a coalition of parties in the legislature. 
Przeworski et al. (1996:49) accurately capture this situation by indicating that  
 
democracies can survive in even in the poorest nations if they 
manage to generate development, if they reduce inequality, if the 
international climate is propitious and if they have parliamentary 
institutions.  
 
On the significance of institutions, Linz and Stepan (1996:17) argue that political parties 
must be able to adapt themselves to the rules of the game and that all political 
stakeholders must be effectively subjected to the rule of law; therefore the ideal 
situation is a “rechtsstaat” or a “state subject to the law”. There must also be a state 
bureaucracy that can be used by the new democratic government to protect the rights of 
the citizens and that has the capacity to deliver the basic services to the population.  
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2.4.3 Policy restraint by the winners  
 
Leftwich (2000:140) suggests that, under this condition, new democracies have a 
greater chance of surviving and prospering, if the newly installed government does not 
pursue “highly contentious policies”. That is, winners consolidate the regime, “if the new 
government does not pursue [controversial] policies too far or too fast, especially when 
these policies seriously threaten other major interests” (Leftwich, 2000:141). But it must 
win over them in order to increase and widen the levels of development in the country. 
Hence Leftwich (2000:140) states that 
… it is unlikely that any group or party would accept the rules of the 
electoral game if losing meant that it or the interests it represented 
would lose too much. It follows that while losers must accept the 
outcome, winners must also accept that there are significant limits to 
what they can do with their newly won power.  
 
Leftwich (2000:141) mentions South Africa as an explicit example where, upon its 
assumption of power in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) was cautious not to 
threaten the white economic interests. Newly elected governments have to rule with 
restraint in dealing with more dominant interest groups in society. These powerful 
interest groups are typically found in the ranks of established economic elites such as 
landowners, or industrial elites, or in the traditional society, where the elites could be the 
monarchy or tribal leaders (chiefs) or both, or in the bureaucracies of the state, where 
the military is an obvious example.  
 
2.4.4 Poverty as an obstacle  
 
According to Leftwich (2000:142), the successful eradication of poverty is a crucial 
determinant for democratic survival. He agrees with Huntington (1996) and Lipset, 
Seong and Torres (1993:156) that there is a strong positive correlation between the 
wealth of a country and democracy. This is in line with the thinking of Przeworski et al. 
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(1996).  If economic growth and wealth are effectively distributed across the society, this 
could have a positive impact on democratic consolidation.  
 
Leftwich (2000:143) argues that poverty can become an obstacle for democratic 
conditions in poor countries as the result of the struggle for scarce resources. He states 
that “the enormous advantages that permanent control of the state may bring to a party 
or faction make democracy very unlikely”. Thus, the control of state power is often seen 
as the most reliable source of economic wealth. Hence, Leftwich (2000:143) points that 
“incumbents holding of state power will be reluctant to engage in compromise and will 
be very unwilling to lose control; suspending democracy is a good way of staying in 
power”. 
 
Przeworski et al. (1996), writing in What Makes Democracies Endure, agree with 
Leftwich (2000) that the distribution of wealth is vital for democratic survival. They 
postulate that the following conditions should prevail for democratic survival:  affluence, 
growth with moderate inflation and declining inequality. Lipset (1960:31) correctly 
asserts that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy”. Certainly, poverty and social inequality are seen as threats for the stability 
of democratic regime. 
 
Feng (2001:170) points that “wealth ... sustains democracy once it is achieved”. 
Huntington (1996:5) believes that economic growth minimises inequalities and 
increases the chances for the survival of democracy. He suggests a “coup-attempt 
ceiling” beyond which military coups are unlikely to happen at GNP of US$3,000 as well 
as “coup-success ceiling” beyond which military interventions are unlikely to succeed at 
US$1,000.  
 
Further insights are found in Lipset (cited in Diamond, 1996:33) that there is a 
relationship between the existence of democracy and variables such as per capita 
income, industrialisation, urbanisation and the levels of education. Diamond (1999), Linz 
and Stepan (1996) and Lipset (1960) all argue that democracy is likely to survive in 
 55
areas where poverty and inequality are reasonably low and where the levels of 
education and income are relatively high. Lipset (1960:31) states that  
 
from Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a 
wealthy  society  in which  relatively  few citizens  lived at  the level of 
real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the 
population  intelligently  participate  in politics  and develop  the self-
restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of  
irresponsible  demagogues. 
 
Lipset implies that the more developed the country is, with sufficient and equal 
distribution of wealth, the greater the chances are for the occurrence of democratic 
survival. 
 
The successful eradication of poverty is therefore relevant to performance legitimacy as 
governments should resort to all available avenues to ensure that there is efficient and 
effective distribution of services. Civil society groups or political parties must push for 
increased widespread development initiatives as this enables people to acquire the fair 
share of benefits that follow from economic growth and development. Democracy must 
be seen as the re-organisation of productive and distributive processes for all. Banguara 
(1992:34) correctly asserted that  
 
although democracy is concerned with the rules and institutions that 
allow for open competition and participation in government, it 
embodies also social and economic characteristics that are crucial in 
determining its capacity to survive. 
 
2.4.5 Social Cleavages  
 
Lastly, the other cardinal factor for democratic survival is the ability to deal with ethnic, 
cultural, racial and religious divisions within the society (Leftwitch, 2000:143). Leftwich 
 56
(2000) argues that ethnic, cultural or religious differences can be obstacles and may   
have a negative impact on democratic survival. Lesotho is in a favourable condition 
because of its homogeneity, although social cleavages between Catholics and 
Protestants played major roles in the recruitment of supporters for political parties (see 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 hereunder).  
 
Linz and Stepan (1996) indicate that although cleavages are obstacles, they are 
“surmountable” through institutional devices such as proportionalism. Leftwich 
(2000:144) further argues that intense conflicts can erode the “prospects of a 
consensus basis for democratic politics”. These differences can be followed by hostile 
acts and violent confrontations. Governments should be able to contain national, 
cultural and religious differences. Constitutions or inter-elite pacts ought to be carefully 
drafted to ensure that all these segments are covered in the society.  
 
In Lesotho’s case, the cleavages are not ethnic, but between monarchists and minor 
chiefs, between traditionalists and modernists, between Catholics and Protestants, and 
between lowlanders and mountain dwellers. Can a constitution be crafted to suit these 
conditions? 
 
2.5  Related economic and social factors for endurance   
 
Leftwich (2000:145) pays attention to the factors for democratic consolidation and 
acknowledges the role of socio-economics. Leftwich (2000:145) agrees with the 
arguments put forward by Przeworski et al. (1996) on the survival and death of 
democracies of 224 political regimes in 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. He 
identifies affluence as a critical for democratic endurance.  
 
Przeworski et al. (1996:41) (using data for 1990) in their analysis of 135 countries state 
that per capita incomes that are above US$6,000 make democracies “impregnable” and 
that democracies are “fragile” when per capita incomes are US$1,000 or  lower. For 
states with per capita that is higher than US$6,000, the chances of democratic survival 
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are excellent. This is because “no democratic system has ever fallen in a country where 
per capita income exceeds US$6,055”. These data have not been adjusted for today’s 
inflation. If this is done, then fragility would be in the order of about US$3,000 or lower, 
and impregnability would be about US$18,000, or higher.  
 
Economic viability is therefore of utmost importance for consolidation and the following 
factors are regarded as essential for the state economic viability: the functioning of the 
state economy and the market (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Democracy can survive in 
areas that have adequate levels of per capita income, adequate levels of United Nations 
Human development Index (UNHDI) and literacy rates. This means that economc 
growth is good for democracy.  
 
Lesotho’s per capita income is currently at US$950, which is lower even than 
Przeworski’s outdated benchmark of US$1000 in 1990. It is three times lower than 
US$3000 when adjusted for inflation. Breytenbach (2007) found that the average for 
Africa’s older democracies in 2005 was US$2996. Clearly, Lesotho remains fragile 
despite institutional reforms since 1998.  
 
Leftwich (2000) also agrees with Przeworski et al. (1996) that weak democracies can 
consolidate if their economies “do not stagnate or contract”. Growth can reduce the 
levels of poverty. Leftwich (2000:145) argues that Przeworski et al. (1996) postulated 
that democracies have a greater chance of consolidating if their income inequalities are 
“either moderate or declining”. Similarly, Nylen (2000:127) states that “a concern for 
greater social and economic equality is absolutely necessary to enable formal 
democracy to become consolidated in any meaningful sense of the world”.  
 
Leftwich (2000:146) notes that in areas where democracies have previously been 
overthrown, new democracies under these “economic circumstances are more 
vulnerable – a bleak consideration for many African and Latin countries where the coup 
culture has been deeply entrenched”.  
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Leftwich (2000) agrees with Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992:6) and 
Diamond (1999:239-60) that a “rich and pluralistic civil society” is significant for 
democratic consolidation. For Linz and Stepan (1996:17), the foremost condition for 
consolidated democracies is a “free and lively civil society”. Civil society must work 
towards the improvement of the lives of people; it is one sphere capable of pushing 
towards performance legitimacy of the state. Leftwich’s argument is in line with the 
social structuralist theories that encapsulate the role of class and civil society as crucial 
for democratic consolidation (Schmitter, 1994).  
 
Barrington Moore (1996) also pays particular attention to the social factors. Moore 
argues that the existence of the bourgeoisie remains essential for democracy. He 
believes that the middle class is the primary actor in a democracy. Breytenbach 
(2007:3) notes that Moore “was dismissive about peasants as modernisers but was 
convinced that the middle class is the key not only to modernisation, but to democracy 
as well”. Hence Moore (1996:418) points out: “No bourgeoisie, no democracy”. This 
means that the middle class plays an important role in democratic consolidation. Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997) also mention that a sizeable middle class is essential for 
democratic consolidation.  
 
2.6. Levels of democraticness and breakdowns 
 
Schedler (1998:92) states that “there are those borderline cases that possess some but 
not all of liberal democracy’s essential features, and therefore fall somewhere in 
between democracy and authoritarianism”. He calls such semi-democratic regimes 
“electoral democracies”. Schedler (1998:93) explains that a special feature of these 
electoral democracies is that they have succeeded and managed to have more or less 
free and fair elections, but they fail to uphold both political and civil freedoms critical for 
liberal democracy to be assured.  
 
Schedler (1998:91) postulates that there are varying degrees of democraticness. This 
perception is relevant to Collier and Levitsky’s (1997) four regime classification, which 
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includes authoritarian, electoral democratic, liberal democratic and advanced 
democratic regimes.  
 
Nicholas Van de Walle (2002:68) supports the idea on the classification of regimes 
undertaken by Freedom House as “roughly correct” (Breytenbach, 2005:52). The 
Freedom House approach entails classification of regimes into “free”, “partly free” and 
“not free”. Diamond (2002) and Bratton (1998) relied on the Freedom House qualitative 
distinctions between different types of democracies as essential. Breytenbach (2005:52) 
states that Phillip Nel (2005) also follows the classification of political systems into 
“authoritarian, semi-democratic and democratic”. 
 
Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005:16-19) have gone even further. They  
classified over 50 African countries into the following types: “unreformed autocracy” 
(which includes countries such as Swaziland and Sudan), “liberalised autocracy” 
(includes countries such as Zimbabwe and Angola) and “not free”, which they have also 
described as ambiguous (includes countries such as  Nigeria and Zambia), followed by 
“electoral democracy” (includes countries such as Ghana and Namibia), which are “all 
presumably partly free”, and lastly, “liberal democracy” (which includes countries such 
as Mauritius, South Africa and Botswana). Recently, Freedom House ranked Lesotho 
as free. But it is the poorest of the free nations in Southern Africa. Whether they are 
consolidated is a different issue.  
 
Schedler (1998:97) argues  that whilst many new democracies face the danger of illegal  
or pseudo-legal overthrow  by anti- democratic forces, this is not the real danger, as 
many new democracies have to contend with the danger of erosion, of less  
spectacular, more incremental and less transparent forms of regression.  
 
Schedler (1998:97) argues that “while the former (illegal overthrow) referred to classical 
coup politics”, O’Donnell (1996a:143) described the latter as “a progressive diminution 
of existing spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness of the classic 
guarantees of liberal constitutionalism” as a “slow and at times opaque … process of 
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successive authoritarian advances”, which ultimately end as “democradura, a 
repressive, facade democracy”. 
 
Schedler (1998:93) argues that the main threat for new democracies is not sudden 
deaths, coup d’etats but erosion from within. His acknowledgement is made to 
Huntington (1998:93), who states that “the problem is not overthrow but erosion: the 
intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it”. 
 
Schedler (1998) also alludes to the concept of erosion and breakdown of institutions. 
Democratic breakdown provokes radical discontinuity with democratic politics (leading 
to authoritarianism) and this can sometimes take the form of coups. This illegal 
overthrow may be undertaken by anti-democratic actors such as the disenchanted 
population, who may feel tired of democracy, or have a feeling that democracy has not 
benefited them, or has produced much more economic and social inequality (Diamond, 
1996; Gunther, Diamandourous and Hans-Jurgen 1995; Huntington, 1991). 
 
Schedler (2001) argues that the “core symptom of failed institutionalisation” is violence. 
He further states that political competition in a liberal-democratic framework entails the 
unconditional renunciation of violence. Violence occurs when actors with their own 
political goals use the element of force to violate the fundamental norms of democratic 
theory and practice. In fact, they play “other games” than their democratic counterparts, 
the one which undermines the universal validity of democratic values (Schedler, 
2001:71). 
 
He also argues that the deepening of democracy is not inevitable. Carothers (2002:11) 
makes a critical point on the misconception that young democracies would inevitably 
take the way of becoming consolidated democracies. Carothers’s argument is that the 
regression of transitional governments often turns out to be chaotic rather than a linear 
one-way direction. He indicates that authoritarian trends can emerge, even after the 
establishment of democratic institutions, and ultimately regression could occur rather 
than increased progress towards democratic consolidation.  
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Carothers (2002:11) provides an explanation for the syndromes that inhibit democratic 
consolidation in the “gray zone” governments. He terms them as “feckless-pluralism” 
(i.e. better) and “dominant–power” (i.e. worse) syndromes. In Africa “the most common 
other political syndrome in the “gray zone” is dominant-power politics” (Carothers, 
2002).  
 
Carothers (2002:12) continues by indicating that “a key political problem in dominant-
power countries is the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party. The 
state’s main assets – that is to say, the state as a source of money, jobs, public 
information (via state media), and the police power– are gradually put in the direct 
service of the ruling party”. He further states that a typical issue about these “dominant-
power” countries is that the judicial organ is cowed, as part of the one-sided grip on 
power; over time elections are tilted considerably in favour of the ruling party. 
 
This is undertaken through the suffocation of the opposition groups just enough so that 
they won’t die and as a result the political elites enjoy a monopoly of consistently being 
in power and immune from the considerations of the voters (Carothers, 2002:12). 
Carothers (2002:12) further argues that “dominant-power” systems are common in sub-
Saharan Africa and usually experience problems with large-scale corruption and crony 
capitalism, so much so that the leaders do not often face strong pressure from the 
public to curb down.  
 
2.7 Summary    
  
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) proposed a “multivariate model”. This “multivariate 
model” alludes to the significance of institutions and socio-economic factors for 
democratic consolidation. Leftwich (2000:136-145) argues that the following conditions 
are essential for democratic consolidation: legitimacy (which entails geographical, 
constitutional, political and performance legitimacy– the latter being my addition), 
adherence to the constitutional rules of the game, policy restraint by the winners, 
successful eradication of poverty and the ability to deal with ethnic, cultural, racial or 
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religious divisions within the society. Bratton and Van de Walle’s (1997) “multivariate 
model” does not entail any of the above mentioned factors. But Leftwich (2000) adds 
most of them as factors for the endurance of democracy.  
 
Leftwich (2000) thus proposed the following additional factors as critical for democratic 
consolidation: affluence, economic growth and declining income inequalities. He adds 
that in areas that have previously had their democracies overthrown, new democracies 
under “these economic circumstances are more vulnerable”. He noted that   a 
parliamentary system lasts longer than presidential systems and the existence of vibrant 
civil society is essential (2000:145-147). These additional factors proposed by Leftwich 
are relevant to Bratton and Van de Walle’s (1997) “multivariate model” and to the 
preconditions for democratic consolidation indicated by Przeworski et al. (1996).  
 
Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that civil society, acceptance to the rules of the game, 
rule of law, state bureaucracy and delivery of services are crucial for democratic 
consolidation. Schedler (1998) argues that institutions such as political parties, 
legislatures, bureaucracies, judiciaries and organised interest groups are essential for 
the consolidation of democracy. Linz and Stepan’s (1996) and Schedler’s (1998) 
conditions are broadly relevant to Leftwich’s (2000) conditions for democratic 
consolidation as they cover both institutional and socio-economic factors.      
 
Leftwich’s (2000) conditions for democratic consolidation could also be described as 
conforming to a “multivariate model”. Bartton and Van de Walle (1997) “multivariate 
model” and Leftwich (2000) arguments are significant for assessing prospects of 
consolidation, as they are empirically measurable because most democracies in sub-
saharan Africa are still confronted with problems of poverty, lack of development and 
have weak civil society organisations. Also, the democratisation process in most 
countries has produced largely unresponsive and unaccountable governments in 
countries such as Angola, which have been unable to deliver on their electoral 
promises.  
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Institutional and socio-economic conditions coupled with HDI will form a critical element 
for the assessment of the prospects for democratic consolidation in Lesotho, all of which 
will be subjected to critical analysis within the “multivariate model”.  Institutions identified 
in Lesotho include the monarchy, the military and the electoral system. The socio-
economic factors identified are affluence, economic performance and inequality 
reduction as well as civil society. A special attempt will be made at the end of every 
chapter to assess the implications of the discussion for democratic consolidation.  
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE BASOTHO MONARCHY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the rise and erosion of the monarchy during British colonial 
rule, a period of six ruling generations (six monarchies ruled under the British). Its 
purpose is to examine the political legacy of the Basotho monarchy and to assess its 
implications for Lesotho’s democratic consolidation.The monarchy as an institutional 
factor is one of the four historical forces that have been inductively identified as major 
actors in Lesotho’s political landscape: the other three are the military, the electoral 
system and socio-economic factors.   
The earliest political structures of the country are eloquently documented in Ashton 
(1967), Eldredge (1993), Gill (1993), Leeman (1985), Machobane (1990), Maqutu 
(1990), Ritter (1955), Tylden (1950) and Weisfelder (1971). I have no intention of 
repeating the country’s pre-colonial and colonial history, but I have carefully narrated 
the events relevant for the purposes of this study until 1966, when Lesotho became 
independent as a constitutional monarchy.   
3.2 The rise and erosion of the monarchy 
3.2.1 Volatility in the mountains  
During the 16th through to the 18th century fragmented groups of Sotho people gradually 
expanded into the portion of Southern Africa between the Vaal River and the 
Drakensburg mountains. Although these dispersed segments, primarily of ascendant 
Koena and Kgatla lineage clusters, dominated and often assimilated the earlier 
inhabitants of the area, they retained a decentralised, small-scale pattern of political 
organisation (Weisfelder, 1971; Eldredge, 1993).The royal house is from the Koena 
lineage.  
A trend towards the amalgamation of separate Sotho political units occurred in the late 
18th and 19th centuries. This was a result of the increasing population densities and the 
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emergence of new trading patterns with Europeans. This was followed by the disastrous 
drought in the 1820s and a great famine which increased the competition for resources. 
Consequently, chiefdoms competed for expansion in an effort to acquire more 
resources (Leeman, 1985:5; Gill, 1993:14).The unifying catalyst which reinforced this 
‘rudimentary state-building’ process occurred in the form of a devastating series of wars 
known as difaqane (1822-1835) (Weisfelder, 1971). Julian Cobbing (1988) argued 
persuasively that difaqane has been a construct of apartheid politicians and historians 
who were attempting to justify the longstanding oppression of black South Africans by 
the white colonisers. Cobbings arguments are beyond the scope of this study because 
my attention is directed to the emergence of Basotho Kingdom not so much on the 
causes of difaqane  and the  the rise of the Zulu Kingdom.  
In this recurrent struggle the Southern Sotho suffered a degree of social and physical 
dislocation that substantially altered their territorial distribution, ethnic composition, 
political and economic life. It was through this that Moshoeshoe I rose from obscurity 
and managed to counteract anarchic trends precipitated by difaqane (Weisfelder, 
1971:35). Born in 1786 at Menkhoaneng and originally named Lepoqo, Moshoeshoe I 
was the first son of Mokhachane of the Mokotedi clan of the Koena.  In 1804 he went to 
be initiated (lebollo) and afterwards led his initiation mates in a series of successful 
cattle raids. Bardill and Cobbe (1985:8) indicate that  
to commemorate one of these he composed a praise-poem to the 
effect that he had shaved his unfortunate victim’s beard, i.e. his 
cattle. From this time onward he assumed the name, under which he 
was to become famous throughout Southern Africa, that of 
Moshoeshoe....  
Bardill and Cobbe (1985:8) further note that in 1820 Moshoeshoe I left Menkhoaneng 
with his followers and established himself as a village headman at the foot of Butha-
Buthe Mountain. But after the difaqane skirmishes with the Tlokwa in 1822 and 1823, he 
sought for a more secure refuge. He finally settled in Thaba-Bosiu Mountain from 1822 
onwards (Ritter, 1955:109). The mountain had good pastures and “its steep uppermost 
cliffs and the passes could be easily defended against potential enemies” (Bardill and 
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Cobbe, 1985:9). Thaba-Bosiu’s defensive capabilities were soon put to the test by the 
Ngwane in 1828, the Tlokwa of Sekonyela in 1829 and the Ndebele in 1831. 
The Ndebele raid signalled an end for difaqane skirmishes for Moshoeshoe I’s 
followers. The Ngwane left the area in 1828. Sekonyela,  impressed by the increasing 
size and power of Moshoeshoe I, refrained from making any further attacks, whilst the 
Ndebele “confined their activities in their home base north of the Vaal  River” (Bardill 
and Cobbe, 1985:9). Hailey (1953:28) states that around 1831 Moshoeshoe I was 
recognised as the leader of the tribal societies which surrounded him, who further 
supported him in exchange for protection. His prominence was recognised through the 
titles such as Morena oa Basotho, chief of the Basotho and Morena e Moholo, Great 
Chief or King (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985:10).  
In 1833 Moshoeshoe’s I small and insignificant chiefdom was transformed into a 
kingdom. MacGregor (1965:15) argues that the rise and transformation of 
Moshoeshoe’s kingdom was attributable to events in the aftermath of difaqane. Both the 
Sotho and Nguni, driven by the desire for security and protection had voluntarily joined 
his Kingdom.  
Weisfelder (1969:10) states that the Basotho nation was at its inception a political rather 
than an ethnic and linguistic entity. During this process of nation building Moshoeshoe I 
used “every means to forestall attacks from those stronger than [him] ... put on a great 
display of strength where necessary”. His authority became legitimately accepted 
because of his capacity to fulfil these popular expectations (MacGregor, 1965). 
He used the following political and social institutions for expansion and consolidation of 
his kingdom, beginning with the “Sons of Moshoeshoe” followed by ‘placing’, lekhotla la 
mahosana (grand council), pitso (public meeting), matona (privy council), lebollo 
(initiation), mafisa (cattle-loan) and matsema (surplus labour for chiefs) (Kimble, 
1999:14). Leeman (1985:18) notes that, while the territorial integrity of the country was 
under threat, these institutions provided a powerful political platform for public 
discussion and tolerance of different views.  
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Although Moshoeshoe I ruled from 1822 and consolidated his state between the 1830s 
and 1860s, threats were always imminent. For example, after the Basotho-Boer War of 
1865-1868, the Basotho came under British control, from which time the survival of the 
ruling class was at stake (Ajulu, 1995:6). Early evidence of this was the Gun War of 
1880-1881, after which the Basotho were disarmed. Another example was the reduction 
in the number of traditional chiefs from 2500 in 1935 (by the Pim Commission) to only 
122 in 1946. Most junior chiefs were not recognised and within two decades this 
grievance led to the formation of the BNP in the 1950s by a junior chief, Leabua 
Jonathan, who came to power after the 1965 parliamentary elections immediately 
before independence in 1966, when the status of the once powerful monarch was 
reduced to that of a titular king. 
3.2.2 Placing, pitsos, mafisa, missionaries and British protection in 1868 
Moshoeshoe’s central power was enhanced through ‘placing’ all his sons and loyal 
relatives over segments of the country. Chiefs under ‘placing’ had full rights. ‘Placing’ 
became effective political and administrative machinery which ensured loyalty from his 
subordinates. Weisfelder (1971:16) argues that ‘placing’ established a sense of 
belonging and participation in a cohesive political community under the leadership of 
Moshoeshoe I. But it also enabled Moshoeshoe I to centralise his control and influence 
across his Kingdom.  
‘Placing’ occurred in the following way beginning in the western lowlands. Butha-Buthe 
was ‘placed’ under the authority of Matela, a chief of the Khwakhwa. His second son 
Molapo was ‘placed’ in an area stretching from Butha-Buthe to Peka. Masupha, his third 
son, was put in charge of the area between Peka and Thaba-Bosiu. Letsie I’s first son 
and heir to the throne was put in charge of the area between Thaba-Bosiu and 
Matsieng. The southern districts were under the authority of Moshoeshoe’s I brothers 
Poshudi and Mohale. The chiefs of the Phuthi and Taung tribes, Moorosi and 
Moletsane, were allowed to retain their status but owed their allegiance to Moshoeshoe 
I (Ashton, 1938:296). 
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Lekhotla la Mahosana (grand council) composed of his sons, his advisers, junior chiefs 
and the representatives of the distant chiefs who owed allegiance to him (Kimble, 
1999:14). Lekhotla la Mahosana assisted and advised Moshoeshoe I on major policy 
issues (Ashton, 1967:24). Machobane (1990:22) further notes that “it was on such 
occasions when the lekhotla la mahosana convened that the allegiance of 
Moshoeshoe’s I territorial chiefs was also tested”. 
At the pitsos (public meeting) matters of national concern were widely discussed and 
major decisions made. Pitsos were characterised by considerable freedom of speech, 
the aim of which was to give an idea of popular opinion on matters of national 
importance (Weisfelder, 1971). Their significance was that people somehow 
participated in their government and their governance (Kimble, 1999).  
Weisfelder (1971:35) argues that Moshoeshoe’s domestic political influence was 
“contingent upon his ability to secure consent through regular consultation with his 
people at large”. Weisfelder further argues that the frequently cited Sotho maxim, “A 
chief is a chief by the people” was applicable in his Kingdom. Pitsos further served as 
the primary basis of support “in lieu of traditional hereditary legitimacy and as medium of 
political socialisation for inculcating a sense of cohesion among his polyglot following” 
(Weisfelder, 1971:36). 
Arbousset and Daumas (1946:47) note that matona (privy council) were as “the eyes, 
ears, and arms of the chief” consisting mostly of senior members of the royal family. 
Matona advised him on public affairs, assisted him in the day-to-day execution of his 
duties and gathered intelligence on how the people felt about his rule. They checked his 
tendencies towards despotism and ensured that he ruled through the will of the people 
(Mothibe, 1998:41). 
Those who felt marginalised would often voice their grievances in the pitsos and at 
times use Matona to voice their displeasure with the central administration. Casalis 
(1861:233-6) noted that pitsos were conducted with a discernible degree of order. A 
“subject of discussion was normally put to the people by one of the King’s courtiers, 
taking care to let his personal opinion appear as little as possible”. Machobane 
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(1990:23) argues that those “with the gift of speech aired their views with the greatest 
freedom and plainness of speech. There were always different opinions in terms of 
supporting what was being discussed. Moshoeshoe I at the end summarised 
arguments, made his own presentation and then created consensus”. Through the 
consensus that Moshoeshoe I created the following laws were widely discussed, 
debated and abolished: 
(1) The law removing the ‘customary spoor law’, stated by Mohato Letsie as “a law 
forbidding any person from being punished simply on the evidence of a spoor or 
of slaughtered meat being found at a village”; 
(2) Moshoshoe’s first law against witchcraft in 1843. Machobane (1990:25). 
 
Mothibe (1998:42) further states that lebollo (initiation) was an educational system that 
marked a transition from boyhood to manhood. The initiates were taught adult 
responsibilities and “as loyal subjects to their chief” they were also taught to show 
“respect for the authority”. 
Moshoeshoe I was also responsible for the welfare of his citizens through the mafisa 
(cattle-loan) system. Mafisa created a system of dependence on him by the destitute 
members in the kingdom. Mothibe (1998:12) accurately notes that the beneficiary of the 
loan consumed the dairy products and used the cattle for agricultural purposes. The 
benefactor retained the ownership of the cattle. This created a strong social bond 
between the two parties (Moshoeshoe I and his subjects) and ensured loyalty and 
dependence of the beneficiary on the benefactor. 
Mafisa was not seen as exploitative by his subjects; instead it became a successful 
welfare system which eliminated extreme poverty. The socio-economic inequalities 
remained, but wealth “was redistributed in a permanent way, since a destitute person 
could acquire his own livestock through mafisa arrangements” (Eldredge, 1993:35).  
Moshoeshoe I was able to extract tribute in the form of labour in exchange for benefits. 
People willingly offered their labour in his fields, which were designated masimo a lira 
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(fields of enemy). Casalis (1861:143-144) noted that “the mosuto chief possesses ... the 
supreme degree of ... hospitality...such that in Basutoland there are never any poor, 
nowhere anyone who dies of hunger”. 
Moshoeshoe’s prerogatives of summoning communal labour, levying taxes in cattle 
(sethabathaba) as well as having a larger share over the agricultural produce and wild 
game allowed him to mobilise economic resources that were necessary to undertake 
military and administrative responsibilities, for tribute payments to his enemies, to 
provide hospitality for stranded strangers and to care for the impoverished (Weisfelder, 
1971:34).     
Moshoeshoe I adopted a “tenacious defense coupled with conciliatory gestures toward 
his foes [which] offered the best chance of survival” (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985:10). In an 
effort to provide more security for his followers, he invited European missionaries whom 
he had been informed “were proving helpful in bringing peace to ... Rolong and Griqua 
settlements”. Ultimately, three Frenchmen of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society 
(PEMS) responded to his call and arrived at Thaba-Bosiu in 1833 (Bardill and Cobbe, 
1985).  
Literacy rates improved over the years as missions stations were opened across the 
country. Mothibe (1998:40) notes that missionary innovations increased agricultural 
productivity and Lesotho became the granary of Southern Africa in the 1850s. The 
missionaries later acted as diplomats in Moshoeshoe’s dealings with the British 
(Widdicombe, 1895). 
Although Moshoeshoe I was interested in the activities of the PEMS (Protestants), the 
missionaries were more interested in working with the ordinary population than the 
chiefs. Sheddick (1953:67) indicates that the missionaries developed an 
uncompromising attitude against what they viewed as “heathen” customs such as 
puberty schools/initiation (lebollo), polygamy and the payment of dowries (bohali). 
Similarly, Tylden (1950:193) notes that the payment of dowries was officially forbidden 
by the PEMS in 1881. The PEMS missionaries further refrained from converting chiefs. 
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Ellenberger (1938:39) notes that missionaries “had to develop in the very heart of 
heathendom, and had to deal with a strong and yet untouched nationality that stuck 
jealously to its ancient traditions. There the power of the chief was almost absolute. The 
missionaries had to acknowledge it just as much as the Basuto themselves”. As a result 
Christianity did not penetrate into the higher echelons of administration. Hence, 
Widdicombe (1895:77) noted in 1895 that “Basutoland [Lesotho]... [was] still 
emphatically a heathen country ... not a single chief of the front rank [principal chief] is a 
Christian”. 
The PEMS missionaries’ arrival was followed by the Roman Catholic missionaries 
(RCC) in 1862 and those from the Anglican Church in 1876. As a result of the PEMS 
dominance, the Catholic and Anglican missionaries at that time had little influence on 
society (Sheddick, 1953:67). But over the years, because of their sympathy with the 
traditional customs, the Roman Catholic missionaries garnered an increased support 
from the conservative chiefs and their followers, especially further afield in the 
mountains in the eastern part of the country.   
Paramount Chief Seeiso Griffith and some significant chiefs were converted to the RCC 
in 1913. Weisfelder (1971:34) argues that Griffith was “undoubtedly attracted by the 
Roman Catholic missionaries’ conservative emphasis on notions such as hierarchy and 
deference to authority, and by their ... eagerness to work through the traditional 
institutional framework”.  
Breytenbach (1973) also agrees that the PEMS failed to make an impact upon the 
traditional structures, which were more impressed with the hierarchical nature of the 
RCC. Moreover, the Anglican Church also made a significant contribution to the spread 
of Christianity across the rest of the country. Undoubtedly, Lesotho’s missionaries – 
Protestants, Catholics and Anglicans – had a great impact on culture and change in this 
mountain kingdom. Protestants developed civil society in the western lowlands, as they 
were prominent among the members of the Progressive Association founded in 1907 
and the Basutoland African Congress (BAC) established in 1954.  
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In cases where it became impossible to consult the nation at large, Moshoeshoe I relied 
upon the wisdom of subordinate chiefs, close royal sympathisers (mostly his ‘placed’ 
sons) and other prominent members of the community. This small, informal core of 
national leaders tended to be responsive for they regularly had face-to-face interactions 
with ordinary citizens in their lekhotla (courts) (Weisfelder, 1971:34). 
Amongst the 22 tribal chiefs that came under his protection, only the Khwakwa clan of 
Butha-Buthe, the Taung of Mohale’s Hoek and the Tlokwa of Mokhotlong were able to 
retain their separate ethnic identities (Ashton, 1967:3). All other tribal groups and clans 
were eventually assimilated into the Koena culture (Breytenbach, 1973). Consequently, 
this led to the homogeneity of the nation. 
Moshoeshoe I further pleaded for protection under pressure of war from the Orange 
Free State (OFS) in the 1860s (Gill, 1993:67). Mahao (1994:191) states that “if this had 
[not] happened, it would have led to the loss of the territory and possible disintegration 
of the nation”. But he had clearly indicated that the British could exercise their authority 
over his kingdom through him.  
On his application for protection, Moshoeshoe I in 1862 stated that;  
I am like a man who has a house, the man rules the house and all 
that it is in it, and the government rules him. My house is Basutoland. 
So that the queen rules my people only through me … I wish to 
govern my own people by native law, by our own laws, but if  the 
Queen wishes after this to introduce other laws into my country, I 
would be willing, but I should  wish such laws  to be submitted  to the 
council of Basutos (cited in Machobane, 1990:34). 
Machobane (1990:14) indicates that Moshoeshoe’s application for protection showed 
that he did not wish to cede his sovereignty. He wanted to be under British protection as 
a ‘vassal’. This was a status which the Amapondo of chief Faku enjoyed under his 
protection. The British High commissioner, Sir Phillip Wodehouse, grasped the point 
that Moshoeshoe I did not want to be a “British subject and was not prepared to submit 
to British laws” but was desperate for protection (Machobane, 1990). Maqutu (1990:40) 
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agrees and indicates that “this was according to tradition, because Moshoeshoe I had 
authority over subordinate chiefs but not over the subjects. He dealt with the subjects 
through their chiefs”. But this does not mean that all the chiefs that were ‘placed’ under 
him and his close relatives were always submissive to him. His nephew (Lesaoana), 
was one of the chiefs who usually made their independent decisions against 
Moshoeshoe’s I wishes.The competition for power between his three sons (Letsie, 
Molapo and Masupha) also saw them undermining his authority by making their own 
independent decisions.   
Lesotho became under British protection in March 1868, but was placed under the Cape 
colonial government in the 1870s. The country’s loss of political sovereignty and 
independence was implicit in the Annexation Proclamation (1868, No. 14), which 
declared that “the said tribe of the Basutho (sic) shall be, and shall be taken to be, for all 
intents and purposes British subjects and the territory of the said tribe shall be taken to 
be British territory”. From 1884 (at the time of the Berlin conference that unleashed the 
“scramble for Africa”), it was ruled directly by the British (Machobane, 1990:49). 
Pre-colonial Lesotho under Moshoeshoe I had defined institutions of government; there 
was distribution and control of authority, a legal system and territorial integrity. However, 
Bardill and Cobbe (1985:12) note that  
the kingdom was still a loose confederation rather than a tightly knit 
unitary state. Many of Moshoeshoe’s brothers and sons, now 
stationed throughout the territory, were showing ambition for greater 
autonomy and became frustrated when autonomy was denied them. 
So too were powerful non-Koena subordinates such as Moorosi. 
I acknowledge Bardill and Cobbe’s argument, but Moshoeshoe I diplomatically 
managed to counteract such threats. Similarly, Breytenbach (1973:119) states that 
“Moshoeshoe succeeded in achieving a relatively high level of national integration”. He 
created a powerful, strong and united state, with similar characteristics of a modern 
state. I concur with Machobane (1990) that there was a population, territory and 
government and which had established relations with other states.  
 74
Finally, Maqutu (1990:39) states that “the ascendancy of his dynasty was an integral 
part of the Basotho way of life”. “His less talented descendants held the nation together 
through the tradition of rallying to the recognised chief and making up for his 
deficiencies” (Maqutu, 1990). A senior chief could thus delegate to those who were 
more talented to perform duties in his name. Ashton (1967:243) also indicates that this 
“enabled the successors of Moshoesh to build up an exceedingly strong centralised 
organisation covering the whole country”.   
3.2.3 The monarchy after Moshoeshoe I: the impacts of imperialism  
Although Moshoeshoe I left the monarchy on a solid basis, the erosion of monarchical 
powers became evident after his death in 1870. His successor in 1870 (Paramount 
Chief Letsie I) and the colonial representatives wrestled for political authority. 
Paramount Chief Letsie I was eager to assert his control, while the colonial officials 
wanted to impose British supremacy (Machobane, 1990:50).  
The British did not refer to Moshoeshoe’s successors as “Kings” but as “Paramount 
Chiefs”. Machobane (2001:1) argues this was to avoid a confusion of having many 
Kings under their Queen. Breytenbach (1973:3) argues that the British referred to all 
chief authorities in “centralised” kingdoms in Africa as “Paramount Chiefs”. These power 
struggles led to the colonial officials issuing a circular to the institution of the monarchy, 
strongly reminding them that “the Supreme chief in this territory in Basutoland [Lesotho], 
[was]… the governor representing the Queen of England” (Machobane, 1990:51).  
The critical blow to the old monarchy was the Annexation Act of 1871. The Report of the 
Commission on Native Laws and Customs of the Basutos (1873), states that this Act   
stipulated that  
(a) All land should belong to the Queen. Private individuals should be 
encouraged to possess property and purchase land, to offset the comparative 
wealth and power of chiefs. 
(b) The individual should be protected from the chief – a practice such as “eating 
up” which is the chief’s confiscation of a subject’s entire property ... should be 
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forbidden (Report of the Commission on Native Laws and Customs of the 
Basutos, 1873:126-38). 
Then came the Gun War of 1880-1881, after which chiefs and commoners alike were 
disarmed. Proclamation 2B of 1884 was another instrument used by the British colonial 
government to undermine the monarchy. Maqutu (1990:41) states that Proclamation 2B 
of 1884 stipulated that the High Commissioner’s Agent known as the Resident 
Commissioner, who was the chief executive officer in Lesotho, became a court of law 
with   
the jurisdiction in and [to] adjudicate upon all causes, suits and 
actions whatsoever, civil and criminal, within the said territory, such 
court to beholden at such place or places within the said territory  as 
Resident Commissioner shall from time to time appoint   
(Proclamation 2B of 1884 Regulation 1).       
Furthermore, Orders in Council in February 1884 Part II stipulated that   
the High Commissioner shall have and may exercise, in the name of 
her Majesty, all the legislative and executive authority in and over the 
territory of Basutoland. The High Commissioner is … empowered 
and required in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, to make by 
proclamation such laws as may to him appear necessary for peace, 
order and good government ... and to appoint such Resident or 
Deputy … Commissioners, Officers and Magistrates and generally to 
make such measures and to do all such matters and things as he 
may think expedient for peace, order and good government.   
Through these proclamations the British High Commissioner in South Africa assumed 
the legislative and principal authority for Lesotho in the name of the Queen of England 
(Maqutu, 1990:42).The monarchy lost enormous administrative, political and judicial 
powers.The introduction of the colonial legal framework managed to undermine the 
political hierarchy of the monarchy and led to the gradual phasing away of the traditional 
lekhotla.  
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The colonial administration sub-divided the country into districts and allocated land in 
these areas. This districts were delibaretly made in the way that coincided with those of 
Moshoeshoe’s I sons: Leribe (under Molapo), Matsieng (under Letsie I) and Thaba-
Bosiu (under Masupha). This arrangement meant that all the three senior sons of 
Moshoeshoe were delibaretly and effectively made politically equal to each other and 
their powers significantly reduced. The colonial administration further introduced tax and 
secured the control over the movement of people in and out of the country by 
introducing passes (Kimble, 1999:27). 
The changing socio-economic conditions also dealt a serious blow to the powers of the 
monarchy (Leeman, 1985:40). The discovery of minerals in the 1870s and 1880s 
created the demand for vast pools of labour and Lesotho was seen as a reliable area for 
the provision of labour by the colonial officials (Spence, 1968:11; Machobane, 1990:59). 
Spence (1968:11) states that “Basotho migrated to the Vaal diamond diggings [in large 
numbers]”.This labour migration to the mines was greatly encouraged and favoured by 
the British colonial administration.  
Eventually the social set-up where the chief was responsible for the welfare of his 
subjects changed. Many people began looking to mining wages for survival rather than 
dependence on their chiefs. People started questioning why chiefs should continue to 
retain their traditional privileges when they were no longer able to fulfil their traditional 
obligations (Spence, 1968). These changes were aggravated by the British policy of 
integrating Lesotho into the mining labour market. Hence, the British Resident 
Commissioners Report (1898/99:13) stated that, 
though for its size and population, Basutoland [Lesotho] … has the 
industry of great economic value to South Africa, viz. the output of 
native labour … To others who urge higher education for natives, it 
may be pointed out that to educate them above labour would be a 
great mistake. Primarily native labour ... tends to fertilise native 
territories with cash which is at once diffused for English goods.  
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The chiefs often resisted the British innovations as they viewed the reforms as divergent 
from their national traditions (Breytenbach, 1973:113). However, the British influence 
gradually infiltrated into the traditional structures of authority, which weakened the 
monarchy. In the 1930s the number of chiefs was reduced as mentioned before, but 
they also became the agents of British colonial administration. They became the line 
functionaries of the British colonial administration. Most of the ruling lineage chiefs were 
excluded from positions of privilege and access to traditional methods of accumulation 
which they had previously enjoyed.   
They assisted in the collection of taxes, controlled grazing areas and land allocation as 
well as the movement of people. They retained limited powers over the administrative 
functions of the country (Kimble, 1999:21; Leeman, 1985:40). Leeman (1985:41) adds 
that “chiefs gradually degenerated into a scavenging, inept, illiterate bureaucracy”. 
Consequently, this saw the decline in the popularity of the monarchy as the junior chiefs 
in their ward areas collected more tax than was required. This enabled them to acquire 
their personal income at the expense of the citizens. The popular dissatisfaction with the 
chiefs was further worsened by the way in which the some chiefs were making gains 
from their close relationship with the colonial administration.This was openly articulated 
in 1880 when proposals to double tax met little opposition from the chiefs (Kimble, 
1999:35). 
The other critical factor that led to the significant erosion of the powers of the monarchy 
were the internal struggles and the tensions between the “Sons of Moshoeshoe”. These 
tensions became violent under the reign of Letsie I (1870-1891) as well as under 
Lerotholi’s reign (1891-1905).The lack of interference by the colonial officials in the 
internal affairs of the country and particularly not intervening in the traditional authorities 
further deepened the tensions between the “Sons of Moshoeshoe”. The internal 
struggles occurred mainly between the two sons of Molapo, Joel of Butha-Buthe and 
Jonathan of Leribe (Weisfelder, 1971:27-29), the grandfather of the founder of the 
conservative BNP that won the elections of 1965.  
Tensions also developed between Masupha of Thaba-Bosiu and his paternal uncle 
Lerotholi of Matsieng, an heir to the throne (Tylden, 1950:193). Moreover, there were 
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also tensions between Lerotholi and Jonathan, the second son of Molapo as well as 
between Lerotholi and his brother Maama, who felt that he was the rightful heir to the 
throne of their father Letsie I (Tylden, 1950:195). 
There was an intense competition between Jonathan and Joel, sons of Molapo over the 
succession (Breytenbach, 1973:20-22). Paramount Chief Letsie I remained neutral and 
turned to Sir Marshall Clark, the Resident Commissioner, to resolve the succession 
issue. Overall, a lasting solution was not achieved until Joel was defeated in November 
1885 (Widdicombe, 1895:276).  
The consequences of these continuous internal struggles amongst the “Sons of 
Moshoeshoe” and his grandsons led to the confirmation of the King’s power in the local 
affairs of the country. But the seeds of division were sown. Ultimately, this enabled the 
subordinate chiefs to pursue their own independent policies. This became prevalent 
amongst the junior chiefs in the mountain areas (Tylden, 1950:192). Because of the 
topographic nature of the country (mountains), regular contact was almost impossible 
between the junior chiefs and the central authorities in the western lowlands. 
Consequently, this undermined the central authority under the Paramount Chief and led 
to poor coordination in the upper echelons of administration.  
The junior chiefs also refused to fully cooperate with the senior chiefs. Leeman 
(1985:40) indicates that ‘placing’ was abused as senior chiefs ‘placed’ their favourites. 
They further ‘placed’ their sons over the already existing and established chiefs and 
downgraded their authority by “obtaining the income of the area themselves” (Jones, 
1977:4). 
Leeman (1985) states that even in the event of a senior chief dying, his widow’s sons by 
another father would be ‘placed’ as her late husband’s sons. The junior chiefs were 
further displaced by their seniors who were eager to accommodate their numerous sons 
from polygamous marriages.  
Consequently, this undermined ‘placing’, which had previously succeeded in 
maintaining cohesion, unity and loyalty (Kimble, 1999:21). Moreover, conflicts between 
the senior and junior chiefs undermined the possibility of creating national consensus on 
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major issues and consequently the pitso on a national scale became impossible to 
organise.  
Against this background, the colonial administration proposed an alternative to pitso, 
which had disintegrated. This started as early as 1884. The pitso was replaced by the 
Basutoland National Council (BNC) in 1903. The BNC was adopted under Paramount 
Chief Lerotholi (Breytenbach, 1973). The BNC (1903-1910) was composed of chiefs, 
whose functions were to advise the colonial administration and the Paramount Chief on 
policy matters. The colonial officials were eager, however, “to take [chiefs] into 
partnership [in government]”, as Kimble (1999:106) noted. Consequently, there was a 
shift in the concentration of power from the monarchy to the BNC, an erosion of 
tradition. 
It was through this council that the Melao ea Lerotholi (Laws of Lerotholi) in 1904 were 
formulated. Melao ea Lerotholi covered a wide range of principles and procedures “for 
judicial and political affairs..., political rights of succession”, the authority of the 
Paramount Chief, the rights and duties of the chiefs in relation to land allocation, tribute 
labour and seizure of property, the limits of jurisdiction of makhotla a marena (chiefs 
courts) (Kimble, 1999:106). 
This was a watershed, for it marked official interference in affairs of the monarchy. I 
agree with Machobane (1990) that the BNC tried to restore and give the monarchy a 
new lease of life. But the context was different. It further attempted to restore the 
‘nation’s faith in the indigenous government by bringing chiefs under law, with the 
objective of placing them under the monarchy. But it was doomed from the onset as a 
result of internal disputes between the “Sons of Moshoeshoe”. 
Melao ea Lerotholi further provided challenges for Paramount Chief Letsie II, who 
succeeded his father Paramount Chief Lerotholi. His subordinate chiefs refused to obey 
him. Even the senior Chief Jonathan Molapo of Leribe became uncooperative in the 
efforts to restore the dignity of the monarchy (Machobane, 1990:91). 
The BNC was not fully representative. It was composed of 95 members, of which the 
Resident Commissioner in Lesotho had the right to appoint five members. Kimble 
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(1999:106) notes that “the Basutoland colonial accounts were to be submitted to the 
Council, which was also permitted to discuss changes in local laws”.  I am of the opinion 
that these laws did not only redefine the powers of the monarchy, but they led to the 
reduction of its powers. The monarchy became subject to British laws. From 1905 it was 
evident that the monarchy would have to cope with organised political organisations – 
an early manifestation of a civil society that was eager for greater participation in the 
country’s administration.  
The monarchy therefore did not thrive under British colonial rule. The colonial 
authorities continued to depend on the chiefs partly because of the shortage of colonial 
administrative staff (Breytenbach, 1973:113). Maqutu (1990:19) states this resulted in 
the existence of two conflicting constitutional systems in the country: the monarchy (with 
the assistance of principal chiefs) and the colonial administration (with the minor chiefs 
assisting in the day-to-day administration). 
Maqutu (1990:19) argues that this resulted in the development of a dualistic 
constitutional set-up in the domains of government and in the ‘realm of law’. This means 
that the British had their own government, laws and hierarchy of courts. On the other 
hand, there were traditional chiefs, with their laws and customary courts. Ordinary 
citizens were subject to both systems (Maqutu, 1990:19.). Maqutu (1999:20) also 
argues that “the British authorities ... used the office of the Paramount Chief to erode 
traditional chieftainship and to streamline it in the way they ... desired”. 
After the Pim Commission – which undertook its study as early as 1934-5 – chiefs were 
gazetted. The choice to be gazetted depended on the Paramount Chief (i.e. the King). 
Most chiefs, eager to safeguard their appointment, hardly concentrated on serving their 
subjects (Leeman, 1985:44). Smith (1939:303) suggests that this resulted in a more 
oligarchic framework, which gave subordinate chiefs an increased interest in favouring 
their seniors than focusing on winning the respect and support of their subjects. 
Another consequence of the Pim Commission was Proclamation No. 61 (Native 
Administration) of 1938, which confirmed chiefs as the agents of administration. Chiefs 
were allowed to remain in office only if they were officially gazetted. Leeman (1985:42) 
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notes that “a gazetted chief could … be deposed”. Moreover, the chiefs’ powers to 
‘place’ were dissolved.  
A chief could only be ‘placed’ with consultation and the approval of the Paramount Chief 
and the British Resident Commissioner. Proclamation No. 62 (Native Courts) of 1938 
also restricted the number of chiefs with the powers to conduct courts. In 1946 courts 
were reduced and only 122 chiefs were recognised, as mentioned earlier (Leeman, 
1985). The colonial administration believed that these two proclamations of 1938 would 
rectify the administrative chaos caused by the shortcomings of the chiefs. But they led 
to the further erosion of monarchical powers.  
The establishment of the Basuto National Treasury in 1946 was a devastating blow for 
the monarchy. Machobane (1990:220) argues that “the idea had been conceived by the 
colonial administration and was supposed to be beneficial to the monarchy; however, 
instead of strengthening, crippled it”. Consequently, the traditional relationship between 
the chiefs and the commoners collapsed.  
Leeman (1985:42) asserts that “the main criticism was that chiefs would no longer be 
responsible to the people but to the [British colonial] government”. This situation further 
resulted in tensions and insecurity amongst the junior chiefs at the lower levels. The 
reason, as Leeman (1985:42) noted, is that “being usually illiterate, the lesser chief[s] 
were not well-prepared for the new tasks of submitting monthly reports...” 
The significant consequences of these reforms (the proclamations of 1938 and the 
Basuto National Treasury in 1946) were that the colonial administration was able to 
exercise increased control over the monarchy and the chiefs. Secondly, Machobane 
(1990:188) states that “while the bahlalefi (the educated elite) – emboldened by the 
political victory over the chiefs, in the form of the reforms – doubled their efforts to gain 
more representation in the National Council and to turn it into a Legislative Council”  
Another significant development that led to the erosion of the powers of the monarchy 
was the role played by Chief Leabua Jonathan. He was a descendant of Molapo 
(second son of Moshoeshoe I). Chief Leabua Jonathan led a formation of the BNP, as 
will be discussed later. He made a significant proposal in the BNC that Paramount Chief 
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Letsie II should sign an agreement binding him to respect the rights and property of 
others. He further proposed that the BNC should be divided into two chambers, one 
representing the chiefs, while the other should represent commoners.  
Chief Leabua Jonathan became the first chief to advocate bicameralism in the BNC 
(Public Records Office, 417/411, No. 1138, 1905). He was defeated in both of his 
proposals as it became evident that chiefs were not willing to share power with the 
commoners along bicameral lines. But these proposals revealed the lack of unity 
amongst the “Sons of Moshoeshoe”, which had significant impact on the erosion of 
monarchical powers.  
The BNC was replaced by the Basutoland Council (BC) from 1910 to 1958. The 
Basutoland Council (BC) was also criticised by most people, who argued that it was 
more representative of chiefs’ interests rather than catering for the needs of the 
population (Breytenbach, 1973). Hence, one member of the Council, Bernard Matete 
(1956) complained that  
the constitution of this Council does not allow us to be quite free in 
expressing our views ... We young men ... are just like hammers in 
the hands of the Chiefs ... we cannot oppose the Chiefs. 
Kimble (1999:108), on the other hand, argues that the Council created a “new space for 
political expression and a forum for two aspects of political struggle: the relations 
between the various classes in colonial Basutoland, and the interaction between the 
colonial administration and the chiefs”.  
Nevertheless, the BC excluded the commoners, except the few who were advisers. This 
development failed to satisfy the increasing numbers of commoners, who believed that 
the chiefs were enjoying privileges with the British colonial government. The 
commoners continuously challenged the monarchy through their organised Basutoland 
Progressive Association (BPA) formed in 1907 and Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB) founded in 
1918.  
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The BPA saw its role as representing the interests of the educated elite vis-à-vis the 
‘traditional authority’ of chiefs within the forum of the council. It advocated the reduction 
of powers of chiefs and a greater role for the bahlalefi (educated elite) in both the 
economic and political affairs of the country (Rugege, 1993:1; Leeman, 1985:41). 
The LLB became critical of the ‘malpractices’ of chiefs and their close association with 
the colonial administration. These movements demanded increased representation in 
the Basutoland Council (BC) and a transition towards a parliamentary system (Sechaba 
Consultants, 1995:67). This made political parties a significant factor. 
The colonial administration did not only interfere with the Basotho pre-colonial forms of 
administration but it turned Lesotho into South Africa’s labour reserve. Basotho were 
transformed into a nation of migrants. The colonial administration primarily fostered 
labour migration because their interests lay outside the country in the South African 
mines. The colonial administration labour policy was accompanied by measures which 
made the development of the national economy difficult. This meant that the country as 
early in the colonial period did not have a viable national economy that would increase 
interaction between the state and its citizens.    
3.2.4 The emergence of modern political parties  
Modern political parties were preceded by the Proclamations of 1938 and the National 
Treasury in 1946, through which the monarchy lost enormous powers. The first political 
party was the BAC, founded in 1954, which changed its name and became the BCP in 
the 1960s. The BCP emerged as a broad national front mobilising for unity between 
chiefs, commoners, Protestants and Catholics, but it later criticised chiefs as the “the 
long-time political incumbents, who ... proved their incompetence and unreliability by 
becoming agents of alien [British] rule” (Weisfelder, 1999:94). The BCP became aligned 
to the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) as it did not fully support the 
traditional authorities especially chiefs and the monarchy. 
In a memorandum sent to the National Council Committee, which was tasked to 
investigate the reform of chieftainship, the BCP labelled chiefs as the agents of the 
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colonial administration. Ntsu Mokhehle (leader of BCP) stated in the BCP’s newspaper 
that “the nation could progress well without chiefs” (Weisfelder, 1999:10). 
Bennett Makalo Khaketla (who was then the deputy leader in the BCP, but he later left 
the BCP in 1960 and became a powerful figure in the MFP) castigated the chiefs for 
being undemocratic. Khaketla indicated that Lesotho’s political traditions under 
chieftainship with the monarchy at its apex were previously democratic. He argued that  
in Sesotho we have a saying that a Chief is a Chief because of the 
people. In other words, it means that he remains Chief so long as he 
protects the interests of his people, and rules them according to their 
wishes and not his own whims and idiosyncrasies. This saying 
expresses a very great fundamental truth and explains the nature of 
Chieftainship in a manner that is accepted by all democratic 
countries the world over. It means that Chieftainship is the product of 
the wills, the desires, the sympathies and the thoughts of men over 
whom it rules. It is constituted by comradeship in work, by fellowship 
in purpose and in hope, by a general desire for and a general 
willingness to submit to constituted authority that will be the protector 
of the interests of the ruled and not of a privileged section. Take 
away this desire, this willingness, this sympathy, and there is no 
Chieftainship (Mohlabani, Vol. 1. 11 December 1955) (my own 
translation from Sesotho). 
In its efforts to politicise the population and detach them from the dependence on chiefs, 
the BCP “antagonized and frightened the powerful sectors of society”. It campaigned 
against chiefs and the white traders (Mohlabani, Vol. 1. 11 December 1955). In a direct 
accusation against the chiefs and the monarchy, the party claimed that their love for 
their subjects had deteriorated so much that it was difficult for commoners to know 
where their grievances and problems could be addressed (Machobane, 2001:3).  
Machobane (1990:282) argues that the party did not only develop a negative attitude 
towards the monarchy but also against the RCC. In 1961 Ntsu Mokhehle argued that  
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the British officials have organised chiefs, the white businessman, 
and the white [RCC] missionaries … against us. They have also 
formed, with the help of the missionaries and chiefs, small political 
gangs – erroneously financed and morally supported by the white 
people both in Basutoland and in the Union of South Africa. Our 
policy is non-violence, but the British officials, using chiefs, the white 
traders, the white missionaries and their political gangsters, are set 
on provoking trouble and creating confusion in our peaceful but 
effective struggle for freedom (Machobane, 1990:283). 
Consequently, the RCC declared a political war against the BCP. It labelled the BCP 
and its leadership as communists. But Machobane (1990:284) argues against this 
contention and indicates that there were only a handful people in the BCP with strong 
Marxist-Leninist views.  
Its leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, was conversant with Marxist thought and as far back as in 
1958 he had encouraged “some of his students to be familiar with Marxist views before 
rejecting or accepting them; but he was not a Marxist” (Machobane, 1990:284). He 
worked closely with the Secretary-General of the party, Godfrey Kolisang, and his 
deputy, Gerald Ramoreboli, who were both conservative. Importantly, Gerald 
Ramoreboli was a member of the RCC (Machobane, 1990). Overall, the BCP remained 
anti-Catholic church and the RCC remained anti-BCP.  
The BNP was formed in 1957 by Chief Leabua Jonathan; although from the royal family, 
he was not a member of the ruling lineage. He defended the traditional structures of 
chieftainship. The BNP argued that “the unity of the nation ... [depended] on 
chieftainship” (Weisfelder, 1999:27). Its support became concentrated in the rural areas 
where the traditional structures of chieftainship were respected and commanded 
significant influence. These were the areas where Catholic missionaries were 
prominent.  
Consequently, the minor chiefs and headmen became its powerful constituency for it 
recognised them as partners in governance (Weisfelder, 1999:27). These chiefs 
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developed a feeling that their traditional interests were under threat from the modernist 
BCP which enjoyed support from the lowlands, commoners and Protestants. Grotpeter 
(1965:154) argues that the minor chiefs were aware of their “utility value” and the 
potential in a political party that could possibly be exploited as an instrument of power in 
pursuing their own interests both at the national and local levels of the political system. 
The BNP constitution supported hereditary chieftainship and the restoration of ancient 
democratic relationships between the chiefs and the people (Lesotho Times. 9.2. 
1968:7). But it stopped short of endorsing the monarchy. The BNP enjoyed official 
support from the RCC. This was because prior to the formation of the BNP, the RCC 
had attempted to form its own political party called the Christian Democratic Party 
(CDP). Khaketla (1971:18) argues that the name CDP was popular in countries where 
Roman Catholic dominated. Its key objective was to defend the freedom of the Church. 
Evidently, it was clear that the CDP had similar inspirations in Lesotho.  
The programme of the CDP was to “fight against Communism under whatever name it 
may present itself” (Khaketla, 1971:19). But Patrick Duncan, formerly a Judicial 
Commissioner to Lesotho, advised Chief Leabua Jonathan, who had served as an 
assessor under him, to form  his own political party. The CDP manifesto was handed to 
Chief Leabua Jonathan, who made some amendments to the original manifesto of the 
CDP, which then became the basis for the formation of the BNP (Machobane, 
1990:286). This shows that the BNP was the brain-child of the RCC authorities and it 
became closely aligned to it. 
Following the formation of the BNP, the RCC leadership made the following 
pronouncements, articulately paraphrased by the Bloemfontein Friend (1959) to the 
effect that  
members of the Roman Catholic Church in Basutoland [Lesotho] 
should take part in the political development[s] of their country, said 
the Bishop, the Right Rev. J.D. Des Rosiers of Maseru, in an 
interview with the Southern Cross, official organ of the Church. The 
Bishop said that as the population was mainly Christian, it would be 
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the natural thing for them to belong to parties which subscribed to 
Christian principles and were led by Christians. Unfortunately, up to 
the present, the majority of political leaders … [are] ... left-wing and 
anti-religious. He did not think it is proper for a Catholic party to be 
formed ... All Christians should join in the fight against communism.  
Machobane (1990:286) argues that the “left-wing’, “communist” leaders and parties 
were labelled to Ntsu Mokhehle and the BCP. Chiefs and commoners now had their 
political parties. The weakened monarchy lacked any political support. 
It was the MFP, formed in 1962, which advocated the restoration of executive powers 
for the monarchy. Bennett Makalo Khaketla, who was previously in the BCP, became 
one of its founders. Weisfelder (1999:46) notes that it was a “royalist” party and had 
strong sentiments that “a Paramount Chief … [should] have a central role to play” in the 
political landscape. Weisfelder further notes that the installation of Bereng Seeiso as the 
Paramount Chief in 1960 was seen as a victory for the party to push for the restoration 
of his executive powers.  
This was contrary to the strong opposition of some elements of the ruling lineage led by 
Chief Leabua Jonathan. Weisfelder (1999:40) accurately identified the MFP support 
base by stating that “many ranking chiefs gravitated toward[s] Marematlou [Freedom 
Party], while the majority of lesser chiefs and headmen remained loyal to the [Basotho] 
National Party “ 
The organised commoners movements had long insisted on greater participation in the 
country’s governance; Breytenbach (1973:175) asserted that the majority of them were 
eager to participate in the Basutoland Council (1910-48), as mentioned before, given 
the grievances against what they described as the abuse of power and exploitation by 
the chiefs. Significantly, the lack of commoner participation in the council further 
aggravated tensions and divisions between the commoners, junior chiefs and the “Sons 
of Moshoeshoe”. 
Overall, political agitation was led from the beginning by the educated elite and mainly 
Protestants, mostly in the BCP. They had more significant exposure in terms of 
 88
economic and political independence (Weisfelder, 1971). Machobane (1990:245) 
mentions that the educated elite later joined ranks with the more agrarian-based but 
“less coordinated” groups in the organisations to expose the limitations of chieftaincy 
and pushed for reforms. 
The elites labelled the Basutoland Council (BC) as “merely a parliament of chiefs, 
without a mandate from the people” (Machobane, 1990:246). Weisfelder (1971:35) 
indicates that “the [Basutoland] Council was dominated by the “Sons of Moshoeshoe” … 
the major descendants of … the Moshoeshoe lineage”. In questioning the legitimacy of 
the Council, Mohlori (1958:235) stated that  
now these men who have not been chosen by the nation go to 
Parliament at the end of the year, to say what? Only they know, as 
even in the course of the year they never convene meetings with 
men of the districts from which they come, so that they may hear 
what they say and what [those men] wish to be brought to the 
attention of Parliament. There they go, these men who have been 
appointed by one person to speak at his Council, which is said to be 
respectable, ... some of us know ... it is the foundation of a strong 
government, when it is run properly. 
The BCP further called for immediate self-government. Machobane (1990:254) notes 
that the essence of the party’s call for self-government was worth quoting as it stated 
that  
whereas Basutoland is sometimes referred to as a democracy, we ... 
hold that there is no democracy in Basutoland – the High 
commissioner in Pretoria and the High commissioner at Matsieng 
rule this territory with such powers as amount to open dictatorship, in 
practice though not by law. The Basotho, who in fact own the land, 
have, through the National Council, been reduced to mere advisors 
on vital matters that fundamentally affect their own political, social, 
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economic and educational matters ... We ... therefore .. do demand 
self-government in Basutoland by the Basotho NOW. 
It was against this background that the High Commissioner “authorised the 
establishment in April 1954 of the Administrative Reforms Committee chaired by Sir 
Henry Moore. Its purpose was to examine the Native Administration in Basutoland and 
make relevant recommendations with regard to its future developments” (Machobane, 
1990:257). There were great expectations from the commoners movements that the 
Moore Report would focus on the establishment of the legislative council. But the 
Report did not raise the issue of the formation of the legislative council. 
Machobane (1990:257) argues this was a result of the influence of the senior chiefs, 
who opposed such a move. Weisfelder (1974:17) notes that this was “owing to their 
fears that the more far-reaching demands for self-government under a legislative 
council would lead to the subordination and destruction of the chieftainship by an 
elected majority”. But with continuing commoners pressure on the colonial 
administration, the legislative council was finally established in 1958. 
3.3 1960 District Council elections and their aftermath 
The first direct elections took place in 1960. For these district council elections the 
country was divided into nine electoral districts, which had to elect 40 council members. 
The main contestants in the elections were the BCP, the BNP and the royalist MFP. The 
BCP won 30 seats, the MFP won five, the BNP won one and the independents 
candidates got four seats (Leeman, 1985:120). 
The council seats won by the BCP meant that the party exercised its independence 
from the traditional structures in carrying out development projects. It further took over 
the functions that were traditionally undertaken by the chiefs, particularly the allocation 
of land (Machobane, 1990).  
Leeman (1985:121) mentions that its leaders became “enthusiastic, idealistic and 
anxious to implement their ideas of village democracy”. Consequently, the chiefs 
became hostile to the councils and “even obstructive” (Leeman, 1985:121). Hughes 
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(1985:121) states that “the chiefs found that things were happening in their own areas of 
which they knew little or nothing”. Ultimately, the chiefs became dormant as decisions in 
their wards were made without their approval. Matlosa (1997:141) states that the district 
council elections succeeded in building a strong foundation for efficient government and 
democratised the local structures of government. Matlosa (1997:142) further states that  
the BCP victory vindicated its nation-wide popularity as the oldest 
nationalist movement, its commanding mass base which could not 
be challenged by other protagonists, its Pan-Africanist ideology 
which was then a strong force in the liberation politics ... and its 
strong and deep-rooted network of local structures of village and 
constituency branches ... The BCP’s performance sent shivers down 
the spines of the conservative political actors as the independence 
elections approached. In those circumstances, the BCP naturally 
anticipated yet another landslide victory five years down the line and 
undoubtedly imagined itself assuming mantle of government from the 
departing British colonial authorities.  
The BCP’s victory coincided with the installation of Prince Bereng Seeiso in 1960, who 
was officially given the name of King Moshoeshoe II (Machobane, 2001:2). Importantly, 
Chief Leabua Jonathan was against the installation of the Prince Bereng Seeiso. Chief 
Leabua Jonathan argued that the Prince was young and should be given time to mature 
and get married before his installation (Sixeshe, 1984:22). Machobane (2001:1-2) aptly 
captures Chief Leabua’s Jonathan behaviour by stating that  
the subject of Prince Bereng’s installation was typified by acrimony 
and pursuit of traditional rivalry in the royal lineage ... of the eighteen 
chiefs who finally won the day and signed a letter in support of the 
Prince, fourteen were from the south, essentially sons of Letsie – the 
first born son of Moshoeshoe I. There were only two sons of Molapo, 
his second born son. And those chiefs, namely, Letsie Motsoene and 
Molapo Qhobela, shared a history of serious succession feuds in 
their recent ancestry. When [Chief] Leabua Jonathan’s faction lost 
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the battle, he himself pouted out of the royal village of Matsieng. The 
Prince exulted in triumph. A permanent mutual hatred between the 
two royal relatives commenced. 
This contestation of power between Chief Leabua Jonathan and King Moshoeshoe II 
was later to become a political issue that divided the royalty and traditionalists. This was 
because Chief Leabua Jonathan, who led the BNP, did not support the executive 
monarchy. This situation contributed to the erosion of the powers of the monarchy as 
Chief Leabua was determined to subjugate it. On the other side, King Moshoeshoe II 
was inclined to the MFP, which was eager for him to be granted executive powers. 
Indeed, the monarchy was weak and divided, worsened by the infighting amongst the 
senior and junior sons of Moshoeshoe I.  
Nevertheless, the BCP’s victory in the 1960 elections became an appropriate political 
platform for the commoners to challenge the relevance of the monarchy in the country. 
This resulted in enormous pressure on the recently installed monarch, who was 
ambitious and eager to re-assert his control over the elected district councils.  
The election was a turning point, for it signalled the emergence of the clash between the 
democratically elected elements (dominated by the commoner interests in the BCP) and 
the hereditary traditional structures. The defeat of the royalist MFP further aggravated 
the erosion of monarchical powers. This was because the party offered the monarchy 
with the political platform against not only the commoner’s led movements, but also 
against the traditionalists faction (junior chiefs) led by Chief Leabua Jonathan.  
The commoners called for self-government. In 1961 the motion of self-government was 
adopted (Khaketla, 1971:4). Consequently, King Moshoeshoe II set up a commission to 
gather views in a consultative process across society on the form of the constitution 
they preferred (Machobane, 1990:277). The commission, assisted by Professor D. 
Cowen (a constitutional expert), focused mainly on the following points:  
(1) the status of the Paramount Chief; 
(2) the status of chiefs;  
(3) the status of Basutoland;   
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(4) the process of elections, direct or indirect;  
(5) the franchise; 
(6) the form of parliament;  
(7) the future of the Basotho courts (Leeman, 1985:11; Machobane, 1990:277).  
As the commission continued with the gathering of evidence, Chief Sekonyela of 
Tlokoeng Ward as cited in the (Basutoland Constitutional Commission, 1962. Vol. 1 
170) stated that  
the Paramount Chief is the backbone of the country. If he is not there 
then there could be no life in the country, he is ... the pillar around 
which the whole nation is built. He should be given a higher title than 
he has at present. He should therefore be the ruler of Basutoland, ... 
the whole administration [should] be under him and [should] have 
under him all the various departments of government ... his power 
[should] be undisputed, parliament  will be stable under him, if he is 
put in the position in which I propose he should be placed. 
Machobane (1990:277) notes that the crucial issue was the status of the King. I concur 
with this for the King was eager to obtain executive powers. He hoped that the masses 
would support his desires. Moreover, Chief Sekonyela’s response also suggested that 
he was in favour of an executive monarchy, hence his reference to the King’s power 
being ‘undisputed’. The King still felt that the masses wanted him to have greater 
powers. This was evident from the Moore Report (1954:12), which stipulated that 
in Basuto eyes he is at once the custodian and embodiment of 
Basotho national aspirations. He is regarded as the head of the 
Basuto Government to whom all Principal Chiefs, Ward Chiefs, 
Chiefs and headmen are subordinate. No Chief, however powerful, 
can claim to share authority with him, once his status has been 
recognised and declared. 
Apartheid South Africa was not entirely impressed with the political developments in 
Lesotho. In early as 1961, it voiced its displeasure with granting of Lesotho’s 
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independence. Prime Minister Verwoed publicly argued that “an independent Lesotho 
could well become a danger to South Africa” (Makoa, 1996:14). 
3.4 The independence constitution, 1966  
 
A Westminster-style constitution was adopted, with 60 seats in the lower house 
(national assembly) elected through universal adult franchise. The upper house 
(Senate) comprised the 22 principal and ward chiefs, with 11 members nominated by 
the King on the advice of the Prime Minister.  
The Senate was vested with limited powers of review (Maqutu, 1990:12; Breytenbach, 
1973:239). It therefore created a parliamentary system within a constitutional monarchy. 
In the context of Africa this created interesting challenges. It also opted for a 
constituency-based electoral system based on the FPTP principle. Moreover, the 1965 
elections were won by the BNP and the winner of the 1960 district elections (the BCP) 
was narrowly defeated. However, this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
The 22 Principal Chiefs formed the “College of Chiefs” (the old “Sons of Moshoeshoe”), 
whose function was to advise the King on decisions at the higher levels of 
administration. The King became the political head of the nation assisted by the 
principal chiefs, to whom he delegated powers and who were in charge of some their 
regional areas in the country (Breytenbach, 1973:133). The Prime Minister assumed all 
the governmental duties in the King’s name. The Prime Minister could only remain in 
office if he enjoyed the support of the majority of members of the lower house (national 
assembly) (Gill, 1993:47).  
Regarding the final conclusion of the constitution, Cowen (1963:56) stated that  
the basic plan of the proposed governmental structure is to provide 
Basutoland with a bicameral legislature, a British-style executive 
responsible to a democratically elected legislature, a Bill of Human 
Rights, and an independent judiciary charged with the duty of 
enforcing the constitution. 
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Cowen (1963) raised an interesting issue at that time, namely that the ‘dangers of 
instability’ in contemporary Africa were inherent in a parliamentary model. In this way 
the traditional kingdom of the Basotho became a parliamentary democracy (with 
unspecified dangers) under the political leadership of the party with the electoral support 
of the majority. The Prime Minister became the head of government, while the King was 
reduced to titular head of state, as mentioned earlier.  
3.5 Assessment  
Moshoeshoe I left the institution of the monarchy on a solid basis with executive powers 
until about 1868. People had voluntarily joined his kingdom for security and welfare 
benefits. Though the monarchy was hereditary and not elected, Moshoeshoe I managed 
to establish participative institutions (e.g. the pitso).  
Pitsos were characterised by considerable freedom of speech and equality for all the 
citizens. This provided the citizens with an opportunity “to unburden their minds and to 
seek for information and guidance” (Leeman, 1985:19). Pitsos also offered an important 
platform where political hierarchy was confirmed, new ‘placings’ acknowledged and 
legitimacy bestowed on the central authority (monarchy) through freedom of expression 
(Weisfelder, 1971).  
Lekhotla further enhanced regular contact between the chiefs and their subjects. Hence, 
Weisfelder (1969:11) noted that  
the Basotho system represented ... democratic facets suited to the 
social and economic environment of the pre-colonial era. It involved a 
series of reciprocal and closely related duties and functions 
performed by both ruler and ruled alike, where each element had an 
effective set of options for influencing and reducing and regulating the 
behaviour of the other. 
Furthermore, in pitsos and lekhotla, a tradition of democracy and tolerance of opposition 
existed which was reflected in the Sesotho proverb: Mo-oa khotla ha a tsekisoe (What is 
said in the court is not blameworthy) (Kimble, 1999). 
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I concur with Weisfelder (1971:30) that these deliberative assemblies were modified 
reincarnations of consultative assemblies. There were meaningful political forums where 
a wide range of viewpoints were freely and intelligently articulated the ordinary citizens 
with minimal fear of reprisal. Moshoeshoe I retained a dominant influence by controlling 
the agenda, recognition of speakers, applause for the preferred ideas and the right to 
formulate final decisions.  
Mafisa (cattle loan) enabled Moshoeshoe I not only to assert his influence, but he 
became responsive to the societal needs of the poor members and managed to reduce 
the levels of poverty. Hence, the centralisation of monarchical power occurred through 
‘placing’. The execution of law was maintained by the ‘placed chiefs’, who ensured that 
the law was applicable equally to all members of the society through the command and 
control from the monarchy. 
Moreover, under Moshoeshoe’s I reign there was a grand council, which was comprised 
of different chiefs and allies. Its composition represented the divergent views of various 
chiefs under his authority. This helped to ensure that different views across the society 
were accommodated freely before any major decisions could be made.  
Significantly, these indigenous institutions established by Moshoeshoe I managed to 
maintain unity and cohesion for the nation. However, it should be noted that these were 
the characteristics of a pre-colonial society, which may not have had the exact features 
of a democratic state, but yet they had some distinctive features of a modern 
democratic polity. There were responsive and accountable institutions which enabled 
freedom of expression, the provision of welfare benefits and the execution of law. But 
his successors were less successful. 
Over the years after colonisation in 1868, these participatory institutions degenerated 
and lost their legitimacy. This was because the colonial officers turned them into forums 
for introducing colonial visitors, giving direction on policy issues and imposing unpopular 
decisions. Eldredgre (1993:167) notes that colonial officials consciously designed the 
strategies that were designed to weaken the authority and power of the monarchy.  
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Moreover, pitso was replaced by the Basutoland National Council (BNC) in 1903. An 
official interference in the affairs of the monarchy occurred through Melao ea Lerotholi in 
1904. The commoners’ grievances which had increased considerably were advocated 
through organised movements such as Lekhotla la Bafo, which became the convenient 
platform to voice grievances against the monarchy. For those few who served in the 
BNC, it became a springboard to vent their frustrations and to speak out on behalf of 
majority outside. 
The emergence of modern political parties and role of Chief Leabua Jonathan in the 
post-independence era was another serious blow to monarchical powers. The final 
straw for the powers of the monarchy was the adoption of the Westminster-style 
constitution in 1966, which created a parliamentary system within a constitutional 
monarchy. 
Lesotho’s elites were mostly commoners, and they viewed the British and European 
governments as models. The history of the French revolution taught in Western Europe 
showed that the aristocrats were the key enemies of democracy. The aristocracy in 
Europe was overthrown or neutralised because it had subjugated and exploited the 
population. Arguably, this historical understanding widened divisions between the 
commoners and the royalist as the two protagonists viewed each other with suspicion 
and hatred. The monarchy found political sympathy only in the MFP. The party’s stance 
was that an executive monarchy would serve as ‘an insurance policy’ against the 
potential abuse of power by politicians and ensure that democracy became entrenched 
in the country.  
Basotho have traditionally developed a great respect towards the monarchy. They 
regard the institution as a symbol of self-respect and often look “with pity and contempt 
on a man without a chief” (Maqutu, 1990:20). For it was the monarchy which mobilised 
people against the complete subjugation of the Kingdom by the white settlers known as 
the Boers. Under the same institution, Lesotho sought protection from the British to 
avoid complete incorporation into South Africa (Maqutu, 1990: 24; Weisfelder, 1971). 
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Given such heroic battles that the monarchy fought against and with the political legacy 
for executive powers; it was unlikely that the monarchy would surrender its status of 
constitutional monarchy without a fight. King Moshoeshoe II, who was inaugurated in 
1960, as mentioned before, had consistently resisted being relegated to being a passive 
Head of State. He argued against what he termed “foreign political institutions” 
(Weisfelder, 1971:24).  
Instead he advocated the “synthesis of parliamentary democracy with the Basotho 
political tradition in order to preserve executive functions for the King as the ultimate 
protector” (Weisfelder, 1971:24). While the monarchy declined following the colonial 
interaction with the British, it still remained a key but a declining actor in the political 
landscape. Machobane (2001:9) notes that “the King [Moshoeshoe II] was still hoping to 
obtain increased powers within the constitution”.  
Dahl (2005:195) notes that free, fair and frequent elections are essential in a 
democracy. Here, however, the Kings party, the MFP, always lost heavily in such 
elections. It lost to both traditionalists (the BNP) and the modernists (the BCP) in the 
1960 district council elections and 1965 pre-independence elections. However, the 
results of the elections are contrary to Maqutu’s (1990) and Weisfelder’s (1971) 
observations that most people still regarded the monarchy as a symbol of unity. In fact, 
the election outcome gives an impression that the public trust in the monarchy had 
eroded significantly. If the monarchy was still a powerful factor, how do they account for 
the poor performance of the royalist-backed political party (the MFP)? I am of the 
opinion that many people had lost faith and trust in the monarchy as an effective 
political and administrative machine for governance.   
The key question is: what was wrong with the 1966 constitution? A significant issue was 
that all the key political parties approved the constitution prior to the 1965 elections. I 
concur with Maqutu (1990:12) that it was not seen as a perfect document, but “all 
parties found it [a] reasonable and workable ground norm which could be improved”. 
However, the losing parties assailed the constitution, as will be shown later.  
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In 1990 the political activism led to King Moshoeshoe II again being exiled by the 
military to England and deposed in favour of his son, who became King Letsie III. Even 
in 1994 King Letsie III cooperated with the military to seize power in the coup. Similarly, 
in the 1998 post-election crisis, there were strong accusations by the victorious LCD 
that the monarchy had a secret agenda to topple it from power and that it had 
cooperated with the military and the opposition parties (the BCP, the BNP and the MFP) 
to destabilise it. The salient question is: why has the monarchy regularly intervened in 
Lesotho’s political landscape? 
3.6 Implications for democratic consolidation  
Amongst the conditions that Leftwich (2000) proposed for democratic consolidation, the 
following are relevant to assess the possible implications that the monarchy might have 
had towards democratic consolidation in Lesotho. These include legitimacy, adherence 
to the constitutional rules of the game and policy restraint. However, though the 
monarchy was often seen as an appropriate institution to provide for legitimacy, after 
both the 1960 district council elections, the monarchy did not recognise the legitimacy of 
the democratically elected structures. 
In fact, the institution became embroiled in the political battles with the political elites in 
contesting for political power. Similarly, following the victory of the BNP in the 1965 
elections King Moshoeshoe II refused to recognise the legitimacy of the BNP 
government, as will be explained later. Nevertheless, the salient question is: why did the 
King refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the democratically elected BNP government?  
Machobane (2001:16) noted that the BNP government after the 1965 elections 
regarded Principal Chief Mathealira Seeiso and the King’s eldest sister Princess 
Mampoi Makhaola as “baferekanyi ba baholo – great destroyers in the country”. 
Seemingly, the BNP government did not enjoy geographical legitimacy, as some 
Principal Chiefs executed their policies, which were different from those of the BNP 
government.  
They acted against BNP developmental projects such as dam and road construction, 
and did what they said was important in their ward areas. The question is: what 
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implications did this have for democratic consolidation? The pro-monarchical MFP 
monarchy also refused to recognise the legitimacy of the BNP as “procedurally entitled 
to be there”, as Leftwich (2000:138) noted in a different context.   
Regarding adherence of the constitutional rules of the game, this was not done by the 
monarchy. Though, the monarchy as an institution did not directly contest the elections, 
it backing of the MFP failed to abide by the rules of the game. Its defeat was a blow for 
monarchical aspirations. Instead of accepting the defeat, MFP joined King Moshoeshoe 
II in denouncing the victorious BNP government and resorted to acts of destabilising it. 
The MFP even made a public affirmation in 27 December 1966 to the effect that  
we pledge ourselves to continue our constitutional fight until the 
powers of the intervention which we feel the King should have as a 
safeguard against power hungry politicians [have been granted] 
(Mohlabani, Vol. 12. February 1967). 
I agree with Machobane’s (2001:17) point that, according to the MFP, “a constitutional 
battle on behalf of the King had not been abandoned’.  Following its defeat in the 1965 
elections, the MFP even assailed the constitution on the grounds that it did not give the 
king sufficient powers to act properly. This would have gone way beyond the 
constitution at that time.   
Devenish (1998:3) argues that constitutionalism includes the “use of values or norms in 
the political practice and discourse ... when political leaders and others respect the 
basic laws as a framework that cannot be ignored”. Hyden and Venter (2001:3) state 
that “constitutions function only when everyone accepts that they represent a self-
binding moral commitment to a set of rules that can only be sacrificed in very 
exceptional circumstances”. The MFP did not adhere to the constitutional rules of the 
game.  
In 1970, when Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan suspended the constitution after 
his party lost to the opposition, he did not adhere to the constitution either. This did not 
augur well for the future of democracy in Lesotho.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONFLICTUAL ELECTIONS AND THE MILITARY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Lesotho’s monarchy did not thrive under British colonial rule. The British colonial 
administrators viewed it as a rival form of government. Policies were conspicuously 
designed to undermine its powers and streamline it in the way the British desired. 
Various legislative instruments such as Proclamation 2B of 1884, Proclamation No. 61 
and No. 62 of 1938 were of utmost importance in curbing monarchical powers.  
 
Added to the monarchy’s loss of powers and political isolation, internal disputes 
between the “Sons of Moshoeshoe” over supremacy degraded its capability to function 
as an effective administrative organ. Factionalism became rife between the senior and 
junior chiefs and this undermined the prospects of reaching consensus on major issues. 
Junior chiefs took advantage of internal powers struggles amongst the "Sons of 
Moshoeshoe" and undermined their authority. The monarchy found itself not only 
fighting a subtle political battle, but also having to adapt to the changing economic 
environment as people no longer depended on it for survival.    
 
Added to these fault lines within the traditional authority were the divisions in society 
brought about by various Christian denominations. Political parties had also aligned 
themselves along these societal divisions. The BCP became anti-chiefs, anti-RCC and 
anti-monarchy. The BNP became traditionalist, pro-RCC but never supported the 
monarchy. They did support one of the lineages, however, viz. the Molapo house of its 
leader, Chief Leabua Jonathan, which was from outside the Matsieng or royal branch. 
 
The MFP remained mainly royalist and was sympathetic to the Matsieng house. These 
various forces (monarchy and divisions in the society along Christian denominations) 
had created a volatile political situation in the country. Although Lesotho had no ethnic 
divisions as in most of the rest of Africa, these other divisions were as destabilising as in 
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heterogeneous states. This was evident, given that each of the forces would perhaps try 
to re-assert its dominance over the other.  
 
The catalyst for these struggles for dominance became the political elections 
necessitated by parliamentary democracy since 1965. Most of the elections after that 
were marred by serious conflict and this gave the military a pretext to intervene.  
 
This chapter focuses on the following set of elections: the 1965, the 1970, the 1985 
“mock elections” (Mahao, 1997) and the very violent 1998 elections. Attention is paid to 
the military interventions of 1986 and 1991, and the palace coup in 1994. The purpose 
of the chapter is to investigate the role played by the military and the monarchy in the 
country’s democratic breakdowns and to assess implications of this for democratic 
consolidation. The salient question is: in what way did the military affect the breakdown 
of democracy in 1970 and 1998 after it had intervened during the three cases 
mentioned above? After independence the military entered the public domain. Was it 
now a force for upholding the constitution or not? 
 
4.2 The 1965 and 1970 elections and their aftermath  
 
4.2.1 The 1965 elections  
 
The pre-independence elections were held in 1965. The main contestants for state 
power as in the previous 1960 district council elections were the BCP, BNP and the 
MFP (Makoa, 1997). Strom (1978:58) argues that the BNP received significant financial 
support for the electoral contest from South Africa and the West German Adenauer 
Stiftung.  
 
Leeman (1985:124) argues that the BNP’s campaigns were well publicised by the 
Roman Catholic missionaries. Leeman (1985:125) also notes that voters “were taught 
that voting for the BNP was a declaration of support for the Pope, while in some cases, 
the message was “Cow-God, Knobkerrie-Satan” (which were the symbols of the BNP 
and BCP respectively). Catholic women were encouraged to bring back to the priests 
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their unused BCP voting discs to ensure that they had voted correctly (Voix du 
Basutoland, 1964). The RCC provided unreserved support for the BNP. The military 
was not in existence yet.  
 
Weisfelder (1969:11) indicates that out of 60 BNP candidates, 56 were Catholics and 
four were Protestants, but as junior chiefs, they were closely connected with the BNP 
support base. The BCP was labelled as anti-Christian and communist by the Catholic 
priests (Mphanya, 2004:12). Importantly, the royalists who were close to the monarchy 
gained only 16, 5% of the vote, which translated into four seats as illustrated in Table 1 
below.  
 
Table 1: 1965 General Election for the National Assembly 
Contestants  No. of votes % of votes  No. of seats  % of seats  
BNP  108, 162 41,6 31 51,66 
BCP 103, 050 39,7 25 41,6 
MFP 428, 37 16,5 4 6,67 
MTP 5697 2,2 0 0 
Indepts  79 0,03 0 0 
Total  259,825 100 60 100 
Source: Van Wyk, 1967  
 
Appendix One shows the geographical support of the constituencies that were won by 
the BCP, BNP and MFP. The BNP won most seats in the mountainous constituencies; 
these were the areas with strong RCC influence. The BCP won most of its seats in the 
lowlands constituencies, including the small urban areas and Maseru. This was a result 
of its strong urban, progressive and modern policies. The MFP seats were scattered 
between Maletsunyane, Tsoaing and Matela. These were the areas where monarchical 
influence was strong (MacCartney, 1973).  
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Makoa (1997:141) argues that the BCP did not expect to lose the election, considering 
its previous victory in the 1960 District Council elections. Even Weisfelder (1979:25) did 
not anticipate that  
 
Chief Jonathan’s (BNP leader) poorly organised conservative 
amalgam of the rural peasants, junior chiefs and Roman Catholics 
could prevail against the militant, Pan-Africanist thrust of Ntsu 
Mokhehle’s Congress Party (BCP). 
 
Although the BNP had a majority of seats in the national assembly (31 of 60), it had only 
41,6% of the popular vote. This distribution is entirely feasible in a constituency-based 
system, which might seem unfair to the opposition parties. The BCP and MFP had a 
combined 56,2 %( 39, 7% plus 16, 5%) of votes but only 29 seats (Khaketla, 1971:12).  
 
Significantly, Chief Leabua Jonathan was defeated by his rival Gauda Khasu of the BCP 
in the Manka constituency. But he later contested the by-elections in the Mpharane 
constituency. However, prior to the by-elections the South African government gave 
Chief Leabua Jonathan a personal gift of 100,000 bags of maize (Machobane, 2001). 
 
Khaketla (1971:32) denounced the gift as a “cheap political trick that was intended to 
buy support for Chief Leabua Jonathan and his [Basotho] National Party”. A large 
portion of the maize was distributed in the Mpharane constituency with the message 
“Leabua [Jonathan] is feeding the people” (Khaketla, 1971:12, Stevens, 1967:90).  
 
In response to his critics on the personal gift from South Africa, Chief Leabua Jonathan 
stated that “I acted in the same way as some scholarships and funds were obtained 
from China. The BCP were given East European and Chinese scholarships before and 
after independence. They were not distributed by [an] aircraft, nor were there 100,000 of 
them”. Ultimately, Chief Leabua Jonathan emerged victorious in the by-election. 
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Peter Sanders (1965:72), who was the Chief Electoral Officer in Lesotho, claimed that 
this result was a “fair reflection of the views of the Basotho people”. Weisfelder 
(1999:52) argues that Sanders’s perception becomes “questionable when we leave the 
raw data and examine the composition of the national assembly, the lower house of 
Parliament, where the popular mandate was skewed by the distribution of the vote 
among the sixty single-member constituencies”. Weisfelder (1999:53) further argues 
that if “PR was used, a process of coalition building would have become necessary, 
because the BNP would have held only 25 seats versus 24 for the BCP, 10 for the 
MFP”. This issue will be discussed in Chapter Five. In any democracy this kind of 
distribution of power is a serious indictment of the fairness of the electoral system.   
 
The BCP refused to accept the election outcome and instituted legal proceedings 
against the BNP government, alleging that the election was not free and fair. It 
challenged the electoral outcome in four constituencies (Mphanya, 2004:57). Its 
electoral challenge was successful in two constituencies. After this, the BNP 
government retained 29 seats in the national assembly, while the combined opposition 
also had 29 seats (Khaketla, 1971:13; Machobane, 2001:11). Prime Minister Chief 
Leabua Jonathan, fearing that the constitutional challenge would force his party out of 
power, forced the national assembly sittings to adjourn sine die (Khaketla, 1971:12; Gill, 
1993). 
 
In 1968 three vacancies occurred in the national assembly after the deaths of the BCP 
MP for Qeme, the MFP MP for Maletsunyane and the BNP MP for Kolobere. The 
opposition parties (BCP and MFP) clamoured for by-elections to fill these vacancies. 
However, these vacancies were not filled until the 1970 general election (Khaketla, 
1971:17). 
 
After its defeat in the 1965 elections, the BCP refused to recognise the legitimacy of the 
victorious BNP. It resorted to mobilising anti-government sentiments across the country. 
The royalist MFP also refused to recognise the legitimacy of the BNP because of the 
lack of any specific recognition of the monarchy. Later the BCP, King Moshoeshoe II 
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and some Principal Chiefs formed an alliance based on their hostility towards the BNP 
government. 
  
Machobane (2001:12) argues that “they believed that they could achieve their objective 
by overpowering it [the BNP government] with popular antipathy”. The BCP issued a 
warning reminding the BNP government that the “nation belong[ed] to the King not to 
Chief Leabua Jonathan” (Makatolle, Vol. 3, No. 7. January 1969).  
 
As one of the key organs of the state, the monarchy together with opposition parties 
refused to adhere to the constitutional rules of the game, including addressing the 
problems with the electoral system. The monarchy did not see the BNP government as 
procedurally entitled to rule. In his defiance against the BNP government, King 
Moshoeshoe II “inspired and backed by the BCP and the MFP, scheduled a prayer 
session at Thaba-Bosiu – Lesotho’s nineteenth-century fortress” to further denounce 
and undermine the BNP (Machobane, 2001:12).  
 
Sixeshe (1984:47) argues that the prayer meeting was organised to topple the BNP 
from state power. Sixeshe further suggests that Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan 
had earlier warned the King not to proceed with the prayer meeting. Machobane 
(2001:14) argues that Principal Chiefs “were written letters explicitly forbidding their 
attendance at Thaba-Bosiu [by the BNP government]”. But King Moshoeshoe II used his 
“moral authority over the Principal Chiefs to attend the prayer meeting” (Masupha 
Mamathe, 31 May 1989). Ultimately, the prayer meeting went ahead, but was 
suppressed by the BNP government.  
 
The official government statement later announced that the King, the BCP and the MFP 
had secretly planned to stage a coup, as their supporters were “heavily armed” 
(Machobane, 2001:13). It remains a moot point whether the military were involved. The 
government further stated that “from Thaba-Bosiu the mob was to march to Maseru [the 
capital] and seize power from the [BNP] government” (Nketu oa Mara, Vol. 3. January 
1967).  
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This lack of legitimacy of the BNP government impacted negatively on its ability to 
deliver services. But Makoa (1997:143) argues that performance legitimacy of the BNP 
was also hindered by “its willingness to consolidate its hegemony against the 
opposition”.   
 
Consequently, it focused on consolidating its influence in the areas that were seen as 
pro-government (that is, among Catholics, junior chiefs and supporters in the 
mountainous areas). Constituencies won by the opposition parties became victims of 
these uneven developmental projects. Hlasane Nkao (2005) argues that “agricultural 
schemes, water schemes and roads were done in the areas that were regarded as the 
stronghold of the ruling party”. Ngqaleni (1991) argues that the Thaba-Phatsoa and 
Khomokhoana agricultural projects were used by the BNP to build its constituency 
support rather than for genuine development. As a result, those suspected of being 
opposition supporters were marginalised developmentally.  
 
This widened the sense of social exclusion and feelings of marginalisation across the 
population as political loyalty to the ruling party remained crucial for service delivery. In 
expressing his gratification at the economic policies pursued by Chief Leabua Jonathan 
at a political rally, Principal Chief of Roma, “Tiger” Maama, who enjoyed strong political 
favour, stated that “you have been given by God. Your acts of [economic] developments 
... speak for themselves” (Basotho National Party (BNP) Rally, Roma, 23 February 
1965). 
 
The monarchy’s close association with the MFP also had far-reaching effects and 
eroded its image of being non-partisan. The King later dismissed the senators he had 
appointed on the advice of Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan. He argued that the 
dismissed senators (C.D. Molapo and others) did not support him. But the High Court 
ruled against the King and stated that he did not have the power to dismiss the 
senators.  
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The King was a constitutional monarch who had to operate within the rule of law. I 
agree with Maqutu (1990:35) that after the “dismissal of the senators was declared as 
unlawful by the Courts of Law, this exposed the King’s political partisanship without 
vindicating his action as an action that could be seen as undertaken in the interests of 
the people”.  
 
Heywood (2002:342) explains that in most cases of this nature the King as the “non-
partisan” head of state “acts as an embodiment of traditional authority”. But this was not 
case with the Lesotho monarchy. After the 1965 elections the monarch did not abide by 
the constitutional provisions, thus violating one of Leftwich’s conditions for 
consolidation. The King denounced the government and portrayed the monarchy as 
better equipped to rule than the democratically elected BNP government. Lesotho’s 
monarchy thus contributed to the violation of democratic principles. 
 
Lesotho’s constitution provides for mandatory national elections every five years (The 
Constitution of Lesotho, 1993:57). But Weisfelder (1974:8) notes that Lesotho’s 
constitutions have often been at the “centre of political haggling”. The adopted 
constitution remained at the centre of political disputes. The rules of the game as 
prescribed in the constitution were not only unacceptable to the monarchy, but even the 
BCP did not like Section 77 of constitution, which stated that  
 
The King shall have the right to be consulted by the Prime Minister 
and other Ministers on all matters relating to the government of 
Lesotho and the Prime Minister shall keep him fully informed 
concerning the general conduct of the government of Lesotho and 
shall furnish him with such information as he may request in respect 
of any particular matter relating to the government of Lesotho (The 
Constitution of Lesotho 1993: 34). 
The BCP was uneasy with the right of the monarchy to be informed on matters affecting 
the administration of Lesotho. Mphanya (2004) argues that it was like having a Prime 
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Minister who is accountable to the hereditary and non-democratic institution (the 
monarchy) which they did not fully support.   
 
According to Leftwich (2000), policy restraint is another condition for democratic 
consolidation. But upon the assumption of governmental power, the BNP government 
was confronted with the strong and established monarchical interests. These 
monarchical interests led to open confrontation with the BNP government. The BNP 
also went overboard with the selective application of development policies. 
 
Most of the agricultural projects and construction of roads were undertaken in 
Kolonyama (home of Chief Leabua Jonathan), Manka and Maputsoe. This led to a 
violation of policy restraint as the BNP implemented controversial policies. Mokhotlong 
and Matsieng, which were seen by Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan as the 
strongholds of the opposition parties (BCP and MFP) were neglected.  
 
Most areas such as Koeneng and Fobane were marginalised as far as the provision of 
clean water was concerned and no major developmental projects were carried out in 
these areas despite the public outcry over the lack of clean water and the poor roads 
(Hlasane Nkao, 2005). The Prime Minister also seldom consulted the King as required 
in the constitution in his appointment of senior civil servants. In 1967 the Prime Minister 
even tried to exile the King, but this move was strongly opposed by the Principal Chiefs.    
 
Lesotho was a culturally homogenous society, but this homogeneity was changed by 
the introduction of different Christian denominations and the status differentials between 
the chiefs and commoners. The BNP came to power in an environment marked by 
religious hostiles between the Catholics in the BNP and the Protestants in the BCP.  
 
Most importantly, the RCC had actively campaigned for the BNP in the 1965 elections. 
The Prime Minister kept blaming the spread of communist ideologies on the Protestants 
and the BCP. In rebuking the Protestants in the BCP, Prime Minister Chief Leabua 
Jonathan often argued that  
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Basotho are fundamentally a Christian nation and to expose them to 
the ideologies that by their foreign nature are a threat to their beliefs 
would be a failure on my part ... There are no two ways about these 
things... I reject communism and all it represents (Leistner 
1983:209). 
Then came the elections of 1970. 
 
4.2.2 The 1970 elections  
 
In the 1970 election the BNP was expecting to win with a landslide majority (Mphanya, 
2004:65, Khaketla, 1971). The BNP hoped that the construction of new tarred road and 
agricultural projects would help it to secure victory. Candidates for the 1970 election 
were given strictly seven days to get nomination papers, learn how they should be filled 
in and submit them to the nomination courts by the Electoral Commission. 
 
 Khaketla (1971:203) noted that  
 
this period of seven days was too short … according to the 
provisions of the Electoral Act … nomination papers, in order to be 
valid for official party candidates, had to be signed by the Secretary- 
General and the Chairman of the party … Unless they were so 
signed, the candidates could not be accepted as official candidates 
representing their respective parties.  
Given the country’s difficult terrain and poor communication networks, opposition 
candidates were confronted with the impossible task of having to travel long distances 
to the nomination courts. The Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) managed to field only 
one candidate, whilst the United Democratic Party (UDP) fielded three candidates. But 
the BNP, with the monopoly over state resources, did not have problems in reaching its 
candidates across the country. The BNP was so confident that one executive member 
was quoted in Khaketla (1971:206) as saying,  
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How can we lose the match? The ball is ours, the jerseys are ours, 
the field is ours, the linesmen are ours, and more important, the 
referee too is ours. 
The RCC still campaigned strongly for the BNP. The BCP allegedly accused the RCC of 
assisting the BNP to illegally secure arms and stockpile them in the RCC missions 
(Makatolle, Vol. 8, No.51. December 1969).The significance of the BCP’s charge 
against the BNP and the RCC was its projection of imminent violent elections. But the 
BCP had undoubtedly prepared itself for the 1970 election contest.  
 
Matlosa (1999:172) argues it “was aiming to upset its arch-rival BNP and reverse the 
1965 political outcome”. Leeman (1985) argues that it took advantage of the major 
policy blunders of the BNP government. Matlosa and Pule (2001:43) contend that “the 
outcome of this election did not determine Lesotho’s political destiny as the ruling party 
interrupted the whole process mid-stream upon realising an impending defeat and 
declared the election null and void”. The results of the elections (that were annulled) are 
indicated in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2:  1970 General election for the National Assembly 
Contestants  No. of Voters  % of Votes  No. of seats  % of  seats  
BCP 152 907 49,8 36 60,0 
BNP 108 162 42,2 23 38,3 
MFP 22 279 7,3 1 1,7 
Other  1909 0,7 0 0,0 
Total  285 257 100 60 100 
Source: Lodge, T, Kadima, D and Pottie, D 2002:47 
 
Appendix Two shows the regional support in terms of the constituencies won by the 
BCP, BNP and the MFP. The BCP returned the western lowlands but made a strong 
showing in the mountainous areas that were traditionally regarded as the BNP 
strongholds. The BNP, however, still maintained a good performance in the 
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mountainous areas. The MFP support base was still confined to areas with strong 
monarchical influence (Fox, 1995). But the result was ominous. MFP popular support 
dropped from 16,5% to 7,3% and from four seats to only one. This must have 
threatened the King.   
 
After some results had been made known, it became clear that the BNP had lost to the 
BCP. Its leadership decided to seize power. The elections were invalidated, a state of 
emergency was declared, the 1966 constitution was suspended and parliament was 
dissolved. The government did this without the support of the military.  It was the state 
of emergency regulations that kept the BNP in power, with opposition politics curtailed 
and the King exiled to the Netherlands (Makoa, 1997).  
 
The reason for exiling the King to the Netherlands was that it “would give the 
government a breathing space within which it will be able to restore calm and stability in 
the country” (Machobane, 2001:29-30). This decision was strange given the loss of 
support for the MFP.  
  
The BNP argued that it was remaining in power to save the country from the onslaught of 
communism that was propagated by the BCP. It accused the BCP of winning through 
intimidation and manipulation of the election result (Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Events Leading to the Political Disturbances which occurred in Lesotho during the 
period between 1st July to 30 November 1998, 2001:11). 
 
Sixeshe (1984:12) argues that Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan was not aware that 
 
thousands of his party supporters in the rural areas had not gone to 
the polls, due to the violence that they were threatened with if they 
voted … [and] in Quthing [district] election officials had been 
kidnapped by some BCP supporters and all the election material 
seized.  
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Sixeshe (1984) further alleges that in some areas the ballot boxes were grabbed from 
the polling officers by the BCP supporters. Why the police had not intervened strongly 
remains a mystery. According to Sixeshe, Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan could 
not have handed over power under such circumstances. Matlosa (2000) argues that 
there was not sufficient evidence to support Sexishe’s allegations that the BCP used 
violence and intimidation in the election.  
 
Machobane (2001) argues that Sixeshe failed to provide credible sources of information 
to substantiate his allegations. I concur with Matlosa (2000) and Machobane (2001), 
because there was nothing credible that Sixeshe provided as evidence to substantiate 
his allegations. Khaketla (1971:206) notes that the judiciary was deliberately 
suppressed by the government to undermine the possibilities of any possible legal 
challenges. 
 
Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan, in trying to regulate relations between the 
institutions of the state, on 10 February issued the Lesotho Order No. 1 of 1970 
(Mphanya, 2004:71). The intentions of the Order were to provide for peace, order and 
good governance. This Order served as a “new constitution” until a better constitution, 
suited to the needs of the Basotho nation, was drafted (Mphanya, 2004).  
 
Upon his return after eight months in exile, the King was under oath that, as Machobane 
(2001:30) succinctly puts it, “in the presence of the omnipotent God, he would 
cooperate in accordance with the policies of ... the existing BNP government”.  
 
 Machobane (2001:30) further states that  
 
he agreed, in keeping with the oath that he would never again allow 
the Office of the King, “bo lubakangoe le lipolotiki” … to wallow in 
politics or allow any political party to use him. 
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Matlosa (1997:144) states that the BNP justified its actions on the basis of anti-
communist beliefs and got support from the RCC. However, Machobane (2001:28) 
argues that the RCC was “surprised and disconcerted by the announcement of the 
(civilian) coup d’etat”. The church did not see a military hand in the events. Hence, it 
appealed to the BNP government authorities to protect and promote peace and stability. 
It further appealed to the government to “align themselves with the law of God, who 
binds all men in peace and reconciliation” (Nketu oa Mara, Vol. 6. February 1970). 
 
In an effort to provide legitimacy and to calm the political tempers, Prime Minister Chief 
Leabua Jonathan proposed the formation of an Interim National Government in 1973.  
As the BNP government was to exercise total control over the Interim National 
Government (Machobane, 2001:34), it was a gross violation of the democratic rules of 
the game.   
 
The BCP leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, opposed the participation of the BCP in this interim 
rule. However, his Deputy Leader in the BCP, G.P Ramoreboli, and 22 members of the 
BCP agreed to join the assembly against the wishes of their leader (Machobane, 2001). 
This marked the formal beginning of a split in the BCP as Ramoreboli was temporarily 
expelled from the party.  
 
During this period the BNP government exercised strict control over the institutions of 
the state and particularly the recruitment into the armed forces. Southall and Petlane 
(1995:146) argue that the BNP consolidated its power by using the “Sephephechana 
system, which required the recruits [to the army] to be card-holding members of the 
party”. Was it the beginning of the politicisation of the military? It was certainly not a 
case of policy restraint by the so-called winners. Southall and Petlane (1995:154) 
argued that “[the BNP] managed to convert the armed forces into its own political 
constituency”. 
 
This consolidation of power was not only directed against external threats but most 
critically against the internal opposition (Mphanya, 2004:71). In fact, Mothibe (1999:47) 
 114
argues that “the action set in motion an authoritarian agenda characterised by brute 
force, naked oppression and de facto one-party rule”. But it was civilian.  
 
Mothibe (1999) argues that the military became highly politicised and acted as 
supporters of Chief Leabua Jonathan’s dictatorship once in power. The BNP further 
continued to politicise other organs of the state. It was through the military’s assistance 
that the opposition parties were suppressed and a reign of terror imposed by Chief 
Leabua Jonathan.  
 
According to Khaketla (1971:227), there were a series of bloody military operations as a 
witch-hunt against those who were opposed Chief Leabua Jonathan’s state of 
emergency. Khaketla further argues that the military went from village to village 
provoking trouble, arguing that they were looking for BCP members who had rigged the 
1970 election.  
 
Added to these military operations, members of the BNP Youth League also went on 
the rampage beating and torturing people who were suspected of being BCP 
supporters. Khaketla (1971) mentions an incident where members of the BNP Youth 
League provoked a public meeting in Mathebe. They brandished guns, fired shots and 
promised to shoot people for no apparent reason. In retaliation to such threats, the 
locals retaliated and stoned six of them to death. In response, the military, as Khaketla 
(1971:278) aptly puts it,  
 
within a short time… entered the village and began attacking 
everybody they saw - men, women and children. Bursts of gunfire 
were echoed by the surrounding hills. Flames shot up as houses 
were set alight, burning people, furniture, clothes … All the people, 
young and old, took to the mountain, [those found in the houses] 
were attacked with axes and bayonets  and then set… [alight]. 
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During this operation over 100 houses were burnt down and 14 people were killed, 
while scores were injured. A similar operation was carried out in Quthing district; the 
military burned houses, killed the owners’ animals and hunted people down. Those who 
were caught were subjected to brutal beatings. The military further continued with the 
opposition crack down and many people, according to Khaketla, were allegedly killed.  
 
All political activities were banned, though parties were allowed, but they were de-
mobilised. Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan made public declarations that the 
country had suspended multiparty democracy (Gill, 1993:237). 
 
The Prime Minister argued that the BNP government had avoided “a bloody revolution 
[that] would have plunged the people of this country into a state of misery and tragedy” 
(Prime Minister’s Statement on the Banning of the Communist Literature from Lesotho, 
6 February 1970). Matlosa (1999:43) indicates that over time conflicts erupted between 
the executive organ of the government and the military over the issues of internal law 
and order. However, the BCP members were continually harassed by the BNP Youth 
League, which accused them of conspiracy to topple the government (Gill, 1993:230). 
 
In response the BCP launched uprisings against the government. In January 1974 an 
attempt was made to take over Mapoteng, Peka, Monotsa and Kolonyama police 
armouries. Gumbi (1995:4) argues that what started as political resistance developed 
into a violent struggle following the departure of the BCP leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, from 
Lesotho in 1974 to exile in Zambia. Ntsu Mokhehle’s departure saw the establishment 
of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), an armed wing of the BCP. The democratic rules 
of the game were eroding rapidly on all sides. It was only a matter of time before the 
military intervened, ostensibly to protect social order. 
 
It was throughout the 1970s and 1980s that the LLA regularly tried to topple the BNP 
government. But, because of the BNP’s monopoly over the politicised organs of the 
state, the LLA attacks were easily crushed by the military, which gave unreserved 
support to the BNP despite its unconstitutional assumption of power.  
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Machobane (2001:45) raises an important issue that there often comes a time when a 
ruler is referred to as an “old man”. This label of “old man” is often characterised by the 
following complications. His cabinet, senior advisers and some parliamentarians in 
pursuance of their objectives slowly manipulate his exhausted mind in order to achieve 
their desired ends by “gaining his trust in preparation to succeeding or deposing him”. 
 
By the 1980s Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan, born in 1914, was seemingly 
exhausted. The more active, younger politicians in the BNP like Desmond Sixeshe, 
Vincent Makhele, Evaristus Sekhonyana, the BNP Youth League and some senior 
military officers had established a protective ring around him with the group pursuing its 
own objectives (Gumbi, 1995; Machobane, 2001).  
 
Machobane (2001:136) argues that since the declaration of the state of emergency in 
1970, Chief Leabua Jonathan had succeeded in centralising power in himself and his 
close confidants. Leeman (1985:43) also argued that  
 
Leabua was accused of moving towards the establishment of a one-
party state with a constitution similar to that of Kenya, Malawi or 
Taiwan. It was more accurate to say he wished to create a no-party 
state, in which nominated members would fill the government and 
local administration, all of whom would owe their appointment to him. 
In particular he wished to use the chiefs, partly through his own 
adulation of that institution, partly because he had the power to 
nominate, regulate and expel them, but also because by using chiefs 
he could justify his methods by recourse to spurious shallow ideology 
claimed to be in keeping with national Basotho tradition…. 
 
As a result of internal and external pressure to return the country to democracy, the 
BNP government made token moves to settle the legitimacy crisis that dogged it. It 
called for general elections in 1985, but opposition to civilian authoritarian rule was so 
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strong that the opposition boycotted the elections. Through all this, the King remained 
silent. But would the military respond? 
 
4.3 The 1985 general elections 
 
In the 1985 elections “gerrymandering of the electoral constituencies” became a critical 
instrument used to disadvantage other opposition parties in the electoral race (Mahao, 
1997:4). Moreover, opposition parties boycotted the election as a result of two 
provisions within the electoral law. These were that each candidate had to pay a deposit 
of M1000,00 for his candidature and should mobilise at least 500 signatures of 
supporters endorsing his candidature (Mahao, 1997; Matlosa, 1997:96). With the help of 
the party which was in power, only the BNP candidates were able to contest the 
election. They all returned to the national assembly unopposed. Ajulu (1995:11) notes 
that over this period prior to the 1985 elections, the BNP’s existence at the apex of state 
power had  
 
transformed its social composition and the class base of its 
leadership. Its monopoly over state power had enabled it to make the 
transition to a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Its control over educational 
resources had enabled it to train and acquire a bureaucratic and 
intellectual class of its own. 
 
Consequently, the election result exacerbated growing tensions among the different 
factions in the BNP that culminated in disagreements and leadership squabbles 
(Mahao, 1997). This saw the emergence of two competing intolerant factions, with each 
pursing its own agenda. This could either have created the conditions for a mutually 
hurting state - make those hasted reforms, or it could have inspired the military to 
intervene. The BNP victory in this unopposed election predictably did not create the 
legitimacy that it yearned for, or result in a democratic breakthrough. Within one year 
the military deposed it from power in 1986, ushering the first breakdown by the military 
of civilian rule anywhere in Southern Africa.    
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4.4 The military interventions of 1986 and 1991  
 
Machobane (2001:70) argues that South Africa created a platform conducive to the 
military coup. In 1982 the South African Defence Force (SADF) struck at Maseru, the 
capital of Lesotho, and killed African National Congress (ANC) liberation fighters. South 
Africa further imposed an economic blockade on Lesotho to pressurise it to expel ANC 
liberation fighters. This led to serious economic hardships, as the country was without 
the basic necessities (The Christian Science Monitor, 31 January 1986). 
 
At the height of this economic melt-down, the general masses bitterly complained about 
the effects of commodity deprivation and blamed Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan 
(Gill, 1993; Mothibe 1998; Machobane, 2001). Added to this economic crisis, the small 
clique that seized control over the BNP Youth League leadership demanded a new 
party leadership. Maqutu (1990) states that the electoral laws in the BNP had been 
amended in such a way in 1985 that anybody who rebelled against the party would lose 
his seat.  
 
Since the 1970 declaration of the state of emergency and the suspension of the 
constitution, the BNP never had an elected leadership. Maqutu (1990:46) indicates that 
“an attempt to elect the Basotho National Party leadership was quashed by Prime 
Minister Leabua Jonathan and [those who attempted] to elect party officials were put 
under house arrest in 1971”. I concur with Maqutu that it is justifiable to conclude that 
Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan had over the years succeeded in oppressing the 
BNP just as he denied the people their democratic right to elect the government of their 
choice. The Prime Minister was then a civilian autocrat, while the BNP Youth League 
became his storm-troopers.  
 
The leadership of the BNP Youth League started to threaten the military and this gave 
the military the impression that the League was an alternative army (Maqutu, 1990). Gill 
(1993:56) argues that unconfirmed rumours started circulating that the BNP Youth 
League was to seize power and displace the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF, now 
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the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF)) as a national army. Coupled with these uncertainties 
plus economic hardships as a result of the South African economic blockade, the (real) 
military staged a coup on 20 January 1986.  
 
The coup dislodged the BNP from power after 16 years of oppression, mismanagement 
of the national resources and unaccountable rule (Mahao, 1997:2; Gill, 1993:243). The 
military argued to have launched a coup in order to return the country to democratic rule 
through a process of national reconciliation (Gill, 1993:289). Segments of the BNP, as 
well as the supporters of the King, were apparently behind this coup. Did oppression 
and hardship serve to bring the monarchy and the military together?  
 
According to Matlosa and Pule (2001:45), the monarchy was at the helm of the military 
administration. Afterwards the Lesotho Order No. 2 of 1986 was introduced. It vested 
the executive and legislative powers in the monarchy. The Lesotho Order No. 2 of 1986 
also paved the way for the establishment of a military council comprising of six military 
personnel. There was also a “co-opted array of civilian ministers from the educated elite 
who were loyal to the monarchy”, who formed a council of ministers (Machobane, 2001: 
xi). 
 
Major General Metsing Lekhanya became the chairman of the two councils. Gill (1993) 
and Machobane (2001) point out that the monarchy was to exercise legislative and 
executive power on the advice of the military council. However, the high political profile 
of the King in the decision-making process together with the politically motivated 
interpretation of this coalition arrangement resulted in an ambiguity as to whether the 
real power rested with the King or the Military Council (Gumbi, 1995:2). Was it a case of 
the King using the military or the military using the King?  
 
The military administration was often hostile to any form of popular criticism and 
protests. It often labelled such incidences as “civil unrest and the refusal to be 
governed” (Machobane, 2001:85). Pressure mounted on the military administration.This 
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heightened tensions and the differences between the junior officers and senior officers 
in the army came to the fore.  
 
The King continued to criticise the military government regarding corruption, violation of 
human rights and undemocratic practices. This led to a confrontation between the King  
and the chairman of the military council and council of ministers, Major General Metsing 
Lekhanya (Gumbi, 1995). This in turn led to factions forming within the military 
(Machobane, 2001:57), leaving the monarchy as a weakened, but stand-alone 
institution in the state.   
 
The monarchy and military alliance soon collapsed after the fatal shooting of a male 
student at the Lesotho Agricultural College (LAC) by Major General Metsing Lekhanya. 
Numerous attempts to force him to resign were fruitless (King Moshoeshoe II Letter to 
the Chairman of the Military Council and the Council of Ministers, 22 February 1990). 
But Major General Lekhanya was later cleared of any wrongdoing by the Judicial 
Inquest that ruled that the murder was “justifiable homicide” (Matlosa and Pule, 
2001:46; Machobane, 2001). These events did not make any possible contribution for 
democratic rule, except that they probably weakened both the monarchy and the 
military.  
 
Meanwhile, Ntsu Mokhehle finally returned from exile in 1989 and an internal coup took 
place in February 1990. Three members of the military council and one member of the 
council of ministers were sacked. All those sacked were known to be supporters of the 
monarchy. King Moshoeshoe II was stripped of executive and legislative powers, 
deposed and forced into exile in Britain (Mahao, 1997; Machobane, 2001).  
 
The military administration replaced him with his son, Prince Mohato Bereng Seeiso, 
who became King Letsie III in November 1990. Major General Metsing Lekhanya stated 
that the dismissed ministers and the deposed King were delaying the process of re-
democratisation (Press Statement by His Excellency the Chairman of the Military 
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Council and the Council of Ministers, 30 April 1990). Matlosa and Pule (2001:47) state 
that   
this was vociferously denied by the [deposed] King [Moshoeshoe II] 
who made a counter-claim that [Major General Metsing] Lekhanya 
and his allies were solely responsible for the delay in restoring 
constitutional rule since every time the matter was discussed ... he 
insisted that such issues first had to be discussed by the armed 
forces. 
In an effort to appease the potential opposition in the country, the military administration 
established a constituent assembly in 1990. The assembly was given the responsibility 
of drafting a new constitution that would be considered by the military council (Gumbi, 
1995).  
 
According to Section 9 (4) of the Government Gazette Extraordinary “executive 
authority in Lesotho [was] vested in the military” (cited in Gumbi, 1995:34). The 
assembly was to use the 1966 constitution as a working document. It was composed of 
the council nominees by the military government, the senior chiefs, soldiers, policemen 
and leaders of the banned political parties.  
 
The leaders of the main political parties, the BNP, BCP, UDP and the CPL, were 
reluctant to join the constituent assembly because it was merely an advisory body. They 
believed that the presence of military and police personnel in the assembly would deny 
them freedom of expression. They were also unwilling to serve as appointees and not 
as elected members in the assembly (Joint statement by leaders of Political Parties, 30 
May 1990).   
 
Mahao (1997) argues that Major General Metsing Lekhanya frustrated and delayed the 
process of handing over power to the civilian administration. Gumbi (1995:3) also 
argues that the military violated the rule of law, abused basic human rights and retarded 
the process of democratisation. Moreover, corruption also became rampant (Mirror, 27 
May 1991). The BCP, MFP, UDP, NIP parties issued a statement indicating that  
 122
 
persistent refusal by the military council to form an all-party 
government of national reconciliation has undermined the only 
justification for the military coup of 1986. And the continued 
suppression of democracy under the draconian Order No. 4 which 
suspended politics has imposed a national moral slavery that 
equates the Basotho with the sub-human beings and dumb animals. 
Another refusal to hold a plebiscite on the political future of this 
country will seal off that fate… The branding of the “Big Five” [BCP, 
MFP, UDP, NIP] as “traitors and the Judas Iscariots” by the military 
council is a smokescreen designed to cover their gross 
incompetence to resolve differences on national issues by 
negotiations… The Big Five have lived with intimidations, threats and 
abuses (Mirror, 27 May 1991). 
 
As a result of the discontents within the military administration and pressure to return 
the country to democratic rule, the junior officers staged another internal coup that 
dislodged Major General Metsing Lekhanya from power on 30 April 1991. The 
chairmanship of both councils was taken over by Colonel Phisoana Ramaema (later 
promoted to the rank of Major General). Major General Ramaema’s assumption of 
power saw the lifting of the controversial Suspension of Political Activities Order No. 4 of 
1986. The specific clause in the proposed constitution that entrenched military 
personnel in a democratically elected government was also dropped (Mirror, 27 May 
1991). Had the military now become reluctant reformers? 
 
Upon his assumption of power in 1991 Major General Phisoana Ramaema was clear on 
one thing: he had to drive forward the government objective of transferring power to the 
civilian administration. He publicly expressed a popular slogan that “I am a driver of a 
lorry [of government] without a reverse gear. It will only shift forward” (Moeletsi oa 
Basotho, 22 September 1991). 
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Major General Phisoana Ramaema’s administration was confronted with the mammoth 
task of deciding what to do with deposed King Moshoeshoe II. According to Machobane 
(2001:126), there was increasing pressure from the Commonwealth Secretariat, royalist 
supporters and 19 of the 22 Principal Chiefs that the King Moshoeshoe II should be 
reinstated to the throne. This pressure on the military administration was further exerted 
by his son Prince Mohato Seeiso who, as mentioned before was placed in his fathers’ 
position as King Letsie III on 12 November 1990 (Southall, 1995). 
 
On 28 December 1992 King Letsie III wrote a letter to the heads of churches in Lesotho 
and accused the military administration of persecuting his father King Moshoeshoe II. 
He accused the military administration of unfairly sending to him into exile and deposing 
him. He claimed that he was improperly installed by the military administration.  
 
King Letsie III also argued that ‘placing’ him on the throne while his father was still alive 
was an unusual step in Basotho tradition. He defended his father against what he 
described as the “baseless” accusations made against him by the military government. 
He further appealed to the nation under the leadership of various Christian 
denominations to push for the re-installation of his father to the throne (Lengolo la 
Rabasotho King Letsie III - Ho Lihlooho tsa Likereke, December 1992).   
 
Southall (1995:30) argues that the removal of King Moshoeshoe II as well as the 
installation of his son King Letsie III was intended to neutralise the monarchy and left 
the country with the “inevitable consequence of One Country, Two Kings”. But the 
military administration ignored the calls for the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II until 
the March 27 elections in 1993. King Moshoeshoe II claimed that he was deposed and 
sent into exile only because he demanded the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry 
into the allegations of corruption in the public service (Mirror, 6.3.92).  
 
Commenting on the reluctance in the military to hand over power to civilian 
administration, The Star (6 May 1988) stated that  
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more than two years after they seized power in Lesotho, the military 
shows no signs of keeping their promise to hand it back to the 
civilians. Some Basotho think the soldiers have acquired such a 
liking of power that they are reluctant to give it up. The military 
leaders insist, however, that they still intend to return power to the 
civilians. But they cannot do so, they say, until the civilians are ready 
to receive it, until a suitable political structure is in place to exercise 
the power. By this they appear to mean that there should be a new 
constitution and reasonable certainty that there will not be an 
immediate resumption of the party political feuding that plagued the 
country until the military overthrow of Prime Minister Leabua 
Jonathan’s government in January 1986. 
 
I concur with Matlosa (1995:120) that even after the transition process and the 1993 
elections, the military was still reluctant to effectively hand over power to the 
democratically elected civilian government, even after the BCP captured 74,7% of the 
vote in the 1993 election (see the next chapter on the re-democratisation elections of 
1993). 
 
People were denied the freedom to exercise their democratic right for eight years under 
military dictatorship. In the early phases the monarchy was co-opted to legitimise the 
military’s assumption of state power. The military abused the monarchy an even tried to 
eliminate political opposition to form a no-party state. But the act of balancing military 
and monarchical interests became problematic.  
 
Machobane (2001:134) states that “the soldiers incarcerated or flushed each other out 
of the political court.” However, because of the internal struggles and corruption within 
its ranks, it became hostile to the citizens. It relied on the use of force to silence 
opposition. This was contrary to its earlier promises of intervening in politics to promote 
economic development, peace and stability, and to facilitate the speedy return to 
democratic rule.  
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4.5 The role of the monarchy in the military coups: in 1986 and after the election 
     of 1993.  
 
We have seen that the military thought it might use the monarchy for its own purposes. 
However, according to Machobane (2001:65), from its inception the 1986 coup was 
identified with the Matsieng royal ambitions. It provided King Moshoeshoe II with an 
opportunity to pursue his desire for executive powers. The founder of the Basotho 
nation, Moshoeshoe I, had four sons; Letsie I was the oldest and the first in the royal 
lineage. Letsie I was the great-grandfather of King Moshoeshoe II and an elder brother 
of Molapo, the second son. 
 
Chief Leabua Jonathan was a descendant of Molapo. There was contestation for 
political power and authority between these two senior sons of Moshoeshoe I in the 
colonial period. These divisions within the traditional authority for political supremacy 
had placed the country in a precarious situation. But the military coup marked the 
ascendancy of the Matsieng royal house (associated with the MFP), which over the 
years had felt that it was being suppressed by Chief Leabua Jonathan from the Molapo 
house (associated with the BNP). It was the military that removed Chief Leabua 
Jonathan from politics in 1986.  
 
Machobane (2001:66) further notes that “the King gave the military government the 
highest praise of anybody and any group of people in the country since the founding of 
the nation”. His passionate speech is worth noting as he indicated that 
 
a second miracle happened on the 20th January this year [1986]. 
This nation was redeemed the second time and given a new lease of 
life. The armed forces ushered a new era into Lesotho in an 
extraordinary fashion, one so different from what usually happens in 
similar circumstances, that many people are asking themselves 
whether the change is real and lasting (King Moshoeshoe II Address, 
12 March 1986).  
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In the military administration the King advocated what he termed ‘participatory 
democracy’. This would witness the re-introduction of the Matsieng house at the apex of 
Lesotho politics, something that the ballot box had failed to do. According to him, all 
sectors of the society, farmers associations, chiefs, chambers of commerce and the 
others could directly participate in the political process through their representatives and 
not through political parties. He argued that their interests would be clearly addressed 
through an advisory national council. Importantly, a national council should be 
dominated by senior chiefs with him at the top. He argued that this was normal in a 
parliamentary system. 
 
Machobane (2001:91) argues that King felt that “in a parliamentary system, a 
commoner-dominated legislature rules the land. In the [proposed] Lesotho national 
council, authority ...  [will be] in the hands of chiefs”. Overall, the King wanted a system 
of governance in which the monarchy will be at the apex of administration. The 
monarchy wanted Lesotho to be a no-party state (almost as in former King Sobhuza’s 
Swaziland).  
 
Following the BCP’s landslide victory in the 1993 election, the BNP refused to accept 
the election outcome (this will be discussed in Chapter Five), while King Letsie III 
continued to demand the immediate restoration of his father to the throne. I concur with 
Matlosa (1995:130) that the BCP government was unable to effectively assert its control 
over the military. Amid the uncertainties about what the military might do and pressure 
from King Moshoeshoe II to be reinstated, the leader of the victorious BCP in the 1993 
election, Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, established the commission of inquiry into the 
events relating to the military.  
 
The terms of reference of the commission of inquiry into the LDF were to inquire into   
 
(a) the events that took place during the period between November 1993 and April 
1994; 
(b) the role of the LDF in those events; 
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(c) what future actions can be taken to prevent a repetition of these events.  
 
The commission was further to investigate and identify the people whose activities 
contributed to those events, the history of the military since its inception, the possible 
redeployment of those members of the military who may be “found to be in excess of 
requirements and the incorporation of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) into the army” 
(Legal Notice No. 61 of 1994, Commission of Inquiry into Lesotho Defence Force, 27 
December).   
 
But the LDF believed that the government had a secret agenda to dismantle it and 
replace it with its former armed wing, the LLA. This perception was intensified by the 
fact that in its 1993 election manifesto the BCP had promised the following:  
 
(a) Efficient and disciplined security forces to maintain law and order and to protect 
lives and property; 
(b) Professional and non-partisan security forces under the command of the Head of 
State and the Defence Commission; 
(c) A defence force based on quality, not quantity, in order to promote efficiency in the 
maintenance of law and order as well as the defence of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the country (Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) Election Manifesto, 
1993:3).  
 
Matlosa and Pule (2001) argue that it remained unclear as to how exactly the BCP 
government was going to implement these policies. But with the continuing anti-army 
statements from its supporters, this further deepened the hostility between the 
government and the military. Makoa (1997:21) states that there were also “inflammatory 
remarks from the BCP cabinet ministers and parliamentarians”. This included public 
statements by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle denouncing the LDF as the BNP’s 
murderous youth league that should be disbanded. 
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In response to such accusations, on April 14 1994 the military assassinated the Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Selometsi Baholo. Four cabinet ministers 
(Monyane Moleleki – Minister of Natural Resources; Kelebone Maope – Minister of 
Justice; Pakalitha Mosisili – Minister of Education; and Shakhane Mokhehle – Minister 
of Trade) were briefly abducted and later released by the soldiers. The BNP leader, 
Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana, managed to take advantage of the established military 
interests by “exhorting the army to do something about the rumours that government 
wanted to disband and replace the military with the LLA, its former armed wing” 
(Matlosa and Pule, 2001). 
 
Makoa (1997:22) aptly captures the BCP’s government attitude after the 1993 elections 
by stating that  
 
not only did the regime exclude its opponents from the administrative 
and governmental processes, but it also appeared determined to 
stoke political instability and violence. Examples of this double-
pronged policy are the purging of the civil service and the security 
forces, secret importation and stockpiling of weapons of war, and the 
training of BCP members in their use so that  they could challenge 
the army and eradicate the opposition. 
 
At the centre of these increasing hostilities between the government and the military 
was the monarchy. King Moshoeshoe II appealed by writing a letter to Prime Minister 
Ntsu Mokhehle demanding his reinstatement to the throne and outlining how unfairly he 
was treated by the military administration (Matlosa, 1995:131). In his response Prime 
Minister Ntsu Mokhehle stated that the best way for the King to seek redress about what 
he claims to have been abuse of his human rights by the former military government 
would be to take recourse to the courts of law. 
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Matlosa (1995:131) notes that Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle in the National Assembly 
on 28 March 1994 further outlined the following options as the possible solutions for the 
problems confronting the monarchy: 
 
... the first option is that of a referendum, which should be a short 
and simple question that the people will not have difficulty in 
understanding ... the second option will be to institute a commission 
of inquiry to look into the circumstances that led to the dethronement 
of King Moshoeshoe II and recommend, if necessary, measures that 
could be taken towards his reinstatement. The third option is the 
changing of the constitution, which will also need a question to be 
thrown to the masses for approval (Mopheme, 8.3.94). 
 
The government adopted the second option in an effort to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the monarchy and its supporters. The royalists and the BNP further embarked on 
the joint demonstration on 15 August 1994. They demanded the immediate 
reinstatement of King Moshoeshoe II, the dissolution of the BCP government, called for 
the establishment of an interim government of national unity and preparations for fresh 
elections under proportional representation (Sejanamane, 1996; Matlosa, 1999; Matlosa 
and Pule, 2001). The old bone of contention, the electoral system, was now ripe for 
resolution.  
 
King Letsie III further denounced the BCP government and called for the restoration of 
his father King Moshoeshoe II to the throne. The government established a Commission 
of Inquiry into the monarchy and the role of King Moshoeshoe II during the BNP’s 
government. This commission was bitterly resented by the King and his supporters 
(Sejanamane, 1996:38).  
Sejanamane (1996:38) argues that “the terms of reference of the commission were 
clearly biased against Moshoeshoe II ...  the membership of the commission was not 
helpful, in that some members were known to hold very strong views on the issue being 
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investigated”. Unhappy about the commissions terms of reference and its membership, 
King Letsie III wrote a letter to the Prime Minister and pointed out that, 
by its composition, the commission can hardly be taken and 
accepted as neutral, impartial and without … prejudice, especially 
when some members of the commission are self-professed anti-
monarchists who on many occasions made public utterances which 
directly attack and besmirch both the person of His Majesty and the 
institution of the monarchy … (His Majesty King Letsie III letter to the 
Right the Hon. Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, 4 August 1994).  
King Letsie III, under acute political pressure from the royal family, the Principal Chiefs 
of Matsieng and Mokhotlong, Chief Masupha and Mathealira, wrote a letter to the Prime 
Minister, arguing that the consequence of the commission would be mounting tensions 
rather than national reconciliation (Sejanamane, 1996). He pointed out that 
… I can only conclude by expressing my concern and fears to the 
effect that this commission, as it presently stands, is not intended to 
establish the truth and justice to the wronged. On the contrary, it has 
been created to provide an arena for conducting a political vendetta 
against His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II. A commission of this 
nature will not be seen as having the required and necessary 
integrity and legitimacy of the public.. it will be virtually impossible for 
me to accept the results of its work and its findings as being 
objective, fair, impartial and just (His Majesty King Letsie III letter to 
the Right the Hon. Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, 4 August 1994).  
It was against this background that King Letsie III stormed into Radio Lesotho and 
announced that the BCP government had been dissolved and the constitution 
suspended again (Sejanamane, 1996:39; Southall and Petlane, 1995:133). He 
afterwards appointed an interim administration.  
Matlosa (1995:133) argues that the interim administration was designed to encompass 
all the “major shades of political opinion”. It was chaired by Hae Phoofolo (a human 
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rights lawyer and a former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Lesotho), 
Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana (leader of the BNP), was responsible for Foreign Affairs, 
Mamello Morrisson ( the former editor of royalist paper, Mohlabani), was responsible for 
Information, Khauta Khasu (formerly of the BCP, who had contested the 1993 election 
under the banner of Hareeng Basotho Party (HBP) in Peka), was responsible for 
Agriculture,  Mathabiso Mosala (the former President of the Lesotho National council of 
Women),  was responsible for Labour and Moletsane Monyake ( the former managing 
director of the Lesotho National Development Corporation), was responsible for Finance 
(Matlosa, 1995:133). 
Matlosa (1995:133) argues that in denouncing the deposed BCP government, the 
Chairman of the Interim Provisional government, Hae Phoofolo “criticised [Ntsu 
Mokhehle] for mishandling … the issue of the monarchy and the military disturbances of 
1994”. Mamello Morrisson, who was responsible for Information, argued that the King 
intervened as a result of the deteriorating political and security situation in the country 
since the 1993 election and that the King acted to prevent an “outright military coup”. 
She also insisted on the urgent need to “purify the civil service and reconstruct the 
armed forces to avoid their manipulation by the politicians (Mopheme, 26.8.94). Despite 
these efforts to justify the King’s declaration of the palace coup, this was met with stiff 
opposition both internally and externally. 
External pressure from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member 
states resulted in the restoration of the BCP government to power and a Memorandum 
of Understanding was signed on 14 September 1994 (Matlosa and Pule, 2001:55). The 
Memorandum provided for 
the restoration of the duly elected government of Lesotho, 
cancellation of the Commission of Inquiry into the position of the 
monarchy, reinstallation of King Moshoeshoe II [and] indemnity for 
King Letsie III [as well as], members of the Provisional Council of 
State, advisers, public servants and security personnel from legal 
proceedings for actions against taken in the period August 17 to 
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September 1994, [lastly], Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
[will] ... henceforth maintain an ongoing interest in Lesotho’s politics 
and … they shall be the guarantors of Lesotho’s democratic 
dispensation (Understanding of Measures and Procedures Relating 
to the Restoration of Constitutional Order in Lesotho, 14 September 
1994:1). 
King Moshoeshoe II died in 1996 in a car accident two years after his reinstallation to 
the throne and was succeeded by King Letsie III. 
 
Importantly, the military supported the palace coup. This was proved by its brutal 
suppression of the pro-democratic forces. Five BCP supporters were shot dead in the 
vicinity of the Royal Palace and 16 injured by the military during the mass protest 
against the displacement of the BCP from power (Matlosa and Pule, 2001:54).  Matlosa 
(1995:134) argues that “the security forces remained firm; implementing a curfew … 
zealously guarding [places] such as Radio Lesotho and government buildings deemed 
to be of strategic importance”. 
 
The palace coup marked a clash of interests between the commoners and the royalists.  
Leftwich (2000) mentions policy restraint by the winners against the established 
interests as being crucial to democratic consolidation. But the BCP government pursed 
policies which threatened the military (fears of being disbanded and replaced by its 
former armed wing, the LLA). Ultimately, the military joined hands with the monarchy 
driven by their vested interests and grievances against the BCP government. The 
democratically elected government now had former allies as new enemies.  
 
In assessing why the military fully backed the palace coup, it should be noted that since 
the attainment of independence, the military had always been used as a partisan and 
politicised tool. Between 1970 and 1986 the BNP government had exercised “stringent 
control over the armed forces and shaped the military to serve its own political ends” 
(Mothibe, 1998:14; Matlosa and Pule, 2001).  
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It was through this trend that the military was transformed into a political actor. Its 
political activism was further demonstrated by its interference in the toppling of the BNP 
government in 1986, in defiance of the constitutional rules of the game, and its refusal 
to recognise the legitimacy of the BCP after the 1993 redemocratisation elections. For a 
homogenous country such as Lesotho, this indicated remarkably divisive elements. But 
they were not cast in stone, as shifts occurred all the time.  
 
4.6 The 1998 Elections: the worst violence 
 
The military was now seemingly out of the way and so was the monarchy. The BCP’s 
political woes continued, which affected its day-to-day administration in government. 
The BCP was embroiled in the power struggles over the party leadership. The BCP’s 
1995 annual conference failed to produce a National Executive Committee (NEC). This 
resulted in the protracted legal battles over the control of party.  
The BCP crises were worsened by the deteriorating health of Ntsu Mokhehle, the Prime 
Minister and the leader of the BCP, which made him unable to control the power 
struggles and temper the political aspirations of its executive members who were eager 
to succeed him. Fearing the possibility of being officially ousted from the leadership of 
the party, Ntsu Mokhehle announced on 9 June 1997 that he had formed a new political 
party called the LCD (Sekatle, 1997:68; Pule, 1999:23).  
The formation of the LCD was the result of a resolution of Ntsu Mokhehle’s followers, 
who met on 7 June 1997. This was in response to his call for such a gathering to find a 
solution to the problems in the BCP. The BCP lost the support of the majority of MPs, 
who crossed the floor and joined the LCD (Sekatle, 1997:69; Pule, 1999:25). The LCD’s 
assumption of power saw the relegation of the BCP (winner of 1993 election) to ranks of 
the opposition. Ntsu Mokhehle’s departure from the BCP and his takeover of the 
country’s administration under the LCD was condemned by the opposition parties.  
The BCP led a series of protests to the Royal Palace to demand the restoration of the 
government. The BCP appealed to SADC. These appeals were directed to South Africa, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe (which had intervened in 1994 in the restoration of the BCP, 
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following King Letsie III’s palace coup). The BCP, BNP, MFP, UDP, HBP, Labour Party 
(LP) and Lesotho Education Party (LEP) formed a coalition intended to force Prime 
Minister Ntsu Mokhehle to resign (Makoa, 1997:15).  
The memorandum was sent to King Letsie III, pleading with the King to dismiss the 
Prime Minister, dissolve parliament and to organise new elections. The memorandum, 
signed by the Secretary General of the BCP, G.M Kolisang indicated that 
the formation of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy [LCD] as a 
political party in parliament is not only a manipulation of the 
democratic process, a travesty of justice but … a betrayal of the trust 
that has been reposed upon him as the leader of the Basutoland 
Congress Party [BCP] and warrants the applicability of the 
convention that Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle resign as Prime Minister (sic). We 
request the King to see to it that democratic rule is restored 
otherwise  the people  will have no option other than to return their 
rule by use of all peaceful endeavours (sic) (Mohlanka,  23 August 
1997).   
The Upper House (Senate) denounced the LCD government as unconstitutional and 
declared that the Senators would boycott all parliamentary bills passed for scrutiny by 
the LCD dominated House of Representatives (Makoa, 1997:18). Newspapers opposed 
to Ntsu Mokhehle believed that a second intervention by Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe was on the cards. The pro-BCP newspaper, MoAfrika had the photos of 
Presidents Mandela and Mugabe on its front page, along with the article indicating that  
… sources close to the government of Lesotho confirm that Messrs 
Robert Mugabe, Nelson Mandela and Ketumile Masire are planning 
to visit Lesotho to warn Ntsu Mokhehle that his action is 
unacceptable (18 July 1997).  
But the LCD remained in power until the 1998 election. For the 1998 election, the main 
contestation for state power was between the LCD, BCP and the BNP. There were high 
expectations that the newly formed LCD would be defeated (Kadima, 1999:77). It was a 
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newcomer contesting against well-established parties such as the BCP and BNP. But 
the elections were won overwhelmingly by the LCD (see the results in Chapter Five).  
The LCD won 78 out of 80 constituencies with 60,7% of the total votes on election day. 
It later won one constituency in the delayed election which increased its number of 
seats to 79. The royalist backed MFP fared badly in the elections and got 1,3% of the 
votes and failed to win a seat. The BCP, BNP, the MFP and other smaller parties with a 
total of 40% of the vote ( but with only seat), refused to accept the election outcome 
because of allegations of ballot rigging (Makoa, 1999:83, The Star, 4 September 1998). 
The electoral system of FPTP served as the catalyst in these problems; opposition 
parties felt excluded from participation in the democratic process (refer to the next 
chapter). These parties (BCP, BNP and MFP) formed an official coalition called the 
Setlamo Democratic Alliance (SDA). The SDA filed urgent applications in the Lesotho 
High Court against the election outcome. But these cases were all unsuccessful 
(Kadima, 1999:78). 
In response to the unsuccessful legal challenges, opposition parties tightened their grip 
and appealed to King Letsie III to dissolve the LCD government. They also demanded 
the formation of a government of national unity and new elections based on PR 
(Mothibe, 1999; Kadima, 1999).  
Opposition parties later mounted protests against the LCD government, which almost 
paralysed the LCD government. The opposition supporters went on the rampage, 
mounting illegal road blockades, terrorising street vendors, burning tyres, and looting 
and burning shops. The capital, Maseru, became largely inaccessible. During these 
mounting tensions, the security establishment failed to bring the situation under control. 
Members of the LDF remained unconcerned about acts of violence as they gradually 
gravitated towards civil war (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events 
Leading to the Political Disturbances which occurred in Lesotho during the period 
between 1st July to 30 November 1998, 2001:34). 
On 4 August 1998 opposition parties marched to the royal palace in protest against 
what they described as the rigged elections. They stayed around the palace gates 
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waiting for the King Letsie III to respond to their demands.The victorious LCD 
government condemned this act, but the opposition resisted without any noticeable 
willingness to compromise (Matlosa, 1999:180). 
External mediation efforts led by South Africa under the auspices of SADC led to the 
establishment of the Langa Commission of inquiry. The opposition parties established 
their own commission of inquiry into the conduct of the 1998 elections chaired by 
Moletsane Monyake of the MFP. Monyake’s commission concluded that the elections 
were rigged even before the Langa Commission could officially start with its 
proceedings.   
The Langa Commission of Inquiry was vested with the powers to investigate the 
conduct of the 1998 elections in the light of the opposition’s grave allegations that the 
elections were rigged. It was chaired by the Justice Pius Langa from the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa. But the proceedings of the commission went at a slow pace and 
political tempers continued to rise. There were also some delays in the publication of 
the report from the commission and this created an impression in opposition ranks that 
the LCD had rigged the 1998 election.  
Political tempers kept rising and this resulted in violent clashes between the opposition 
and the LCD supporters (Matlosa, 1999). The contents of the report were at last made 
public after long delays on 17 September 1998. But Matlosa (1999:183) argues that 
instead of offering a solution to the volatile situation, the Langa report was full of unclear 
and inconclusive statements. 
Gay (1998:3) argues that “the report was a disappointment, as it seemed … [that] it was 
giving both warring factions something to cheer about and also blaming the 
Independent Electoral Commission for the mess in the elections”. An example drawn 
from the report stated that, 
we are unable to state that the validity of the elections has been 
conclusively established. We point out, however, that some of the 
apparent irregularities and discrepancies are sufficiently serious 
concerns. We cannot, however, postulate that the result does not 
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reflect the will of the Lesotho electorate. We merely point out that the 
means for checking this has been compromised and created much 
room for doubt (Langa Commission of Inquiry into the 1998 Elections 
in Lesotho, 1998:28). 
Consequently, opposition parties tightened their grip and continued demanding the 
dissolution of the LCD government. The LDF members remained indifferent to acts of 
violence, looting and burning in the capital city of Maseru. They watched helplessly as 
the police battled with the opposition protesters. This was despite their visibility around 
the city, heavily armed supposedly with the intention to maintain law and order.  
Opposition supporters took advantage of the reluctance of the military to quell the 
protests. They confiscated government vehicles, closed government offices and 
captured the state-run radio station (Radio Lesotho). This was followed by the forcible 
closure of the National Assembly (Independent Mail, 03/09/1998; Mothibe, 1999:57). 
Tensions flared between the military and the police as they exchanged fire around the 
palace gates. Junior officers of the army staged a mutiny and forced the commander of 
the army to resign. This was followed by the arrest and detention of 28 senior officers 
(Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 11 September 1998). Upon their release, they all fled to 
South Africa.  
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, under acute pressure and unable to restrain the wrath 
of the opposition, wrote to the President of South Africa who was the Chairman of 
SADC, appealing for military intervention. The contents of the letter are worth 
highlighting because they signalled that there was a coup. This was in spite of the 
repeated denials from the opposition parties that there was a coup.  
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili stated that ‘the junior army officers have staged a 
mutiny … its members have become spectators to the acts of intimidation, violence and 
arson committed in their presence, cabinet ministers have been attacked and their 
vehicles taken and impounded on palace grounds, the parliament has been forcibly 
closed …we have a coup in our hands’ (MoAfrika, 20/09/1998).  
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Matlosa (1999:183) argues that these developments suggested that there was a plot to 
topple the government, but he adds that  
they did not in their own way amount to coup as yet. A coup d’état is 
a situation whereby a de jure government has been effectively 
displaced by unlawful means by a person or group of persons who in 
turn impose a de facto authority. 
I concur with Matlosa’s observation, but the opposition parties had completely knocked 
the government out of power. It lacked the coercive capacity to maintain law and order. 
There was a power vacuum as the executive organ went into hiding, the national 
assembly was non-functional and civil servants stayed away from work for their safety. 
Similarly, Mothibe (1999:57) argues that “the country was effectively without 
government, as the country’s political and military leadership appeared totally helpless”. 
Consequently, South Africa responded by sending its forces to Lesotho. This military 
intervention led by South Africa and later joined by Botswana forces took place under 
the auspices of SADC. The intervention neutralised the military involvement in the 
political crises and, importantly, it dispersed the opposition coalition that had camped 
outside the palace and laid siege to the LCD government (Makoa, 1999:81; Molomo, 
1999:133).  
The intervention resulted in the establishment of a new political institution, the Interim 
Political Authority (IPA), which was mandated to prepare for the next elections. The IPA 
was to have 24 members, with two from the each party that participated in the May 
1998 election (Elkit, 2002:2). 
During the 1998 election crisis the military was divided into two different factions. The 
first faction consisted of the senior military officials, who were mostly professional 
soldiers and who believed that their duty was to support the government of the day, 
irrespective of which party was in power. In 1998 the party that was in power was the 
LCD. The second faction consisted of the lower ranks that were still operating in terms 
of the legacy of the BNP affiliation and were anti-LCD. 
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The second faction which was greater in numbers and shared the same sentiments with 
the opposition parties that the LCD had rigged the election. It also accused the 
commander of the army, Lieutenant General Mosakeng, of assisting the LCD to rig the 
election. There were also accusations and unconfirmed allegations that Lieutenant 
General Mosakeng had bought himself a farm in South Africa with the military money 
(Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events Leading to the Political 
Disturbances which occurred in Lesotho during the period between 1st July to 30 
November 1998, 2001: 20).  
Opposition grievances found a fertile ground in the military. The entrenched military 
interests around the domains of state power saw them intervening in politics to back up 
the opposition claims against the LCD government. The military joined in the political 
crusade against the LCD government; it obstructed the police from dispersing the 
protesters at the palace gates and assisted them as them as they committed crimes 
around the major urban centres (Maseru, Mafeteng, Berea and Mohale’s Hoek) 
(Matlosa, 1999; Mothibe, 1999).  
After the South African-led military intervention, opposition supporters went on the 
rampage. They torched the homes of the cabinet ministers, MPs and assisted the 
opposition parties’ members in burning and looting in Maseru and other urban centres 
(Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events Leading to the Political 
Disturbances which occurred in Lesotho during the period between 1st July to 30 
November 1998, 2001:25). 
 
4.7 Assessment  
 
Schedler (1998) argues that democratic breakdowns are often influenced by feelings of 
economic and social inequalities. Huntington (1998) argues that in societies where 
political participation is high, yet the process of political institutionalisation is low and 
weak, there is likely to be political instability. He (1998:4) points out that in most 
developing societies political instability is “in large part the product of rapid social 
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change and rapid mobilisation of new groups into politics coupled with the slow 
development of political institutions”.  
 
I am of the view that Lesotho’s political system was fragmented by the monarchy and 
the military; hence “the political institutions have little power, less majesty and no 
resiliency ... [and] governments simply do not govern” (Huntington, 1998:2). According 
to Schedler (2001), a “core symptom of failed institutionalization” is violence. The 
monarchy and the military (as key organs of the state) were highly politicised and they 
later had a violent confrontation with the democratic structures in the post-democratic 
order in 1993. They used force to “violate the fundamental norms of democratic theory 
and practise” (Schedler, 2001).  
 
The breakdown of law and discipline in the Lesotho military became widespread. 
Hutchful (1998:41) argues that such breakdowns are common to all military 
governments throughout the African continent. This is because the military assumes all 
the executive and administrative powers and corruption becomes rife. Thus, instilling 
order and control becomes almost impossible. Secondly, the interests of the military in 
active politics and state power are further entrenched.  
 
According to Matlosa and Pule (2001:40), the “military ushered in a new era in the 
country’s political development, an era of military authoritarianism [after it seized power 
in 1986]”. They noted that there “‘were often regular revolts by the junior officers in the 
army which changed not only the leadership but gave rise to the succession of military 
administrations”. Appointments to senior positions in the civil service were made on the 
basis of loyalty to the military rather than efficiency.  
 
Southall (1995:27) argues that the soldiers’ grievances in revolting against Major 
General Metsing Lekhanya in the first phase of  the military governance was caused by 
their dissatisfaction with a 22% pay rise that they were offered in the budget, “which 
contrasted adversely with the supposedly fabulous financial gains being ... [enjoyed] by 
those at the centre of power”. This endorses Gill’ (1993) and Liebenow’ (1986) 
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arguments that economic desires often serve as the catalysts for the military 
intervention in politics. 
 
Southall (1995:28) further notes that “the deep involvement of Lekhanya in corruption 
meant that he had led those who, in order to prevent retrospective prosecution or 
recovery of their illicit gains, had argued for constitutional entrenchment of a military 
presence within any civilian government”. On the other hand, Ramaema felt that the 
army’s interests would be “better served ... [by] an acceptance of civilian government 
authority”. I concur with Southall (1995) that the displacement of Major General Metsing 
Lekhanya led to the emergence of two military factions which continued to exist even 
after the 1993 elections. 
 
Huntington (1998) and Finer (1975) argue that coups occur in states suffering economic 
hardships. In the 1980s Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan made major policy shifts 
and joined the international community in denouncing apartheid South Africa. South 
Africa later imposed a total economic blockade on its borders with Lesotho. During this 
economic meltdown, the military intervened in politics and staged a coup. The economic 
hardships brought about by the closure of the border with South Africa brought Lesotho 
to the brink of collapse with no basic necessities and this precipitated the military 
intervention in politics.  
 
Lesotho’s military after its assumption of power in 1986, was convinced that the country 
needed a new constitution relevant to modern political developments of the 20th century. 
But this was not the case, as no proper constitutional framework was designed. Very 
little was done to promote the principles of democracy; the citizens did not have the 
freedom of express their views. There were no alternative sources of information as the 
military became hostile to criticism. The military was unable to serve the interests of the 
people as attention was directed at safeguarding its own interests at the expense of the 
population. 
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The military administration also failed to bring stability as promised. Some members of 
the military went to the extent of broadcasting to the nation over national radio that they 
toppled Chief Leabua Jonathan from government for themselves. Maqutu (1990:74) 
states that “the toppling of a government was presented as do it yourself, (hoa itihelloa), 
which meant everyone who topples a government does it for himself”. 
 
Arguably, the problem of the Lesotho military can be best explained through an 
emphasis on its historical background. According to Matlosa and Pule (2001:40), from 
its inception in 1963 (when the army was founded), the military was plagued by 
conflicting perceptions about the exact role it was expected to play. “None among the 
political elite was under any illusion that, once founded, the military could defend the 
country’s borders to any significant degree – given Lesotho’s precarious position as a 
tiny country, totally surrounded by ... South Africa”.  
 
Maqutu (1990) notes that Aristotle allegedly never liked professional soldiers. According 
to him, professional soldiers only served their master, if there is no determined enemy 
to face. The Lesotho military was a professional institution that only served its master 
(Chief Leabua Jonathan) for there was no potential enemy to confront. Maqutu 
(1990:115) further warns that  
 
in imperial Rome it [the military] became a serious problem to 
emperors. It sometimes oppressed the people against the wishes of 
the emperors. It often toppled emperors who tried to improve the 
[livelihoods] of the people ... When enemies have been vanquished, it 
starts being involved in the country’s politics. In France, Napoleon, a 
French general, ended up seizing power. 
  
While it is indisputable that recruitment to the military helped to solve the chronic 
unemployment problem, the military itself does not have a proper or clearly focused job. 
Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa, with minimal hostile threats. 
Ultimately, the military intervened in politics and turned into an army against its own 
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people. Interestingly there was no suspicion that South Africa was behind these later 
coups in 1986 and 1991 only perhaps when Chief Leabua Jonathan took over in 1970.    
A perception had developed within military ranks that they have power to make and 
unmake governments. An interesting point is that even the military administration feared 
its own army during its period of governance. 
 
Most problems associated with the transitions to democracy from military rule are that, 
once the military have tasted the benefits of state power, the military tends to become 
addicted to it. Matlosa (1995:14) argues that “this inevitably has a bearing upon the 
degree to which a new civilian government can have effective control and authority over 
its armed forces”.  
 
Matlosa (1995:118) and Decalo (1992:25) state that “military rulers have to date fared 
poorly in the democratisation sweepstakes and are likely to continue doing so in the 
future”. Decalo (1992:157) points out that the military knows fully “that to liberalise is to 
dig their own graves”. The Lesotho military did not therefore serve as custodians and 
guarantors of democratic rule, but became active political actors competing for state 
power. 
 
The military’s interest in politics after its withdrawal from state power in 1993 still 
remained strong. It was previously used as a tool to support the unconstitutional seizure 
of power by Chief Leabua Jonathan in 1970 after his defeat in the elections. In 1986 it 
directly assumed political power and instituted its own military authoritarianism. It 
oppressed the citizens and violated democratic principles. But Major General Phisoana 
Ramaema did not reverse his predecessor’s decision concerning the reinstatement of 
the dethroned King Moshoeshoe II (Gill, 1993; Machobane, 2001). Although the military 
takeovers of 1986 and 1991 had some support from the monarchy, the King could not 
rely on the military to restore his power.  
 
Matlosa (1995:119) argues if the civilian administration in the new democratic 
dispensation denied them the material and other privileges they previously had under 
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their administration, “the military is unlikely to grant its unreserved commitment to a 
newly democratic order”. Its monopoly on the use of arms is often a threat to the 
democratic order. Similarly, Stepan (1988) notes that given the dominance of the 
military over the physical power of the state, it is often difficult for incoming civilian 
governments to effectively exercise their command and control over the military 
immediately after the return to civilian rule. 
 
Matlosa (1995:118) also argues that in transitions managed by the military, the general 
expectations are that the military should be subjected to the civilian administration. But 
in most cases the rules and regulations of the transition are set down by the military. It 
often creates a protected political space for its survival in the post-transition political 
dispensation (Hutchful, 1989).  
 
In Lesotho the transition to democratic rule in the 1990s was managed by the military, 
but it was also reluctant to hand power over to the civilian administration. Hence 
Matlosa (1995:119) noted that “it seem[ed] as if their withdrawal from the political office 
(not from politics) was rather a face-saving strategy against internal and external 
pressures than commitment to democracy”. Lesotho’s military did therefore not willingly 
embrace the democratisation process.  
 
But Machobane (2001:133) argues that the military was still ensnared in the political 
culture and legacy developed by the BNP. The military had developed a feeling that 
they were custodians of democracy. Owing to its experience of control over the financial 
coffers of the state, a perception had developed within its ranks that the assumption of 
state power is the most reliable way of fulfilling its own interests. 
 
I concur with Matlosa (1997:95) that the 1970 state of emergency laid a firm ground for 
future democratic breakdowns. He eloquently captures this situation by stating that  
 
as the political elite began to view politics in zero-sum terms, and not 
as a positive-sum game, contestation for state power became 
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tantamount to some form of warfare whereby only the fittest would 
survive. State managers would invest more energy and resources on 
annihilating the opposition than on ensuring social stability and 
economic development. Some of the outcomes of the twin strategy 
of repression and accommodation were increased defence spending 
and misuse/abuse of public resources by the ruling elite for self-
serving political ends.  
The military regularly intervened in politics. For instance, it besieged the BCP 
government eight months after it was voted into power in the 1993 elections. A culture 
seemed to have developed and become entrenched in the military ranks that they have 
the powers to make and unmake governments as they wish. The 1994 palace coup thus 
offered the military an opportunity to protect their interests against what they viewed as 
the hostile BCP government (which had historical ties with the ANC that came to power 
in South Africa during that same year).  
Politicians in Lesotho have always succeeded in influencing the military against their 
rivals and the democratically elected structures and this contributed to the violation of 
democratic principles. Thus, the military played a decisive role in the country’s 
democratic breakdowns, at that stage probably against the wishes of a powerful 
neighbour.   
The military, in the early stages after its assumption of political power, argued that it had 
opened an arena for democracy, but it was still not fully committed to the restoration of 
democratic rule. Even after the return to democratisation, military interests around the 
domains of state power remained strong. This was proved by the military’s actions after 
the 1998 elections, as will later be discussed. It has to be pointed out, however, that the 
military played almost no visible role in the violence that erupted during the elections of 
1998.   
I now shift attention to the way that the monarchy contributed to the democratic 
breakdowns in Lesotho. The monarchy, as mentioned before, exercised executive 
powers in the early phases of military governance. This enabled King Moshoeshoe II to 
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attain what he had long cherished since independence. After the 1960 district council 
and 1965 pre-independence elections, King Moshoeshoe II refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of the democratically elected structures and disapproved of their existence, 
because he demanded more executive powers. In 1970, as the result of his political 
activism, he was exiled by Chief Leabua Jonathan after the declaration of a state of 
emergency and the suspension of the constitution.  
The arrangement over the executive powers in the military administration did not last 
long because of clashes over who was directly in control of the administration of 
Lesotho. These differences led to the dethronement of King Moshoeshoe II by the 
military administration in 1990. In commenting on the dethronement of King 
Moshoeshoe II, Machobane (2001:122) states that  
… the military council had seriously tinkered with the Basotho 
grundnorm: Moshoeshoe II’s own faults put aside, no Mosotho 
monarch before him had ever been dethroned. Letsie I, who ruled 
from 1891 to 1903, had made a feeble bluff in protest to Governor’s 
Agent Captain Blyth that he might resign if things did not work out his 
way. But when the latter called the bluff, he recanted. Letsie II, who 
ruled from 1905 to 1913, was probably the weakest monarch 
Basotho ever had. He was also an embarrassing alcoholic. The 
colonial administration sometimes refrained from meeting him 
because he was too drunk to stand up. But his removal from office 
was never contemplated. Given such facts, the military council may 
itself have felt that it had unwillingly taken a responsibility on its 
shoulders that it had never imagined. A responsibility that was too 
awesome for any government to undertake. 
I concur with Machobane’s argument, but given the fact that “military governments are 
...by their nature authoritarian” (Matlosa, 1997: ii). This gives an adequate explanation 
as to why the military administration felt brave enough to dethrone the King. Chief 
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Leabua Jonathan exiled the King following his unconstitutional assumption of power in 
1970, but he never dethroned him. 
Matlosa (1997) points our correctly that military rule is founded “principally on the 
bullet”. I am of the opinion that there was a strong possibility that the military would 
abolish the monarchy. Similarly, Machobane (2001:122) states that the 22 Principal 
Chiefs feared that the military administration “might ... give them a King of its own 
choice ... or even abolish monarchy altogether”.  
The monarchy was eager for executive powers and this often led to clashes with the 
democratically elected structures after the 1993 elections. The BCP government’s 
reluctance to reinstate King Moshoeshoe II and its intolerable behaviour reached a 
climax with the palace coup. The military also pursued its agenda for political power and 
sympathised with the monarchy against the BCP.  
Interestingly, these two institutions (monarchy and military) had often over the years 
(1986-93) clashed, yet they were able to form a formidable opposition against the BCP. 
Both institutions as key organs of the state contributed towards Lesotho’s numerous 
democratic breakdowns. Nevertheless, these entrenched interests in the monarchy and 
the military continued to exist, as will be showed later by the attitude of both institutions 
(military and monarchy) after the 1998 and 2007 elections.  
4.8 Implications for democratic consolidation  
 
Amongst the conditions that Leftwich (2000) proposes for democratic consolidation, the 
following institutional factors are relevant to assess the possible implications for 
democratic consolidation. These are legitimacy, adherence to the constitutional rules of 
the game and policy restraint. After the 1965 elections the monarch refused to adhere to 
the constitutional rules of the game. King Moshoeshoe II refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of the victorious BNP. He felt that the BNP government was not procedurally 
entitled to rule. The monarchy has over the years consistently refused to adhere to the 
formal structure of rules within which political power is contested. Functional interests 
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were so entrenched. At the core of this refusal to adhere to the rules of the game was 
the constitution, which the monarchy disapproved of.  
 
The military’s backing of the 1970 democratic breakdown led to an establishment of the 
civilian dictatorship that lasted for 16 years. The military later intervened in politics and 
instituted its own period of military authoritarianism that lasted for eight years. Over its 
period in governance, the military regularly frustrated efforts to re-democratise. This 
opened a way for the entrenchment of military interests around the domains of state 
power.  
 
Under such circumstances it was almost certain that the adherence to the rules of the 
game was going to be problematic in the post-military civilian administration. In the post-
transition period in 1993 the military, despite its constitutional obligation to uphold the 
rule of law, failed to recognise the legitimacy of the BCP government. The BCP 
government was not viewed as procedurally entitled to be there. The violent military 
confrontations of January 1994 was a notable indication of its refusal to recognise the 
legitimacy of the BCP government and to adhere to the rules of game.  
 
Leftwich (2000:138) eloquently argued that “for democracies to survive there needs to 
be agreement or acquiescence about the rules of the political game and the loyalty to 
those rulers, that is to the democratic process itself”. But this was contrary to what the 
Lesotho military did. Authoritarianism was deeply entrenched within its ranks and it did 
not pledge loyalty to the democratic structures.    
 
Lesotho’s institutional organs (the military and monarchy) were thus highly politicised, 
with each pursing its own agenda. Both institutions failed to uphold the rules of the 
game. In the early stages of the military governance after 1986 King Moshoeshoe II had 
tried to impose his own model of democracy. This almost developed into monarchical 
authoritarianism, without the basic conditions for democracy. This also saw the 
monarchical battle for political supremacy with the military. This problem is traceable to 
the political legacy of the monarchy under Moshoeshoe I. I am of the view that the 
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monarchy was likely to commit more political blunders owing to its entrenched interests 
in executive powers. Politicians have always used the monarchy to resolve their own 
grievances, which once they have attained their goals, the monarchy is criticised by the 
very same politicians.  
 
The advent of the military administration did not bring any better prospects for 
democratic stability as expected. There were no socio-economic improvements during 
this period. The public announcement made by the military that they have toppled the 
government for themselves held some serious implications for future democratic 
dispensations. This meant that the government was there for the taking by anybody who 
could mobilise sufficient military force. This was not a healthy constitutional situation. 
Surely a country cannot have a military as the legitimate source of all authority in 
government. The military had learned from its master Chief Leabua Jonathan how to 
suppress the citizens and the monarchy. Maqutu (1990:79) argues that  
 
[the] ... military had learned how effective power can be kept while 
legal forms were exploited to conceal what was going on. The 
Chairman of the military council blamed failure to return the 
democratic rule immediately after the 19 February 1990 on the King. 
However, no sooner had the King been… [exiled] to Britain for 
refusing to associate himself with the reshuffle of the military 
councillors without prior consultation.  
I am of the opinion that Chief Leabua Jonathan should not be held solely responsible for 
the 1970 democratic breakdown. The political environment prior to 1970 was highly 
charged. He knew he had South Africa on his side. Churches had divided people, the 
monarchy was eager for executive powers and fierce competition for political power 
within parties was tense.  
 
The military also backed the coup, while the monarchy pursued its agenda for executive 
powers. This deepened the crisis. In the past the Verwoed government  donated grain.  
The  BNP had concentrated its efforts towards 1970 elections by further deepening the 
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societal divisions, as it composed songs such as “Leabua ke ‘muso ngoanaka” 
translated as “Leabua is the government, my child, whether you like it or not, my child”. 
Such public utterances paved the way for Chief Leabua Jonathan to break the rules of 
the game. He was not prepared to “have to compete again and put their record to the 
test in the next election” (Leftwich, 2000:139). Hence, in 1970 after his defeat, he 
refused to adhere to the rules of the game. Pretoria must have been happy.  The BNP 
government later marginalised other sectors of the society in implementing its 
developmental projects in order to consolidate its grip on power. 
 
After 1993 the BCP government pursued highly contentious policies which threatened 
the established monarchical and military interests. Leftwich (2000) argues that policies 
introduced by the newly established governments should not threaten the established 
interests. But the BCP leadership mounted an onslaught on the military, labelling it as 
the murderous BNP Youth League that needed to be disbanded (Makoa, 1997). 
 
Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle even went as far as making public declarations that the 
key enemies of democracy in Lesotho were the military and the monarchy. Such public 
pronouncements heightened fears within the military and the monarchy, and strained 
the relations between the key organs of the state with no policy restraint to guard 
against the established interests. In retaliation, the monarchy staged a palace coup in 
August 1994, which was supported by another threatened institution (the military).But 
politics in South Africa had also changed.  
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CHAPTER 5: ELECTIONS AND RE-DEMOCRATISATION 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The military has throughout been an active actor in Lesotho politics. In 1970 it backed 
the unconstitutional assumption of power by Chief Leabua Jonathan, who suspended 
the constitution, aborted the elections and instituted a period of civilian dictatorship. In 
1986 the military deposed Chief Leabua Jonathan from state power after 16 years. But 
civilian authoritarianism was replaced by military rule. The monarchy, which was 
sidelined by the independence constitution and the BNP government of Chief Leabua 
Jonathan, was drawn into politics to provide legitimacy for the military administration 
after its seizure of state power.  
It soon became unclear whether real power was vested with the King or the military and 
this became problematic. The King did not like restrictions imposed on him by the 
military. The military responded by removing him from the throne and sending him into 
exile in 1990. In 1991 the military staged an internal coup that deposed Major General 
Metsing Lekhanya from power and replaced him with Major General Phisoana 
Ramaema. During this period of governance, military interests in the domains of state 
power increased considerably.  
The military came under pressure to institute the transition to multiparty democracy in 
1993 and reluctantly handed over power to the civilian administration. Given the 
military’s entrenched interests in the domains of state power, the post-1993 democratic 
dispensation was vulnerable to further intervention. Hence this post-1993 democratic 
dispensation was characterised by a number of ugly political episodes. Violent 
confrontations occurred between rival military factions. This was dealt with in Chapter 
Four.  
The Deputy Prime Minister was assassinated and the military gave tacit support to the 
palace coup that displaced the BCP from power in August 1994. Hence Weisfelder 
(1997:35) argues that the country emerged from the 1993 elections “as a case study of 
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murderous anarchy, requiring external intervention and mediation on several 
occasions”. The military was the key agent of this anarchy as it regularly refused to 
adhere to the rules of the game. But this was followed by a process of re-
democratisation and with that process, peaceful elections as well.  
This chapter focuses on the re-democratisation process prior to the 1993 elections, with 
a special reference to the constitutional changes. It covers the following elections: 1993, 
1998, 2002 and 2007. Violence broke out after the 1998 election, which precipitated the 
electoral reforms of 2002. Attention is also paid to the depoliticisation of the military and 
the monarchy in the post-1998 political crisis and the 2002 elections, which were run 
under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). 
The salient questions are: how did the old electoral system (FPTP) contribute to the 
democratic breakdowns in the post-1993 dispensation (especially in 1998)? Has the 
new MMP, instituted in 2002, had a different impact on the elections of 2002 and 2007? 
Electoral reforms were undertaken with the intentions to curb the recurrent and 
perennial political conflicts and to make parliament more inclusive.  
5. 2 The constitutional changes   
After the assumption of state power in 1986, the military administration protected the 
monarchy’s authority and supremacy in its early phases of governance. But its 
administration was comprised of commoners and those who closely related to King 
Moshoeshoe II. They had differences regarding the monarchy and it was obvious that 
another struggle for power was imminent.  
The military administration was composed of the commoners and the royalists – through 
their party, the MFP, which included the descendants of Moshoeshoe I through his 
sons, Letsie, Lerotholi, Bereng and Theko (Moeletsi oa Basotho, 22 September 1991). 
The commoner officers often saw themselves as resisting potential domination by the 
royalist forces that enjoyed support of King Moshoeshoe II.  
Added to this was a group of civilian ministers in the Council of Ministers who were 
appointed by the monarchy. Most of King Moshoeshoe II’s wishes were carried out as 
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he proposed. Machobane (2001:80) argues that the monarchy assumed its historic role 
of unprecedented exercise of political power with tenacity and a sense of mission. He 
further notes that  
... from being a rubber stamp to a soldier’s administration, he and the 
ruling military council were as two visible horns on a bull’s head. 
They carried equal authority and responsibility over the successes 
and failures of governance. The King bemoaned time lost while he 
was in bondage as a constitutional monarchy.  
The military also battled with the supporters of the previous BNP administration to 
establish effective governance and political legitimacy. It blamed Chief Leabua 
Jonathan’s government for violation of human rights during its period in government. 
Interestingly, most of the large-scale atrocities that occurred during Chief Leabua 
Jonathan’s reign were carried out by the same military on his behalf.  
The military later issued a strong warning against the deposed former members of the 
Chief Leabua Jonathan government. The BNP’s resistance to the military administration 
came notably from Chief Leabua Jonathan and Chief Peete Peete, a die-hard ex-
minister and veteran in the BNP. These two political figures were strongly advised to 
stop denouncing the military government. The Citizen (6 March 1986) reported that the 
military administration issued a warning stating that  
it had come to the notice of the Military Council that these Chiefs, 
Leabua Jonathan and Peete Peete, had been holding meetings at 
which they influenced people not to recognise the new government 
and to disregard its statements. 
It was evident that if any BNP protestations continued, there would be reprisals 
(Machobane, 2001). The military administration further started negotiating with the BCP 
leadership in exile with the intention of achieving more stability and order (Daniel 1995; 
Machobane; 2001, Mothibe, 1999). The central question is whether the monarchy or the 
military became stronger. Did they strengthen or did they weaken one another?  A 
major breakthrough occurred after 20 May 1988, when the BCP leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, 
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agreed to return home and labelled this as a “programme for peace, reconciliation and 
the return to democracy” (Moeletsi oa Basotho, 30 October 1988). What he did not 
know was that the worst violence ever in Lesotho was to occur during ten years in the 
aftermath of the 1998 elections.  
Machobane (2001:96) argues that the return of Ntsu Mokhehle was largely seen as a 
return of the Messiah. His return stimulated the desire for the speedy return of 
multiparty democracy. The dethronement of King Moshoeshoe II by the military 
administration in 1990 was a critical event that paved the way for the return to 
democratic rule as the monarchy was stripped of legislative and executive powers. 
Makoa (1996:15) argues that “this created a legitimacy crisis for the … [military 
administration] for which the solution lay in making a major concession to the nation”. 
Consequently, the military administration announced a return to democracy in 1990. 
This might have been a reluctant beginning of re-democratisation.  
King Moshoeshoe II was accused of resisting efforts to return to democratic rule. Makoa 
(1996:15) argues that after the monarchy was stripped of executive and legislative 
powers, the military government announced its intentions to “steer the nation to 
democracy by 1992”. That marked an official split between the military administration 
and the monarchy. The critical question is: were the military and the monarchy prepared 
to recognise the rules of the game?  
Civil society organisations and the heads of churches kept up the momentum for the 
return to democratic rule. In October 1992 the heads of churches in Lesotho organised 
workshops across the country. Their intentions were to educate the electorate on 
responsible voting and to ensure that the elections were held (Work for Justice, No. 35. 
1992).  
Before that, riots erupted in May 1991. These riots, which were directed against Asian 
traders, erupted across the major urban centres. Thirty-four people were killed, 66 
injured and 425 arrested within a week. These violent protests were aggravated by the 
increasing incidence of poverty, unemployment and perceived corruption within the 
echelons of the state. Neocosmos (2002:42) argued that the “riots were the only 
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possible response, given the absence of avenues for the expression of popular anger, 
grievances and frustration”.  
Arguably, the most positive step towards re-democratisation in 1993 was the 
establishment of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) (mentioned in Chapter Four) 
in May 1990, which was vested with the powers of devising the new constitution and 
paving the way for the return to democratic rule. The NCA was made up of 17 members 
of the military government, 22 Principal Chiefs, 20 District Development Councillors, 20 
representatives of various political parties; 10 representatives of the public were 
appointed by the military government, eight from the military and 10 from the urban 
councils (Machobane, 2001).  
Major General Metsing Lekhanya, who was the head of government in the first phase of 
the military administration, argued that the 1966 Westminster constitution had failed to 
protect democracy. He argued that it should be amended to provide for a “custodian 
that will protect it against the executive and advocated for the establishment of an 
independent body that would supervise the elections” (Southall, 1995:25). Southall 
(1995:25) noted that “he also insisted that members of an outgoing administration 
should be guaranteed against retrospective prosecution to facilitate a free transfer of 
power”.  
The old 1966 constitution was endorsed as the working document. But the military 
insisted on the dubious clause, as mentioned before, that the commander of the military 
should be “an ex officio member” of the incoming civilian cabinet. But Major General 
Metsing Lekhanya was ousted from power in April 1991 in an internal coup as result of 
contestation for power within the military ranks. His removal was another positive step 
towards re-democratisation, as his successor, Major General Phisoana Ramaema, 
appeared more committed to ensure a speedy return to democratic rule.  
There was no constitutional change regarding the position of the monarchy. The 1966 
constitution, therefore, remained largely unchanged. Southall (1995:26) argues that the 
restoration of the Senate (basically a “House of Chiefs”) was also unchanged and it 
remained primarily representative of chieftaincy, with its roots in the BNP and MFP. 
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The military administration was criticised and accused of manipulating the proceedings 
of the NCA. In response the military administration appointed a Constitutional 
Commission in an effort to ascertain popular opinion on the recommendations of the 
NCA.  
The Constitutional Commission was made up mostly of the members of the NCA with 
the representatives of the seven political parties. The Commission began its work in 
October 1991 and concluded its nationwide campaigns on the popular opinion in March 
1992. The military government also introduced parallel campaigns over the radio and 
organised public meetings to explain the NCA’s proposed changes to the 1966 
constitution (Southall, 1995; Machobane, 2001).  
There was increasing dissatisfaction with the official consultative process undertaken by 
the Constitutional Commission and by the military government. In response, the main 
churches – the RCC, the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC) and the Lesotho Anglican 
Church (LAC) – organised their National Conference in October 1992.  
The intentions of this conference were to promote popular discussion about the 
elections. Amongst those who had attended the conference were the various parties, 
the trade unions as well as non-governmental organisations. But the main political 
parties, the BCP and BNP, did not participate in the conference. The participants of the 
conference voiced their concerns over what they viewed as the military’s delaying 
tactics in returning the country to democratic rule (Southall, 1995).  
The constitutional changes made were more favourable to the military. Firstly, the 
Lesotho Defence Force Order (17) of 1993 was passed. Although this order effectively 
removed military matters from the control of the civilian administration, it paved the way 
for the establishment of the Defence Commission – a body which did not have any 
civilian participation. This body was vested with the powers of appointing staff and 
handling disciplinary matters regarding members of the military, and it also had the right 
to remove members of the defence force from duty (Matlosa and Pule, 2001:50; 
Machobane, 2001:132).  
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Secondly, there was to be the State Council. The State Council was the highest body 
that had the power to deal with political crises. It was to be chaired by the Prime 
Minister. It was also to be made up of the Commander of the Military, Commissioner of 
Police, Director of Security Forces (Machobane, 2001:132). Machobane (2001) argues 
that this was intended to curb the Prime Minister’s sole responsibility in declaring a state 
of emergency, as had occurred under Chief Leabua Jonathan in 1970. The Prime 
Minister would first have to secure the assent of the Council of State – with securocrats 
on board – before the declaration of a state of emergency. 
Southall (1995:32) argues that in an effort to harmonise the relations with the pro-
democratic forces, a clause which granted the Defence Commission the right “to impose 
duties on any public officer or on any authority of the Government of Lesotho” was 
dropped (Lesotho Government Extraordinary 1993a, Section 145).  
Makoa (1996:15) argues that in 1990 reconciliatory gestures by the military to speed up 
the process of constitutional changes saw the appointment of BCP members into 
ministerial positions and senior governmental positions. Hence one of the BCP 
stalwarts, Kelebone Maope, served as the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice 
during military rule. There were no reported cases of harassment and intimidation 
against the BCP and its supporters. There was not even an attempt to disarm the BCP 
former armed wing, the LLA.  
The other significant initiative in the constitutional changes was the assistance from the 
United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth and various human rights groups (Daniel, 
1995). Through their monitoring exercises, they provided both financial and technical 
assistance to ensure the smooth running of the constitutional changes. The most 
notable assistance was given in 1992 when the Noel Lee, the Director of Elections in 
Jamaica, was appointed as the Chief Electoral Officer. But the postponement of the 
election from 28 November 1992 to 27 March 1993 resulted in the return of Noel Lee to 
Jamaica to supervise elections there. He was replaced by Jocelyn Lucas, the Chief 
Election Officer of Trinidad and Tobago (Southall, 1995; Matlosa, 1997).  
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Southall (1995:33) argued that “the retention of the first past the post (FPTP) electoral 
system required a fresh delimitation of boundaries (last conducted in 1985), which 
subsequently provided for the addition of five extra constituencies to the sixty seats 
competed for in previous elections”. Southall (1995) argues FPTP was retained with 
strong opposition to the adoption of the PR.  
Southall (1995:26) also argued that the rejection of PR was “in large measure, 
apparently, because of the almost total lack of technical understanding as to how such a 
system would work”. However, the registration process began in December 1991. It was 
often faced with challenges as some parties voiced their grievances about the 
registration procedures. Southall (1995:33) argued that these grievances came mostly 
from those parties “which most feared defeat at the polls”. 
In response to such grievances, an Electoral Advisory Committee was established in 
order to make the registration process more transparent. This advisory committee was 
comprised of the representatives of the registered political parties and it published two 
provisional lists of voters for public scrutiny prior to the elections and so that any 
corrections could be brought to the attention of registration officers. Wide-ranging voter 
education programmes were undertaken through radio programmes, press releases 
and public meetings (Southall, 1995; Daniel, 1995).  
Southall (1995:33) argued that  
…although both the BNP and MFP in particular were highly vocal in 
their complaints [on some logistical registration processes]… [the] 
supervision by the Commonwealth-provided Chief Electoral Officer 
meant that the administration of the electoral process could be less 
effectively contested than in 1970, when it had been conducted 
under the auspices of the BNP government with South African 
assistance.   
The monitoring of the elections by the UN and Commonwealth was intended to ensure 
that the elections are conducted in a transparent way. Daniel (1995:97) argued that the 
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country was managerially incompetent and had to submit to the international community 
in the management of the elections.   
Following constitutional developments, the military emerged more powerful. The military 
officers had established themselves as the watchdogs of good governance. The 
monarchy was weaker following its failure to be restored with executive powers. The 
institutional requirement of democracy in the form of elections was about to be attained. 
Was the military or the monarchy likely to support the democratic process? 
5.3 The 1993 elections 
5.3.1 The losers and the lessons  
Lesotho’s long-awaited democratic election took place on 27 March 1993 after the 
country had spent a lengthy period in “constitutional limbo”. The BCP and the BNP were 
able to field candidates across all the 65 constituencies, whilst the MFP fielded only 51 
candidates (Mahao, 1997:1). Matlosa (1997:146) argues that the BCP and the BNP 
were able to field candidates across all the constituencies because of the following 
factors: 
(a) The BCP and BNP … traditionally dominated Lesotho’s political landscape and 
thus have a firmer rooting in the country’s polity;  
(b) These parties have well-organised and deep-rooted structures throughout the 
country and as such have a considerable political appeal among the Basotho 
people;  
(c) Unlike the other contestants, they have substantial resources to mount nation-
wide election campaigns.  
 
The MFP fielded a considerable number of constituency candidates, but its participation 
was overshadowed by the stiff contest between the BCP and BNP (Mahao, 1997). I am 
of the view that their dominance in the political landscape was a result of the 
constituency-based electoral system (FPTP). Heywood (2000) argued that often FPTP 
leads to the emergence of two dominant political parties. After the 1965 elections only 
two parties emerged as the real contestants for state power, namely the BCP and the 
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BNP. The situation in 1993 was no different, but this time the BCP won by a large 
margin. 
 
Matlosa (1997:146) argued that the BNP contested the 1993 election tainted by its ugly 
reputation. In 1970 it had annulled the election results, declared the state of emergency 
and suspended the constitution. Matlosa further noted that 
it had institutionalised praetorian rule anchored on outright 
repression of some members of its youth league to intimidate 
members of the opposition and flagrantly violated their basic rights, 
its development policies, projects and programmes also had the 
least impact on the standard of living of ordinary people. 
Similarly, Gill (1993:247) argues that the BNP did not “mobilise significant support at its 
public rallies – the party appeared “demoralised and on the defensive”. Its 
unconstitutional assumption of state power in 1970 became a vital campaigning tool for 
the BCP. The BCP accused the BNP of denying its legitimate access to state power in 
1970. I concur with Ajulu (1995), Matlosa (1997) and Southall and Petlane (1995) that 
the 1993 election was about correcting the historical and unconstitutional wrongdoing of 
the BNP in 1970, and perhaps also the military takeover in the 1980s.   
Southall (1995:32) argues that the BNP was fighting against history as it went to the 
1993 elections “as the bad loser of 1970”. Added to its political woes was its 
leadership’s close association with the previous military administration. But the RCC still 
provided support for the BNP, as was the case in the 1965 and 1970 elections. Some 
Catholic Bishops openly campaigned for the BNP in their missions (Moeletsi oa 
Basotho, 22 September 1992). The MFP was also hoping that its continuing calling for 
the reinstatement of the deposed King Moshoeshoe II would garner sufficient support. 
But the election was won overwhelmingly by the BCP, as illustrated in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: 1993 General Election for the National Assembly 
Contestants No. of Votes %. of Votes No. seats % of seats  
BCP 398 355 74.7 65 100 
BNP 120 686 22.6 0 0 
MFP 7650 1.4 0 0 
Other 6287 1.2 0 0 
Total 532 978 100 65 100 
Source: Southall and Petlane, 1995:42 
The BCP won all 65 constituencies with an overall 74,7% of the vote (Matlosa, 1999:97; 
Mahao, 1997:9). The BNP got 22,7% of votes. Another big loser was the MFP, with only 
1,4% of support. Opposition parties won more than 25% of the votes without a single 
seat. Once again an election was the recipe for conflict. But the biggest lesson was the 
outcome of the electoral system. This portrayed the distortion that the FPTP system 
could produce, as it created a one-party parliament without representation of the losing 
parties.  
Appendix Three shows the regional performance of the BCP across the whole country. 
It had substantial support across all the constituencies. But the BNP made a significant 
showing in Malibamatso, Tsikoane and Peka in the northern rural regions, whilst in the 
southern regions it also performed well in Mpharane, Moyeni and Thaba-Chitja. These 
were areas under the control of minor chiefs.  
The BNP was the second party with the largest support base, but “the effect of the first-
past-the-post ... obliterate[d] it completely as a parliamentary party” (Mahao, 1997:8). 
Owing to its lack of participation in the democratic process, feelings of marginalisation 
developed within its ranks. It refused to accept the election outcome on the basis of 
allegations of ballot rigging. In its press conference on 29 March 1993, its leadership 
dismissed the electoral outcome based on the following issues: 
(a) There had been gross irregularities at the polls. A consignment of ballot boxes 
from Denmark had been tampered with, ballot papers had gone missing in 
various constituencies, and there had been other instances of “foul play”; 
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(b) Logistical shortcomings in the conduct of the elections, such as flaws in the 
distribution of ballot papers and extensions of the voting period to the night of the 
27th  and the whole of the 28th, without due guarantee that all voters had been 
alerted to this fact, constituted a basis of legitimate concern (Sekatle, 1995:109). 
 
Sekatle (1995:105) argues that its allegations of ballot rigging were “founded much 
more upon a pervasive lack of trust which exists between the politicians in Lesotho than 
upon any firmly grounded evidence”. Consequently, the BNP focused its efforts on a 
series of court cases in an attempt to unseat the BCP from state power. Upon its failure 
to succeed in the court cases, the BNP embarked on mobilising the military to rise 
against the BCP government (Likoti, 2005; Southall and Petlane, 1995).  
I am of the view that the lack of participation and feelings of exclusion from the political 
process were most influential in the BNP’s decision not to recognise the BCP as the 
legitimate government. It accused the BCP of ballot rigging. The FPTP system had 
exaggerated the BCP’s overwhelming victory. If PR had been used, Table 4 represents 
what could have been the composition of the national assembly in terms of 
representation. The evidence in this table is the real lesson of the election outcome.  
Table 4: Hypothetical Composition of the National Assembly after 1993  
 elections under PR  
Party  No. of seats in the National Assembly 
BCP 48 
BNP 15 
MFP 1 
Others  1 
Total  65 
Source:  Mahao, 1997:6  
FPTP system had clearly disadvantaged the losing parties with scattered support. But 
another significant factor worth mentioning was the performance of the royalist-backed 
MFP. Despite its close association with the monarchy, it fared poorly in the elections. 
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This carried an ominous lesson for the King. Evidently, the people’s trust and faith in the 
monarchy as a viable instrument of administration had eroded significantly. This was in 
contrast to the royalists views that the monarchy has a fundamental role to play in the 
democratic dispensation. The second lesson of Table 4 is that the monarchy was a 
spent force.  
Despite its overwhelming victory in getting 74,7% of the vote, the BCP government was 
unable to effectively establish its control over the security establishment of the state 
(Makoa, 1997). The situation was worsened by the BNP’s continuing influence over the 
military. By now the flirtation between the military and the monarchy was over. The BNP 
leadership was able to create an atmosphere of uncertainty within military ranks. The 
BNP utterances deepened the tensions between the military and the BCP government. 
The BNP declared that   
because of the political crisis in Lesotho, peace has been threatened 
particularly by government failure to bring the LLA under control. The 
LLA are allegedly being armed with AK-47 automatic machine guns 
… It is surprising that the Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle earlier 
announced publicly that the LLA has been disbanded, yet the same 
LLA is very much alive, and it constitutes a serious threat to peace 
… It is a basic right of every person to defend himself and his/her 
family. When LLA is busy arming itself to [the] teeth, government just 
watches with folded arms. If the RLDF [LDF] is afraid of LLA we, the 
BNP members, will fight LLA until we are all killed if need be … 
(Moeletsi oa Basotho, 14 November 1993). 
The BCP government strongly condemned such inflammatory remarks from the BNP 
and issued a statement indicating that: 
Government would like to strongly advise political parties which are 
bent on sowing seeds of confusion which threaten peace and 
stability to refrain from such. The aim of these people … [was] to 
instil fear on Basotho in order to disrupt peace … Government 
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patience is unfortunately sometimes interpreted as weakness. These 
people, we know, were bitter with the BCP landslide victory during 
the elections and were defeated in court while contesting the election 
outcome. Government, therefore, appeals to Basotho people to stay 
calm and dissociate themselves from instigation by opportunists 
(Lentsoe La Basotho, 27 November 1993). 
But the BNP influence found fertile ground in the highly politicised military (it should be 
noted that most members of the military were pro-BNP, this is because of its 
politicisation policies during its tenure). Hostilities and tensions between the military and 
the government continued to deepen. The military from the Makoanyane base in 
Lesotho wrote a letter demanding a 100% pay increase from the government. The 
military’s letter as cited in Lesotho Today (13 January 1994) stated that  
we are making this request in order to meet our daily needs in view 
of the high cost of living. We had stated in our request that we would 
like the salary increase to take effect from January 1st 1994. We, 
therefore, request a clear response to our request before January 24 
1994. We wish to assure you, sir, that we as members of the Armed 
Forces of Lesotho remain committed to the maintenance of peace 
and stability at all times.   
The military refused to recognise the legitimacy of the BCP government and to adhere 
to the rules of the game. Makoa (1996:15) argued that the BCP-led government 
inherited a system that was characterised by the political polarisation and the high 
levels of uncertainty that were engendered by Chief Leabua Jonathan’s 15 years of 
unconstitutional rule and seven years of military dictatorship.  
Consequently, violent confrontations erupted in the military over disagreements about 
who should take over the administration once it institutes a military coup. But the direct  
military confrontation with the government saw the assassination of the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance, Selometsi Baholo, in April 1994 by the military and its 
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support of the palace coup in August 1994 as indicated in Chapter Four (see also 
Southall and Petlane, 1995).  
Yet another factor that aggravated the hostile relations between the BCP government, 
the military and the main opposition party (the BNP) was the radical shift within the civil 
service. Makoa (1996) argued that soon after attaining state power, the BCP 
government replaced Principal Secretaries and board members of public corporations 
with its supporters. Hence, the country’s High Commissioners and Ambassadors were 
also replaced with BCP members in an effort to consolidate its grip to power. 
I concur with Makoa (1996) that this did not augur well for national reconciliation. It 
deepened political bitterness across the public service and among the political actors, 
particularly the BNP, which did not have any meaningful participation in the democratic 
process. The expulsion of the BNP-inclined civil servants also hardened this perception 
that the BCP government was pursuing a witch-hunt against its opponents. 
5.3.2 The King’s coup in context and turbulence in the ruling party 
In 1994, the recent moves towards re-democratisation suffered a major set back. The 
military backed attempts to impose monarchical control by King Letsie III. This was 
short-lived as it had to do more with the King’s ambitions than with a royal revival. In 
fact, King Moshoeshoe II was reinstated to the throne (as explained in Chapter Four), 
but with restricted powers. 
His reinstatement to power was challenged by Maseru lawyer, Thabang Khauoe. He 
petitioned the High Court to declare his enthronement unconstitutional (Moeletsi oa 
Basotho, 19 April 1995).Though he lost in his case, this did again not augur well for 
political stability in the country, given the enormous pressure that the monarchy and the 
royalists had put on the government to fully restore King Moshoeshoe II to the throne 
after Letsie’s failed attempt. 
Despite its overwhelming victory in the 1993 elections, a sense of crisis escalated within 
the BCP as it was crippled by power struggles. This impacted negatively on its ability to 
fulfil its electoral promises. The striking feature of these struggles was not who would 
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succeed the aging Ntsu Mokhehle as party leader, but who would be the next Prime 
Minister. Consequently, two contesting factions known as the majelathoko (“those who 
eat alone”) and the “pressure group” emerged. The majelathoko faction comprised the 
party’s older members, and its survival and influence depended on the party leader Ntsu 
Mokhehle. 
The “pressure group” was comprised of the younger members who considered 
themselves the think tank of the party. It argued that its mission was to ensure that the 
BCP and its government were united, democratic and strong. But they were labelled by 
the rival faction, majelathoko, as power-hungry and untrustworthy opportunists (Pule, 
1999:6-10). 
The other bone of contention in the BCP was the future of its former armed wing, the 
LLA. The LLA members had exerted more pressure on the government to speed up the 
process of integration into the military (Mothibe, 1999:50; MoAfrika, 8 March 1996; 
Mopheme, 23-30 April 1996). But the Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, argued that the 
LLA had been disbanded. The “pressure group”, however, insisted on the speedy 
integration of the LLA into the military (Pule, 1999:11). 
These rival factions battled for control of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the 
party. This is because it has “constitutional powers to determine the final list of 
candidates who stand for elections” (Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) Constitution, 
1993:21). Certainly, each faction was aiming to drive out their rivals in the nomination of 
candidates for the forthcoming 1998 elections. 
In the March 1996 conference the entire “pressure group” was voted out of the party 
executive committee by the majelathoko faction. The “pressure group” refused to accept 
the outcome of the conference. It challenged the election of the new executive in the 
High Court of Lesotho, asking for the proceedings of the conference and the election of 
the NEC to be declared null and void. They argued that the Free State and Transvaal 
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provinces,6 the Women’s League and Youth League were over-represented at the 
conference (Sekatle, 1997:82-3).  
In the meantime, prior to the judgment, Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle responded on 2 
May 1996 by reshuffling the cabinet. Amongst those kicked out of his cabinet were 
prominent members of the “pressure group”. These were the deputy president, national 
chairman, treasurer general and deputy secretary general in the party. Prime Minister 
Ntsu Mokhehle publicly denounced them and the nation was advised to ostracise them 
– phurallano (Public Eye, 01 October 2004). 
As a result of their dominance over the National Executive, the “pressure group” 
marginalised the majelathoko faction in the affairs of the party. The High Court of 
Lesotho after lengthy deliberations declared the proceedings of the March 1996 
conference and the election of the NEC null and void in November 1996.  
Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle was later voted out of the leadership on 17 February 
1997. But he was reinstated by the High Court of Lesotho, which declared his removal 
and the proceedings of the conference null and void. Fearing the potential loss of 
leadership, Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle broke away from the BCP and formed a new 
political party called the LCD on 9 June 1997 (Sekatle, 1997; Pule, 1999). This led to 
turbulence in the ruling party.  
Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle was joined by 40 MPs, whilst the BCP retained only 25 
(Sekatle, 1997:68). Consequently, the BCP was relegated to the status of official 
opposition in parliament. I concur with Sekatle (1997:68) that this “heralded an abrupt 
and radical change to the leadership of a party formed in 1952 and led by Ntsu 
Mokhehle since its inception”. 
The BCP, however, refused to accept its new status and joined ranks with the BNP, 
MFP, UDP, Hareeng Basotho (HP), Labour Party (LP), Lesotho Education Party (LEP) 
and the Sefate Democratic Union (SDU) in denouncing Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle. 
These opposition parties called on Ntsu Mokhehle to resign as Prime Minister and 
                                                            
6 The BCP has structures in South Africa because of the large numbers of Basotho miners 
working in South Africa.   
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reinstate the BCP to power. They also called for a joint national stay-away. But the stay-
away was unsuccessful as people went about their business as usual.  
On 2 July 1997 the BNP marched to the royal palace joined by the Lesotho Council of 
Non-Governmental Organisations. This anti-Ntsu Mokhehle crusade submitted a 
memorandum requesting the King to dissolve the LCD government and to form an 
interim government to oversee new elections under PR (Matlosa, 1999; Sekatle, 
1997:70).  
The inheritance of state power by the LCD almost paralysed the effective proceedings 
in the national assembly. Both the MPs from the LCD and the BCP exchanged a litany 
of abusive language. The speaker of the national assembly at one stage had to call the 
police to restrain the warring groups. The Senate also joined in this anti-Mokhehle 
coalition and called for the restoration of the BCP to power (Matlosa, 1999).  
Once more the formation of the LCD inflamed political tempers against the key political 
actors. Opposition parties, long sidelined and denied participation in the democratic 
process as the result of the electoral system (FPTP), formed a coalition and resorted to 
provocative ways to undermine the LCD. They refused to recognise the LCD as the 
legitimate government and labelled Ntsu Mokhehle’s action as a violation of democratic 
practices.   
Interestingly, as the opposition parties continued to forcibly destabilise the LCD and to 
strive for more meaningful participation in the democratic process, the monarchy took 
advantage of this and criticised the constitution and appealed for more powers. Hence 
King Letsie III argued that “o fetotsoe sethotsela ke molao oa motheo, o mo timang 
matla” (“he has been turned into a ghost by the constitution which grants him limited 
powers”) (Address by His Majesty, King Letsie III on the occasion of his coronation, 31 
October 1997). The King indirectly appealed for executive powers, as he had in 1994. It 
seems that whenever there was a democratic breakdown, the monarchy took 
advantage to appeal for more constitutional powers. This suggests that the monarchy 
may have deliberately adopted such a strategy.   
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Sekatle (1997:71) argues that though the opposition claimed that the assumption of 
state power by the LCD was illegitimate, this was not the case. She based her 
arguments on two theories of representation: the delegate and trustee theories. Hague, 
Harrop and Berlin (1992:292) argue that  
the delegate is closely bound to reflect the wishes of those who 
elected him or her. Delegates are typically ‘mandated’, that is, given 
instructions to carry out. The trustee, by contrast, uses independent 
judgement on behalf of the voters. The trustee is free to ignore the 
voter’s views, but does so at his or her peril.  
The delegate theory postulates that a delegate does not have an independent function.  
A delegate has to seek a mandate from his/her constituency. On the other hand, 
trustees have a right to exercise their independent function, if they wish so. Hague et al. 
(1992) argue that the priority of national issues is essential and this may sometimes 
lead to the trustees making decisions against the wishes of their constituencies.  
Sekatle (1997) argues that floor crossing often occurs in parliamentary democracies 
under FPTP systems. The reason is that by crossing the floor, it is assumed that the 
trustees are acting in the best interests of their constituencies. Representatives may 
cross the floor or “make decisions that are not necessarily mandated by their 
constituents .... because they are elected for a fixed period of time without conditions”. 
Often, crossing the floor may sometimes result in the failure of the representative to be 
re-elected, which “means that a representative must ensure that his/her action[s] to 
cross the floor ... [are] supported by the majority of people he/she represents” (Sekatle, 
1997:73). 
This shows that when representatives cross the floor and join other parties, they are 
‘choosing their own leaders and determining their own political stand’ (Sekatle, 1997). 
Representatives who crossed the floor with Ntsu Mokhehle exercised their independent 
right and freedom to ‘make and unmake’ Prime Ministers and to change allegiances. 
This episode did not constitute a violation of democratic principles. But it heightened the 
already volatile political situation, which was characterised by the feelings of 
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marginalisation and exclusion from the democratic process as the result of the FPTP 
system. 
King Letsie  III, still  yearning  for executive powers, sought legal opinion regarding the 
assumption of state power by the LCD from the South African constitutional expert, W.H 
Oliver SC, who  advised the King that  
(a) By forming a new political party, Ntsu Mokhehle did not vacate the office of Prime 
Minister; 
 
(b) Mokhehle’s forming of a new party as such does not entitle His majesty to 
remove him from the office of Prime Minster; 
 
(c) Mokhehle’s forming of a new party does not entitle His Majesty to dissolve 
parliament; 
 
(d) Mokhehle is in fact the leader of a political party that commands the support of a 
majority of the members of the National Assembly. There is no reason to assume 
that he should not be regarded as a properly appointed Prime Minister (Urgent 
Legal Opinion, 12 June 1997). 
Finally, the King did not dissolve the LCD government and Prime Minister Ntsu 
Mokhehle remained in power. But this democratic breakdown led to the emergence of 
the ‘official union’ between the former rivals, the BCP and BNP (Mothibe, 1999). This 
marriage of convenience was likely to create more future problems, especially in the 
light of the upcoming 1998 elections. Another democratic breakdown was looming. 
Matlosa (1999:16) hence, argues that  
as the [1998] election drew closer, the political bitterness among the 
contestants became more and more pronounced. The animosity and 
rivalry were real as the opposition parties aimed to either dislodge or 
destabilize the LCD government through both parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary means... 
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5.3.3 The military reform programme, 1994-1998 
Another significant development that had occurred within state parameters was the 
restructuring of the military. In the 1970s, the BNP politicised the military by recruiting its 
card carrying members. Evidently, reforms were necessary. Lesotho military force is 
almost 2000. Mothibe (1999:52) argues that military reforms were done to instil in the 
military personnel respect for democratic values, human rights and the primacy of 
civilian rule. Edmonds (1990:110-112) argues that education and training for the military 
enabled the foundation on which the “normative aspects of the professionalism are 
built”.  
Edmonds (1990) further argues that education for the military must focus on the 
relationship between the armed forces and society in order to discourage the illegitimate 
forms of military involvement in public affairs. I concur with these arguments for they 
were essential as the result of the BNP administration of the politicisation of the military 
and the entrenched military interests in politics.  
In August 1994 the Ministry of Defence was formed in order to bring the military and the 
National Security Service (NSS) under one structure. This Ministry was under the 
authority of the civilian Minister and it became the administrative headquarters of the 
LDF and the NSS (Mothibe, 1999:52). 
Matlosa and Pule (2001:55) state that its mandate was to execute defence policy on 
behalf of the government, provide central control and coordination on defence matters 
and to “ensure propriety in the management of the defence budget”. The establishment 
of the Ministry of Defence was one of the recommendations from the Presidential 
Report of Presidents Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Ketumile Masire (Botswana) on 
11-12 February 1994. The report also noted that there was lack of effective command 
and control over the military matters.  
The formation of the Ministry of Defence was assisted by the British government, which 
had seconded Phil Jones to assist the government and senior military staff in the 
organisation and management of defence. In an effort to speed up the transformation in 
the military, a steering committee was established. Its membership comprised the 
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Principal Secretary for Defence as Chairman, the Commander of the LDF, the 
Commissioner of Police, the Attorney General, the Prime Minister’s political advisor and 
one representative from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana (Mothibe, 1999). 
The steering committee was to focus on re-training of the military, career development, 
promotion criteria, financial management, logistics and administration. It was also 
supposed to identify those areas that needed outside expertise and the nature of that 
expertise (Matlosa and Pule, 2001). 
The Lesotho Defence Force Act. No. 4 was drafted and replaced the Lesotho Defence 
Order No. 17 of 1993. This act focuses on the structural, administrative and operational 
aspects of the LDF (Mothibe, 1999). It also stipulated that the LDF shall be deployed in   
(a) The defence of Lesotho; 
(b) The prevention or suppression of terrorism and internal disorder;  
(c) The maintenance of essential services including the maintenance of law and 
order and prevention of crime (Lesotho Defence Force Act No. 4. 1996).  
In order to introduce a balance in civil-military relations, the Act called for the 
establishment of the Defence Council which replaced the Defence Commission. The 
Defence Council membership was comprised of the Minister of Defence, who was the 
chairman, the Principal Secretary for Defence, who was to chair meetings in the 
absence of the Minister of Defence, the Commander of the LDF, a secretary appointed 
by the minister and two members appointed by the Prime Minister (Matlosa and Pule, 
2001:56).  
The functions of the Defence Council were to  
- Make recommendations to the cabinet on the formulation and implementation of 
defence policy;  
- To make recommendations to the cabinet on the terms and conditions of service of 
members of the defence force;  
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- To inquire into and deal with complains relating to, and grievances of, any member of 
the defence force (Mothibe, 1999:13). 
Matlosa and Pule (2001) argue that the formation of the Defence Council was a positive 
step for ensuring stable civil-military relations. As a result of the efforts from the Defence 
Council, the Ministry of Defence formulated policies that were aimed at transforming the 
LDF into an apolitical, accountable and affordable defence force. Matlosa and Pule 
(2001:56) argue that  
besides the legal framework, key institutions that play a part in 
regulating and controlling the army in Lesotho include the monarchy 
as the pinnacle of the state, the Prime Minister as the Minister of 
Defence, the Defence Council, the MOD [Ministry of Defence]. With 
the advice of the Prime Minister, the King appoints the commander 
of the armed forces and orders the deployment of the forces in part 
or whole outside the borders of Lesotho. The Prime Minister as both 
the head of government and minister plays a central role in civil-
military relations. He is the chairperson of the Defence Council and 
he liaises with the commander on a regular basis on defence and 
security issues.   
The country received technical assistance from Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Britain, United States of America (USA) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). Seminars and workshops were organised for members of the 
military that focused on the role of the military in a democratic state. Members of the 
military were also encouraged to further their academic studies at national and foreign 
tertiary institutions (Matlosa and Pule, 2001; Mothibe, 1999). 
Senior military officers and officials also undertook various study tours and fact-finding 
missions, where they familiarised themselves with the organisation of defence 
institutions. In an effort to familiarise the general public with defence matters, the office 
of the public relations was established in the military (Matlosa and Pule, 2001).  
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There were some positive aspects of the military reform programme both among the 
civilians and the senior military officers. Even the cabinet ministers and MPs stopped 
their anti-army statements. Hence the visits of the Prime Minister (also Minister of 
Defence) to the military barracks were reported to be well received.  
Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle was quoted as saying in Defence News (1996:1) “I and 
my Government are encouraged by these positive developments (the climate of change 
in the defence and security forces) and the direction you have achieved in so far in 
moving so far towards greater professionalism and discipline”.  
Government commitment to the military was shown by an enormous financial injection 
(Mothibe, 1999:53). The national budget showed a steady and large increase from the 
1995/96 financial year. The budget allocation to defence was M102.63 million, a huge 
increase of M39.42 million from that of 1994/95. In 1996/97 it increased to M123.8 
million (this was 9.1 percent of the total national budget and the third highest allocation 
received by any ministry) (Lesotho Budget Speech, 1996/97). In the 1997/98 financial 
year it was M147.1 million and was second to that allocated to the Ministry of Education. 
It increased further to M165.5 million in the financial year of 1998/9 (Lesotho Budget 
Speech, 1998/99). 
This reflected the increasing importance of defence in the national priorities of the 
country irrespective of its limited functions, as mentioned before. Mothibe (1999) argues 
that this showed the willingness of the government to provide enough funds in order to 
enable the military to perform their tasks effectively. In  his presentation of the  1997/98 
Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance as cited in Mothibe (1999:54) noted that “the 
government recognizes the need to maintain a numerically small defence [force] … 
which should be well trained, professional, accountable, highly motivated and well 
equipped”. After the military’s ill-advised support for the King’s palace coup in 1994, it 
matured quite quickly by 1997. 
The military did not join in the political anti-Mokhehle crusade in 1997 that called for his 
expulsion from power. It gave tacit support to the constitution and the LCD remained in 
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power. This created a positive impression and reassured the LCD government that the 
military were sticking to the rules of the constitution.  
5.4 The 1998 elections  
5.4.1 The failure of FPTP system  
The BCP split and the inheritance of state power by the LCD facilitated the 
establishment of an independent electoral body to oversee the conduct of the elections. 
The BCP had always opposed the idea of having an independent body to supervise the 
elections. This was a positive move that could quell suspicions of electoral fraud. Since 
the 1965 election there were consistent allegations of ballot rigging. In 1965 the BCP 
challenged the outcome of the election in the courts of law on allegations of ballot 
rigging. In 1970 Chief Leabua Jonathan cancelled the election result on the allegations 
of ballot rigging. In 1993 the BNP refused to accept the outcome on the allegations of 
ballot rigging (Sekatle, 1997).  
There was an increase in the number of constituencies from 60 to 80, but still within the 
old FPTP system. There were unconfirmed allegations that the RCC senior leadership 
provided financial support for the BNP electoral campaigns (MoAfrika, 18 July 1997). 
The 1998 elections were won overwhelmingly by the LCD. The outcome is outlined in 
Table 5 below.  
Table 5: 1998 General election for the National Assembly 
Contestants  No. of Votes % of Votes No. of Seats % of Seats  
LCD 355,049 60,7 78 98,73 
BNP 143,073 24.5 1 1,27 
BCP 61,793 10,5 0 0,00 
MFP 7,460 1,3 0 0,00 
Others 17,365 3,0 0 0,00 
Total  584,740 100 79 100 
Source: Lodge, Kadima and Pottie, 2002:100 
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Appendix Four shows the regional support of the parties, which varied significantly 
across the country. The LCD received overwhelming support across the country, except 
in one constituency in the mountainous areas where it was defeated by the BNP. Once 
more, the BNP made a significant showing in Tsikoane and Peka in the north, whilst in 
the southern region it made a good showing in Moyeni and Mount-Moorosi. The BNP’s 
support in the 1993 and 1998 elections was almost in the same rural areas, where the 
minor chiefs were in charge. Chief Leabua Jonathan originates from those northern 
constituencies, whilst the southern region was the home of Chief Sekhonyana 
Maseribane, his former Deputy Prime Minister. These areas were traditional BNP 
strongholds.   
The LCD won 78 out of 80 constituencies with 60,7% of the total votes on the election 
day, but gained 98,7% of the seats in parliament. It later won one constituency in the 
delayed election, which increased its number of seats to 79. Opposition parties had a 
combined tally of almost 40% of the votes (Kadima, 1999). But despite this tally, they 
only had one constituency seat won by the BNP as their representation in 
parliament.This was potentially destabilising.   
Once more again the weakness of the electoral system was visible. FPTP 
disadvantaged those smaller parties with widespread but unconcentrated support in 
given constituencies. FPTP weakness was evident through its skewed parliamentary 
representation that it led to in the 1965 and 1993 elections. This lack of representation 
in the national assembly by the losing parties added fuel to the hostilities that had 
preceded the 1998 elections, when the LCD assumed power in 1997. I concur with 
Matlosa (2003) that this exaggerated the dominance of the LCD and resulted in a one-
party parliament. In frustration, opposition parties without any meaningful role in the 
country’s political process diverted their efforts to destabilising the LCD government. 
This shows how important the choice of an appropriate electoral system is in many 
democracies.  
I concur with Rule’s (2000:280) argument that 
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had PR been used as an electoral system for the country … with a 
cut-off point of 1 per cent of votes cast, … a parliament of 80 seats 
would have comprised 50 LCD members, 20 BNP members, 9 BCP 
members and one MFP member. This would clearly have constituted 
a more representative body than the current parliament and resulted 
in greater satisfaction among the electorate.  
The violence that occurred after the 1998 elections and the role of the military were 
comprehensively documented in the previous chapter and will not be repeated here. 
However, the role of the monarchy in the 1998 electoral crisis will be examined. 
Under direct instructions from the Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili of the victorious LCD 
at the height of the 1998 political crisis, King Letsie III was given a prepared speech by 
the government to address the protestors and to call them to disperse from the palace 
grounds. But the King read the speech and left out the part where he was supposed to 
call on the protestors to disperse from the palace grounds. He later argued that he 
forgot to read this part (Mololi, 14 September 2000).  
This was a direct violation of the provisions of the constitution. The King further argued 
that customarily the monarchy had a right to intervene and resolve political matters 
affecting the welfare of the nation. He appealed to the nation to “show the way forward 
by indicating the exact role which the Basotho monarchy, in the interests of all Basotho, 
should play” (Anonymous, 1998:2).  
During the political crisis in 1998 the King appeared to be sympathetic to opposition 
grievances against the LCD government. Hence the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) Secretariat (1998:7) noted that the monarchy believed that “the general 
lawlessness would melt down the multi-party electoral system and in the process the 
monarchy would assert its authority”.  
In his assessment on the behaviour of the monarchy in the 1998 electoral crisis, Prime 
Minister Pakalitha Mosisili argued that  
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I saw the source of the problems I was trying to solve as emanating 
from the palace. It had become the centre from which these people 
[opposition protesters] operated... (Mololi, 14 September 2000).   
The monarchy also became an active actor in the 1998 political crisis. There were 
unconfirmed reports that the opposition protesters camped in the palace grounds were 
supported with foodstuff by his office (Anonymous, 1998:13). The monarchy cooperated 
with the opposition parties. King Letsie III sought to take advantage of the political crisis 
to propose the abolition of the Westminster constitution. 
His father, King Moshoeshoe II, had assailed the constitution in the 1960s, arguing that 
it granted him limited powers. His father even tried to introduce his model of democracy 
during the military administration. King Letsie III suspended the old constitution in 1994 
and tried to impose total monarchical control. In 1997, after the inheritance of state 
power by the LCD, he appealed for more constitutional powers. In 1998 his official 
residence once more became a centre of operation for opposition protestors as they 
besieged the LCD government.  
Again his actions were well calculated. He appealed for more constitutional powers at 
the height of the democratic crisis. This regular trend of such utterances shows that the 
monarchy did not support the current constitution. In 1998 the monarchy also refused to 
recognise the legitimacy of the LCD government and to adhere to the rules of the game 
as he refused to act on its instructions. The military and the monarchy created an 
environment conducive for the opposition parties to destabilise the government.  
5.4.2 Electoral reforms after 1998   
After the re-democratisation in 1993 the elections were free but very violent in 1998 as 
the result of the FPTP system. Arguably, it was certain that electoral reforms would 
have to be undertaken to create a more inclusive electoral system. In its report after the 
1998 election, the IEC noted that 
it appears that the plurality system works best when it is able to 
produce a reasonably effective parliamentary opposition. It is a 
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matter of record that the last two general elections in Lesotho (1993 
and 1998) have produced little or no parliamentary opposition. This 
appears to suggest that the time is now ripe for a serious debate on 
the electoral system of Lesotho (Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC), 1998:46).   
I concur with Southall (2003) and Mothibe (1999) that the South African-led military 
intervention was an effective conflict-management strategy. It was not siding with any of 
the contestants. Despite the lives lost as the result of the intervention and costs 
incurred, it enabled the belligerent parties to come to the negotiation table to map the 
way forward.  
Opposition parties wanted the LCD government to be dissolved. The external mediation 
efforts led by South Africa resulted in the establishment of the Langa Commission. The 
commission was chaired by the Justice Pius Langa from the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa and had three representatives from Botswana, four from South Africa and 
three from Zimbabwe. Its objective was to investigate the conduct of the 1998 elections 
and assess whether the elections were rigged. But the Langa Report did not (as 
mentioned before) clearly spell out what problems were encountered in the 1998 
elections and did not clearly state whether the 1998 election were rigged or not 
(Matlosa, 2003; Mothibe, 1999). 
The Langa Commission Report called “for the LCD to stand down in favour of a 
government of national unity” (Southall, 2003:274). South Africa continued to play a 
significant mediation role, which was led by South Africa’s then Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki and former Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi. This culminated in 
the establishment of the new political institution, the Interim Political Authority (IPA).  
The IPA was established as the compromise between the LCD government and the 
opposition parties (Elkit, 2002:2). The IPA membership comprised the two members 
from each of the 12 political parties that contested the 1998 elections and it was to 
review the electoral system in order to make it more representative and inclusive. But 
the proceedings of the IPA were regularly halted by the poor relations with the LCD 
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government and the IEC. Civil society organisations and ordinary citizens were denied a 
chance to express their views and to participate in the proceedings of the IPA 
concerning the reforms in the electoral system. The objectives of the IPA were: 
- To prepare, in liaison with the legislation and executive organs of the state, for a fresh 
election … [and] to level the playing field for all parties and candidates to participate 
meaningfully in the election in an environment that promotes and protects human rights 
and to eliminate any impediments to legitimate political activity, including undue 
victimisation or intimidation;  
- To ensure equal treatment of all political parties and candidates by all governmental 
instructions and in particular by all government-owned media, prior to and during the 
election (Government of Lesotho, Interim Political Act, 1998). 
The IPA took a unanimous decision on 25 August 1999 in favour of the adoption of an 
MMP system for the next parliamentary elections. According to Matlosa (2003), this 
system uses the PR mechanism as the basis for the overall allocation of seats, though 
parties are allowed to retain the constituencies they won. This system combines the 
advantages of both FPTP and the PR systems. Mixed systems are used in countries 
like Germany, New Zealand and Italy (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). 
Mixed systems can either be compensatory or parallel. In a compensatory system, the 
two components are linked in “that the list seats are used to create overall 
proportionality between a party’s list votes and its total number of seats” (Gallagher and 
Mitchell, 2005:592). As a result, the number of list seats parties get depends not only on 
their overall vote, but also on the number of single-member constituency seats won 
(Blais, 1999:342). Gallagher and Mitchell (2005:592) state that  
 
a party that won few constituency seats in relation to its votes is 
likely to receive a relatively high number of list seats in order to bring 
its overall number of seats close to its ‘fair’ share – for this reason,  
list seats are sometimes termed ‘correction’ or ‘top-up’ seats in 
compensatory variants. Conversely, a party that did well at 
 181
constituency level may receive few seats if it is already close to its 
fair share on the basis of constituency victories alone.    
 
The MMP system also retains the proportionality benefits of PR seats and ensures that 
the voters have geographical representation. They are able to exercise two votes: one 
for the party and one for their local MPs. But the critical issue which is often 
misunderstood by the voters is that the vote for the local MP is less important than the 
party vote in determining the allocation of parliamentary seats (Horowitz, 1991; 
Sundberg, 1997:74). The MMP system also creates two classes of MPs, unlike the 
parallel system. There are those who are directly elected under FPTP and the PR list 
(Likoti, 2007; Matlosa, 2003; Southall, 2003).   
In a parallel system the two methods of seat allocation operate independently from each 
other. The number of list seats that a party receives depends completely on the share of 
the list votes it wins; this is regardless of how many constituency seats it has won. 
Some electoral systems are somewhere in between (partly compensatory) (Blais, 
1999:350; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005:592). 
Elklit (1997: 53) argues that “parallel systems … use both PR lists and the winner-take-
all districts but unlike the MMP system, the PR lists do not compensate for any 
disproportionality within the majoritarian districts”. They partially combine the benefits of 
the PR and FPTP systems. Parallel systems give results that fall between “straight 
plurality-majority and PR systems”. 
The IPA battled with numerous problems after it adopted the MMP system.  
1. The number of parliamentary seats for the next national assembly. Some parties 
advocated the 65/65 split, whilst other wanted 80 FPTP seats and 50 PR seats for 
the National Assembly (Matlosa, 2003).   
2. The LCD government favoured the parallel system. It also raised its concerns over 
the number of parliamentary seats, which it argued should be lower than the 130 
seats as was proposed by the IPA. But after lengthy consultations a deadlock was 
reached and it was agreed that the MMP system would comprise of 80 FPTP seats 
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and 40 PR seats. Afterwards the IPA drafted bills that were passed by parliament in 
2001 and 2002. Consequently, the constitution was amended (Fourth Amendment 
to the Constitution Act 2001) to cater for the MMP system with a ratio of 80 FPTP 
and 40 PR seats (Likoti, 2007; Matlosa, 2003). 
Southall (2003:276) argues that most politicians in the IPA were eager for more PR 
seats in order to maximise their chances of making it to the National Assembly. After the 
disagreements between the opposition parties and the LCD government over the 
number of seats, this matter was referred to the Arbitration Tribunal, which was chaired 
by Judge Julian Browde of the Lesotho Appeal Court. On 15 October 1999 the 
Arbitration Tribunal ruled for the ratio of constituency seats and proportional seats to be 
80/50. 
Lesotho’s MMP system gives a voter two votes, a constituency vote and a party vote. 
Comparatively, the German system also has two ballots like the Lesotho system. 
Mahler (1995:248) notes that “citizens can vote directly for a candidate who has been 
nominated by a local political party organisation … in the ‘second vote’, the political 
party is voted [for] not a candidate”. 
Importantly, Mahler further argues that “the second ballot [PR] is in many ways more 
important than the first direct ballot [FPTP], because it is the second ballot that 
determines the final proportion of parliamentary seats that each party will receive”.   
More votes count, thus voters can express their true preferences. 
In the German system the constituency vote determines who will represent the 
constituency in parliament, whilst the party vote is used to elect candidates from the 
party lists and to compensate parties that have fewer constituency seats than they 
would be entitled to under pure proportional representation (Mahler, 1995). I concur with 
Likoti (2007:2) that  
the rationale for this model is to produce proportionality in 
parliament. A mixed member proportional system offers regional 
representation and stable, effective government – and it offers better 
legislative balance, better representation of parties, better 
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demographic representation, more diversity of ideas, more effective 
opposition, more value for votes  and more inclusive decisions. 
The allocation of seats is based on the proportion of the popular vote that parties 
receive on the second ballot. Thus, PR seats are awarded to compensate for any 
disproportionality produced by the constituency seats results. This means that, if one 
party wins 10 per cent of seats in the votes nationally with no constituency won, it will be 
awarded sufficient PR seats from the PR lists to bring its representation up to 10 per 
cent of the seats in the national assembly.  
Lesotho uses a compensatory system. But the big difference between Lesotho’s MMP 
system and the German system is the overall number of seats. In Lesotho’s MMP 
system, the number of parliamentary seats is fixed at 120 (80 FPTP + 40 PR). This fixed 
number of seats is likely to undermine the compensatory aspect of the MMP system. 
Parties cannot be adequately compensated in proportion to their relative performance in 
the polls because of the inflexibility of the national assembly. Thus, the MMP system is 
a limited compensatory system.   
The biggest problem of the Lesotho MMP system is the lack of understanding on how it 
works among the electorate and politicians. The Lesotho MMP system is also difficult to 
operationalise. Lesotho’s situation is worsened by the absence of clear guidelines on 
how the translation of votes into seats, especially for candidates under PR, has to be 
undertaken, whilst the translation of votes under FPTP did not create any problems.  
The lack of detailed explanation or legal explanations of how Lesotho’s MMP system 
works has resulted in different interpretations on how it is supposed to be 
operationalised. But the Lesotho MMP system was adopted against the background of 
violent political tensions in 1998. It came as an electoral compromise from diverse 
political parties and the LCD government. Despite the electoral reforms, it was clear that 
these unsettled issues around the operationalisation of the MMP system were likely to 
create more problems.   
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But a serious limitation was the failure of the IPA to consult civil society organisations 
and the electorate in the reformation process. The whole process of the electoral 
reforms was done by the political elites without enough citizens’ participation.  
5.4.3 Restructuring of the military in the post-1998 electoral crisis  
The crisis of 1998 did not only lead to electoral reforms, but also to the final 
restructuring of the military. The LCD government took advantage of the presence of the 
South African and Botswana military forces, as Southall (2003:278) states, “as a historic 
opportunity to rectify the imbalances of power which had previously undermined the 
post-1993 government’s authority”.  
The LCD government believed that it won the 1998 elections fairly, just like the landslide 
victory of the BCP in the 1993 elections (Thebe Motebang MP, Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) General Conference, 23 January 2000). Southall (2003:278) argues 
that it  
viewed the challenge of the opposition alliance to its popular 
legitimacy as emanating from undemocratic elements, covertly 
backed by the King … It also argued that its right and capacity to rule 
had been effectively negated by the disloyalty of elements of the 
LDF. 
Despite a series of retraining and transformation efforts and increased military 
expenditure with the intention of creating a professional apolitical military in 1994, the 
government introduced more reforms in the military. 
Forty members of the military who were involved in the 1998 mutiny were arrested and 
amongst them were those who had allegedly assassinated the Deputy Prime Minister 
Selometsi Baholo in 1994. After appearing before the court martial, most of them were 
convicted and got stiff sentences, whilst some were expelled from the military 
(Ambrose, 2000; Southall, 2003). Those charged with the assassination of the Deputy 
Prime Minister Selometsi Baholo in 1994 received lengthy sentences in the series of 
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court cases, which dragged for the next three years after the 1998 electoral crisis 
(MoAfrika, 14 July 2005). 
The government also terminated the services of some senior military officers who were 
suspected of spearheading the mutiny in 1998. This was followed by a series of 
seminars and workshops for the military and organs of civil society designed to promote 
civil-military relations. The LDF recruitment was revised in an effort to avoid political 
bias. Southall (2003:280) states that  
plans to demobilise some 500 soldiers, or about a quarter of the 
LDF, were announced in 2001, this programme [was] assisted by 
advisors from the UNDP who had experience of restructuring or 
dissolving armies and backed by assurances that full gratuities would 
be paid to reduce the chances of retirees seeking to take illegal 
retaliatory action. Those retired were replaced in 2002, the new 
intake featuring graduate recruitment to the officer corps, a career 
option made more attractive by a new emphasis upon despatching 
trainers on specialist courses in countries such as Britain, China and 
Germany.    
The LDF also became regionally orientated. There were regular exchanges of its 
members to SADC military academy in Zimbabwe. An additional advantage saw the 
arrival of the Indian Army staff officers, who were to assist the LDF with specialist 
training in spheres such as intelligence, law and logistics. Indian Army staff officers also 
assisted in the creation of three 30-man Special Forces, whose purpose would be to 
deal with disorder and terrorism (Southall, 2003:280).  
But the BNP, not surprisingly, strongly criticised these transformative and retraining 
exercises within the military. It accused the LCD government of politicising the military.  
Southall (2003:281) argues that  
despite the various trials and retrenchments, the main body of the 
security forces (notably at lower levels) remained those who had 
been recruited by the BNP or during the military rule. However, 
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whereas their political loyalties and antipathies may explain the 
various disturbances which rocked the governments after 1993, the 
SADC intervention had clearly eroded their autonomy.       
I concur with Southall’s (2003) argument, but in my view the restructuring process was 
largely successful; it was able to diffuse the political inclinations that were largely visible 
at the height of the 1998 electoral crisis. I further concur with Southall (2003:281) that 
the external intervention made the military aware that intervention in politics “could carry 
severe costs”.  
5.4.4 The depoliticisation of the monarchy in the post-1998 electoral crisis     
The monarchy did not escape the consequences of the crisis of 1998. The restoration of 
King Moshoeshoe II in 1994 did not succeed in depoliticising the monarchy. Makoa 
(1996:16) correctly asserted that since independence the monarchy has always been at 
the heart of the country’s political problems. The monarchy has regularly intervened in 
politics and refused to accept the king’s constitutional status. Significantly, there were 
no constitutional changes regarding the position of the monarchy after the 1998 
electoral crisis. However, the external intervention had been an eye-opener for the 
monarchy about the negative consequences of rising against the democratically elected 
structures. 
Yet in another significant political development, which depoliticised the monarchy, the 
Principal Chief of Matsieng (where the royal seat of power is located), younger brother 
to King Letsie III, Chief Seeiso Mohato, was appointed by the LCD government as 
Lesotho’s High Commissioner to Britain in September 2005. The royalists labelled this 
as “politicization of the monarchy, to pursue [the LCD] political agenda” (Khoabane 
Theko, Principal Chief of Thaba-Bosiu, Senate Chambers, 12 December 2007).     
Despite these criticisms from the royalists and some opposition parties (MFP and the 
BNP) who believed that the LCD government was streamlining the powers of the 
monarchy, this gesture seems to have smoothed the relations between the monarchy 
and the government. The appointment of the King’s brother led to little monarchical 
interference in politics. This seems to have been a well calculated effort to neutralise 
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monarchical interference in politics. On the other hand, the MFP has over the years 
failed to attract significant support within its ranks in order to push for more 
constitutional changes. 
Significantly, infighting amongst the Principal Chiefs has further eroded the strength of 
the monarchy as a vital actor in the political scene. Some Principal Chiefs in the Senate 
were allegedly accused by their counterparts of voting in approval of the government 
bills from the national assembly even when the bills were not in the interests of the 
monarchy. For instance, the Principal Chiefs were divided as they appealed for more 
powers to debate bills and make laws like the democratically elected national assembly.  
Rivalries and contestation for power has been rife over the years between the Principal 
Chiefs of Matelile, Tajane and Ha Ramoroetsana. This has gradually seen the strength 
of the monarchy in the Senate gradually eroding away. There were some allegations 
that the Principal Chief of Thaba-Bosiu, Khoabane Theko, was sponsoring the 
ABC/LWP political campaigns prior to the February 2007 elections.   
After the death of Principal Chief of Peka, Tsikoane le Kolobere-Lechesa Mathealira 
from the Molapo house (Chief Leabua Jonathan was a member of this blood line) in 
2002, his junior sons and the widow of his deceased first son were involved in the bitter 
struggle over who should succeed him.  
This succession impasse was solved by intervention from the Matsieng house (the royal 
line). It stated that that, according to Lesotho traditions and customary laws, the first son 
has to succeed and in the event of his death, his wife has to take over until such a time 
as her first son is ready to assume duties as the Principal Chief (Melao ea Lerotholi -
Laws of Lerotholi, 1904:12).  
The Matsieng house intervention seems to have harmonised the traditional contestation 
between the Matsieng and the Molapo houses (originally between King Moshoeshoe II 
and Chief Leabua Jonathan). Also, there is a new generation of Principal Chiefs 
amongst the Matsieng and Molapo houses, which has seen the traditional contestation 
between the two houses gradually eroding.  
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Both the military and monarchy became weaker after the 1998 crisis. They were unlikely 
to intervene in politics. Was it because they were locked in a mutually hurting stalemate, 
or because democracy had ripened to the point of maturity? What other lessons were 
learned? 
5.5 The 2002 elections: new rules of the game  
Despite the logistics in finding the appropriate electoral system, the re-run for the 1998 
elections were held in 2002. Prior to the 2002 elections, significant developments 
occurred within the ruling LCD. The party was struck by internal power struggles over 
the leadership of the party, which occurred in almost similar fashion to those in the BCP 
after the 1993 elections. 
Two factions had developed within the LCD known as the lesiba (feather), led by the 
Deputy Prime Minister Kelebone Maope and Shakhane Mokhehle, and sehlopha 
(group), which had the support of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. The lesiba faction 
made public pronouncements to the effect that the “train had derailed [meaning that 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili only works with his close cronies over the policy and 
direction of the party], and that it was their obligation to ensure that the train is back on 
track“ (Nonyana, 14 May 2001). They called their rival faction sehlopha and labelled the 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili as dictatorial and authoritarian (Likoti, 2005).  
They claimed that Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s government had deliberately 
deviated from the electoral mandate and described the Prime Minister as an “inept, 
inefficient and undemocratic leader” (Public Eye, 01 October 2004). They allegedly 
accused the Prime Minister of fomenting divisions in the LCD by favouring those from 
the southern region. The Prime Minister and most cabinet ministers come from the 
southern region (MoAfrika, 18 March 2001).  
The lesiba faction also accused the Prime Minister of favouritism. They claimed that 
development projects were mostly directed to the southern regions whilst the northern 
regions were marginalised. Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili was accused of not 
consulting with the ruling party National Executive Committee (NEC) regarding the 
appointment of senior civil servants, the country’s Ambassadors and High 
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Commissioners. They claimed that this led to internal instability amongst the party 
members, who felt that they were overlooked.  
The Prime Minister was allegedly accused of not being sensitive to the problems 
affecting the welfare of the civil servants. This was because the government increased 
civil servants salaries by 2%, which they argued was worthless, not on a par with 
inflation and damaging to the party’s electoral future support. It was against this 
background that on 14 September 2001, the lesiba faction broke way and formed the 
new party called the Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) (Likoti, 2001).  
Southall (2003) noted that power struggle also crippled opposition parties. The BCP 
was once more engaged in the power struggles over the leadership of the party 
between Molapo Qhobela and his deputy Tseliso Makhakhe. This competition over the 
leadership took a dramatic turn after Molapo Qhobela lost his case over the leadership 
against Tseliso Makhakhe. Molapo Qhobela broke away in January 2002 and formed 
the BAC (Southall, 2003, MoAfrika, 14 August 2002). 
Some senior RCC Bishops went to the extent of publicly campaigning for the BNP over 
the private radio stations and in some local newspapers.7 Southall (2003) argues that 
the proliferation of small parties saw an increase in the number of political parties from 
12 parties in 1998 to 19 political parties in the 2002 election.  
Southall (2003) thus argues that the LCD did not expect to win the election with a 
landslide majority across all the constituencies. It had anticipated tough competition 
from the newly formed LPC. However, it won 77 out of 80 constituency seats on election 
day. It later won one additional constituency in the delayed election. Its closest rival, the 
LPC, won only one constituency (Fox and Southall, 2003). 
                                                            
7 At the St. Rose Mission and St. Ann Mission (Catholic missions) polling stations in the Peka 
constituency, the BNP candidates got 263 and 185 votes respectively, whilst the LCD 
candidates got 47 and 34 votes in the 2002 election (Maseru Mpiti, Chief  Returning Officer, 
Peka, 20 June 2002). But the LCD won an overwhelming majority the across the entire 
constituency’s polling stations. This was not an isolated incident; in some constituencies (e.g. 
Likhetlane, Maputsoe and Tsikoane) the BNP won in all the Catholic missions’ polling stations.     
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The formula of seat allocation (2002 election) was to be as follows: 
 
If after counting the party results (FPTP + PR) are as follows: 
Red Party 101,237 
Blue Party 132,679 
Pink Party 268,103  
Total votes 502,019 
 
502,019 will be divided by 120 (which is the number of seats in Lesotho 
parliament) to get the quota of votes  
                            502,019 = 4,183.491  
                             120  
-When 4,183.491 is rounded off to the next whole number it becomes 4,184 which 
will thus become the quota of votes. Based on the above calculations, the 
provisional allocation of seats is as follows: 
 
Red Party 101,237 votes divided by 4,184 = 24.19622 
Blue Party 132,679 votes divided by 4,184 = 31.71104 
Pink Party 268,103 votes divided by 4184=64.07815  
 
The seat allocation to each party without taking any decimal fraction into account 
will be as follows,  
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Red Party 24 seats  
Blue Party 31 seats  
Pink Party 64 seats  
Total        119 seats  
 
120 - 119 = 1 seat still to be allocated. 
 
If there are fewer seats provisionally allocated that the total number of seats in 
the National Assembly, the first remaining seat will be allocated to the political 
party with the highest decimal fraction and so on. 
  
- Taking the above example, Blue Party will be allocated an additional seat and it 
will have 32 seats. 
 
Each party’s provisional allocation of proportional representation seats will be 
calculated by deducting the number of seats won by party in the constituency 
elections. 
 
In the constituency system, the seats are as follows: 
Red Party 15 constituency seats  
Blue Party 20 constituency seats  
Pink Party 45 constituency seats  
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Therefore, the provisional allocation of compensatory seats is as follows: 
Red Party 24, provisional seats minus 15 constituency seats won = 9 
compensatory seats  
Blue Party 32, provisional seats minus 20 constituency seats won = 12 
compensatory seats  
Pink Party 64, provisional seats minus 45 constituency seats won = 19 
compensatory seats. 
 
If this example is followed, the allocation of seats is easy and it does not have 
any complications. The final proportional seats will be 9+12+19= 40 seats. This 
shows that a party should participate both in the constituency and PR list in order 
to be compensated. 
Source: Independent Electoral Commission, 2002:2 
As result of the reformed electoral system, opposition parties were rewarded with PR 
seats based on their actual representivity. The LCD won 79 seats out of 80 FPTP seats. 
The BNP with 22,4% of votes got 21 PR seats, the LPC with 5,8% of the vote had six 
seats and the NIP also with 5,5% of the vote won five seats. The BAC with 2,9% and 
BCP with 2,7% of the vote got three seats each. The MFP with 1,2%, PFD with 1,1% 
and NPP with 0,7 % got one seat each. This was fair distribution.   
Southall (2003) argues that because the LCD maintained a clean sweep over the 
constituency seats, it was not allocated PR seats. In the Lesotho MMP system, it had 
already exceeded its quota of seats by virtue of winning the majority of constituency 
seats. Consequently, opposition parties received all of the 40 PR seats. By only 
compensating some parties, this in effect made the mixed system of Lesotho less of a 
compensatory system and moved it closer to the characteristics of a typical parallel 
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system. The results of the 2002 election and the allocation of seats is indicated in 
Table 6 below 
Table 6: The 2002 election and the allocation of FPTP and PR seats  
Contestants 
No. of 
votes 
(FPTP 
+PR) 
% of 
votes 
(FPTP + 
PR) 
FPTP 
seats 
PR 
seats 
Total 
seats 
% of 
seats 
LCD 302,316 54,8 79 -  79 65,8 
BNP 124,234 22,4 - 21 21 17,5 
LPC 32,046 5,8 1 4 5 4,2 
NIP 30,346 5,5 - 5 5 4,2 
BAC 16,095 2,9 - 3 3 2,5 
BCP 14,584 2,7 - 3 3 2,5 
LWP 7,7788 1,4 - 1 1 0,8 
MFP 6,890 1,2 - 1 1 0,8 
PFD 6,330 1,1 - 1 1 0,8 
NPP 3,985 0,7 - 1 1 0,8 
Others 7,772 1,4 - - - - 
Total  554,386 100 80 40 120 100 
Source: Independent Electoral Commission 2002:4  
Therefore, parliament became more inclusive, proportional and representative. Ten 
political parties were represented in parliament. Consequently there was no election-
related political violence. Likoti (2007:3) argues that “the adoption of the MMP was done  
with the clear understanding that the country was now entering an era of democratic 
inclusivity where even the less resourced parties would [have] representation [in 
parliament]”. 
The BNP accepted its 21 PR seats in parliament, but refused to accept the election 
outcome. It accused the IEC of rigging the election in favour of the LCD. Southall 
(2003:290) indicates that even before the final count of the results  
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General Lekhanya [BNP leader] began repudiating the constituency 
results even before they had all been counted, making generalised 
complains about electoral malpractice and alleging curious statistical 
patterns in the votes. 
In protesting against the election outcome a senior BNP member, Lekhooana Jonathan, 
argued that “how it is possible for them [the LCD] to maintain a clean sweep in the 
constituencies after the [LPC] breakaway? Something fishy was done by the IEC to 
ensure that LCD remained in power” (Basotho National Party (BNP) Constituency Rally, 
Kolonyama, 20 July 2002). The BNP MPs continued to denounce the IEC for rigging the 
elections. The BNP youth league leader, who became an MP via the PR ticket, 
Moeketsi Hanyane, was quoted as saying “we will mobilise our supporters against the 
rigged 2002 elections; we won’t surrender easily in our case” (Basotho National Party 
(BNP) Constituency Rally, Stadium Area, 20 August 2003). 
Despite its participation in parliament and commanding the majority of PR seats, the 
BNP still refused to recognise the legitimacy of the LCD government and to adhere to 
the rules of the game. In defiance against the rules of the game, the BNP leader, Major 
General Metsing Lekhanya,8 wrote a “Memorandum of Settlement Agreement” to Prime 
Minister Pakalitha Mosisili on the party’s stance on the conduct of the 2002 elections. 
The contents of the memorandum worth mentioning are highlighted below:   
 
“MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT”, 18 AUGUST 2003     
BNP E TLA AMOHELA SEPHETHO SA LIKHETHO TSA MOTSEANONG 2002 TLASA 
LIPALLO TSE LATELLANG 
-BNP ETLA HULA LINYEOE TSA EONA TSE KA KHOTLA HAEBA IEC ETLA 
ETSA TLATSETSO EA M550,000 HO BNP BAKENG SA LITSENYEHELO TSA 
NYEOE. 
                                                            
8 Formerly the chairman of the military government from 1986 to 1991. He was elected to the 
leadership position following the death of the BNP leader, Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana, in 1998. 
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-TONAKHOLO A ITLAME HORE O TLA ELETSA MOTLOTLEHI HO THONYA 
MATONA A MABELI LE MOTLATSI OA LETONA MOKHENG OA BNP  HO BA 
LITHO TSA K’HABINETE ,’ME EBE MATONA A TOKA, LIHLOLILOENG, LE 
MOTLATSI OA LETONA LA LICHELETE  
 
-HO HLOMATHISOE MOLAO OA MOTHEO E LE HORE  LENANE LA LITHO 
TSE THONYETSOANG HO KENA KA PARAMENTENG KA SEMOTINYANE E 
BE 50, ’ME LE TSA MABATOOA E BE 50.  
 
This memorandum is translated as:   
“MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT”, 18 AUGUST 2003  
The BNP will only accept the outcome of the May 2002 elections under the following 
conditions: 
 - the BNP would withdraw its legal challenges if the IEC agrees to compensate it 
with the sum of M550, 000 to cover its legal costs; 
 
- the Prime Minister should confirm that he would consult with the King Letsie III  
to appoint three BNP members into his cabinet, who shall serve as the Minister 
of Justice, Minister of Natural Resources and the Deputy Minister of Finance; 
 
-the constitution should be amended so that there should be uniformity in terms 
of representation on the parliamentary seats, parliament should be composed of 
50 constituencies and 50 PR seats (my own translation from Sesotho).     
Source: Office of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, 18 August 2003 
In another protest against the 2002 election the BNP decided not to participate in any 
constituency by-elections. According to Major General Metsing Lekhanya, this was an 
appropriate action to voice their displeasure against what they viewed as the illegitimate 
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LCD government. The BNP further refused to participate in the (first-ever) 2005 local 
government elections. Its youth league leadership led protest marches against the 2002 
elections (Nonyana, 14 March 2005; MoAfrika, 10 June 2005; Moeletsi oa Basotho, 13 
June 2005).   
Other opposition parties did not actively join the BNP in its protests; seemingly they 
were satisfied with their participation in the National Assembly. Hence Thoahlane 
argues (2006:2) that “this model ... [gave] the country some degree of relative stability”. 
But these protests were also not violent, as their organisers were now part of the 
democratic process because most of them were MPs. 
Matlosa (2003:36) argues that the change in the electoral system was able to give work 
to the opposition leaders. Arguably, the electoral reforms benefited only the few who 
made it to parliament. This may suggest that while proper elections are necessary for 
democratic governance, more is required for consolidation. This raises the arguments 
about affluence, reduction of inequality, the middle classes and civil society.   
Given the behaviour of the country’s political elites when the assumption of state power 
is seen as the most reliable means accessing economic power, it was unlikely to draw 
the conclusion that the reformed electoral system managed to contain election-related 
violence. Similarly, Southall (2003:293) argued that  
its long-term prospects for resolving conflict in Lesotho are less 
certain, not at least because the country’s improved political 
prospects are located in a context of enduring economic decline. The 
election itself took place against a background of crop failures which 
raised the alarming spectre of famine, the effects of which could be 
devastating for an already extremely poor country. Migrant labour to 
South Africa, a staple of the economy, dropped precipitately from 
126,700 in 1989 to about 76,000 in 2002, and the migrant 
remittances with it ... if Lesotho’s politicians continue to view the 
country’s politics in zero-sum terms, then the struggle for scarce 
resources [would lead to more political instability]. 
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Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili commented that “naheng e hlokang mesebetsi joalo ka 
Lesotho, hoba setho sa paramente ha se feela bosebeletsi ba sechaba,… motho o 
fumana mosebetsi o motle lemo tse hlano” [“in the country like Lesotho, where there are 
few employment opportunities, being an MP does not only mean being a representative 
of the people, but it is a viable source of employment for five years” (my own translation 
from Sesotho)] (Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 11 March 2003). Arguably, the reliance on 
parliamentary seats as form of employment was likely to intensify. Parliamentary 
representation becomes important for a non-political reason: money.  It underlined the 
importance of socio-economic problems in Chapter Six.   
5.6 The 2007 elections: institutional legitimacy restored? 
Prior to the 2007 elections Thomas Thabane,  the Minister of Communications, Science 
and Technology and a senior cabinet Minister, resigned from his post, broke away from 
the LCD and formed a political party called the ABC. He accused the LCD government 
of failing to implement development strategies to eradicate the escalating levels of 
poverty and unemployment. But the LCD newspaper Mololi (12 December 2006) stated 
that Thomas Thabane broke away from the LCD because he was not elected into the 
“LCD National Executive Committee (NEC)”. This was contrary to the statements from 
the ABC leadership; its deputy leader, Sello Machakela, blamed the amendments to the 
party’s constitution, which granted the LCD NEC the powers to accept or reject the 
party’s nominees for the 2007 elections as the major cause of the breakaway (Public 
Eye, 15 November 2006). 
Prior to the breakaway, there had been unconfirmed allegations that Prime Minister 
Pakalitha Mosisili was retiring from politics and would not contest the 2007 elections. 
Consequently, some senior cabinet ministers had already started positioning 
themselves for the country’s most powerful political office. Prime Minister Pakalitha 
Mosisili even rebuked those who were fuelling divisions by making public 
pronouncements that he was retiring. 
Amid tensions in the ruling party a senior cabinet minister, Monyane Moleleki, a key ally 
of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, survived an assassination attempt in January 2005 
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and accused his rivals in the party as responsible. The LCD youth league also clashed 
in their general conference over constitutional amendments made by the LCD NEC 
(Mololi, 12 December 2006). 
There was a public outcry within the party ranks over the delivery of services. The LCD 
MPs also voiced their concerns over what they described as “preferential treatment 
given to the constituencies in the southern regions in the delivery of services” (Lesotho 
Congress for Democracy (LCD) Parliamentary Caucus, 10 March 2006).  
This was not the first time that such accusations on favouritism were levelled against 
the LCD government. Before they broke away and formed the LPC in 2001, the then 
lesiba faction had voiced their frustrations over the same issue. Consequently, this led 
to the feelings of marginalisation amongst some of the ruling LCD MPs. Those from the 
northern regions argued that they did not have much influence over the development 
initiatives and policy direction both within the party structures and at the government 
level.  
The ABC formation was greeted with massive support across the urban areas,9 mostly 
in the northern regions. These urban people often complained about their 
marginalisation regarding the delivery of services. Thomas Thabane was joined by 17 
MPs from the ruling LCD in October 2006. They were also joined by an MP for 
Mokhotlong, Lehlohonolo Tsehlana who was expelled from the LCD.  
Prior to his expulsion, Lehlohonolo Tsehlana had accused the LCD leadership of being 
authoritarian and deviating from its electoral promises. Among the grievances that 
Lehlohonolo Tsehlana raised was the unequal treatment of the LCD MPs by the party 
leadership, favouritism in appointments to cabinet and diplomatic positions, and lack of 
developmental projects in the northern regions.   
Consequently, the LCD dominance was substantially reduced in parliament: it remained 
with 61 seats, whilst opposition parties had 58 seats, making for a competitive 
                                                            
9 It was estimated that over ten thousand people attended the launch of the ABC in Maseru and 
Teya-Teyaneng. Similar figures were estimated in Maputsoe, Hlotse and Butha-Buthe (Harvest 
FM, Radio Broadcast, 30 March 2007; Public Eye, 17 March 2007). 
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legislature. There were unconfirmed reports that the ABC was mobilising MPs from the 
ruling party to cross the floor and push for the vote of no confidence in the LCD 
government. The LCD MPs were also allegedly offered M12,000 to cross the floor 
(Mololi, 12 December 2006). Consequently, fearing further cracks within the LCD, Prime 
Minister Pakalitha Mosisili responded by calling for the closure of parliament and 
announced early elections (Moeletsi oa Basotho, 4 December 2006). Table 7 below 
shows the representation in parliament after the floor crossing of the LCD MPs to the 
ABC. 
Table 7: Party Representation in the National Assembly after Floor Crossings in 
2006 
Parties No. of seats  after2002 elections 
No. of seats after 
floor crossing 
(2006) 
Gains/ Loss 
LCD  79 61 -17 
BNP 21 21 0 
ABC - 18 +18 
BAC 3 3 0 
BCP 3 3 0 
LPC 5 5 0 
NIP  5 5 0 
LWP 1 1 0 
MFP 1 1 0 
PFD 1 1 0 
NPP 1 1 0 
Source: Matlosa and Shale, 2006:4 
In response to escalating support for the ABC across the urban areas, the LCD formed 
a coalition with the NIP. The negotiations leading to the formal signing of this coalition 
were lead by the LCD deputy leader, Lesao Lehlohla, and the NIP deputy leader, 
Motseki Motikoe. The ABC also formed a coalition with the LWP. 
But the legality of the LCD/NIP coalition was challenged by Anthony Manyeli (leader of 
the NIP) after he was left out of the party’s PR list. This resulted in the emergence of 
 200
two factions in the NIP. One faction supported Anthony Manyeli, whilst the other faction 
was under Motseki Motikoe. The Motseki Motikoe faction argued that the decision to 
form a coalition with the LCD was a resolution of the NIP NEC. 
Motseki Motikoe argued that Anthony Manyeli was left out of the PR lists on account of 
his old age, as he could not engage fully in parliamentary debates. Anthony Manyeli 
appealed to the High Court of Lesotho to nullify the LCD/NIP coalition. He further 
appealed to the High Court to “instruct the IEC to discard Motseki Motikoe’s list and 
consider his [list] as legitimate”. Anthony Manyeli got a successful interdict, which 
declared the LCD/NIP coalition null and void. But this was later overturned by the Court 
of Appeal (Anthony Manyeli, Press Conference, 10 February 2007). 
Nine political parties contested the 2007 election as coalitions:  
- All Basotho Convention / Lesotho Workers Party (ABC/LWP); 
- Basotho National Party/ National Progressive Party (BNP/NNP); 
- Alliance of Congress Parties (ACP), comprised of the Basutoland African 
Congress (BAC), Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) and another faction of the 
Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) known as Mahatamoho a Khotso le Poelano 
(Congress of Reconciliation and Union); 
 - Lesotho Congress for Democracy/National Independent Party (LCD/NIP).  
These coalitions were formed as a result of the political parties’ eagerness to maximise 
the allocation of PR seats. Under the Lesotho MMP system the more the party wins the 
constituency seats, the less it gets the compensatory seats. Hence, the LCD after 
winning 79 out of 80 constituency seats did not get PR seats in the 2002 election. 
Seemingly both the ABC and LCD were willing to capitalise on the smaller parties with 
less following to maximise their share in the allocation of PR seats. This was because 
the LWP and NIP did not have significant support across the population. These two 
small parties joined these coalitions prompted by their desire for more parliamentary 
seats. Even the other parties formed coalitions in an effort to increase their share of the 
allocation of PR seats. 
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It should be noted that though the LCD and NIP formed a coalition, both parties have 
different ideological positions. The NIP broke away from the BNP, a conservative party 
which did not support the monarchy. The LCD broke away from the BCP, which was 
anti-chieftainship and anti-monarchy. It will be interesting to see how long this marriage 
of convenience will last.  
The ABC, on the other hand, broke way from the LCD and was able to unite different 
people with varying ideologies. The ABC is a populist party, which does not have strong 
roots across society and any clear ideological orientation. Its coalition partner, the LWP, 
is largely pro-working class dominated by factory workers. Similarly, it remains to be 
seen how long the coalition will be able to contain these divergent views within its ranks.  
The Alliance of Congress Parties (ACP), comprised of the LPC, BAC and Mahatamoho 
a Khotso le Poelano (Congress of Reconciliation and Union), consists of those 
members who had served within various leadership structures of the BCP and LCD, but 
had who left after power struggles. Some examples are indicated below.  
- Kelebone Maope, the LPC leader, was a former Deputy Leader and Deputy Prime 
Minister in the LCD. He had served as the Minister of Law and Constitutional Affairs and 
Minister of Finance in the LCD government. He was one of the key BCP members who 
were appointed into the military administration cabinet in the early 1990s, as a 
reconciliatory gesture in the transition period, but had left the BCP for the LCD in 1997. 
He later led a break-away from the LCD in 2002.  
- Khauhelo Raditapole, a BAC leader who was a Minister of Health in the BCP 
government. She broke away from the BCP before the 2002 election with Molapo 
Qhobela to form the BAC. Molapo Qhobela later broke away from the BAC and formed 
the New Basutoland African Congress (NBAC) in 2006, which did not contest the 2007 
election. 
- Ntsukunyane Mphanya, a leader of Mahatomoho a Khotso le Poelano, was a Minister 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives in the BCP government.  He was one of the key figures 
of the then “pressure group” in the BCP. He remained in the BCP after the LCD broke 
away from the BCP in 1997. He later broke away from the BCP in 2005 and led a 
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faction that contested the 2007 election under the banner of the ACP. The entire 
executive of the ACP consists of people who had been Ministers, Principal Secretaries 
and Ambassadors in the respective BCP and LCD governments.    
It should be noted that most political parties in Lesotho are off-shoots of both the BCP 
and the BNP (Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA), 2004:27). The formation of new 
parties and splits from the old parties are regular occurrences in Lesotho. For instance, 
the BCP split more than five times, the LCD is a splinter faction from the BCP and it also 
split further to form the LPC. The ABC is a splinter faction from the LCD.  
Almost all the political parties have little variation in terms of ideology and policy 
positions, and they have similar policies for addressing socio-economic issues. 
Moreover, there are no ethnic differences. Most of these manifestos are inclined to 
either to the nationalists (conservatives) and the congress (much more progressive and 
anti-traditional structures). Hence the Transformation Resource Centre (TRC), 
(2003:13) noted that  
parties only differ in names  and colours … party manifestos are the 
same … the difference is only in language used in writing the 
manifesto and leadership … parties have no activities between 
elections. 
Importantly, the NIP and LWP did not contest the constituency elections, but contested 
only the PR ballot or party ballot. Similarly, their coalition partners, the LCD and the 
ABC, contested the constituency elections but did not run under the PR ballot. In return, 
LCD and ABC supporters were encouraged to vote for the NIP and LWP respectively 
under the PR ballot. There was to be “an exchange of votes by their respective 
supporters by these parties” (Horowitz, 1991:167).i.e. vote pooling.  
Anthony Manyeli’s NIP faction contested the FPTP in nine constituencies. It used the 
same party symbol that was used by the other faction under Motseki Motikoe, which 
was in coalition with the LCD. The LCD which was in coalition with the NIP under 
Motseki Motikoe faction was not bothered by this, because Anthony Manyeli’s PR list 
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was rejected by the IEC following the Court of Appeal verdict. Hence its Secretary 
General, Mpho Malie, stated at an LCD rally on 27 January 2007 at Peka that  
le khethe mokhethoa oa LCD lebatoeng le nt’o qetella ka ho khetha 
NIP khekhethaneng, le se ferekanyoe ke boteng ba NIP ea Ntate 
[Anthony] Manyeli mabatoeng a mang, lenane la hae la khekhethane 
le lahliloe, litho tsa LCD li teng lenaneng la khekhethane ea Ntate 
[Motseki] Motikoe le amohetsoeng ke IEC, joale khethang NIP 
khekhethaneng re tsebe ho fumana litulo tse ngata.  
[Vote for the LCD candidate at the constituency level [under FPTP] 
and then vote for the NIP on the PR ballot. Do not be confused by 
the contestation of Mr [Anthony] Manyeli NIP in some constituencies; 
his PR list has been rejected by the IEC; there are LCD members on 
the NIP PR list who have been accepted by the IEC submitted by Mr 
[Motseki] Motikoe. Vote for the NIP at the PR ballot, so that we can 
get as many seats as possible under PR.] (my own translation from 
Sesotho)     
This shows that the intentions of the LCD/NIP coalition was to maximise the share of 
the PR seats. Similarly, in other coalitions (ABC/LWP) and ACP, there was no real 
commitment from these parties to genuinely work together. These were coalitions of 
convenience that were hastily created without any prior consultation with their 
respective supporters. 
In the LCD the decision to form a coalition with the NIP was unilaterally undertaken by 
the executive committee. Notably, some LCD and ABC members who contested the 
FPTP constituency were also on the PR lists of NIP and LWP respectively. The Ace 
project (www.aceproject.org/today/feature-articles/the-mmp-electoral-system, 08 June 
2008) noted that 
as a result, some people represented two parties in different aspects 
of the election. Nevertheless, the four parties used different symbols 
and registered separately for the elections. Clearly, the larger parties 
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aimed to earn compensatory seats through the “backdoor” provided 
by the smaller parties; the smaller parties were attempting to 
“piggyback” on the strength of the larger parties to gain access to the 
legislature for at least some of their candidates. 
Similarly, Likoti (2007:7) argues that “in their attempt to defeat inclusivity, which the 
[Lesotho] MMP was originally meant for, the ABC-LWP ... specified that ABC should not 
submit its PR lists but leave that in favour of the main coalition partner LWP”. The 
LCD/NIP coalition agreement stipulated that the first five PR positions in the NIP lists 
were reserved for the NIP candidates, while the following ten positions were for the LCD 
candidates which would then be followed by the NIP five and so on (Motseki  Motikoe, 
Press Conference, 26 January  2007). 
Opposition parties accused the LCD government of organising the ‘snap elections’. 
They claimed that this was a deliberate attempt to deny them an appropriate time to 
campaign across the country (Thomas Thabane, South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC) Morning Live, 10 January 2007). The RCC senior leadership also 
called for a change in the government. It appealed to its followers to vote for the BNP. 
The ABC was able to attract a significant support from large numbers of Basotho 
working and living in South Africa.  
The government later claimed that it had uncovered a plot allegedly organised by the 
South African labour union, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and ABC of conspiring to destabilise the country after the 2007 elections (Prime Minister 
Pakalitha Mosisili, Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) Rally, Teya-Teyaneng, 24 
January 2007). 
Despite the rising political temperature, the 2007 elections were won by the LCD as 
indicated in Table 8 below. The mathematical calculations in the translation of votes into 
PR seats remain unclear. But there are no legal stipulations explaining how the formula 
should be implemented. Table 8 also shows the allocation of seats after the elections.  
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Table 8: The 2007 elections and the allocation of FPTP and PR seats  
Party 
Name 
Party 
votes 
(FPTP + 
PR) 
Const. 
seats 
Compen. 
seats (PR) 
 
Total 
number 
of seats
% party 
votes - 
PR (valid 
votes) 
% Seats 
won(Const. + 
Comp. seats 
ACP 20,263 1 1 2 4,6% 1,7% 
BBDP 8,474 0 1 1 1,9% 0,8% 
BCP 9,823 0 1 1 2,2% 0,8% 
BDNP 8,783 0 1 1 2,0% 0,8% 
BNP 29,965 0 3 3 6,8% 2,5% 
LWP 107,463 0 10 10 24,3% 8.4% 
MFP 9,129 0 1 1 2,1% 0,8% 
NIP 229,602 0 21 21 51,8% 17,6% 
NLFP 3,984 0 0 0 0,9% 0,0% 
PFD 15,477 0 1 1 3.5% 0,8% 
ABC - 17 0 17 0,0% 14,3% 
LCD - 61 0 61 0,0% 51,3% 
Totals 442,963 79 40 119 100% 100% 
Source: www.iec.org.ls/online/NAER_Seat_Allocation. pdf, 10 June 2008 
The LCD won 61 constituencies out of 79 on the election day. It later won the delayed 
Makhaleng constituency elections and this increased the number of seats to 62. Its 
coalition partner, the NIP, got 21 PR seats. Therefore the LCD/NIP coalition obtained 83 
seats, which resulted in their dominance in the National Assembly. The ABC won 17 
constituency seats, while its coalition partner LWP got 10 PR seats. The ABC/LWP 
coalition had a total of 27 seats (Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Report on 
Lesotho 2007 General Elections, 25 February 2007).  
As a result of a strong urban following, the ABC won all the lowlands urban 
constituencies in the northern regions. In Maseru it won all nine urban constituencies 
and lost in the outskirts. In Berea, Leribe and Butha-Buthe the ABC won all the 
constituencies around their urban centres. In the highlands it won the district 
headquarters of Mokhotlong. The LCD won all the rural areas of the lowlands and on 
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the outskirts of the urban centres. Arguably, the ABC was able to highlight the need to 
improve service delivery. It should be noted most of these urban constituencies always 
voiced their grievances about their marginalisation in the delivery of services compared 
to the rural areas.  
The ABC refused to accept the election outcome. It argued that the elections were 
rigged. It instituted legal proceedings against eight constituencies on allegations of 
ballot rigging. It claimed that it has “video footage of the woman who voted two times” in 
the elections as empirical evidence (Mokhosi Matooane, 20 February 2007). 
The ABC alleges that in Bela-Bela constituency its constituency candidate, Mokhosi 
Matooane, was not allowed to vote because his name did not appear on the registration 
list as it was said that he had died in 2005. Mokhosi Matooane instituted an urgent court 
application seeking for the court to nullify the constituency results and call for new 
elections in the constituency (All Basotho Convention (ABC) Media Report, 17 March 
2007).  
In protest at the election outcome the ABC and the BNP boycotted the swearing in 
ceremony of the MPs in parliament. They called on their supporters to stay away from 
work pending the outcome of their legal challenges. The ABC, ACP, BNP and the MFP 
appealed to SADC to intervene over the issue of what they describe as “unfair allocation 
of PR seats” (Public Eye, 17 March 2007). They alleged that the LCD/NIP coalition 
manipulated the allocation of PR seats to deny opposition parties equal representation 
in parliament.  
Thabane further pleaded with the SADC member states to withhold their recognition of 
the LCD government. SADC has, however, called upon concerned parties “to truly 
address … [their] differences through dialogue in the best interest of the Basotho nation 
and of the SADC region as a whole” (Ministerial Troika of the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Affairs Cooperation, 23 March 2007). 
Thabane called for the immediate swearing in of the NIP leader Anthony Manyeli as an 
MP with his preferred PR list, which did not have LCD members (All Basotho 
Convention (ABC) Rally, Ha-Abia, 25 March 2007). Anthony Manyeli’s argument was 
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that he should be sworn in as an MP and be allowed to control the NIP because “the 
Court of Appeal … ruled in 2003 that issues related to election disputes are not 
supposed to be taken to the Appeal Court; the High Court ruling is final” (Harvest FM- 
Radio Broadcast, 30 March 2007). 
Section 69 (6) of the Constitution of Lesotho10 states that “the decision by the High 
Court in an election dispute cannot appear before the Appeals Court” (The Constitution 
of Lesotho, 1993). What surprised Anthony Manyeli was that all the decisions by Judge 
P. Steyn of the High Court, who declared the LCD/NIP coalition null and void, were 
overruled by the Appeals Court.  
This was despite the relevant constitutional clauses. Anthony Manyeli argued that the 
National Assembly Order 1992 (section 111) supported his contention that the decision 
by the High Court in an election dispute is final. He indicated that he would continue 
fighting for control of the NIP with the support of the ABC, ACP, BNP and MFP until he 
is recognised as the party leader, sworn in as an MP and allowed to submit his PR list 
of candidates, which does not have LCD members (Public Eye, 30 March 2007). 
Some individual ABC candidates from Kolonyama, Thaba-Phatsoa and Machache 
constituencies also filed urgent applications in the High Court. They alleged that the 
election was rigged and full of irregularities. The ABC also raised allegations of vote 
buying by the ruling party and the use of the government vehicles to transport voters to 
the polls.  
The ABC leader Thomas Thabane even argued on the 21 February 2007, that 
my general impression is that the atmosphere was peaceful and I 
think we are all free to vote as we like, but I cannot add the word fair 
… the ABC should have won over 30 seats.  
                                                            
10 At the time of writing, the LCD government was pushing for an amendment to this clause. 
Opposition parties were against this move. Given the LCD’s parliamentary majority, this section 
of the constitution was amended, but the Senate refused to approve it. This means that this 
amendment has not been officially enacted into law.  
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After the allocation of seats was completed, the ABC changed its earlier allegations of 
ballot rigging. It joined other opposition parties complaining about what they described 
as the “unfair allocation of PR seats by the IEC” (Public Eye, 23 March 2007). Even the 
individual ABC candidates withdrew their court challenges against what they had 
described as rigged elections in their respective constituencies.  
Most of opposition candidates (the BNP, MFP and the LWP) and ABC/LWP candidates 
who were not high on the PR lists insisted on the re-allocation of 40 PR seats. Perhaps 
they believed that they might make it to parliament after the re-allocation of PR seats. It 
should be noted that ‘vote pooling’ between the ABC/LWP and LCD/NIP coalition 
deepened the electoral crisis.  
Opposition parties argued that the IEC should have taken into consideration that the 
LCD and NIP had actually contested the election as one party, as were the ABC and the 
LWP. They claimed that the IEC should have treated both coalitions (ABC/LWP and 
LCD/NIP) as one party in the allocation of PR seats. They argued that if these coalitions 
were treated as one party, it could have led to an increased representation of the 
smaller parties. They claim that the overall dominance by the LCD/NIP coalition would 
then have been smaller. 
Significantly, despite the opposition grievances about the unfair allocation of seats, it 
should be noted that the most problematic issue that confronted the MMP system in 
Lesotho was the IPA retaining a fixed number of 120 seats. This made the National 
Assembly inflexible in terms of the quota. Contrary to the German system, this has 
made parliament inflexible if a full quota of votes were to be used. If the size of 
parliament was flexible, I am of the view that the current political impasse could have 
been partly addressed.  
Crucially, Leshele Thoahlane, Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Commissioner, 
on 10 March 2007 noted that “when the current quota (3,723) is operationalised for the 
first time, it provides for more than 40 available PR seats”. This inflexibility of Lesotho’s 
MMP system further raised political tempers. For instance, the MFP’s share of votes 
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increased from 1,2% in 2002 to 2,7% in 2007. Its support doubled, yet it still has only 
one seat, as it had in 2002 (South African Development Community (SADC), 2007:3).  
Table 9 below shows the allocation of seats when a quota of 3,723 (for 2002 elections) 
was applied after the 2007 election. The total number of party votes (PR) was 442,963. 
The first round allocated 119 seats (an election did not take place in one constituency) 
on the basis of a quota of 3,723 votes per seat (442,963 divided by 119). The ABC and 
the LCD were not included in the provisional allocation of PR seats as they did not 
participate in the PR ballot. If this provisional allocation of seats is followed, it is likely to 
allocate more compensatory seats than the available 40 PR seats as indicated in 
Table 9. 
Table 9: 2007 elections and first round of the allocation of PR seats  
Party 
Total  
party 
votes 
(FPTP + 
PR) 
Party’s  
quota of 
seats 
Alloc. 
based 
on full 
quota 
Highest 
decimal 
fraction 
Rank 
Party’s 
provisional 
allocation of 
total no. of 
seats 
Const
won 
Party’s 
provisional 
allocation of 
compen. 
seats 
ACP 20,263 5,442654 5   5 1 4 
BBDP  8,474 2,276121 2   2 0 2 
BCP 9,823 2,638464 2 0,638464 3 3 0 3 
BDNP 8,793 2,359119 2   2 0 2 
BNP 29,965 8,048617 8   8 0 8 
LWP 107,463 28,864625 28 0,864625 1 29 0 29 
MFP 9,129 2,452055 2 0,452055 4 3 0 3 
NIP 229,602 61,671233 61 0,671233 2 62 0 62 
NLFP 3,984 1,070105 1   1 0 1 
PFD 15,477 4,157131 4   4 0 4 
ABC       17  
LCD       61  
Total 442,963  119 115   119 79 118 
Quota of Votes 3722, 37815 rounded to 3,723   
Number of seats 120  
Delayed elections    1  
Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Report on Lesotho 2007 Election, 
 25 February 2007 
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This allocation is partially consistent with a parallel system and the significance of the 
strategies used by the two big coalitions was to use the system as a parallel and not as 
a compensatory system. This was problematic, because it had to be reworked by the 
IEC so as to fit into 40 PR seats. 
The IEC went to the second round; it excluded the 78 seats that were already won by 
the parties that were not listed on the party ballot and the one constituency seat which 
was not contested. One of the parties (ACP) which had run on the party ballot had also 
won one constituency seat. This seat was added to the 40 compensatory seats to make 
a total of 41 seats to be considered. In the second round, the quota was 10,804 votes 
per seat (442,963 divided by 41) and it was applied to those parties (the ABC and LCD 
were excluded) that participated in the party election (PR) (Leshele Thoahlane, 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Commissioner, 10 March 2007). 
This determined how the allocation of 40 PR compensatory seats was finally done. 
What should be noted is that there are no legal guidelines explaining how this has to be 
done. The mathematical calculations were done by the IEC without any constitutional or 
legal stipulations on how it should approach the re-allocation of seats to fit them into 40 
PR seats. An attempt to get a clearer explanation from the one of the former 
Commissioners of the IEC in 2007 was fruitless. This is an example of the partial 
example of the parallel system. Table 10 shows the second round allocation of PR 
seats. 
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Table 10: The 2007 elections and second round of the allocation of PR seats 
Party 
Total 
party 
votes 
(FPTP+P
R) 
Party’s 
quota  of 
seats 
Alloc. 
based 
on full 
quota 
Highest 
decimal  
fractions 
Rank 
Party 
provisional 
alloc. of 
total no. of 
seats 
Const. 
won by 
party 
Party’s 
provisiona
l alloc. of 
compen. 
seats 
ACP 20,263 1,875509 1 0,875509 3 2 1 1 
BBDP 8,474 0,784339 0 0,784339 6 1  1 
BCP 9,823 0,909200 0 0,9092 2 1  1 
BDNP 8,783  0,812940 0 0,81294 5 1  1 
BNP 29,965 2,773510 2 0,77351 7 3  3 
LWP 107,463 9,946594 9 0,946594 1 10  10 
MFP 9,129  0,844955 0 0,844965 4 1  1 
NIP 229,602  21,251573 21  21  21 
NLFP 3,984  0,368752 0  0  0 
PFD 15,477 1,432525 1  1  1 
Total  442,963 41 34  41 1 40 
Quota of votes 10,803.9756 rounded to 10,804 
Number of seats   41  
Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Report on Lesotho 2007 Election, 
 25 February 2007 
It was against this background that the opposition parties refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of the LCD. They argued specifically that the LCD/NIP coalition undermined 
the whole process of electoral reforms that were undertaken after the 1998 electoral 
crisis. Once more feelings of exclusion surfaced amongst the smaller parties. There are 
12 parties represented in parliament compared to the 2002 elections, when ten parties 
were represented in parliament. But there is a difference in terms of proportionality and 
the allocation of seats.  
Opposition parties have vehemently insisted that the process of the allocation of PR 
seats should be re-done. The MFP lodged a complaint in the High Court, complaining 
about the unfair allocation of 40 PR seats. According to Public Eye (10 May 2008), the 
MFP has requested 
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the court to direct the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to 
[re]allocate the PR seats in the lower house in terms of a formula 
agreed upon by all parties … [and] ... to declare alliances of 
ABC/LWP and LCD/NIP null and void. 
The Lesotho High Court referred the MFP case to the Constitutional Court of Lesotho 
for further adjudication. The Constitutional Court of Lesotho in August 2008 dismissed 
the MFP application with costs. The Constitutional Court judgment was wholly criticised 
by opposition parties. The judgment stated that only the IEC (not MFP) has the right to 
put the case before the Courts of Law. The judgement states that  
a political party has a discretion– it is under no obligation– to present 
a party list under the PR system and a political party is not prohibited 
under law to form any alliance or pact with any political party or 
parties, and the Independent Electoral Commission is not enjoined to 
treat – for purposes of PR allocation – any alliance as a single entity 
unless such alliance contested the constituency seats as a single 
entity. This must be clear to all concerned in these proceedings. If 
the IEC treated any unregistered alliance as a single entity – it would 
be acting so ultra vires and its allocation would have been illegal 
outright (Judgement of the MFP Vs Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC), 17 August 2008). 
Section 57:28 of the judgement further indicates that  
with the multiplicity of parties in Lesotho’s political landscape, 
alliance formation is to be expected at election time, the purpose 
being to amass and accumulate constituency votes or the PR seats 
allocation.This alliance formation should either be outlawed or 
controlled under law. The court cannot declare as illegal something 
not prohibited under law (Judgement of the MFP Vs Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC), 17 August 2008). 
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The judgment states that there are no legal stipulations or provisions that explain the 
agreed party’s formula as the MFP alleges (Lesotho News Agency, 18 August 2007). 
The electoral reforms were introduced to reduce potential election-related conflicts. 
MMP succeeded after the 2002 election, but this was short lived as five years down the 
line – in 2007 it resulted in political crisis. The skewed allocation of seats was influenced 
by the emergence of coalitions which undermined all issues that the MMP system was 
intended to address.  
What is surprising is the lack of understanding on how the calculations were done 
amongst some senior staff members of the IEC. This perhaps shows the lack of 
understanding of the complexities of Lesotho’s MMP system in terms of the translation 
of votes into seats and how the calculations were done. In the informal discussions with 
various politicians, they all expressed different views and interpretations on how the 40 
PR seats should have been allocated.  
The BCP and the Basotho Batho Democratic Party (BBDP) leadership publicly 
announced that their parties should have been compensated with four seats each as a 
result of their poor performance in the constituencies. They believe that the 
compensatory aspect of the MMP system is meant for parties that performed poorly in 
the constituencies so as to make the parliament more inclusive and representative.    
It is a fact that the allocation of seats in the national assembly is not fully proportional 
but compensatory in a limited way. Both the ABC and LCD have benefited from both 
FPTP and PR seats. But both of them (ABC and the LCD) contested only under the 
FPTP ballot. They also paid the required amount of M200.00, for fielding the candidates 
under FPTP to the IEC. The LWP and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) only paid 
the M8000.00 required for contesting under the PR ballot. The other parties – ACP, 
BBDP, Basotho Democratic National Party (BDNP), BNP, BCP and MFP – fielded 
candidates under both FPTP and PR and paid M200.00 and M8000.00 respectively.  
Lesotho’s electoral law does not give an appropriate explanation on some issues in 
relation to the electoral conduct. Section 49B (1) stipulates that “a political party 
intending to contest an election may nominate candidates for election by proportional 
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representation” (Lesotho News Agency, 18 August 2007). The LCD, ABC and PFD did 
not comply with the rules of registration for two ballots. As there is no legal instrument 
that compels the parties to submit either their FPTP and PR lists, it is thus up to them to 
decide which one to submit or not, and they have a choice to do as they wish. If parties 
do not submit their PR list, it means that they will not be entitled to PR compensatory 
seats.  
The MMP is often referred to as the compensatory model. As mentioned before, a party 
that wins more constituency seats under the Lesotho MMP system is often not 
compensated under the PR seats. The LWP, NIP and PFD were awarded PR seats, yet 
they did not field candidates under the FPTP. This was a result of the silence of the 
electoral law on whether they should have registered for both lists. Likoti (2007:5) states 
that “the MMP compensate only parties that failed dismally on FPTP, not those that did 
not”. But the law is silent on this issue as it does not explicitly state that parties should 
submit a list as well as field candidates in constituencies so as to conform to the nature 
of the ideal electoral system. 
The ABC and the LCD did not comply with the principles of the electoral system. The 
submission of the PR seats was done by their coalition partners, i.e. the LWP and the 
NIP. The basis of this was to give preferences to those candidates in the ABC and LCD 
who were seen as going to lose the elections, yet they were senior members. 
Significantly, Reynolds and Reilly (1997:75) give a similar example of this by indicating 
that  
MMP can give rise to what are called “strategic voting” anomalies. In 
New Zealand in 1996, in the constituency of Wellington Central, 
some National Party strategists urged voters not to vote for the 
National Party candidate, because they had calculated that under 
MMP his election would not give the National Party another seat in 
parliament, but simply replace another MP from their party list.  It 
was therefore better for the National Party to see a candidate elected 
from another party, providing he was in sympathy with the National 
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Party’s ideas and ideology, than for votes to be “wasted” in support 
of their own candidate.   
There were no legal instruments established in order to monitor the status of coalitions 
in the country. It can be argued that parties which did not participate in the constituency-
based electoral ballot should not have been entitled to the compensatory seats on the 
PR ballot. But there is no legal instrument prohibiting or stating how the allocation of 
seats should be done and the constitution is silent as well. These coalitions were also 
not registered legally with the Lesotho Law Office. 
Likoti (2007:7) points out that “there are pacts with no force of law, no constitution and 
the electoral law is silent on such informal pacts”. This informality of the coalitions 
means that the IEC cannot treat them as one party in the allocation of PR seats. Each 
party was treated independently in the allocation of seats. Importantly, Likoti (2007:7) 
argues that “while the PR lists of alliances reflected names of candidates from other 
parties, this does not mean anything because the National Assembly Election Act is 
silent on the membership of a candidate who is nominated for PR and FPTP”.  
Another significant issue absent from the Act is that it does not specify whether the PR 
candidates submitted to the IEC should belong to a certain party. It does not give a 
clear indication of the merits and demerits of including the names of individuals in the 
PR lists. Consequently, both the LCD and ABC were able to submit their members 
under both the names of the NIP and LWP respectively.  
This coalition between the ABC/LWP and the LCD/NIP did not amount to a formal 
breaking of the rules of the game; there is no official legal instrument prohibiting these 
coalitions, but the spirit of the rules of the game was broken. The ABC and LCD did not 
take into account the political background and the political culture of the country that led 
to the adoption of MMP.  
What is likely to complicate this issue is that some LCD members in parliament via the 
NIP PR list were appointed into the executive. These are the current Minister of Trade 
and Industry, Popane Lebesa, who is also the LCD Secretary; Lebohang Ntsinyi, 
Minister of Tourism, who is  also the LCD deputy secretary; and the Minister of 
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Education, Mamphono Khaketla (Public Eye, 30 March 2007). These LCD members 
were defeated in their respective constituencies under the FPTP by the ABC. The Ace 
project (www.aceproject.org/today/feature-articles/the-mmp-electoral-system, 08 June 
2008) states that it “defies a common political sense that a person can stand for two 
parties in one election, because there were no legal or constitutional provisions that 
prohibited political parties from forming alliances or coalitions”. 
I am of the view that the blame cannot be directed at the Lesotho MMP system. Its 
inclusivity in terms of the allocation of seats was undermined by the self-interest of 
politicians who were eager to maximise their share in the allocation of PR seats. As a 
result, the allocation of seats occurred in accordance with the principles of a mixed 
parallel system.  
It can also be argued that the allocation of seats does not represent an accurate picture 
of a mixed parallel system. Neither the ABC nor the LCD appeared in the PR list. Also, 
the NIP appeared under FPTP in nine constituencies. It can therefore not be accurately 
classified as a fully mixed parallel system.  
But I strongly believe that this allocation occurred in the form of mixed parallel system 
as both the LCD and ABC benefited under both under FPTP and PR systems, despite 
the fact that they did not contest the PR seats. Matlosa (2007) correctly asserted PR 
has failed to compensate the losing parties. In the allocation of seats, the number of 
seats won in the FPTP did not have an effect on the number of PR seats allocated to 
each party as the two tiers were treated differently. This is similar to Japan’s mixed-
member system. Gallagher and Mitchel (2005:281) argue that in the Japanese mixed 
member system, 
the candidate who receives the most [FPTP] votes wins the seat. 
The number of seats won in the [FPTP] has no effect on the number 
of PR seats allocated to that party. In terms of seat allocation, the 
two tiers are completely separate. 
In their common cause against the government, opposition parties formed a coalition 
consisting of the ABC, ACP, BNP, LWP and MFP, popularly known as the “Big Five”. 
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These parties publicly pledged their support to Anthony Manyeli’s NIP faction as the 
legitimate one which was entitled to the PR seats. This is because Anthony Manyeli’s 
list did not have LCD members. They have pointed that the LCD/NIP coalition under 
Motseki Motikoe was declared null and void by the High Court, only to be overturned 
later by the Court of Appeal. They have argued that it was unconstitutional for the Court 
of Appeal to overturn the High Court verdict.   
The “Big Five” also based their concerns on the relevant constitutional clauses. These 
are Section 69 (6) of Lesotho’s constitution, as mentioned before, which stipulates that 
“the decision by the High Court in an election dispute cannot appear before the Appeals 
Courts”. Similarly, the National Assembly Order 1992 (section 111) stipulates that “the 
decision by the High Court in an election dispute is final”.  
On 16 March 2007 Anthony Manyeli went to the National Assembly demanding that the 
speaker of the National Assembly recognise him as the legitimate leader of the NIP. 
Anthony Manyeli went to the National Assembly with 20 members hoping that the “Big 
Five” would influence the speaker to accede to their demands, so that they could be 
sworn in as legitimate MPs (Public Eye, 23 March 2007). 
Upon his failure to be sworn in as an MP, the “Big Five” staged a sit-in protest in 
parliament against what they described as the unfair treatment of Anthony Manyeli and 
the unfair allocation of PR seats. But this sit-in protest in parliament was brought to a 
halt by the military. The opposition MPs were forcibly ejected from the parliament house 
by the military. Public Eye (23 March 2007) aptly captures the events of that fateful day, 
16 March 2007, by noting that 
upon seeing the military boots, camouflage gear and rifles in their 
midst, opposition MPs almost chest-pushed down heavy parliament 
doors as each and everyone of them struggled for survival and 
rushed to be the first to get out of the house. All hell broke loose 
when the muscled military officers man-handled one of the 
opposition members, Sello Machakela, who started kicking in vain 
[and] protest[ed] into the sky as he was carried out of parliament. As 
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the drama unfolded, opposition MPs almost forgot the vows and 
commitments of an ‘injury to one is an injury to all’ which they had 
made ... instead of pushing one another to the doors, they were 
pulling each other back. It was everyman for himself. 
This drew a sharp criticism from the opposition parties, who claimed that the LCD 
government was using the military to guard against what they described “as the 
unconstitutional assumption of state power” (Billy Macaefa, Leader of the Lesotho 
Workers Party (LWP), 16 March 2007). I disagree with Billy Macaefa’s view, however, 
because the LCD was the majority party in parliament with 62 seats in the parliament. 
Even if the re-allocation of the 40 PR seats was to be re-done, it would still remain 
government of the day because of its parliamentary majority.   
Furthermore, after the opposition’s abortive attempt to force the speaker to accede to 
their grievances, they called for a public ‘stay-away from work’. This ‘stay-away’ almost 
paralysed the effective functioning of the government. Civil servants were left stranded 
as the public transport commuters joined the stay-away and refused to take them to 
work.  
The commercial sectors across Maseru and in other urban centres remained closed.  
Violent incidents were reported. Those who did not participate in the opposition stay-
away were harassed and some cars were burnt and shops looted. The stay-away was 
suspended after SADC intervened and promised to look into the problem of the 
allocation of seats.  
SADC appointed the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, to mediate in 
the political impasse between the LCD government and opposition parties over the 
allocation of PR seats following the Constitutional Court judgement. Nonetheless, 
external intervention efforts have so far proved fruitless. Opposition parties have 
accused Sir Ketumile Masire of supporting the LCD government.  
The LCD government has also refused to negotiate with the “Big Five” parties. It has 
argued that the issue of the allocation of PR seats has been solved by the Constitutional 
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Court. According to Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, who is also the leader of the LCD, 
the following reasons contributed to the failure of mediation process. 
1. Mekha ea bohanyetsi e tsitlaletse hore ho khutleloe tabeng ea kabo ea litulo 
joaloka ha eka Lekhotla le Phahameng ha lea e qeta. Ba re ho bitsoe litsebi tsa 
machaba ho tla aba litulo bocha. Joale rona re le LCD re lomahentse meno re re le 
ho leka! Litsebi tseo tsa bona li na kob’a bohali kapa oona matla a ho etsolla 
likahlolo tsa makhotla a Lesotho. 
2. Mekha ea bohanyetsi e batla hore ho fetoloe mofuta oa likhetho (electoral model) 
hape. Ba re ho aroloe litulo tsa Lekhotla La Sechaba ka ho lekana pakeng tsa 
masieasieane le khekhethane, ho seng joalo ho hle ho felisoe mabatooa ha hang, 
ho sebelisoe khekhethane feela (100 % PR). Joale LCD e re ha ho nonyana e 
llang joalo.   
3. Mekha ea bohanyetsi ba re ho uoe likhethong tse ncha nakong e etsang likhoeli 
tse 18 ho tloha hona joale. Re re na hobane’ng, e le ha ho etsahetse eng ha re 
tsoa likhethong tse akaretsang ka 2007. Rona re re ho hlomphuoe qeto/khetho ea 
sechaba, LCD etla busa ho fihlela 2012! 
4. Mekha ea bohanyetsi ka eona ke ha ba re ho eketsoe litulo tse 20 ka Lekhotleng la 
Sechaba e le ‘matseliso (compensation) ho batho ba hlotsoeng ho kena 
paramenteng. Taba ena e tsoaloa ke tumelo e fahliloeng ea ba bohanyetsi ea hore 
hantle-ntle litulo tse 21 li abetsoe selekane sa LCD/ NIP ka phoso, e n’e ts’oanela 
ebe li aroletsoe mekha ea bohanyetsi (Seboka sa Boetapele, 26-28/09/2008).  
This is translated as follows.  
1. Opposition parties have strongly insisted that the allocation of PR seats should 
be examined despite the Constitutional Court ruling. They have insisted that 
international experts on electoral systems should be consulted and tasked with 
the process of re-allocating the disputed PR seats. The LCD as the ruling party 
does not support such a move because the Constitutional Court has ruled that 
there is nothing wrong in the allocation of PR seats. The LCD has indicated that 
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international experts do not have the authority to overturn the rulings made by 
the Constitutional Court of Lesotho. 
2. Opposition parties want the current electoral system (MMP) to be changed. They 
have insisted that the allocation of seats should be done equally between FPTP 
and PR seats; alternatively, FPTP should be abolished and full PR be used in the 
allocation of the seats for the National Assembly. The LCD does not support this 
demand. 
3. Opposition parties have demanded that new elections should be held within a 
period of 18 months. The LCD has rejected such a move and it does not see 
anything wrong with the 2007 elections. The LCD has indicated that it will be in 
power until the next elections which are scheduled for 2012. 
4. Opposition parties have demanded that the size of National Assembly should be 
increased by 20 PR seats. This is to compensate for the 21 PR seats which 
opposition parties believe were wrongly allocated by the IEC to the LCD/NIP 
alliance. (my own translation from Sesotho) (Seboka sa Boetapele, 26-
28/09/2008).   
The “Big Five” refused to recognise the LCD as the legitimate government. Their 
supporters attempted to frustrate the government’s development plans in some urban 
constituencies on the basis that it did not win any urban constituencies. Added to these 
political tensions, the homes of government ministers as well as the ABC leader were 
attacked by unknown gunmen (Public Eye, 23 March 2007). 
Rising political tempers saw violent clashes in some urban constituencies between the 
LCD and the opposition supporters. Illegal roadblocks were mounted by unknown 
assailants who “strangely managed to disarm some military personnel patrolling 
Maseru” (MoAfrika Radio Programme, Mafekefeke, 24 June 2007). Sporadic incidents 
of violence were reported, which the military and police battled to contain. 
Consequently, the government imposed a curfew to curb what was likely to turn into 
anarchy.  
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Has institutional legitimacy been restored? Since the 2002 elections the military has 
hardly intervened in politics. After the 2007 elections, the military acted swiftly to quell 
the political impasse between the speaker of the National Assembly and the opposition 
parties. The King seemed to have remained a more potent destabilising force than the 
military. But there were unconfirmed allegations that some military personnel assisted 
the opposition parties in trying to destabilise the government. Some military senior 
officers were arrested in June 2007 and have been charged with sedition, high treason 
and conspiracy to overthrow the government. 
Political tempers have continued to rise. The LCD government further issued a 
statement that it had uncovered opposition plans to assassinate some government 
ministers, senior civil servants and business people. The LCD government further noted 
that it has learnt about opposition efforts to topple the government and also to lure the 
military into assisting them (Mothejoa Metsing, Minister of Communications, Science 
and Technology, Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 20 December 2007). 
The military has abided by the provisions of the constitution and has been working 
cooperatively with the police to maintain law and order. The monarchy has appealed to 
all major political stakeholders to resolve their political differences in a peaceful manner 
and to exhaust all the available legal avenues to redress their grievances (Public Eye, 
23 March 2007).   
While the reforms regarding the monarchy, the military and the electoral system seem 
to be in place, the remaining obstacles remain socio-economic. Southall (2003) argues 
that as the result of increasing famine, declining migrant labour and the rising levels of 
unemployment, it was unlikely that MMP would offer long-term solutions in Lesotho. 
Some well-known figures who were MPs in 2002 have now been left out of the 
government and have taken to criticising the LCD government and labelling it as 
illegitimate. The MMP has led to political instabilities and has “negated the consensus 
… [it] ... was designed to promote” (Ace report, www.aceproject.org/today/feature-
articles/the-mmp-electoral-system, 08 June 2008).  
 222
The spirit of the rules of Lesotho’s MMP has been broken. It can be argued that the 
allocation of seats looks like a mixed parallel electoral system in “which the calculations 
of FPTP and PR seats are made separately and do not have any effect on each other” 
(Ace report, www.aceproject.org/today/feature-articles/the-mmp-electoral-system, 08 
June 2008).  
5.7 Assessment 
The reforms were long in the making. Lesotho’s military reluctantly managed the 
transition to democratic rule in 1993. A significant breakthrough occurred in 1990 after 
the monarchy was stripped of legislative and executive functions. This development 
compelled the military administration to introduce a return to democratic rule as it was 
engulfed in a legitimacy crisis – the monarchy had managed to provide some form of 
legitimacy after the military’s assumption of power in 1986. The Council of State was 
formed to deal with election-related political violence. A Defence Commission was also 
established to handle military issues. However, there were no major constitutional 
changes to the old 1966 constitution. 
The return to democratic rule in 1993 was seen as positive step towards 
democratisation. Matlosa (1997:ii) notes that since 1970, “elections did not feature 
prominently in the rulers political scheme of things as their legitimacy rested more on 
coercion … than persuasion and consensus”.  
While people yearned for elections as a way to regain their roles in the country’s 
democratic process, the “military also saw it as a means of easing itself out of the mire 
of perpetual coups [and] legitimacy crisis” (Mahao, 1997:12). As a result of entrenched 
military interests in the domains of state power and the continuing insistence on 
executive powers by the monarchy, it was unlikely that democratic stability would 
survive after democratisation in the post-1993 period (as the monarchy remained 
restless). Consequently, the BCP government battled to impose its authority over the 
security establishment of the state and the monarchy. Its leadership, cabinet ministers 
and MPs vented their frustrations at the military, often labelling it as Chief Leabua 
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Jonathan’s army. Re-democratisation efforts went fairly well except for elements in the 
military and royalist forces.  
In 1994 the BCP, and later the LCD government, embarked on the restructuring process 
in the military with the intention of creating an apolitical army. Technical assistance was 
sought from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe to enhance the transformation of 
the military. The Ministry of Defence and National Security was established, which 
became the headquarters of the military. Another important transformative issue was 
the formation of the Defence Council, which managed to place the military much more 
under civilian authority. The Defence Council handled all issues relating to the military, 
and the terms and conditions of its members’ service. Educational programmes and 
seminars on the role of military in a democracy were organised for military personnel. 
But the results of this transformative exercise of the military proved fruitless after the 
1998 elections as the military once again intervened in politics.  
The other problem which arose during the new re-democratisation phase were 
problematic elections. The BNP refused to accept not only the 1970 outcome but also 
the 1993 election outcome on the allegations of ballot rigging. Bratton and Van de Walle 
(1998) argue that acceptance of the validity of founding elections by the losing parties is 
important because it signals the first tentative consensus on democratic rule. 
Since the 1965 elections there have always been feelings of marginalisation amongst 
the losing parties in the democratic process as the result of FPTP, which led to skewed 
parliamentary representation. After the 1965 elections the BNP became a minority 
government with less than 50% of the total vote – but with the majority of seats. Even in 
the aborted 1970 elections, there could still have been skewed representation in the 
national assembly. In the 1993 elections the BNP was the party that came second, with 
over 20% of the votes, but did not have representation in parliament. The tables were 
thus turned. The BCP with 74,7% of the vote got all 65 parliamentary seats.  
Due to this crisis of representation and feelings of marginalisation in the democratic 
process, the BNP resorted to destabilising the government. This suggests that there 
was a problem with the electoral system. Even after the assumption of state power by 
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the LCD in 1997, which was supported by the majority of the MPs, opposition parties 
refused to recognise the LCD as the legitimate government – again because of over-
representation. They organised public protests against what they claimed was the 
violation of democratic principles and appealed to the King to dismiss Ntsu Mokhehle. 
This was contrary the practices of the Westminster model, which allows MPs to cross 
the floor to make or unmake Prime Ministers as they see fit. 
In the 1998 elections the losing parties got almost 40% of the votes, but had only one 
seat. The LCD with 60,7% of the vote had 79 seats. Arguably, 40% of the votes were 
not adequately represented in parliament. Consequently, opposition parties resorted to 
violence. The country was engulfed into the worst political violence which almost 
precipitated a state of anarchy and civil war. 
The winner takes all system has made an enormous contribution to the country’s 
democratic breakdowns. It led to problematic elections, which paved the way for 
electoral reforms and the MMP system was adopted for the 2002 elections. Tekle 
(1998:175) argues that  
mutual appreciation of opposing views must be accepted and the 
conviction that losers lose everything while winners take it all can no 
longer be the norm. It must be recognised that in a democracy 
winners and losers are partners and not enemies who must destroy 
each other. Electoral systems must advance this in law and practice. 
Makoa (2002:3) argues that despite the bloody conflicts over the election results, 
“Basotho people have steadfastly clung to the view that elections are the only legitimate 
means of appointing their government”. But elections in Lesotho are only celebrated by 
the victorious party, whilst the losing parties have since independence consistently 
refused to accept the outcome. 
Makoa (2002) further argues that “elections have as yet not brought national unity”.  
Despite the country’s ethnic homogeneity, the political elites are divided and there is a 
lack of collective responsibility among the political elites over developmental projects 
affecting the welfare of the nation. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
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Events Leading to the Political Disturbances which occurred in Lesotho during the 
period between 1st July to 30 November 1998 (2001:56) notes that 
Basotho people speak one language and are all of the same tribe. 
Despite this, the evidence revealed Lesotho to be divided and 
troubled society divided by fundamental differences of views on 
diverse matters and troubled by its failure to reconcile them. 
 Similarly, Makoa (2002:3) argues that  
individuals and political parties competing for state power have been 
prepared to discredit, undermine and directly oppose national 
development projects that might increase or strengthen their 
opponents’ popularity and political support.   
I concur with Makoa’s (2002) argument, because the levels of cooperation between the 
political elites have been minimal. There has been lack of trust and tolerance of differing 
views. Political elites have since independence directed their efforts at campaigns and 
protests to destabilise the position of their rivals.  
After the 2002 elections, for the first time in the country’s history, 10 political parties 
were represented in parliament. The parliament was therefore much more inclusive and 
representative of all the political stakeholders. Consequently, violence was reduced to a 
minimum and peace prevailed. The long-term prospects of peace were short-lived as 
the 2007 elections, still run under the MMP system, created more problems than 
anticipated. Opposition parties have argued that they are not adequately represented in 
parliament. The leader of the ACP, Kelebone Maope on (10 December 2007), argued 
that “injustice has been done to us, we were cheated, the BNP has been robbed of its 
five seats while the New Lesotho Freedom Party (NLFP) was completely denied its 
proportional share”  
Despite the prevailing political instability in the country since the 2007 election, the 
Lesotho MMP system was adopted through the IPA reforms with the intention of 
ensuring that all political parties are represented in parliament. But it has been 
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manipulated by the same politicians who were pleased with its achievements in the 
2002 elections.  
The current political standoff in Lesotho does not mean that there are serious flaws with 
MMP system. The problem is only that it is very complicated to operationalise in 
Lesotho. But it has worked successfully in Germany. In Lesotho’s MMP system it seems 
that the two methods of seat allocation (FPTP and PR) operated independently from 
each other. Compared to the German system, Lesotho’s MMP system has the following 
shortcomings:  
- no upward flexibility in the size of parliament; 
- no legal specification that parties must register for both ballots; 
- no legal guidelines for coalitions (treated as one party or not, legal registration required 
or not, individuals on lists).   
Lesotho’s MMP system was adopted with the intention that it would not be manipulated 
by political parties but there were no measures to close any possible loopholes. I concur 
with the South African Development Community (SADC) (2007:4) view that  
any reforms of MMP systems should consider making explicit the 
legal status of alliances and coalitions, particularly when it comes to 
the calculation of quotas. The law should guide election 
administrators as to how to allocate compensatory seats in cases 
where coalitions are not officially registered or when the parties listed 
on the constituency are not the same as those on the party ballots.  
What is interesting is that, if the IEC were to re-allocate the 40 PR seats within the 
LCD/NIP coalition (if considered as one party) by virtue of winning over 60 constituency 
seats, its share over the compensatory seats would be reduced significantly. The 
ABC/LWP coalition (if considered as one party) would be compensated in proportion to 
the seats at the constituency level. For citizens this is confusing. 
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Seemingly, the electoral reforms have not solved the country’s democratic problems. 
Instead of ensuring that there is inclusivity in parliament, more election-related conflicts 
have resulted. Tlakula, Molokomme and Jordan (2003:28) argue that this manipulation 
of the MMP system has not reflected or given a clear representation of the major 
political stakeholders in Lesotho. He further state that 
parliament must be an accurate map of the whole nation, a portrait of 
the people, faithful echo of the voices, a mirror that reflects 
accurately the various parts of the society. It is only when parliament 
reflects a cross-section of society that society needs can be 
addressed adequately. 
Likoti (2007:10) argues that the other problematic challenge of the MMP system is that it 
gives room for coalition politics and “they are usually prone to pernicious combinations 
of ideological incoherence [and] policy stalemate”. I concur with this assessment, 
because the ABC and LCD joined in coalitions with the LWP and NIP respectively with 
differing ideological positions. These coalitions of convenience were prompted merely 
by the desire for more PR seats. Does the electoral system now create a larger number 
of smaller parties? 
The fruits of the restructuring of the military in 1998 were seen after the 2007 elections, 
as it refused to be drawn into the political impasse. Perhaps the gradual phasing out of 
the senior military officers and their replacement with the new generation has minimised 
the military’s involvement in politics. After the 2002 and 2007 elections the military has 
not intervened in politics; it has abided by the provisions of the constitution and 
supported the government of the day. But electoral politics became more confusing 
except that monarchical politics became more stabilised.  
The consistently dismal performance by the royalist MFP in the elections has reduced 
monarchical influence in politics. In 1993 it had 1,2% of the vote; in 1998 it had 1,3% of 
the vote; in 2002 it had 1,2% of the vote; and in 2007 it had 2,1% of the vote. This 
shows that people prefer a democratic system of government rather than a monarchical 
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rule. This was contrary to the MFP stance that the monarchical system of administration 
was better than that of the democratically elected representatives. 
5.8 Implications for democratic consolidation 
Democratic consolidation entails a combination of various institutional and socio-
economic arguments. O’Donnell (1996a) argues that a democratic regime can be 
consolidated when it is “likely to endure and may ... last well into the future”. But for 
democratic consolidation to occur there has to be a particular set of conditions. Leftwich 
(2000) proposes the following conditions: legitimacy, adherence to the rules of the 
game, policy restraint, poverty reduction and an absence of ethnic divisions. As argued 
before, Lesotho meets only the last of these.   
Leftwich (2000:132) argues that “no democratic polity can survive and become 
consolidated unless it enjoys some form of legitimacy, whether of the passive 
acceptance kind or whether of the uncommon positive kind”. But as a result of defects 
of FPTP (skewed parliamentary representation) in Lesotho, opposition parties felt 
excluded from the political system and they resorted to protest politics. They also 
refused to recognise the legitimacy of the victorious parties. But the electoral reforms 
were able to offer a solution to the problem of marginalisation and the unequal 
representation in parliament after the 2002 elections were run under MMP system. 
Almost all parties were represented in parliament. But the main opposition (BNP) still 
refused to accept the election outcome and to recognise the LCD as the legitimate 
government. Without themselves, they would not recognise the redemocratisation of 
Lesotho.  
After the 2007 election opposition parties have refused to recognise the LCD as the 
legitimate government and to adhere to the rules of the game. They even appealed to 
South Africa and regional organisations (SADC) not to recognise the LCD as the 
legitimate government. None of the neighbouring states did that.  
From the 1993 to 2007 elections the governments have always lacked legitimacy. 
Political parties have dragged in other organs of the state (military and monarchy) to 
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destabilise the democratic governments. The losers have never abided by the results of 
the elections and they showed minimal commitment to the democratic process.  
Likoti (2007:9) offers an interesting argument that this was because the LCD pursued 
highly contentious policies. This was contrary to Leftwich (2000) argument that 
governments should not pursue highly contentious policies. The LCD used its 
dominance in the National Assembly to pass the contentious policies that had negative 
implications for democratic consolidation, such as the Members of the Parliament 
Salaries Act in 2003. This act dealt with the MPs’ salaries and benefits. In the 
deliberations over the amendment of this act, Matlosa (2007:71) argues that the LCD 
government strongly maintained that “Proportional Representation MPs do not 
represent the electorate but only their parties. So they cannot be given constituency 
allowances because they have no constituencies”.  
Matlosa (2007:72-73) argues that this had some negative implications for democratic 
consolidation because it led to 
a high level of suspicion, mistrust and even hostility between the 
ruling LCD and the main opposition BNP. In other words, the 
electoral/ parliamentary reforms have not enhanced the prospects for 
co-operation between them. The BNP, along with fewer smaller 
parties, does not believe the ruling party is committed to the principle 
of inclusive government, given that it does not regard proportional 
representation MPs as legitimate representatives of the people …. 
proportional representation and first-past-the-post MPs are treated 
differently in relation to constituency allowances is an important 
political issue. It seems that the former do not believe they are 
relevant or share ownership of the system. Democracy is possible 
only when all stakeholders feel they are integral players. 
I concur with this assertion, because PR MPs developed a negative attitude towards the 
LCD government. An opposition MP argued that we are always outvoted in terms of 
parliamentary bills; we do not make any significant contribution to the democratic 
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process. Though the PR MPs do not get constituency allowances, Lesotho law does not 
discriminate between the FPTP and PR MPs. It regards all the MPs as equal in the 
National Assembly, but the LCD government has been using its majority to marginalise 
PR MPs.   
Likoti (2007) argues that whilst the country’s constitution prohibits any form of 
discrimination, it does not provide the essential remedies for judicial intervention in a 
parliamentary stalemate. The absence of this has made it difficult for those PR MPs to 
seek recourse from the courts for such discrimination in parliament. Hence, PR MPs are 
not seen as legitimate MPs by the LCD and its supporters; this has led to increasing 
hostility between the LCD and the opposition parties. Private interests, rather than 
matters of principle, seem to have been the problem here.   
Given such instances where political actors have failed to adhere to the rules of the 
game and the ruling party did not exercise policy restraint, I am of the view that 
democracy has not become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996) and is 
unlikely “to last well into the future” (O’Donnell, 1996a). It has not been behaviourally, 
attitudinally and constitutionally embraced by the political actors or the majority of the 
population. Still, the greater legitimacy of the political system after the crises of 1993, 
1998 and especially 2002 to 2007 is an improvement, but we remain sceptical about the 
unlikelihood of breakdowns in future. With much of the older institutional problems 
settled, weak socio-economic might well feature in future. This is what Przeworski et. al 
(1996) and Leftwich (2000) wrote about.  
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CHAPTER 6: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN  
THE ENDURANCE OF DEMOCRACY 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Lesotho’s key institutions of state (the military, the monarchy and the political parties) 
have always played a significant role in the country’s democratic breakdowns. The 
military became an active political actor after the re-democratisation process in 1993 in 
that it competed for political power with the democratically elected civilian governments. 
The monarchy, which was supposed to be a unifying actor, did not abide by its 
constitutional role, but also competed for both political and executive power. Since the 
2002 elections the military has not intervened in politics as a result of a comprehensive 
re-training programme. This is a democratic dividend.  
The electoral reforms and adoption of an MMP system in the 2002 election managed to 
minimise political conflicts. More parties were represented in parliament and in a more 
equitable way, which was a milestone considering the history of two-party domination 
since the 1965 elections. This was followed by period of relative peace and stability until 
the 2007 elections. The question is: apart from the complexities of the electoral system 
as well as the issue of representation in coalitions, are there perhaps additional factors 
other than institutions that obstruct the consolidation of democracy? But problems still 
remain with the different interpretations of how the MMP system has to be 
operationalised as well as the dependency of the state on the external sources of 
income and increasing incidences of poverty.  
The chapter focuses on the role of economic and social factors that are essential for the 
consolidation of democracy. The “multivariate model” of Bratton Van de Walle (1997) 
and Leftwich (2000) suggest the significance of economic and social factors for 
democratic consolidation. Leftwich (2000:131) argued that democratic survival requires 
factors such as affluence, growth, reduction of inequality and a strong civil society. 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) also emphasised a high level of literacy and an 
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established middle class. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) “multivariate model” as well 
as Przeworski et.al (1996) and Leftwich (2000) will form crucial aspects within which the 
economic and social factors in Lesotho will be gauged upon.       
This chapter begins with a focus on the economic issues such as per capita income, 
economic growth and reduction of income inequality. The social issues that will be 
covered will include literacy rates, civil society and the role of the middle class.  
6.2 Economic issues: per capita income and growth   
The economic indicators discussed in this section will be broken down into per capita 
income, economic growth and inequality reduction so as to assess their significance in 
the consolidation of democracy. Leftwich (2000) argues that affluence was critical for 
the survival of democracies. He concurs with Przeworski et al. (1996) that per capita 
incomes are very important for the survival of democracies. Przeworski et al. (1996) 
argues that democracies are “fragile” (based on data for 1990) if their per capita 
incomes are lower than US$1000. But per capita incomes that are more than US$6000 
make democracies impregnable. By now these figures can be assumed to be about 
US$3,000 or less and US$18,000 or more.   
According to the United Nations Human Development Report 2000, Trends in human 
development and per capita income, Lesotho’s per capita in 1975 was US$220, in 1980 
it was US$311, and in 1985 it was US$295. According to Africa at a Glance (1992:80), 
in 1989 Lesotho’s per capita income was US$470. In 1990 per capita income was 
US$386. In 2005 it was US$950 (Breytenbach, 2007:110). This was more than twelve 
times lower than the “impregnable” category of Przeworski and also more than half 
lower than the “fragile” category. 
Judged by Przeworskian notions, Lesotho was clearly a case of being too poor for 
democracy to endure. Adjusted for inflation, these benchmarks must be higher, as 
indicated above. In his study in 2007, Breytenbach found that the average per capita 
income of Africa’s oldest surviving multiparty democracies since independence was US 
$ 2996 which is more than three times higher than the average of Lesotho. This is again 
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an indication that Lesotho’s profile in terms of affluence was far below democratic 
endurance levels. It is perhaps still in the “fragile” category. 
Lesotho has experienced very poor economic performance since 1966. Most of the 
external sources of income (migrant remittances, foreign aid and SACU revenues), 
which amounted to a high proportion to her revenues, have declined. The mining boom 
which increased her exports production in the 1980s was short-lived.  
Lesotho does not have a viable economic base through which a strong national 
economy could be created and has low levels of affluence. Makoa (1996:18) correctly 
asserted that Lesotho has a poor functioning economy, which does not have the ability 
to produce goods and services that could be sold on competitive markets.Its 
dependency on South Africa is key.   
Lesotho’s economy has several distinctive features. The country hardly constituted a 
coherent economy prior to independence in 1966. It had long being relegated to being a 
labour reserve for South Africa by the colonial administration (Lundall, McCarthy and 
Petersson, 2003:35). Makoa (1996) wrote that on the eve of independence Lesotho 
barely had a modern communications system. There was a small road network which 
was in poor condition.  
According to Cobbe (1983:18), this did not only militate against creating a viable 
sustainable economy, but it also reinforced the country’s status as the labour reserve for 
South Africa. He argued that 
to a large degree, the economic life of the country was fragmented 
into a number of rural hinterlands that interacted economically with 
the closest South African market across the border and the more 
distant mines and urban centres where migrant workers earned cash 
income. 
According to Bardill and Cobbe (1985), the most productive sector of the economy-
government services excluded, was agriculture, which made the highest contribution to 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1967 to 1968. The manufacturing sector was 
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weak and underdeveloped, and there were no major mining activities. Table 11 below 
shows the sectoral origin of GDP between 1967- 68, immediately after independence.  
Table 11: Sectoral Origin of GDP in 1967-68 
Sector  Percentage 
Agriculture 39,0 
Mining and quarries 2,0 
Manufacturing 0,7 
Construction 1,7 
Services (including government) 56,6 
Total 100 
Source: Kingdom of Lesotho, Lesotho First Five-Year Development Plan 
 1970/71 
The most reliable source of income came through foreign aid, migrant remittances and 
revenues from the Southern African Custom Union (SACU).Table 12 below shows 
government revenues between 1965-1966. This shows its vulnerability.  
Table 12: Lesotho government revenues, 1965-1966 
Revenue Maloti Percentage 
Direct taxes 1,084 10,6 
Customs Union receipts 1,637 15,9 
Other indirect taxes 239 2,3 
Other local revenue 406 4,0 
UK grant-in-aid 5,202 50,7 
UK overseas aid scheme 353 3,4 
UK Colonial Develop and welfare grant 1,346 13,1 
Total 10,266 100 
Source: Ward, 1967:355-368 
Throughout the 1960s the country recorded a very poor economic performance. 
Agriculture at almost 40% was the main contributor to the country’s GDP. The 
manufacturing sector contributed less than 1% to the GDP. It was largely undeveloped 
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and poor. As mentioned there was heavy dependence on the external sources of 
income, especially foreign aid. The level of affluence was too low; and the economy was 
characterised by extreme poverty and low productivity. Consequently, there was neither 
affluence nor was there space for a robust middle class to grow. These have negative 
implications for civil society.  
Between 1970-1980 the GDP growth rate was 7 per cent per annum, while the Gross 
National Product (GNP) grew faster at 7,4% per annum (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985:46). 
These imbalances were in terms of the GDP, while GNP growth rates were caused by 
the following factors. The remittances from the migrant workers who were working in the 
gold and coal mines in South Africa increased rapidly by an estimated 8 per cent annum 
(World Bank, 1987b:15).  
The number of migrant workers increased from 87,400 in 1970 to 112,500 in 1975 and 
to 120,700 in 1980 (Shaw, 1983). There was a substantial increase of foreign aid from 
Britain, the United States of America (USA), West Germany, Denmark and other 
multilateral sources such as the World Bank (WB), the African Development Bank 
(ADB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985:66).  
Matlosa (1995:5) argues that the donors believed that “aid would be temporary therapy 
to set Lesotho on a growth path and would be terminated once this is achieved”. But 
this was not the case. Most foreign aid in the early post-colonial period was primarily for 
recurrent expenditure (budgetary aid) and capital expenditure (development aid). But 
the budgetary aid did not last; it was roughly estimated at M5.5 million in 1965-66. 
During the same period development aid amounted to M2.3 million (Jones, 1977:171). 
Wellings (1983:268) states that  
total UK aid rose to a peak of M8.6 million in 1966-67, dropped to its 
lowest ebb in 1970-71 (when aid was suspended for a brief period in 
response to a political coup in the country), revived somewhat 
afterwards, but reached only M3.8 million in 1972-73.  
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In the 1970s Lesotho’s aid continued to diversify (Gay, Gill and David, 1995:192). 
American assistance which began in 1966 in the form of food aid though the Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS) was increased in 1972/73 to cover technical assistance for 
health, family planning, manpower training and agriculture. Between 1966-75 USA 
assistance to Lesotho was US$26 million (Woodward, 1982:170). Table 13 below 
shows the growth of Lesotho’s foreign aid receipts between 1970 and 1980. 
Table 13: Lesotho’s foreign aid receipts, 1970-80 (million US$, net receipts) 
Year Aid receipts  
1970  10,0 
1971 16,8 
1972 14,1 
1973 14,2 
1974 22,3 
1975 28,6 
1976 30,1 
1977 38,8 
1978 50,1 
1979 64,2 
1980 90,3 
Source: Bardill and Cobbe, 1985: 66 
In the absence of viable and robust productive sectors, foreign aid evolved into an 
industry whose objectives were to boost economic growth and alleviate poverty 
throughout the 1980s to the 1990s (Matlosa, 1995:104). The diversification of aid 
sources was a “function of political sympathy towards a small, impoverished and 
landlocked country under the constant threat of apartheid South Africa” (Matlosa, 
1995:104). But in the 1990s foreign aid declined. In 1995 the amount of foreign aid that 
Lesotho received amounted to US$123.7 million. In 2007 this figure rose to US$350 
million (www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2831.htm, 25 March 2009). Foreign aid still plays a 
vital role in Lesotho’s economy.   
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Towards the end of the 1970s De Beers made a massive financial investment in 
diamond production at Lets’eng-la-Terai, which saw the sale of diamond exports 
increasing from M1.2 million  to M 16.7 million in 1978 to M 24.7 million in 1980 (Bureau 
of Statistics, 1987b:95).  
According to the 1974/75 estimates, the average earnings of the Basotho mines in 
South Africa were estimated at M95 million. The total value of goods imported to 
Lesotho by the migrant workers amounted to M20 million. Migrant remittances in this 
period were valued at about M30 million. The annual country’s imports in 1974/5 
amounted to M 86 million, while exports were only M10 million (Kingdom of Lesotho, 
Second Five Year Development Plan, Volume One, 1975/76-1979/80:6-7). Its impact on 
job creation is rather small.      
In the 1980s there were some changes in the structure of Lesotho’s economy. The 
boom in the diamond industry was short-lived and in 1982 the Lets’eng-la-Terai 
diamond mine was closed down (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991:66).Table 14 shows the 
decline of the country’s exports after the closure of the diamond mine.   
Table 14: Diamond exports from Lesotho, 1977-83 (million, maloti) 
Year Diamond Exports 
1977 1,2 
1978 16,7 
1979 21,2 
1980 24,7 
1981 18,2 
1982 15,2 
1983 0,9 
Source: Bureau of Statistics, 1987b:95 
The contribution of diamond mining to the economy has been unpredictable. Maleleka 
(2007:5) indicates that “in the past diamonds were not mined consistently because most 
of the initial feasibility studies at the exploration stage showed that diamond mining in 
Lesotho could not be sustained and commercialized”. Consequently, from 1983 to 1999 
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there was little commercial activity in relation to the diamond industry. But the 
production capacity of diamond mining changed from 1999 to 2006. This development 
was a result of the re-opening of the Letseng-la-Terai diamond mine in 1999.  
According to Lesotho News Agency (04/08/2008), Letseng-la-Terai diamond mine 
recovered the 15th and 18th largest diamonds in the world in 2006 and 2007 
respectively, which were reported to have been sold for over M70 million. In 2007 it was 
reported that diamond mines contributed 6,7% to the country’s GDP. But there is little 
statistical evidence from the government of Lesotho and there is no accurate public 
information about the diamond industry to prevent unconfirmed speculation on the 
nature of the industry.   
Though the diamond mining sector is emerging as an important contributor to Lesotho’s 
economy, it is generally capital intensive in a country with high unemployment levels. 
Maleleka (2007:12) states that “in March 2007 only 384 employees were employed by 
the mines … to further illustrate the poor employment capacity of the mines … 
Liqhobong operations in 2005-7 had only 75 Basotho employees”.   
In the 1980s it became impossible to maintain high economic growth rates. The growth 
rates were much lower than in the 1970s. GDP grew at 2,1 and GNP grew at 2,8 
percent per annum. The population growth rate was 2,6 percent per annum (Bureau of 
Statistics, 1999:15-20). Consequently, the per capita production declined and the per 
capita income stagnated.  
Prior to 1973 no consumer price index was computed in Lesotho. Lesotho did not have 
a currency of her own and the South African rand circulated freely, while goods from 
South Africa flowed into the country without any impediments (Lundahl, McCarthy and 
Petersson, 2003:47). Lesotho officially introduced her currency (maloti) at par with the 
South African rand in 1980. 
Both the rand and maloti are used as legal tender in Lesotho. The rate of inflation was 
much higher than in South Africa, which was around 7 per cent in the 1970s. Inflation in 
Lesotho increased to 13,6 per cent in 1973-75 (Matekane, 1992:31). In 1975 it 
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decreased to 11,6 per cent. It continued to fluctuate until the end of the 1970s. Table 15 
shows the fluctuating inflation rates in the country until 1988. 
Table 15: Inflation rates, 1979-88 
Year Inflation rates % 
1979 22,4 
1980 12,7 
1981 11,3 
1982 19,0 
1983 9,6 
1984 12,6 
1985 19,4 
1986 10,1 
1987 11,8 
Source: Bureau of Statistics, 2001a:4 
The country’s efforts to contain inflation are constrained by the fact that it belongs to the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA). This means that whatever measures are taken around 
the Maloti by the Central Bank of Lesotho have to be backed by the convertible foreign 
currencies (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991:277-8). Matekane (1992:19) concluded that 
the rate of inflation in Lesotho remained closely correlated with that of South Africa. 
Table 16 below further shows inflation trends from 1966 to 2007. 
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Table 16: Inflation levels, 1996- 2007 
Year  Inflation rates % 
1996  9,1 
1997  8,5 
1998  7,8 
1999 8,7 
2000 6,2 
2001  7 
2002  11,9 
2004  5 
2005  3,4 
2006  6,1 
2007  7,6 
Source: Standard Bank Lesotho Report, 2007:2 
These levels of inflation are uncontrollable because of the chronic economic 
dependence on South Africa’s economy.  
Lesotho’s economy continued to depend on migrant labour remittances, foreign aid and 
revenues from SACU throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. In 1992 the annual migrant 
earnings were M1,299,06 million, which was almost 87,4% of the country’s GNP. The 
miners’ remittances were M347,4 million. In 1992 the total government revenue was 
M1,019,6 million, of which M547,7 million came from SACU dividends (Kingdom of 
Lesotho, Budget 30 April 1994/95, Annexure 1).   
In the early 1990s there was increasing investment from the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project (LHWP). Investments related to the LHWP increased to almost 20 per cent of 
GNP between 1994/95 (Bureau of Statistics, 2000:19-20). In 1997/98 the country’s 
gross investment increased to around 40 per cent of the GNP. It was estimated that the 
royalty payments from the multi-billon dollar LHWP amounted to M143 million in 
1996/97 and M83 million in 1997/98. In the three subsequent years the royalties 
increased to M135 million by 2000/1 (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2002:10). 
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In 1998/ 99 the country’s economy experienced a significant decline (Lesotho National 
Development Corporation, 2001). This decline in the domestic sector was caused by the 
decline in the construction activities of the LHWP and weak growth in the other 
manufacturing sectors, apart from the garment industry. It was also aggravated by the 
1998 political crisis, which resulted in the destruction of the major commercial 
enterprises in the main urban centres (Sechaba Consultants, 2000).  
Most of the external factors that were historically crucial to Lesotho’s revenue declined 
in the mid-1990s. The Central Bank of Lesotho, Annual Report, 31 September 2005 
indicates that the numbers of Basotho migrant workers in South African mines declined 
from 95,913 in 1997 to 56,537 in 2004. Table 17 below shows the declining trends 
since 1997. Dependence meant more poverty.  
Table 17: Basotho migrant workers in South African mines, 1997-2004 
Year Number 
1997 95,913 
1998 80,445 
1999 68,604 
2000 64,907 
2001 61,412 
2002 62,000 
2003 61,413 
2004 56,357 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho, Annual Report, 31 December 2004:11; 
 Central Bank of Lesotho, Annual Report, 31 September 2005:12 
 
Since the 1994 political changes in South Africa, SACU revenues have also declined. 
This was a blow for Lesotho, as over 90% of her imports are from South Africa and she 
was able to claim substantial rebates, which amounted to 60% of total government 
revenue in the 1990s (it comes through compensation from the customs pool) (Sechaba 
Consultants, 2000:32). Most of the international agencies and diplomatic missions that 
were source of foreign aid closed their offices in Lesotho in 1994 and relocated to South 
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Africa and Botswana. Lesotho, therefore, benefited very little, if all, from the post-
apartheid dividend in the region.   
Lesotho’s economic performance still relied on foreign investment as opposed to local 
initiatives. The manufacturing sector, especially the garment industry, improved since 
2000 as a result of the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA). The AGOA 
agreement allows Lesotho’s textiles access to the United States (US) market without 
any duties and tariffs as result of its least developed status (Naumann, 2002:7). But this 
was a temporary project.  
It was reported that exports on the basis of AGOA to the US market doubled from 
US$110,8 million in 1999 to US$140,3 million in 2000 and US$215,3 million in 2001 
(Gibbon, 2002:35-36). Consequently, there was an increase in Lesotho’s commodity 
exports of 40% in 2002. The development of this export-led garment industry was able 
to create more jobs. It was estimated that in 1998 employment numbers in the textile 
and clothing sector doubled from 13,313 in 1998 to 26,185 in 2001 (Lesotho National 
Development Corporation, 2001:21). 
Lesotho’s GDP grew at an average total rate of 6.3 percent from 1970 to 1997 (Bureau 
of Statistics, 1999:1-2; World Bank, 1998-17). Despite the high average economic 
growth, rates of unemployment and underdevelopment kept on rising. This was the 
result of the increasing population density, declining productivity in agriculture and the 
decline in migrant labour. There was also stagnation in the growth of the public sector 
employment and the manufacturing sector failed to compensate for the poor 
performance of other sectors of the economy. 
Lesotho is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the World 
Bank (1998), the country’s total per capita GDP measured in terms of the Purchasing 
Power Parities was US$1,860 in 1997. This placed Lesotho among the world’s 50 
lowest-income countries. The Lesotho poverty line is M124.00 and 68% of its population 
is poor (May, 2001:24).The United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) ranked 
Lesotho 138th out of 177 states in 2007/8. This is not in the lowest but the lower-medium 
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category. This medium ranking is due to its relatively high literacy rates (see Table 18), 
despite low affluence levels.  
Poverty levels vary across the country’s four geographic regions: the highlands, the 
lowlands, the foothills and the Senqu River Valley. Poverty is rampant in the rural areas 
and remote highlands and the Senqu River Valley. More than 80% of people in these 
areas are characterised as “poor” or “destitute”. For most people in these areas it is 
normal not to have a toilet or to drink water from the river, and to gather cow dung for 
fuel. But poverty is also high in the lowlands and the foothills (Government of Lesotho, 
2002; Lundahl, McCarthy and Petersson, 2003; UNDP, 2002). 
The country’s small domestic market is also dominated by the more competitive South 
Africa’s business sector. The formal sector absorbs only 20% of new job seekers. It was 
predicted that the country’s labour force would increase by 20-25,000 annually, while 
the economy generates about 6,000-10,000 jobs each year. In 1998 unemployment 
levels were estimated at over 40% (Central Bank of Lesotho, 31 December 1998:15). In 
2005 unemployment levels had increased to over 54% (Central Bank of Lesotho, 
Annual Report, 31 September 2005). The overall impression is therefore that the 
economy is poor.    
6.3 Reduction of income inequality 
Lesotho has over the years experienced high levels of inequality in the way the income 
is distributed. The country’s economic growth rated at 7,2% from 1987 to 1992 did not 
benefit the population equally. According to the UNDP (1998), it was established that 
45% of the total national income flows to the richest people, who are only 10% of the 
population, presumably civil servants.While the poorest are in the rural, and mountain 
areas.  
 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy of Lesotho (2000:7) notes that “one severe implication 
of this skewed distribution of income is that growth in the national income levels such as 
GNP and GDP in Lesotho is less likely to benefit the poorest groups”. The Gini 
coefficient increased from 0,23 in the rural areas in 1967/69 to 0,57 in 1993 (Lundahl, 
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McCarthy and Petersson, 2003). The poorest are also the unemployed as well as 
peasant farmers especially in the mountains, as mentioned above.   
 
Przeworski et al. (1996) and Leftwich (2000) argue that democracy is likely to survive in 
countries where income inequalities are declining over time. But since 1990s the 
income gaps in Lesotho have kept on increasing between the few employed in the 
public sector, in the small private sector, and the majority of the retrenched migrant 
workers and the ranks of the unemployed. Przeworski et al. (1996) found that the 
expected lifespan of democracy in countries with declining income inequalities was 
about 84 years, while the expected lifespan of democracies with increasing income 
inequality was about 22 years. If this is the case, more breakdowns are likely to occur in 
Lesotho in future.  
Lesotho’s economic growth has therefore hardly benefited the entire citizenry. Lesotho’s 
state has failed to accumulate and redistribute wealth among her population. The 
country growth in the 1990s has not been effectively distributed and levels of inequality 
are high. Makoa (1996:19) argues that the state cannot create even a most basic 
‘welfare state’ to provide for the needs of its citizens. 
Table 18 below shows the trends of the UN Human Development Index of Lesotho 
since 1990. Despite fluctuations, the trend is downward.   
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Table 18: UN Human Development Index 1990-2007  
Year Rank Trend  
1990 78 - 
1992 107 worse 
1993 120 worse 
1998 127 worse 
2001 120 better 
2002 132 worse 
2003 149 worse 
2004 145 better 
2005 149 worse 
2006 149 same 
2007 138 better 
Source: UNDP, 2007:12 
Lesotho performs poorly when measured against aspects of the HDI such as life 
expectancy, mortality rates and standard of living. Life expectancy declined from 41 
years in 2000 to 35,6 years in 2007 (this is due to HIV/AIDS). The mortality rate was 
75,5% in 2000 and it has increased to 80,0% (UNDP, 2007:13). The only relatively 
positive indicator is adult literacy at 82%.    
It can be argued that the prospects of democratic survival in Lesotho are low. Almost all 
the economic preconditions for democratic endurance are virtually non-existent. The 
high economic growth rate in the 1990s did not manage to reduce the inequalities. It 
was accompanied by increasing levels of unemployment and low domestic production.  
Judged by the economic benchmarks of affluence, growth and income inequality 
reduction, Lesotho seems very fragile indeed. Although Leftwich (2000:135-145) 
reminds us that poverty is an obstacle to the survival of democracy, Przeworski et al. 
(1996:49) state that democracies can survive even in the poorest nations if institutions 
and other conditions remain favourable. To be sure, although Lesotho was rated “free” 
by Freedom House after 2002, its per capita income is the lowest of all “free” nations in 
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Eastern and Southern Africa (Breytenbach, 2005:63). Poor nations can therefore be 
free, but this is exceptional. India and Ghana are other nations in this category.    
6.4. Social factors  
Apart from institutions and the economic conditions already discussed, there are social 
factors relevant for democratic endurance. These are adult literacy rates (Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1997: 237-241) and the state of civil society (Leftwich, 2000; Linz and 
Stepan, 1996; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Then there is also the question of a 
sizeable middle class (Moore, 1996, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).  
Moore (1996) published an influential work on the role of classes in the making of the 
modern world. He was dismissive about peasants as modernisers, but was convinced 
that the middle class was key not only to modernisation but to democracy as well. 
According to him, democracy was a dependent variable: it depended on the capitalist 
middle class for endurance. Hence his famous dictum “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” 
(1996:14-29). Lesotho’s prospects for democratic consolidation will also be judged 
against these social criteria.  
6.4.1 Lesotho in a social context   
Lesotho is a culturally homogenous country, yet it demonstrates the symptoms of a 
divided society. Leftwich (2000) maintains that social cleavage is a negative condition 
for consolidation. Internal divisions in the society were heightened by the contestation 
for religious domination between the Protestants of the PEMS and Catholics of the 
RCC. It can be argued that this competition was a spill-over of the historical competition 
between the French Protestants and the Roman Catholics in Europe.  
As the competition increased, the Catholics were able to co-opt the royal family (after 
the death of Moshoeshoe I) to their ranks. This saw the Catholics becoming more 
dominant in the country. Odendaal (2000:4) argues that the impact of this competition in 
the name of God became so severe as “it set up social hierarchies based on religious 
membership”. The Church membership determined which school an individual attended 
as well as the type of education received. 
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Church schools are still prominent in society even today. Even the choice of marriage 
partner is determined by religious affiliation. These two religious denominations divided 
the country’s homogenous population into two distrustful and rival groups. And yet 
missionary schools educated the nation.  
What should be noted is that after independence the BNP always enjoyed the support 
of the RCC as the result of its anti-communist stance (Khaketla, 1971; Machobane, 
2001). The BNP was conservative and pro-chieftainship and the RCC also encouraged 
and accommodated traditional systems of authority and belief. Odendaal (2000:4) 
argues that “a prominent aspect of their mission strategy was to incorporate traditional 
elements into church liturgy and practice. This theological focus translated naturally into 
close bonds between the Catholic Church, traditional authorities and the BNP”. The 
BNP continued to champion for the interests of the chiefs and the monarchy, though it 
did not support the Matsieng house.  
The Protestants under the PEMS, which became the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC) 
in the post-colonial period, supported the BCP through the 1970s and 1980s. The BCP 
represented the commoners’ views and perceptions as opposed to the RCC, which was 
pro-chieftaincy. The LEC supported the World Council of Churches’ economic and 
social policies, which favoured the poor in the 1970s. Consequently, the BCP pro-poor 
reforms gained popular support for them (Odendaal, 2000; Khaketla, 1971).  
What should be noted is that though there are more Catholics than Protestants in the 
country, one would have expected that the BNP to have been the most dominant 
political party in Lesotho. But the BCP and its splinter faction, the LCD, received more 
votes in 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2007 elections than the pro-Roman Catholic BNP. The 
BNP was in power until 1986 and remained one of the strongest opposition parties after 
1993.  
This implies that while the RCC was able to provide a strong moral support for the BNP, 
it was unable to convince its grassroots supporters to vote for the BNP. It can be argued 
that the key alliance between the BNP and the RCC exists at the level of the senior 
church hierarchy and the chiefs, therefore mainly in the poorer rural areas.  
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Leftwich (2000) argues that religious differences, especially where they overlap with 
material inequalities, makes the consolidation of democracy difficult. These religious 
differences in Lesotho society overlap with the high incidence of inequality and poverty. 
It can also be argued that this has rendered the prospects of democratic survival in 
Lesotho minimal. 
Another problematic issue has been the increasing levels of HIV/Aids. According to the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Lesotho has one of the 
highest rates of HIV/Aids infection in the world at 31% of the total population. It is 
estimated that 36,1% of women aged between 15-49 years are infected, while the 
infection rate for men in the same age group is 17,4% (Economic Review March 2004, 
www. centralbank.org.Is/publications, 04 July 2008).  
As a result of poverty, it is expensive to maintain health care for those infected by 
HIV/Aids. Financial assistance to fight the pandemic from the Global Fund, the United 
Kingdom Department for International Development, the USA and the World Bank has 
not effectively benefited poor rural households. Larger shares of the funds are allegedly 
been misused in the government ministries and district offices without reaching people 
at the grassroots level (Poverty Reduction Strategy of Lesotho, 2004/5:27).  
But Lesotho does not have high levels of crime. Stock theft is the most prevalent. It is 
rampant along the border with South Africa and in the lowlands (UNDP, 2002). But 
since 2003 stock theft declined by 60% (Crime Assessment Report– Ministry of Home 
Affairs and Public Safety, 31 April–May 2005). The other major challenges include 
recurring droughts, deforestartion as a result of the over-reliance on biomass fuel, 
ineffective land tenure systems, inefficient management of the fragile mountain 
ecosystem and poor agricultural practices. As a result of the high levels of HIV/Aids, 
high unemployment and poverty, most people have now refocused their attention on the 
state for the provision of welfare benefits but this is problematic because the state also 
depends on the external sources of income. 
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6.4.2 Literacy rates  
As the result of the early missionary contact since the 1830s, the country has a high 
literary rate. According to the measures referring to education included in the UNDP 
Human Development Index, the performance of education in Lesotho is positive. The 
country had a high literary rates of 82% in 2004, which is better than the average rate of 
the five oldest multi-party systems in Africa, which is 76% (Breytenbach, 2007:101). 
Secondly, another aspect of the human development index, the school enrolment ratio 
is high (56%) compared to average for Sub-Saharan Africa (42 per cent). The gender-
related development index reveals that the total enrolment ratio is much higher for 
females (60%) than for males (51%). It was ranked 5th out of more than 40 Sub-
Saharan countries in terms of high literacy rates (UNDP, 1997: 146-8; UNDP, 1999:1). 
This high literacy rates have hardly assisted the country’s economic development. The 
government has over the years failed to absorb its educated labour force (Bureau of 
Statistics, 2000). Lesotho is currently experiencing a massive drainage of its valuable 
human resources to South Africa as the result of lack of employment opportunities in 
the country. The brain drain is further worsened by the fact that Sesotho is one of the 
official languages in South Africa and there are more Basotho in South Africa (Free 
State and Gauteng provinces) than in Lesotho. 
Lesotho’s high literacy rates have therefore hardly benefited socio-economic 
development in the country, which is crucial for democratic survival. This is contrary to 
Bratton and Van de Walle’s (1997) argument that literacy rates are crucial for 
democratic survival. (Zimbabwe is another country with an exceptionally high literacy 
rate (90% in 2004), but with serious problems of breakdown). But this positive is 
overshadowed by high poverty, high inequality, weak civil society and rather small 
middle class.  
6.4.3 Civil society 
Neocosmos (2002:39) argues that Lesotho’s first civil society organisations, the 
Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) and the Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB), emerged 
during the colonial period. Selinyane (1997) says that these civil society organisations 
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were more active in the political movements and formed the core of the BCP support. It 
can be argued that there were no major civil society organisations pursuing the interests 
of the working class during the colonial period. 
Southall (1984) points out that though the country’s labour seemed mobilised and 
organised, it did not form a building block of civil society. Selinyane (1997:29) argues 
that 
to the extent that their economic struggles did not combine with the 
political resolve to compel the state to fulfil their demands and to the 
extent that their involvement in political campaigns might have 
lacked specific economic demands – they remained organized 
labour but increasingly lost attributes that made them constitute a 
civil society. 
Selinyane (1997) notes that two tiers of civil society emerged after independence. The 
first one which emerged during the colonial period was incorporated into the BCP. This 
was based on Protestant church organisations. The second tier was directly assisted by 
the BNP government. The BNP- sponsored civil society failed to represent the interests 
of its members against the government. This party lost its autonomy, as it became co-
opted into the ruling party at that time.  
Matlosa (1995:22) argues that in the late 1980s there was a growing perception among 
donors that non-governmental organisations had more capacity to act as agents of 
economic growth and adjustment than the government did. Magazi-Rugasira (1994:7) 
states that 
the 1990s ... [saw] a greater prevalence and proliferation of NGOs on 
the African continent. With the myriad of economic programmes 
being implemented across the continent, NGOs … [were] perceived 
as the engines of growth, this comes in the wake of the popular 
perception that Africans are unable to afford and even manage their 
own affairs. 
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Matlosa (1995) points out that in 1992 the World Bank suggested that NGOs should be 
granted more external funding, since they occupied strategic positions in their societies 
to correct the widespread problems that exist in most African countries. NGOs were 
seen as strategic partners to execute aid programmes in most African countries.  
This perception culminated in the formation of the umbrella body of NGOs in Lesotho- 
called the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCN) in 1990. Most of 
Lesotho’s NGOs are engaged in the variety of donor-aided projects ranging from social 
welfare, emergency services, the environment, employment generation and monitoring 
human rights. 
Selinyane (1997) argues that civil society organisations played a fundamental role in the 
transition process; he argues that the commencement of the LHWP in the early 1990s   
coincided with the arrival of Lesotho trade union workers who were expelled from South 
Africa during the 1987 mine workers strike. Ultimately, this led to increased unionisation 
of workers across the country. 
In 1990 the teachers’ strike climaxed with the formation of the Lesotho Teachers Trade 
Union (LTTU). Civil society strikes in the transition period were also joined by the youth 
and students movements, which called for the speedy return of democratic rule in 
Lesotho during the military administration. Selinyane (1997:32) argues that “the rural 
areas, where the forms and means of oppression are more subtle, were the only sector 
left without dramatic, organised struggles with the state”. 
Despite their role in the transition to democracy during the military governance, civil 
society organisations did not have a ready agenda that could be imposed on the 
incoming democratic government. The only exception was the RCC, which supported 
the BNP and was therefore hardly a pro-democracy factor.  
Arguably, when the democratic platform was opened for political participation in 1993, 
only limited number civil society organisations were able to push for their participation in 
the democratic period. The Construction and Allied Workers Union of Lesotho 
(CAWULE) were able to push for the interests of the workers in the political landscape. 
It formed the Lesotho Labour Party (LLP) but failed to attract any significant support 
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from the working classes. To be sure, the Basotho working classes were more 
prominent in South Africa than in Lesotho. 
I concur with Selinyane (1997:33) that it was almost impossible for civil society groups 
to form a single trade union movement capable of transcending the old political divisions 
as the result of their alignment to the BCP and BNP. Selinyane further argues that this 
was also delayed by the “opportunism, power struggles and financial corruption leading 
to conspiracy and bribe-taking between them”  
Most strikes that occurred in the post-1993 dispensation failed to translate into worker 
political consciousness. Various organisations acted independently despite their 
affiliation to the LCN. The LCN refused to back the 1995 teachers’ strikes; this was 
despite appeals for support from its affiliated teachers union, the LTTU. It also refused 
to back the LHWP workers strikes against unfair labour practices.  
Selinyane (1997) states that the LCN never prescribed a role for itself in the process of 
building democracy. What makes civil society an essential ingredient for democracy is 
the fact that ‘it must be seen to improve the lives of people, to allow for self-exertion and 
release of people’s creativity in the transformation of society for the better in all spheres 
of life’ (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1994:12). The LCN has over the years, lacked the 
cohesive capacity to push for greater demands for its various affiliates and it remained a 
toothless mother-body.   
Matlosa (2003:46) claims that Lesotho’s civil society is weak as a result of its 
dependence on donor funding. He argues that it has not become a major force to push 
for the views of various people. He also says that “as it stands [it] … may not be a great 
force that reflects the views of the Basotho, civil society nonetheless provides a much 
needed window of opportunity”. It is weak and has failed to act as an efficient watchdog 
in the country’s democratic landscape.  
Most civil society programmes are influenced by donor priorities and conditions. The 
country’s NGOs have failed to come up with appropriate programmes to address the 
issues affecting the welfare of the citizens. Their activities have primarily focused on 
creating social awareness among the citizens about their rights without educating 
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people about democracy. Matlosa (2003:47) asks “what is democracy if it does not have 
a citizenry that is aware of their rights?” 
Civil society organisations therefore did very little to sensitise the population about the 
broad understanding of the concept of democracy in the 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2007 
elections. There has been poor inculcation of civic and human rights across the 
population. Matlosa (2003:47) writes that  
their programmes implemented prior to the 2002 elections were 
structured along four main election-related aspects: the Lesotho 
electoral law, how to vote, the importance of voting and relationship 
between elections, democracy, human rights and participation 
responsibilities. But much more needs to be done to continue to build 
on this new awareness among the people.  
Despite this, numerous efforts aimed to promote voter education do exist. It seems that 
very little has been achieved in terms of making people aware of various political 
values, principles and policy differences. Civil society has failed to influence and 
encourage the electorates to break away from their “pre-structured, pre-designed 
political affiliations to choose their leadership along policy issues” (Matlosa, 2003:47-
48).  
Commenting on the weakness of civil society, Mahao (2008) wrote that the LCD 
government’s grip on power in the 2002 and 2007 elections was partly attributable to 
weak civic institutions. He further argues that “without strong media and other civic 
institutions to educate the populace, the majority of the people are not properly informed 
and engaged on issues that affect them” (www.findarticles.com 
/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_ 20070222, 31 July). 
I concur with Mahao’s observation. The country’s civil society has failed to add any 
significant democratic value to the democratic process. It has failed to assert its 
influence over the state. What it successfully attained was to secure a place for itself in 
the bosom of the state and in donor circles. It also failed to force the state to establish 
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the rule of law and a set of standards and rules for business to flourish and to ensure 
that there is efficient redistribution of services across the society.  
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Leftwich (2000:146), and Linz and Stepan (1996) 
argue that a “rich and pluralistic civil society” is crucial for democratic survival. Lesotho’s 
civil society, however, is weak and fragmented. It has failed to push for major 
democratic forms in the state. Its weakness is complicated by the great dependence on 
donor agencies to cover operational costs. Most civil society programmes are rigid and 
insensitive to the needs of the people. They failed to engage people fully in diverse 
approaches beyond regular workshops. Given a weak civil society, it can be argued that 
democratic survival remains unlikely. There are no pressures brought to bear on the 
state to improve the delivery of services which could benefit democracy.  
6.4.4 Middle class (urbanisation)  
Barrington Moore (1996) and Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) argued that sizeable 
middle class is important for democratic survival. Lesotho does not have a sizeable 
middle class as a result of its weak economic base. Usually middle classes exist in 
tandem with working classes and higher levels of urbanisation. But Lesotho’s 
urbanisation rate is at 29%. Breytenbach (2007:100) argues that “urbaninisation may 
reveal the potential for urban based civil society”. But the low levels of urbanisation are 
unlikely to make a positive contribution to the development of a middle class, especially 
not in poor rural areas.  
What constitutes the country’s small middle class consists of the few people employed 
in the civil service (military, police, teachers and in the bureaucracy) and the small 
private sector. This middle class has also been fractured by intense competition for few 
senior positions in the civil service. 
It can therefore be argued that a country does not have the sizeable middle class. 
Lesotho is a poor democracy with a weak economy and it has failed to create a sizeable 
middle class. The majority of the working citizens are migrant workers and most people 
in the country are peasants. But Moore (1996) was dismissive of peasants as essential 
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for democratic survival. Lesotho lacks this essential factor as a precondition for its 
democratic endurance as Moore (1996) and Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) noted.  
6.5 Assessment: implications for democratic consolidation   
Lesotho’s political problems are located in, amongst other things, its enduring poor 
economic performance. Everybody looks at the state for employment opportunities. 
Amongst the few employment opportunities that exist in the country, a large portion are 
in the civil service – in parliament, in the military and other organs of the state. Those 
who are closely aligned to the ruling elites have better access to state resources by 
being employed in the civil service. With its weak economic base, the state is unable to 
“accumulate” (Sekatle, 1997:84) sufficient resources for distribution among its 
population.  
The political impasse after the 2007 election should in part be explained in the context 
of escalating poverty and high levels of unemployment. Political positions are contested 
with passion and violence. The pain of losing an election is therefore much greater than 
normal and for many it means an almost automatic return to poverty. The endless 
breakaways amongst parties were motivated by attempts to address the issue of 
personal poverty. The loss of leadership positions is equated with the loss of one’s 
employment. This situation is aggravated by the absence of meaningful economic 
activities that the state can offer. 
Leftwich (2000:142) states that if poverty is not eradicated, it will be an obstacle for 
democratic consolidation.Leftwich (2000:143) wrote that “the struggle for scarce 
resources, and the enormous advantages that permanent control of the state may bring 
to a party or fraction, makes democracy very unlikely”. Poverty has always been at the 
core of Lesotho’s political problems. Lesotho has failed to eradicate the high levels of 
poverty across the country.  
Lesotho’s political elites depend on state resources to accumulate wealth and to 
marginalise their political opponents. Matlosa (1997:102) eloquently captures this by 
arguing that “the principal pre-occupation of the ruling elite has been the accumulation 
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of power and imposing their political hegemony over other class forces outside the state 
in order to undermine opposition”. 
The most appealing factor in gaining access to state power is better salaries and 
controversial benefits. Cabinet ministers and Principal Secretaries (PSs) have generous 
benefits, including interest-free loans that range between M500,000-800,000 
(Government Gazette, 2005). In 2006 the cabinet ministers were given an opportunity to 
buy their official used latest Mercedes cars E240 and E300 at the knockdown price of 
M4000, while the PSs were allowed to buy their latest Toyota Camry’s at M2000.  
Most ministers bought these vehicles at M4000 and sold them at a higher price. They 
were later seen in Bloemfontein in South Africa valued between M290,000-320,000 
(Public Eye, 15 November 2006). The Minister of Tourism and Culture, Lebohang 
Ntsinyi, openly admitted to selling her car in South Africa. She stated that “if I sell 
vegetables at my home, will you ask me about it? The sale of my car is a personal 
matter” (cited in Public Eye, 15 November 2006). 
This raised a huge public outcry across the poverty-stricken population. In order to 
sustain one’s livelihood, it is rational to stay in politics. Given such benefits, everybody 
wants to be involved in politics. The formation of coalitions before the 2007 elections 
between the main political parties was influenced by the desire to maximise access to 
state resources.  
The political elites were desperate not to lose their seats in parliament and the formation 
of coalitions was the most convenient way to safeguard their positions. There is a strong 
reliance on parliamentary seats as the most reliable source of employment. This 
emerged through the informal discussions that I had with various MPs of the ruling LCD 
and the opposition parties (BCP, BNP and the MFP).11  
                                                            
11 Most of the BNP and some LCD candidates who were in parliament after the 2002, but did 
not make it after the 2007 election, have no formal employment and are struggling to survive. in 
the case of some, their properties have been repossessed by various banking institutions in 
Lesotho. I have first-hand experience of this, as my close relative was an LCD MP in 2002 but 
lost his constituency in the 2007 election. He is currently unemployed and with no parliamentary 
pension.  
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Most of country’s political parties do not have significant following (the stay-away factor 
was big), as was shown by the 2002 and 2007 elections. They emerged out of 
conditions of desperation and poverty, and hardly presented any set of policy 
alternatives for addressing the country’s socio-economic challenges. There is also little 
evidence of the continuous expression of civic responsibility among the voters beyond 
the elections. Work for Justice (2007:12) noted that “parliamentarians occupy a 
parliamentary seat on their own behalf, which is complete with all the perks that come 
with it and they often abandon their constituencies”.   
For most people, working in South Africa is the only source of income and livelihood 
(and this figure declined). This is shown by the ever-increasing numbers (over 10,000 
Basotho men) who are regularly seen queuing at the recruiting agencies of the South 
Africa mines and farms with the anticipation and belief that they would be recruited 
(UNDP, 2002). Added to these figures are the increasing undocumented numbers of 
Basotho men who are regularly seen around the mining towns in South Africa with the 
hope of being employed (Poverty Reduction Strategy of Lesotho, 2004/5). Lesotho does 
not have any relevance for most people as far as their economic needs are concerned.   
Despite the institutional re-arrangements (the electoral reforms and the depoliticisation 
of the military and the monarchy), these positive aspects have been undermined by the 
personal stakes that are associated with access to state power through politics. 
Lesotho’s political parties also do not have policy documents beyond their constitutions 
and electoral manifestos. Their policy issues are combined in the party’s constitutions 
and there are no clear policy guidelines to strengthen their electoral manifestos. 
Most of the parties’ attention is directed to maintaining their parliamentary seats rather 
than focusing on policy formulation and development to address the socio-economic 
challenges facing the country. Lesotho’s population is slightly over 2 million, yet there 
are now over 20 political parties. Mokhele Likate, on 20 July 2002, the former 
Independent Electoral Commissioner (IEC) argued that  
the number and size of political parties is a problem … economically 
available opportunities are not too many in Lesotho … politics is the 
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easily available avenue to making a living … mushrooming of 
political parties is a reality … there is a need for control and 
representation of political party formation … three parties [are] 
enough … there is a need for legislation on the issue (Interview on 
Radio Lesotho).  
It remains reality that Lesotho has low levels of affluence, income inequalities are high, 
unemployment remains high, while HIV/Aids and poverty are also rampant and civil 
society is weak. It has been difficult for democracy to endure under these conditions.  
Furthermore, Lesotho faces the serious problem of ‘brain drain’ to South Africa. Makoa 
(1996:18) wrote that Basotho were transformed into a nation of migrants by the colonial 
administration, with limited direct economic links with their nation state. But apart from 
Chief Leabua Jonathan’s authoritarian rule after 1970, South Africa seldom meddled in 
Lesotho’s domestic politics since redemocratisation in 2003.    
Lesotho does not have appropriate room to design its development plans as the result 
of its chronic economic dependence on South Africa. The question is: will Lesotho be 
able to attain its Vision 2020?12 
Maybe Weisfelder articulated these problems best as long ago as 1992. He wrote that  
during the early ninetieth century, Moshoeshoe I created his 
independent Kingdom as a refugee for people displaced by … 
[difaqane]. But in the new South Africa, Lesotho’s mountain fortress 
no longer provide[s] sanctuary. Instead, they, as well as the maloti 
currency named after them, and the concept of national sovereignty, 
increasingly symbolise the alienation of the Basotho from 
participation in a potentially better future [in south Africa](1992:655).  
This means that the state autonomy has over the years, due to the dependency on the 
external sources of income eroded away.Lesotho remains weak on almost all 
                                                            
12 Lesotho Vision 2020 is the long-term development strategy adopted in 2000. It focuses mainly 
on boosting economic development, the development of human resources, employment 
creation and poverty reduction.   
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Przeworksi’s (1996) and Leftwich’s (2000) socio-economic variables, namely affluence, 
economic growth, inequality reduction and social cleavage. The same applies to civil 
society (Linz and Stepan, 1996) and middle class (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; and 
Barrington Moore, 1996).The positives- homogenity and literacy rates are 
overshadowed. The lesson is that for democracy to endure, sufficient levels of the 
multivariate model must be in place.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  
 
7.1 Overview  
 
The Kingdom of Lesotho has experienced considerable political instability since 
independence in 1966. Various democratic breakdowns occurred precipitated by 
various factors; of all Leftwich’s conditions for survival, there are only two positive 
factors: the absence of ethnic divisions despite social cleavages and high literacy rates. 
The democratic regime inaugurated with the 1965 elections lasted until 1970 when the 
ruling party under Chief Leabua Jonathan declared the election results invalid and 
suspended the constitution. His single-party authoritarian rule lasted until 1986, when 
he was deposed in a military coup. This military regime lasted until 1991, when another 
coup took place, producing a new set of military rulers. A new (second) democratic 
regime was instituted in 1993, with elections for a democratic government. But then 
came election violence in 1998.  
In 1998 the election result prompted a mutiny from the army and a military intervention 
led by South Africa and Botswana. Constitutional reforms followed and in 2002 
democratic rule was re-launched a third time, when elections under a new set of 
electoral rules took place. The electoral reforms and adoption of MMP in the 2002 
election managed to minimise political conflicts, despite confusion about the electoral 
system.  
More parties were represented in parliament and in a more equitable way, which was a 
milestone considering the history of two-party domination since the 1965 elections. This 
was followed by period of relative peace and stability; legitimacy was partially restored 
as well as adherence to the rules of the game. Yet, time and again, policy restraint was 
not exercised by winning parties. At least, parliament became a legitimate institution 
once again.    
The central question asked in this study is why Lesotho seems unable to consolidate 
democracy. We turn to theory for explanation. A case can be made that both 
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institutional and socio-economic factors obstructed the deepening of parliamentary 
democracy in Lesotho. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Leftwich (2000), Przeworski et 
al. (1996) and many others argue that the conditions for democratic consolidation are 
not only institutional but also socio-economic. Lesotho’s is case different from other 
countries in the SADC region. It is much more vulnerable because of its poor 
functioning economy which shows that under poor socio-economic conditions, 
democracy is unlikely to survive.  
The institutional factors identified in Lesotho include the monarchy, the military and 
electoral system. These have changed. The socio-economic issues, as suggested by 
the above authors, include factors such as affluence, growth, inequality reduction and 
civil society. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) as well as Barrington Moore (1996) 
underline the role of the middle classes. This chapter begins with an assessment of the 
institutional factors: the monarchy, the military and the electoral system. It then 
concludes with an overview of the socio-economic conditions and attention is drawn to 
other conditions for consolidation.   
7.2 The monarchy  
The institution of the monarchy stems from the political leadership of Moshoeshoe I, 
who skilfully managed to unite and form his nation within the destructive wars of the 
1820s known as difaqane. Moshoeshoe I was elevated by the people because of his 
leadership skills and wisdom. Moshoeshoe I was democratically inclined and depended 
on participatory methods of governance such as  ‘placing’ (which also enabled him to 
centralise his control), pitsos and the mafisa system to consolidate his kingdom. These 
institutions for administration were able to establish a sense of belonging to and 
participation in a cohesive political community (Weisfelder, 1971). The key question is: 
in what way did the monarchy affect the breakdown of democracy in 1970 and 1998?   
Lesotho’s monarchy did not thrive under the British colonial rule. The British colonial 
administrators viewed it as a rival form of government. Policies were conspicuously 
designed to undermine its powers and streamlined it in the way the British desired. 
There were numerous legislative instruments such as Proclamation 2B of 1884, and 
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Proclamations No. 61 and No. 62 of 1938, which were intended to reduce monarchical 
powers and influence. Chiefs became colonial line functionaries rather than servants of 
the King.   
In addition this loss of powers and political isolation, there were internal disputes 
between the “Sons of Moshoeshoe” over supremacy and this affected its capability as 
an effective administrative organ. Moshoeshoe I had four sons, of whom Letsie I was 
the oldest and the first in the royal lineage. But contestation for power with his junior 
brothers, Molapo and Masupha, resulted in divisions within the traditional authority. This 
competition for power between the “Sons of Moshoeshoe” became so rampant that it 
undermined prospects of reaching consensus on major issues.  
 
Consequently, their subordinates (junior chiefs) took advantage of these internal power 
struggles amongst the "Sons of Moshoeshoe” to undermine their authority and pursued 
independent policies. The monarchy also had to compete with the British colonial 
administrators and was compelled to adapt to the changing economic environment as 
people no longer depended on it for survival. In addition to these fault lines within the 
traditional authority, societal divisions continued to form and deepen at a rapid pace as 
the result of the influence of various Christian denominations, migrant labour and 
voluntary associations – the foundations of civil society in Lesotho. 
 
The erosion of monarchical powers was also aggravated by the emergence of modern 
political parties in the 1960s. These modern parties (the BCP and the BNP) did not 
recognise the supremacy of the monarchy over the democratically elected structures. It 
was only the MFP that strongly advocated the retention of executive powers for the 
monarchy- but it was always the smallest of these older parties, and to be sure was 
behind some military coups of later years.   
 
Maqutu (1990) argues that what the colonial administration and the commoners-led 
political movements failed to totally root out from the society was the perception that 
many people still looked at the monarchy for guidance. Weisfelder (1997:25) similarly 
argues that Basotho groups believe that their identity and survival as a nation was 
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rooted in the monarchy. Maqutu (1990) and Weisfelder (1997) states that despite the 
monarchy’s political isolation and decline of power under the colonial administration, 
people still regarded the monarchy as representing continuity in the tradition of self-
determination.  
I differ from Maqutu (1990) and Weisfelder (1997) that the monarchy still retained its 
special status as the symbol of unity amongst the population. Their arguments become 
questionable when a closer examination is made of the relative performance of the 
royalist-backed MFP in the following elections: 1965, 1970, 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2007. 
It performed relatively poor in the light of what these authors postulated, namely that 
most people still looked at the monarchy for guidance. This poor performance was an 
indication that the people’s trust in the monarchy as an instrument of control and 
administration had eroded by the time electoral politics were established.  
What is significant is that, because of the heroic battles that the institution of monarchy 
fought against the Boers and its political legacy of executive powers, it was unlikely that 
the monarchy would submit to the status of constitutional monarchy without a fight. King 
Moshoeshoe II, who was inaugurated in 1960, consistently resisted being relegated to 
the passive head of state of a parliamentary democracy. 
 
King Moshoeshoe II continued to denounce the 1965 constitution in the post- 
independence period and demanded executive powers. It should be noted that while the 
monarchy declined considerably after the colonial interaction with the British, it still 
remained a key but a declining actor in the political landscape. The monarchy’s 
contestation for executive powers suffered a blow as its royalist-backed political party 
(the MFP) fared poorly in the elections. Despite this setback, the monarchy continued to 
push for more executive powers and denounced the BNP government after the 1965 
election. Was it strong enough to cause breakdowns?  
 
As the result of this traditional rival contestation, Chief Leabua Jonathan, from the 
Molapo house, tried after his accession to power after the 1965 election in various ways 
to undermine the authority of King Moshoeshoe II from the Matsieng house (location of 
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the seat of royal power). He was determined to assert the suzerainty of Molapo house 
over the Matsieng royal house and to relegate it to a minor status.  
 
But this was met with resistance from King Moshoeshoe II, who was seemingly not 
prepared to submit to the authority of Chief Leabua Jonathan. This traditional rivalry 
between the descendants of Moshoeshoe I placed the country in a precarious situation 
which contributed to the democratic breakdowns. This contestation for political power 
and supremacy reached a climax in 1970, when King Moshoeshoe II was exiled to 
Holland by Chief Leabua Jonathan after he had declared a state of emergency. Upon 
his return, the King was forced to submit to the authority of Chief Leabua Jonathan’s 
government.  
 
The restoration of executive powers to the monarchy was always a contentious issue in 
the 1965 constitution and its involvement in the military government was likely to result 
in future democratic problems. The monarchy even tried to impose its own system of 
democracy, but its position at the helm of state power was short-lived, for King 
Moshoeshoe II was again exiled to Britain in 1990 by the military government. Were 
monarchical powers now ready to exploit the military in their quest for power?       
 
In the re-democratisation phase in the early 1990s, the old 1965 constitutional 
parliamentary democracy was retained. The monarchy and its supporters, backed by 
the military, tried to impose monarchical rule through a palace coup in 1994. In the 1998 
electoral crisis the monarchy tried to canvass for the abolition of the 1965 constitution 
and demanded more constitutional powers. The monarchy supported the opposition 
cause against the LCD government in the events which almost precipitated a state of 
anarchy and civil war.  
 
Heywood (2002:342) correctly points that the existence of a constitutional monarch 
often contributes towards the violation of democratic principles. Lesotho’s monarchy 
had up to the 2002 elections never subscribed to its constitutional provisions. It can be 
argued that the monarchy has over the years been at the core of the country’s 
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democratic breakdowns (1970 and 1998) and undermined efforts towards democratic 
consolidation.  
 
It can also be argued that the successful depoliticisation of the monarchy only occurred 
after the Principal Chief of Matsieng, younger brother to King Letsie III, Chief Seeiso 
Mohato, was appointed to the diplomatic position of ambassador in Britain in September 
2005. The continuing infighting between the Principal Chiefs further eroded the strength 
of the monarchy. This situation was aided by the continuing dismal performance of the 
royalist-backed MFP. The net result was that the parliamentary democratic order gained 
legitimacy at the expense of the monarchy. But other problems remained.  
7.3 The military  
 
In 1986 the military staged a coup that deposed Chief Leabua Jonathan after 16 years 
at the helm of state power. It also established a period of military dictatorship, which 
lasted until 1993. The military was an active actor in Lesotho politics often in pursuit of 
either a civilian autocracy (read Jonathan’s rule) or even the monarchy. In 1970 it had 
backed the unconstitutional assumption of power by Chief Leabua Jonathan, who 
suspended the constitution, aborted the elections and instituted a period of civilian 
dictatorship. During its period in governance from 1986-1993, the military’s interests in 
the domains of state power increased considerably. Despite its active withdrawal from 
state power in 1993, the military remained politically involved in the democratic 
landscape. 
 
The military became a key factor in democratic breakdowns as its members indulged in 
violent confrontations in January 1994, destabilised the democratically elected 
governments and gave tacit support for the palace coup in August 1994. Various efforts 
backed by international and regional bodies to transform the military were undertaken in 
1994. But these efforts came to a naught during the 1998 electoral crisis; the military 
directly assisted the opposition parties against the ruling LCD and staged a mutiny. It 
also merely observed acts of violence and intimidation as the breakdown of law and 
order became visible.  
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The Lesotho military did not therefore serve as custodians and guarantors of democratic 
rule, but became active political actors competing for state power. Successful 
depoliticisation occurred only after the 1998 political crisis. There were intensive 
retraining efforts of the military, which were led by South Africa and the regional body 
(SADC). There was a gradual phasing out of those senior military officers from service 
who were seen as political. The fruits of this military depoliticisation became evident 
after the 2007 elections. The military managed to halt opposition moves to render the 
country ungovernable. Perhaps the South African-led military intervention in 1998 was 
an eye opener that military intervention in politics could have dire consequences. Today 
the military is neutral. How it will respond to future crises will be crucial to the question 
of whether it is a force for the preservation of democracy. Unlike South Africa’s implicit 
support for chief Jonathan’s rule during the 1970’s, South Africa never meddled through 
the military during the 1990’s.        
 
7.4 The electoral system  
Lesotho adopted a Westminster-type constitution from its former colonial master, 
Britain, in 1965. It also opted for a constituency-based electoral system based on the 
FPTP principle. But the dependence on FPTP has throughout been a key issue that 
resulted in the democratic breakdowns. In the 1965 election it led to skewed 
parliamentary representation and the BNP became a minority government with less 
than 50% of the total vote. Even in the abortive 1970 elections, the skewed 
parliamentary representation was still evident.  
In 1993 the BCP won all 65 constituencies with an overall 74,7 % of the vote. The BNP 
with 22,7% of votes did not get a seat in parliament. This was a recipe for protest. In 
1998 the LCD won 79 seats with 60,7% but obtained 98,7% of the seats in parliament. 
Opposition parties with almost 40% of the votes had one constituency seat won by the 
BNP (Kadima, 1999). This might have been a perfectly free election, but the result was 
seen as grossly unfair.    
 267
It can be argued that the FPTP system disadvantaged those smaller parties with wide 
but unconcentrated support in given constituencies. This lack of representation in the 
national assembly by the losing parties impacted significantly on the country’s 
democratic breakdowns, as losing parties refused to accept the election outcome and 
resorted to violence. There was a breakdown of the rules of the game; also of the rule of 
law.  
But after the 1998 democratic crisis, electoral reforms were introduced and this led to 
the adoption of the MMP with a fixed number of 120 seats (80 FPTP + 40 PR). The 
adoption of these electoral reforms was followed by relative peace and the problem of 
recurrent political marginalisation was solved. Was this contentious matter now settled?  
The 2007 elections were still contested under MMP. But it resulted in a new set of 
challenges. Opposition parties accused the IEC of unfairly allocating 40 PR seats.  The 
grave problem of the Lesotho MMP system is the lack of understanding among 
electorate and politicians on how it works. This undermined the new- found legitimacy of 
parliament.  
The Lesotho MMP system is also difficult to operationalise. This situation is further 
aggravated by the absence of clear guidelines on how the translation of votes into 
seats, especially for candidates under PR, has to be undertaken in cases where there 
are coalitions. The absence of constitutional provisions or legal explanations of how 
Lesotho’s MMP system works resulted in different interpretations on how it is supposed 
to be operationalised. A well-intended new electoral system now threatened the 
legitimacy of democracy.  
The most problematic issue confronting the Lesotho MMP system was for the IPA to 
retain a fixed number of 120 seats in parliament. The IPA, formed after the 1998 
electoral crises, was vested with the powers to redesign an appropriate electoral 
system. This had the effect of making the National Assembly inflexible in terms of the 
quota. This is contrary to the German system (on which it was based), which is much 
more flexible in terms of the quota. If the size of the National Assembly had not been 
fixed, the problem of the allocation of PR seats could have been partially solved.   
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The skewed allocation of seats in Lesotho’s National Assembly was influenced by the 
emergence of coalitions, which undermined everything that the MMP system was 
intended to address. Some people have argued that parties which did not participate in 
the constituency-based electoral ballot should not have been entitled to the 
compensatory seats on the PR ballot. 
But there is no legal instrument prohibiting or stating how the allocation of seats should 
be done and the constitution is silent on this as well. These coalitions were not 
registered legally with the Lesotho Law Office. The blame cannot be directed at the 
Lesotho MMP system. Its inclusivity in terms of the allocation of seats was undermined 
by self-interested politicians who wanted to maximise their share in the allocation of PR 
seats.  
The allocation of seats occurred in the form of a parallel system. Both the LCD and ABC 
benefited under FPTP and PR, despite the fact that they did not contest the PR seats. 
The allocation of seats does not represent an accurate picture of a parallel system. 
Neither the ABC nor the LCD appeared in the PR list. Also, the NIP appeared under 
FPTP in nine constituencies. Hence, they argued, this could not be accurately classified 
as a parallel system. It failed to compensate the losing parties and occurred in the form 
of parallel PR system.  
Every democratic country has an electoral law that prescribes to particular electoral 
system. This law is supposed to define the clear terms of conduct of the elections. In 
this way “the constitution and the electoral law represent the social contract between the 
state and its people and, more especially, the manner in which they regulate the 
conduct of elections” (Blais, 1999:354).  
But Lesotho electoral law is silent on numerous issues relating to the conduct of 
elections. It does not specify clearly that parties should submit their PR lists. Section 49 
B (1) indicates that “a political party intending to contest an election may nominate 
candidates for election by proportional representation” (The Constitution of Lesotho, 
1993:49). There is no legal instrument or constitutional provision that compels political 
parties to submit their PR or FPTP lists; they have the choice to either submit one list or 
 269
two lists, as they may see fit. This lack of clarity unfourtantely impacts negatively on the 
prospects not of free and fair elections in future but on stability after elections.  
7.5 Socio-economic factors  
Lesotho is a poor country. Most income comes from external sources, such as migrant 
remittances, foreign aid and SACU revenues. Przeworski et al. (1996) argue that 
democracies are “fragile”, based on the data for 1990, if their per capita incomes are 
lower than US$1000. But per capita incomes that are more than US$6000 make 
democracies impregnable. In 1990 Lesotho’s per capita income was US$386. This was 
almost twelve times lower than the “impregnable” category of Przeworski and also more 
than half lower than the “fragile” category. Judged by Przeworskian standards, Lesotho 
is even today too poor to be democratic, but it was rated as “free” by Freedom House. 
Poor nations can therefore be free, but this is the exception.   
Lesotho has high levels of inequality. It performs poorly when measured against some 
aspects of the HDI such as life expectancy, mortality rates and standards of living. Her 
ranking deteriorated from 78th in 1990 to 138th in 2007.  
Lesotho’s civil society is also weak and divided. Lesotho’s civil society activities depend 
mainly on donor funding. Given the weakness of Lesotho’s civil society organisations, 
the level of political participation by the ordinary citizens has been minimal. The high 
literacy rates of 82% have not benefited Lesotho’s democracy in any meaningful way.  
As a weak economy, Lesotho does not have a sizeable middle class. What could form 
the country’s middle class consists of the few people employed in the civil service, 
teachers, the police and the military, and in the weak and small private sector. This 
small middle class has not benefited Lesotho’s democracy in any significant way. 
7.6 Other conditions for consolidation  
Leftwich (2000) argued that legitimacy, adherence to the constitutional rules of the 
game and policy restraint by the winners were essential for democratic conditions. From 
the 1965 to the 2007 election, all the governments have always lacked legitimacy. This 
means that the losing parties have consistently refused to regard the victorious parties 
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as procedurally entitled to rule. The BNP as the main opposition party has over years 
(1993-2006) refused to recognise the victorious BCP and LCD as legitimate. Even after 
the reforms of the electoral model (2002 and 2007 elections), the losing parties still 
refused to recognise the LCD as the legitimate government. Opposition parties after 
2007 election even went to an extent of appealing to the neighbouring South Africa not 
to recognise the LCD as the legitimate government. This shows that this condition as 
mentioned by Leftwich (2000) was not fulfilled in Lesotho.   
In terms of policy restraint after the 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2007 elections, the victorious 
BCP and later LCD have always pursued highly contentious policies. These contentious 
policies threatened the major political stakeholders (political parties, the military and the 
monarchy) in the new democratic dispensation. For instance, the BCP and the LCD 
government’s continuing stance by referering to both the monarchy and the military as 
the key enemies of democracy in Lesotho. The expulsion of the BNP inclined civil 
servants further showed the post-redemocratisation after 1993 governments pursued 
policies that were detrimental to the spirit of the rule of law. This is the politics of bad 
faith.  
The contuining marginalisation of the PR MPS in the parliamentary debates by the LCD 
government after both the 2002 and 2007 elections shows that this did not augur well 
for democratic consolidation. This was worsened by the ruling LCD stance that PR MPs 
are not legitimate.This is also bad faith.  
On the adherence to the constitutional rules of the game (after the 1993, 1998, 2002 
and 2007 elections), the losing parties have always refused to accept the rules of the 
game. This is also bad faith. But the only difference came after the 1998 political crises 
(when reforms were introduced for the 2002 elections), when the military and the 
monarchy adhered to the rules of the game. These are positives that could work against 
breakdowns in future.   
What should be noted is that though elections are essential for any democracy, they are 
not sufficient for democratic consolidation. Elections in Lesotho are only celebrated by 
the victorious parties. But the Basotho people apparently adhere to the principle that 
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elections are the only legitimate means of choosing their government (Makoa, 2002). 
This is contrary to the monarchy’s and the military’s earlier views about electoral 
democracy in the kingdom. 
Given the depoliticisation efforts by the LCD government to the monarchy and the 
military (the retraining processes and the gradual phasing out of the political elements 
within the military), it is unlikely that Lesotho’s democracy will consolidate in the 
foreseeable future. The major weakness in terms of Bratton and Van de Walle’s 
multivariate model is not institutional any more, but socio-economics. It is worth noting 
that Lesotho is one of the few sub-Saharan with a fundamentally homogenous 
population. But this homogeneity (as in Swaziland) has not as yet promoted the 
prospects for democracy.  
Lesotho’s is a homogenous yet poor democracy. Its income base remains external. In a 
society that offers limited employment opportunities, the contestation for political 
positions is undertaken with passion and desperation. Moreover, institutional reforms 
have succeeded. But it is difficult to fashion electoral rules that are able to weaken the 
perception in Lesotho of politics as a winner-takes-all contest. It is evident that amongst 
the variables that were identified in Lesotho (the monarchy, the military and the socio-
economic factors), that the socio-economic factors are much more important than the 
other identified factors. Certainly, with these problematic socio-economic conditions, 
despite institutional reforms, the prospects of democratic consolidation in Lesotho are 
low.  
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix One  
 
The performance of the BCP, BNP and MFP across the country.  
 
 
Source: Fox, R (1995)  
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Appendix Two  
 
 
The performance of the BCP, BNP and MFP across the country. 
 
 
Source: Fox, R (1995) 
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Appendix Three  
 
 
The BCP performance across the country in 1993 election  
 
 
Source: Fox, R (1995) 
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Appendix Four  
 
The LCD performance across the country in 1998 election  
 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Lesotho (2002) 
 
 
 
 LCD 
          BNP 
 276
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
(1)  Books, Articles, Letters 
Ace project. www.aceproject.org/today/feature-articles/the-mmp-electoral-system, 08 June 
2008. 
Address by His Majesty, King Letsie III on the occasion of his coronation, 31 October 
1997. Maseru: The Royal Palace of Lesotho Archives Section.  
Africa at a Glance (1992). Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
Ajulu, R (1995). “From Collaboration to dilemma: A historical background to Lesotho’s 
election of 1993”. In Southall, S and Petlane, T (eds): Democratisation and 
Demilitarisation in Lesotho: The general election of 1993 and its aftermath. Pretoria: 
Africa Institute of South Africa. 
All Basotho Convention (ABC), Media Report, 17 March 2007. Maseru: Harvest FM 
Current Affairs Section.  
All Basotho Convention (ABC) Rally, Ha-Abia, 25 March 2007. Maseru: ABC Publication 
Unit -Carlton Centre.   
Ambrose, D (2000). Summary of Events in Lesotho. Third Quarter. Roma: Institute of 
Southern African Studies (ISAS). 
Annexation Proclamation, No. 14 of 1868. Maseru: Basutoland Records and Archives 
Unit. 
Anonymous (1986). Series of Events in Lesotho. Maseru: Epic Printers. 
Anonymous (1998). Summary of Events in Lesotho. Third Quarter and Fourth Quarter. 
Maseru: Epic Printers. 
Anthony Manyeli, Press Conference, 10 February 2007. Maseru: ABC Publication Unit-
Carlton Centre. 
Arbousset, T and Daumas, F (1946). Narrative of an Exploratory Tour to the North-east 
of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Translated by John Crumbie Brown. Cape 
Town:  Maskew Miller Longman.    
Ashton H (1938). Political Organization of the Southern Sotho. Bantu Studies Vol. xii. 
Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press. 
 277
Ashton, H (1967). The Basuto: A social study of traditional and modern society. 2nd 
edition. London: Oxford University Press. 
Banguara (1992). In Beckman, B “Whose Democracy” in Rudenbeck, L (ed): When 
Democracy Makes Sense. Uppsala: Uppsala Publishers. 
Bardill, J and Cobbe, J (1985). Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Basotho National Party (BNP) Rally, Roma. 23 February 1965. Maseru: BNP Centre 
Printing Unit. 
Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) Constitution (1993). Maseru: Epic Printers.  
Basutoland Congress Party Election Manifesto (1993). Maseru: Epic Printers. 
Basutoland Constitutional Commission 1962. Vol. 1. 170. Maseru: Basutoland Records 
and Archives Unit. 
Basutoland Constitutional Commission. 1965. Morija: Morija Museum and Archives. 
Basutoland Government (1959). Melao ea Lerotholi e hlophisitsoeng- Laws of Lerotholi 
augmented. Morija: Morija Sesuto Book Depot. 
Beetham, D (1994). Defining and Measuring Democracy. New Delhi: SAGE. 
Bernard Matete (1956). Public Records Office (PRO), CO 417/567. No. 8. 
Biemen, S (1978). Armies and Parties in Africa. New York: Africana. 
Billy Macaefa, Leader of the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP). 16 March 2007. Maseru: 
Harvest FM Current Affairs Section.  
Blais, A (1999). “Mixed electoral systems: A conceptual and empirical survey”. Electoral 
Studies, 18(3) 341-366. 
Bratton, M (1998). ”Second Elections in Africa”. Journal of Democracy, 9(3). 
Bratton, M, Mattees, R and Gyimah-Boadi, E (2005). Public Opinion, Democracy and 
Market Reform in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bratton, M and Van de Walle, N (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime 
Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bratton, M and Van de Walle, N (1998). “Neopatrimonial regimes and political transition 
in Africa”. In P. Lewis (ed): The Dilemmas of Development and Change. Boulder: 
Westview.  
 278
Breytenbach, W (1973). Continuity and Change in the Rulemaking system of the 
Kingdom of Lesotho. DLitt Phil Thesis. University of South Africa. 
Breytenbach, W (1975). Crocodiles and Commoners. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South 
Africa. 
Breytenbach, W (2005). Development and Democracy in the Southern and Eastern 
African Region”. In Hansohm, D, Breytenbach, W, Hartenzberg, T and McCarthy, C: 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa. Vol. 5. Windhoek: Namibian 
Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU). 
Breytenbach, W (2007). Development and Democracy in the Southern and Eastern 
Africa Region “. In Hansoms, D, Breytenbach, W, Hartenzberg, T and McCarthy, C: 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa. Vol.5. Windhoek: Namibian 
Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU).   
British Resident Commissioners Report (1898/99). Maseru: Basutoland Records and 
Archives Unit.  
Bureau of Statistics (1987b). Annual Statistical Bulletin of 1984. Maseru: Government of 
Lesotho. 
Bureau of Statistics (1997). The 1994/95, Household Expenditure and Consumption 
Survey Results, Statistical Reports. Maseru: Government of Lesotho. 
Bureau of Statistics, Lesotho (1999). National Accounts 1980-1998, Statistical Report. 
No. 6. Maseru: Government of Lesotho. 
Bureau of Statistics, Lesotho (2000). Report on National Annual Accounts. Maseru: 
Government of Lesotho. 
Bureau of Statistics, Lesotho (2001a). National Accounts 1980-2000. Statistical Report, 
No. 16. Maseru: Government of Lesotho. 
Cardoso, F (2001). “Democracy as a starting point”. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12. 
Carothers, T (2002). “The end of the Transition paradigm”. Journal of Democracy, 13(1). 
Casalis, E (1861). Basuto or Twenty Three years in South Africa. London: Nisbet and 
Co.   
Central Bank of Lesotho, Annual Report, 31 December 1998. Maseru: Central Bank of 
Lesotho. 
Central of Lesotho, Annual Report, 31 December 2004. Maseru: Central Bank of 
Lesotho. 
 279
Central Bank of Lesotho, Annual Report, 31 September 2005. Maseru: Central Bank of 
Lesotho. 
Cobbe, J (1983). “The changing Nature of Dependence: Economic Problems in 
Lesotho”. Journal of Modern African Studies, 21(2). 
Collier, D and Levitsky, S (1997). “Democracy with adjectives’: Conceptual innovation in 
comparative analysis”. American Political Science Review, 87. 
Commonwealth Heads of State (1997). ”Boosting democracy in Africa”. Commonwealth 
Currents, Vol. 1. 
Cowen, D (1963). Some Problems of Constitution making in Contemporary Africa. 
Durban: University of Natal. 
Crime Assessment Report - Ministry of Home Affairs and Public Safety, 31 April- May 
2005. Maseru: Government of Lesotho. 
Dahl, R (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Dahl, R (1986a). Democracy, Liberty and Equality. Norway: Norwegian University 
Press. 
Dahl, R (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Dahl, R (2005). “What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require”. 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 120 (2).   
Daniel, J (1995). “You United Nations Have Delivered Us, Monitoring the 1993 Election 
in Lesotho”. In Southall, R and Petlane, T (eds): Democratisation and Demilitarisation in 
Lesotho: The general election of 1993 and its aftermath Pretoria: Africa Institute of 
South Africa. 
Decalo, S (1976). Coups and Army Rule in Africa. Newhaven CT: Yale University Press. 
Decalo, S (1992). ”The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in 
Africa”. African Affairs, 91. 362. 
Devenish, Ge (1998). Commentary on the South African Constitution. Durban: 
Butterworths.  
Diamond, L (1996). “Is third Wave Over?”. Journal of Democracy, 7 (3). 
Diamond, L (1999). Developing Democracies: Towards Consolidation. Baltimore, 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 280
Diamond, L (2002). “Thinking about hybrid regimes”. Journal of Democracy, 13(2).  
Du Toit, P and Kotzé, H (2006). ”Civil Society and Democracy”. In Ursula, J. Van Beek 
(ed), Democracy under Construction: Patterns from four Continents. Pretoria: Van 
Schaik Publishers. 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 3rd Quarter 1996. Roma: Institute of Southern African 
Studies (ISAS). 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Quarter, 1997. Roma: Institute of Southern African 
Studies (ISAS). 
Economic Review March 2004. www. centralbank.org.Is/publications, 04 July 2008. 
Edmonds, M (1990). Armed services and Society. Inter- University Seminar, Special 
Editions on Armed Forces and Society. Boulder: Westview.  
Eldredge, E (1993). A South African Kingdom. The Pursuit of security in ninetieth 
century Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA) (2003). Country Report - Lesotho. 
Johannesburg: EISA 
Ellenberger, V (1938). A Century of mission work in Basutoland 1833-1933. Morija: 
Morija Sesuto Depot. 
Elkit, J (1994). “Is the Degree of Electoral Democracy Measurable? Experiences from 
Bulgaria, Kenya, Latvia, Mongolia and Nepal”. In Beetham, D (ed): Defining and 
Measuring Democracy. London: SAGE publications.  
Elkit, J (1997). ”Electoral system Design in the Arab World”. In Reynolds, A and Reily, B 
(eds). The International IDEA Handbook of electoral system Design. Stockholm, 
Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Elkit, J (2002). “Lesotho 2002. Africa’s First MMP Elections”. Journal of African 
Elections, Vol. 2. 
Feng, Yi (2001). “Politics and Development”. Journal of Democracy, 12.1 
Finer, S (1975). The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Fox, R (1995). ”Lesotho’s Changing Electoral Geography, 1965-1993”. In Southall, R 
and Petlane, T (eds): Democratisation and Demilitarisation in Lesotho: The general 
election of 1993 and its aftermath. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.  
 281
Fox, R and Southall, R (2003). “The General Elections in Lesotho, May 2002: Adapting 
to MMP”. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 23. Issue 3. 
Gay, J (1998). “Crisis in Lesotho”. Africa Notes. Roma: National University of Lesotho 
(NUL) Research Unit. 
Gay, J, Gill, D and David H (1995). Lesotho’s Long Journey, Hard Choices at the 
Crossroads. Maseru: Sechaba Consultants. 
Gallagher, M and Mitchell, P (2005). The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Gibbon, P (2002). South Africa and the Global Commodity chain for Clothing: Export 
Performance and Constraints. Centre for Development Research (CDR). Copenhagen, 
CDR Working Paper, 02. 7. CDR. 
Gill, S (1993). A Short History of Lesotho. Morija: Morija Museum and Archives. 
Gouws, A and Gibon, J.L (2000). Attitudinal Support for a Democratic Culture 
supporting Democratic Consolidation in South Africa. Unpublished paper. 
Government Gazettee (2005). Maseru: Government Printers. 
Government of Lesotho, Interim Political Act, 1998. Maseru: Government Printers.  
Government of Lesotho (2000). Report of the Workshop on Action Plan to Curb Brain 
Drain in Lesotho. 20-21September. Maseru: Ministry of Economic Planning. 
Government of Lesotho (2002). Pathway out Poverty. Maseru: Government Printers. 
Grotpeter, J (1965). Political Leadership and Development in the High Commission 
Territories. Washington: Washington University. 
Guiseppe Di Palma (1990). To Craft Democracies. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Gumbi, L (1995). “Instability in Lesotho: A search for alternatives”. African Security 
Review, 4 (4). 
Gunther, R, Diamandourous, P and Hans-Jurgen, P (1995). Introduction, The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Hadenius, A (1994). “The Duration of Democracy: Institutional Vs Socio-economic 
factors”. Beetham, D(ed): Defining and Measuring Democracy. London: SAGE 
Publications. 
 282
Hague, R, Harrop, M and Berlin, S (1992). Comparative Government and Politics. 
London: Macmillan. 
Hailey, W M (1953). Native Administration in British African Territories. London: HSMO 
Press. 
Harvest FM - Radio Broadcast, 30 March 2007. Directorate of Current Affairs, Harvest 
FM . 
Heywood, A (2000). Key concepts in Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Heywood, A (2002). Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
His Majesty King Letsie III letter to the Right the Hon. Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, 4 
August 1994. Maseru: The Royal Palace of Lesotho Archives. 
Hlasane Nkao, personal interview in December 2005. Former Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) Secretary General in Peka Constituency. 
Horowitz, D (1991). A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided 
Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Hughes, S (1985) .Histori ea Lesotho. Morija: Morija Museum and Archives. 
Huntington, S (1991). Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century.  
Norman, Oklahama and London: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Huntington, S (1996). The Clash of Civilization and the making of World Order. New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
Huntington, S (1996). “Democracy for the Long Haul”. Journal of Democracy, 7(2). 
Huntington, S (1998). Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale: Yale University Press. 
Hutchful, E (1989). “Militarism and Constitutionalism in Africa: Southern Africa, Political 
and Economic Monthly, 2.10. 
Hutchful, E (1998). The Military and Militarism in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA Books. 
Hyden, G and Venter, D (2001). Constitution-making and Democratization in Africa. 
Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.  
Independent Electoral Commisssion (IEC) (1998). General Report on the 1998 Lesotho 
General Election. Maseru: IEC Lesotho.  
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (2002). General Report on the 2002 Lesotho 
General Election. Maseru: IEC Lesotho. 
 283
Independent Electoral Commission Election Report on Lesotho 2007 General Election, 
25 February 2007. Maseru: IEC Lesotho.  
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2004). 
Deepening Democracy in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Region. IDEA. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2002). Lesotho: Statistical Annex, IMF, Country 
Report No. 02/97. Washington, DC. 
Janowitz, M (1977). Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.   
Joint Statement by leaders of Political Parties, 30 May 1990.Office of the Chairman of 
the Military Council and Council of Ministers:  Mazenod Printing Works. 
Jones, D (1977). Aid and Development in Southern Africa. London: Croom Helm. 
Joseph, O (1979). History of the Basuto’s of South Africa. Mazenod: Mazenod Institute. 
Judgement of the MFP Vs Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), 17 August  2008. 
Kadima, D (1999). ”DRC and Lesotho Crises”. Lesotho Social Science Review, 5(1). 
Kadima, D (2003). “Choosing an Electoral system: Alternatives for the Post-War 
Democratic Republic of Congo”. Journal of African Elections, 2(1). 
Kelebone Maope - Leader of Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC), National Assembly 
Press Room, 10 December 2007. Maseru: Lesotho National Assembly Library. 
Khaketla, B M (1971). Lesotho 1970: An African coup under the microscope. London: C. 
Hurst and Co. 
Khoabane Theko - Principal Chief of Thaba-Bosiu, Senate Chambers. 12 December 
2007. Maseru: Lesotho National Assembly Hansard Section. 
Kimble, J (1981). Aspects of the Penetration of Capitalism into Colonial Basutoland, 
1890-1930 in Class Formation and Class Struggle: Selected proceedings of the Fourth 
Annual Conference of SAUSSC. 
Kimble, J (1999). Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule in Basutoland, 1890-1930. 
Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research. Rhodes University. 
Kingdom of Lesotho (1970). Lesotho First-Five Year Development Plan 1970/71. 
Maseru: Government Printers. 
 284
Kingdom of Lesotho (1975). Kingdom of Lesotho Second Five Year Development Plan, 
1975/76-1979/80.Vol. 1. Maseru: Government Printers. 
Kingdom of Lesotho, 30 April Budget 1994/95, Annexure 1. Ministry of Finance, Maseru: 
Office of the Public Relations Officer (PRO). 
King Moshoeshoe II Address, 12 March 1986. The Royal Palace, Maseru: The Royal 
Palace of Lesotho Archives. 
King Moshoeshoe II Letter to the Chairman of the Military Council and the Council of 
Ministers, 22 February 1990. Office of the Commander of the Army, Maseru: Lesotho 
Defence Force (LDF) Public Relations Office. 
Langa Commission of Inquiry into 1998 Elections in Lesotho. 15 October 1998. Maseru: 
Government of Lesotho. 
Leeman, B (1985). Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania: Africanist Political Movements 
in Lesotho and Azania: The Origins and History of the Basutoland Congress Party and 
the Pan Africanist Congress. Vol. 2 & 20 1780-1966. London: University of Azania. 
Leftwich, A (2000). States of Development. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Legal Notice No. 61 of 1994, Commission of Inquiry into Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). 
Maseru.  27 December: Government of Lesotho. 
Leistner, G (1983). “Lesotho and South Africa: Uneasy Relationship”. Africa Insight, Vol. 
13(3).   
Lekhoana Jonathan, Basotho National Party (BNP) Constituency Rally Kolonyama, 20 
July 2002.Office of the BNP President, Maseru: BNP Centre. 
Lengolo la Rabasotho King Letsie III- Ho Lihlooho tsa Likereke. December 1992.The 
Royal Palace of Lesotho, Maseru.The Royal Palace Archives.  
Leshele Thoahlane, Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Commissioner. 10 March 
2007. IEC Head Office: IEC Information Unit. 
Lesotho Budget Speech, 1996/97. Ministry of Finance, Maseru: Office of the Public 
Relations Officer (PRO). 
Lesotho Budget Speech, 1997/98. Ministry of Finance, Maseru: Office of the Public 
Relations Officer (PRO). 
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) - Lekhotla la Puso ea Sechaba ka Sechaba, 
Constitution (2005). Maseru: Epic Printers. 
 285
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) Parliamentary Caucus, 10 March 2006. 
Maseru: Lesotho National Assembly Hansard Section. 
Lesotho Defence Force Act No. 4. 1996. Maseru: Ministry of Defence and National 
Security. 
Lesotho Government Extra-Ordinary 1993a. Section 145. Maseru: Government Printers. 
Lesotho National Assembly Report, 2002. Maseru: Government of Lesotho.  
Lesotho National Development Corporation (2001), LNDC Assisted Manufacturing 
Companies, Mimeo, 20 September 2001. Maseru. 
Liebenow, J (1986). African Politics: Crises and Challenges. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Lihale, L (1991). “Lesotho under Military Rule: Five years”. On Vanguard, 4(1). 
Lijphart, A (1994). Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A study of Twenty-seven 
Democracies, 1945-1990. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.  
Likoti, F (2001). “Politics and the Betrayal of Electoral Mandate in Lesotho”. A paper 
presented at the National University of Lesotho. 24 November. 
Likoti, F (2005). Investigating Intra-party Democracy in Lesotho. Focus on Basutoland 
Congress party and Basotho National Party. Pretoria: EISA. 
Likoti, F (2007). Democracy and Elections in Lesotho: The Challenges of Lesotho Mixed 
Member Proportional System (MMP). Occasional Paper. Roma: National University of 
Lesotho (NUL).  
Linz, J (1990). “The Perils of Presidentialism”. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7 (4). 
Linz, J.J and Stepan, A (1996). “Towards Consolidated Democracies”. Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 7 (3). 
Linz, J, J, Stepan A (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lipset, Seymour M (1960). Political Man: The Social Bases of Democracy. Garden City: 
Doubleday. 
Lipset, S, M, Seong, K and Torres, C (1993). “A comparative analysis of the social 
requisites of democracy”. International Social Science Journal, 45. No. 136. 
 286
LNDC (2003). Investors Guide. Maseru: LNDC Information Desk. 
Lodge, T, Kadima, D and Pottie, D (2002). “Lesotho”. In Compendium of Elections in 
Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.  
Lundahl, M and Petersson, L (1991). The Dependent Economy; Lesotho and the 
Southern African Customs Union. Boulder Co: Westview Press. 
Lundahl, M, McCarthy, C and Petersson, L (2003). In the shadow of South Africa. 
London: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Maama, “Tiger”, Principal Chief of Roma, BNP Rally, Roma, 23 February 1965. Office of 
the BNP President, Maseru: BNP Centre. 
MacCartney, WJ (1973). “The Lesotho General Election of 1970: Government and 
Opposition.” A Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 8 No. 4. 
MacGregor, JC (1965). Basuto Traditions. Cape Town: 12 April, Argus. 
Machobane, LBBJ (1961). Some observations on class conflict in Basutoland. Morija: 
Morija Museum and Archives. 
Machobane, LBBJ (1990). Government and Change in Lesotho, 1800-1966: A study of 
political institutions. New York: St. Martins Press. 
Machobane, LBBJ (2001). Kings Knights. Roma: Institute of Southern African Studies 
(ISAS). 
Magazi-Rugasira, A (1994). “NGOs: The Politics of Altruism”. Africa World Review, 
May-Sept.  
Mahao, N (1994). “The predicament of Lesotho’s security in the 1990s”. In Sejanamane, 
M(ed): From Destabilization to Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa? Roma: 
Institute of Southern African Studies.  
Mahao, N (1997). “The 1993 Election and the Challenges for the Development for 
Constitutionalism in Lesotho”. Lesotho Social Science Review, Vol. 3(2). 
Mahao, N (2008). “Lesotho’s 2007 Elections”- www.findarticles.com/p/mi-qn4158/is-
20070222, 31 July. 
Mahler, R (1995). Comparative Politics: An Institutional and Cross-National Approach. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
Major General Metsing Lekhanya on Army Day, 20 January 1987.Office of the 
Commander of the Army: Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) Public Relations Office.  
 287
Makoa, K (1996). “Political Instability in Post-military Lesotho. The Crisis of the Basotho 
Nation- State?” African Security Review, Vol. 5.3. 
Makoa, F (1997). “Lesotho Voter and Elections: A Note on the 1998 General Election”. 
Lesotho Social Science Review, 3(2). 
Makoa, F (1999). “The Challenges of the South African Military Intervention in Lesotho 
after 1998 Election”. Lesotho Social Science Review, 5(1). 
Makoa, F (2002). Elections, Election Outcomes and Electoral Politics in Lesotho. 
Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.  
Maleleka, D (2007). “Diamond Mining in Lesotho”. Southern Africa Resource Watch, 
Resource Insight 4. 
Maqutu, W (1990). Contemporary Constitutional History of Lesotho. Mazenod: Mazenod 
Institute. 
Maseru Mpiti, Chief Returning Officer, 20 June 2002. Peka Resource Centre, Peka: 
Office of LCD Secretary in Peka. 
Masupha, Mamathe. Press Report.  Berea 31 May 1989. Office of the Principal Chief of 
Teya-Teyaneng, Berea: Berea District Report. 
Matekane, M (1992). Lesotho Consumer Price Index: An Evaluation of its Reliability and 
Review of Issues in inflation and Domestic Policy Responses’, Staff Occasional Paper, 
No. 8. Maseru: Central Bank of Lesotho. 
Matlosa, K (1995). “The Military after the Election: Confronting the new Democracy”. In 
Southall, R and Petlane, T (eds): Democratisation and Demilitarisation in Lesotho: The 
general election of 1993 and its aftermath.Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.  
Matlosa, K (1995). “Aid to Lesotho: Dilemmas of State Survival and Development “PhD 
Thesis. University of the Western Cape. Cape Town. 
Matlosa, K (1997). “The 1993 Elections in Lesotho and the Nature of the BCP Victory”. 
African Journal of Political Science, Vol .2 
Matlosa, K (1997). “Political Instability and Elections: A case study of Lesotho”, Lesotho 
Social Science Review, 3(2). 
Matlosa, K (1999). “Conflict and Conflict Management in Lesotho”. Lesotho Social 
Science Review, 5(1). 
 288
Matlosa, K (2000). “Electoral Systems and Political Instability in Southern Africa” Paper 
presented at the training workshop on election observation organized by SADC 
Parliamentary Forum, Windhoek, Namibia. 18-22 September. 
Matlosa, K (2003). “Political Culture and Democratic Governance in Southern Africa”. 
African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8 (1). 
Matlosa, K (2003). “Electoral System Reform, Democracy and Stability in the SADC 
Region: A Comparative Analysis”. In Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) 
Research Report. No. 1.   
Matlosa, K (2007). Watchdog. Roma. Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS). 
Matlosa, K and Pule, N (2001). Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in 
Southern Africa. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies. 
Matlosa, K (2002). “Lesotho”. In Lodge, T, Kadima, D and Pottie, D (eds). Compendium 
of Elections in Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. 
Matlosa, K and Shale, V (2006). “Impact of floor crossing on Party systems and 
Representative Democracy: The case of Lesotho. Paper prepared for a workshop on 
Impact of crossing on Party systems and Representative democracy in Southern Africa, 
co-hosted by EISA and KAS. The Vineyard Hotel. Cape Town. 15 November. 
May, J (2001). Poverty and inequality in South Africa. Report prepared for the Office of 
the Executive Deputy President and inter- Ministerial Committee for Poverty and 
Inequality. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). 
Melao ea Lerotholi (1904). Morija: Morija Museum and Archives.    
Memorandum of Settlement, 18 August 2003. Office of Prime Minister Pakalitha 
Mosisili, Maseru: Information Desk.  
Ministerial Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs Cooperation, 
Media Press. 23 March 2007. Office of the Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, Maseru: 
Information Desk. 
MoAfrika FM, Radio Broadcast, 26 November 2006. Maseru: MoAfrika Morning Drive 
Show. 
MoAfrika Radio Programme. Mafekefeke. 24 June 2007.Maseru: MoAfrika Current 
Affairs Unit. 
Moeketsi Hanyane, Basotho National Party (BNP) Constituency Rally, Stadium Area 20 
August 2003. Office of the President: Head of the Electoral Campaigns.  
 289
Mohlori, V (1958). Basutoland Records. Vol. 2. Morija: Morija Sesuto Book Depot.  
Mokhele Likate, interview on Radio Lesotho, 20 July 2002. Maseru: Directorate of 
Current Affairs. 
Mokhosi Matooane, personal interview on 20 February 2007: Fobane Ha-Mokhosi. 
Molomo, M (1999). “External Military Intervention in Lesotho’s Recent Political Crisis”. 
Lesotho Social Science Review, 5(1). 
Moore, B (1996). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in 
the making of the modern world. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Moore, H Sir, Administrative Reforms Committee Report. April 1954. Basutoland 
Records, Maseru: Basutoland Records and Archives.  
Moshoeshoe II Address, March 12 1986. Lesotho National Library, Maseru: Lesotho 
National Library Records and Publications Unit. 
Mothejoa Metsing, Minister of Communications, Science and Technology. Radio 
Lesotho Broadcast. 20 December 2007. 
Mothibe, T (1998). A Modern History of Lesotho since 1968. Staff Occasional Paper. 
History Department. Roma: National University of Lesotho (NUL).  
Mothibe, T (1999). “The Military and Democracy in Lesotho”. Lesotho Social Science 
Review, 5 (1). 
Motseki Motikoe, Press Conference, 26 January 2007.Maseru: Lesotho Times. 
Mphanya, N (2004). History of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)-Lekhotla la 
Mahatamoho. Morija: Morija Museum and Archives. 
Mpho Malie, Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) Rally, Peka. 27 January 2007. 
Munck, G (2001) “Democratic Consolidation”. Forthcoming in Encyclopaedia of 
Democratic Thought. Barry, P and Joe Fowerakers(eds). London: Routledge. 
National Assembly Act 1992. Maseru: Government Printers. 
Naumann, E (2002). An analysis of the Spatial Distribution of the Clothing  and Textile 
Industry in SADC, Development  Policy  Research Unit (DPRU), Working Paper, No. 
02/66.  Cape Town: School of Economics, University of Cape Town. 
Nel, P (2005). “Democratization and the dynamics of the income distribution in low and 
middle income countries”. Politikon, 32 (1). 
 290
Neocosmos, M (2002). “The politics of national elections in Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland”. In Cowen, M and Laakso, L (eds). Multi-party elections in Africa. London: 
James Currey.  
Ngqaleni, M (1991). “Review of Lesotho’s Agricultural Policies and Strategies for the 
1990s”. In Santho, S and Sejanamane, M (eds): Southern Africa After Apartheid, 
Prospects for the inner periphery in the 1990s. Harare: SAPES Books. 
Nylen, W (2000). “The making of a loyal opposition. The Workers Party (PT) and the 
Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil”. In Kingstone, P and Power, T (eds): Democratic 
Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Processes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
O’Donnell, G A (1996a). Illusions about consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 2. 
Odendaal, S (2000). Centre for Conflict Resolution. In ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za Lesotho 
reports/Lesotho reports.html, 10 June 2008. 
Office of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, 18 August 2003.Official Reports Unit, 
Maseru: Information Desk.  
Olayeye, W (2004). Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties in Lesotho. Pretoria: 
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA).  
Oliver, W H (1997). “Urgent Legal Opinion”. 12 June (mimeo). The Royal Palace of 
Lesotho Archives Section. 
Orders in Council, February 1884 Part II. Morija: Morija Museum and Archives.  
Poverty Reduction Strategy of Lesotho (2000). Maseru: Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning.  
Poverty Reduction Strategy of Lesotho (2004/5). Maseru: Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning. 
Powell, G (1982). “Social Progress and Liberal Democracy”. In G. Almond, M Chodorow 
and R. Pearce (eds), Progress and its Discontents. Berkeley: University of California. 
Press Statement by His Excellency the Chairman of the Military Council and the Council 
of Ministers, 30 April 1991. Office of the Chairman of the Military Council  and Council of 
Ministers: Lesotho National Library Records and Publication Unit. 
Prime Minister’s Statement on the Banning of the Communist Literature from Lesotho, 6 
February 1970. Lesotho National Library, Maseru: Lesotho National Library Records 
and Publication Unit . 
 291
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) Rally, Teya-
Teyaneng. 24 January 2007. 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 11 March  2003. 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, Seboka sa Boetapele, 26-28/09/2008. Manthabiseng 
Convention Centre.  
Proclamation 2B of 1884, Regulation 1. Maseru: Basutoland Records and Archives Unit.  
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernado Limongi 
(1996). “What makes democracies endure”? Journal of Democracy, 7(1). 
Public Records Office, 417/411. No. 1138, 1905. Maseru: Basutoland Records and 
Archives Unit.  
Pule, N (1999). “Power Struggles in the BCP” Lesotho Social Science Review, 5(1). 
Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 11 September 1998. Seboping: Directorate of Current Affairs. 
Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 22 March 2007.Seboping: Directorate of Current Affairs. 
Reynolds, A and Reilly, B (1997). The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System 
Design. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance.  
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events Leading to the Political 
Disturbances which occurred in Lesotho during the period between 1st July, to 30 
November 1998, November 2001. Maseru: Government of Lesotho Printers.  
Report of the Commission on Native Laws and Customs of the Basuto, 1873. Maseru: 
Lesotho National Library. 
Ritter, E (1955). Shaka Zulu. London: Panther. 
Rueschemeyer, D, Hubert Stephens, E and Stephens, J (1992). Capitalist Development 
and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rugege, S (1993) “The Struggle over the Restructuring of the Basotho or Chiefs Courts 
in Lesotho, 1903-1950”. Lesotho Law Journal, Vol.3. 
Rule, S (2000). Electoral Territoriality in Southern Africa. Ashgate: Aldershot. 
Sanders, P (1965). Chief Electoral Officer. The Basutoland General Election of 1965. 
Sanders Report. Unpublished Draft: Basutoland Government Gazette, CCXIX[3442}. 
 292
Schedler, A (1998). “What is Democratic Consolidation”? Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 9 (2). 
Schedler, A (2001). “Measuring Democratic Consolidation”. Studies in Comparative 
International Development, Vol. 36. 
Schmitter, P (1994). “Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy”. Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 5. No. 2. 
Schumpeter, J (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Sechaba Consultants (1995). Lesotho’s Long Journey: Hard Choices at the Crossroads. 
A comprehensive overview and political development with a view to the future. Maseru: 
Sechaba Consultants.  
Sechaba Consultants (2000). Poverty and Livelihoods in Lesotho: More than a mapping 
exercise. Maseru: Sechaba Consultants. 
Sejanamane, M (1996). ”The Lesotho Crisis and Regional Intervention”. Southern 
Review Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM), 9(5). 
Sekatle, P (1995). “Disputing Electoral Legitimacy: The BNP’s Challenge to the Result”. 
In Southall, R and Petlane, T (eds): Democratisation and Demilitarisation in Lesotho. 
Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
Sekatle, P (1997). “The formation of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy: Implications 
for the 1998 Election”. Lesotho Social Science Review, 5(1). 
Sekatle, P (1999). “The Lesotho General Election of 1998”. Lesotho Social Science 
Review, 5(1). 
Selinyane, N (1997). “Civil Society and Electoral Politics and the Retrieval of 
Democracy in Lesotho”. Lesotho Social Science Review, Vol. 3 No. 2. 
Shaw, P (1983). Background Information Relevant to Lesotho Poverty Profile, Mimeo, 
may 17, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Sheddick, Y. G (1953). The Southern Sotho. London: International African Institute. 
Shugart, M and Wattenberg, M (2001). Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of 
Both Worlds? New York: Oxford University Press.    
Sixeshe, D (1984). But Give Him an Army Too: Leabua Jonathan, a Biography. Maseru: 
Mokorotlo Publications. 
Smith, E (1939). The Mabilles of Basutoland. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
 293
South African Communist Party (SACP) (1998). “Lesotho Political Players – All are to 
Blame”. The Gazette, 7 October. 
Southall, R (1984). ”Trade Unions and the Internal Working Class in Lesotho”. South 
African Labour Bulletin, 10(3).   
Southall, R (1995). “The Candidates in the 1993 Election”. In Southall, R and Petlane, T 
(eds): Democratisation and Demilitarisation in Lesotho: The general election of 1993 
and its aftermath Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
Southall, R and Petlane, T (1995). Democratisation and Demilitarisation in Lesotho: The 
general election of 1993 and its aftermath. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
Southall, R (2003). “Unlikely Success: South Africa and Lesotho’s election of 2002”. 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 14(2). 
South African Development Report (SADC) (2007). Lesotho Report. Assessment 
Report of the Ministerial Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.     
Maseru: SADC Secretariat. 
Spence, J (1968). Lesotho: The Politics of Dependence. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
Standard Bank Lesotho Report (2007). Maseru. 
Stepan, A (1988). Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Stevens, R P (1967). Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. The Former High Commission 
Territories in Southern Africa. New York, Washington and London: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc. 
Strom, G (1978). Development and Dependence in Lesotho, the Enclave of South 
Africa. Scandanavia: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 
Sunderg, J (1997). “Candidate Choice and Party Proportionality”. In Reynolds, A and 
Reily, B (eds). The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral system Design. 
Stockholm. Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Tekle, A (1998). “Election and Electoral Systems in Africa: purposes, problems and 
prospects”. International Commission of Jurists Review, No. 60. 
Thebe Motebang MP, Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) General Conference, 23 
January 2000. Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) Newspaper Clippings. Maseru: 
Epic Printers. 
 294
The Constitution of Lesotho (1993). Maseru: Government Printers. 
Thoahlane, L (2006). “Welcome Remarks at the Occasion of the Symposium on Political 
Tolerance and Conflict Transformation”. Maseru. Transformation Resource Centre- 
Political Desk. 
Thomas Thabane, South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Morning Live, 10 
January 2007. 
Thomas Thabane, 21 February 2007. ABC Media Conference. Lakeside Hotel   
Tlakula, P A, Molokomme, S and Jordan, P (2003). “Panel contribution”. Electoral 
Models for South Africa: Reflections and Options. Seminar Report. Johannesburg: 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation. 
Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) (2003). Maseru: TRC Research and Publication 
Unit. 
Tylden, G (1950). The Rise of the Basuto. Cape Town: Juta. 
Understanding of Measures and Procedures Relating to the Restoration of 
Constitutional Order in Lesotho, 14 September 1994. Maseru: Government of Lesotho. 
UNDP (1997). Human Development Report. New York: UNDP. 
UNDP (1998). Human Development Report, New York: UNDP. 
UNDP (1999). Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 
UNDP (2002). Human Development Report: Lesotho. Maseru: UNDP. 
UNDP (2007). Human Development Report. New York: UNDP. 
United Nations Human Development Report (2000). Trends in Human Development. 
New York: UNDP. 
Van de Walle, N (2002). “Africa’s Range of Regimes”. Journal of Democracy, 13(2). 
Van Wky, A J (1967). Lesotho. A Political Study. Pretoria: Africa Institute. 
Valenzuela, J S (1992). Democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings: notion, 
process and facilitating conditions. In Mainwaring, O’Donnell, GA and Valenzuela, J.S 
(eds): Issues in democratic consolidation: the new South American democracies in 
comparative perspective. South Bend: University of Notre Dame. 
Wamba-dia-Wamba, E (1994). “Poverty and Political Participation”. SAPEM, 7(10). 
 295
Ward, M (1967). Economic Independence for Lesotho? Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 5(3). 
Weisfelder, R (1969). “Defining National Purpose in Lesotho”. Papers in International 
Studies, Africa Series .No. 3. Athens. 
Weisfelder, R (1971). The Basuto Monarchy: A spent force or a dynamic political factor. 
Denver: African Studies Association. 
Weisfelder, R (1974). “Defining National Purpose: The Roots of factionalism in 
Lesotho”, PhD Dissertation. Harvard University. 
Weisfelder, R (1979). “Lesotho: Changing Patterns of Dependence”. In O’Meara, P and 
Carter, G (eds): Southern Africa. The Continuing Crisis. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press.  
Weisfelder, R (1992). “Lesotho and the Inner Periphery in the New South Africa”. 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30. No. 4  
Weisfelder, R (1997). Historical Dictionary of Lesotho. Roma: Institute of Southern 
African Studies (ISAS).  
Weisfelder, R (1999). Political Contention in Lesotho 1952-1965. Maseru: National 
University of Lesotho (NUL). Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS). 
Wellings, P (1983). What a waste of Manna: Aid, Industry and the Public Accounts of 
Lesotho. Staff Paper No. 1 Durban: Development Studies Unit. University of Natal.  
Widdicombe, J (1895). In the Lesuto: A sketch of mission life. London: Society for the 
Promotion of Christian Knowledge. 
Woodward, C (1982). “Not a Complete Solution: Assessing the Long Years of Foreign 
Aid to Lesotho”. Africa Insight, 12(3). 
World Bank (1987a). Lesotho Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 6671-LSO. 
Washington DC. 
World Bank (1987b). World Development Report 1987, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
World Bank (1998). African Development Indicators, 1998-99. Washington DC. 
World Bank (2005). African Development Indicators, 2005. Washington DC. 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2831.htm, 25 March 2009. 
 296
www. iec.org.ls/online/ NAER_Seat_ Allocation.pdf, 10 June 0 2008.  
 
(2)  Newspapers  
Bloemfontein Friend, 1959. 
Defence News 1996. 
Independent Mail, 03/09/1998. 
Lentsoe la Basotho, 27 November 1993. 
Lesotho News Agency (LENA), 18 August 2007. 
Lesotho News Agency (LENA), 04/08/2008.  
Lesotho Times, 9.2. 1968 
Lesotho Today, 13 January 1994. 
Makatolle, Vol. 3, No. 7. January 1969. 
Makatolle, Vol. 8, No. 51. December 1969 
Makatolle, 30 March 1994. 
Makatolle, 13 May 1994. 
Mirror, 27 May 1991. 
Mirror, 6.3.92. 
MoAfrika, 8 March 1996.  
MoAfrika, 18 July 1997. 
MoAfrika, 20/09/98. 
MoAfrika, 18 March 2001. 
MoAfrika, 14 August 2002. 
MoAfrika, 14 July 2005. 
MoAfrika, 10 June 2005. 
MoAfrika, 18 November 2006. 
 297
Moeletsi oa Basotho, 30 October 1988. 
Moeletsi oa Basotho, 22 September 1991. 
Moeletsi oa Basotho, 22 September 1992. 
Moeletsi oa Basotho, 14 November 1993. 
Moeletsi oa Basotho, 19 April 1995. 
Moeletsi oa Basotho, 13 June 2005. 
Moeletsi oa Basotho, 4 December 2006. 
Mohlabani, Vol. 1. 11 December 1955. 
Mohlabani, Vol.12. No.1.1967. 
Mohlanka, 23 August 1997 
Mololi, 14 September 2000. 
Mololi, 12 December 2006 
Mopheme, 8.3. 94. 
Mopheme, 26.8. 94 
Mopheme, 23-30 April 1996. 
Nketu oa Mara, Vol. 3. January 1967. 
Nketu oa Mara, Vol.6. February 1970. 
Nonyana, 14 May 2001. 
Nonyana, 14 March 2005. 
Public Eye, 01 October 2004. 
Public Eye, 15 November 2006. 
Public Eye, 17 March 2007. 
Public Eye, 23 March 2007. 
Public Eye, 30 March 2007. 
Public Eye, 11 April 2007. 
 298
Public Eye, 10 May 2008. 
Public Eye, 17 June 2007 
The Citizen, 6 March 1986. 
The Christian Science, Monitor, 31 January 1986. 
The Star, 6 May 1988. 
The Star, 4 September 1998. 
The Times, 22 January 1986. 
Voix du Basutoland, 1964. 
Work for Justice. (1992) No. 35.  
Work for Justice. (2007) No. 76.  
 
 
